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Summary 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of how citizenship is constructed, sensed 
and practiced by people who have experienced violent conflict and displacement. In the Acholi 
region of Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) created large-scale insecurity and mass-
displacement between the late 1980s until the region returned to stability in 2006. In this 
thesis I compare two conflict-affected locations in the Acholi region with one non-affected 
location in Lango region. The overall proposition of this study is that the experience of 
protracted conflict and displacement leads to a lack of a sense of citizenship and to diminished 
forms of citizen engagement, due to the limited opportunity for learning and experiencing the 
practice of citizenship.  
 
I used qualitative research methods during ten months of fieldwork in 2010. For an analysis of 
people’s sense of citizenship, I studied how people perceive and feel themselves to be 
members of the wider political community; as members of the Acholi tribe and as citizens of 
Uganda. For the analysis of the practice of citizenship I studied various forms of citizen 
engagement: with local authorities, in community institutions, for development and for 
accountability purposes.  
 
Numerous challenges to citizen participation exist across Uganda. These include a lack of 
knowledge about the system and lack of self-confidence, barriers associated with the 
micropolitics of participation, and democratic deficits of the overall political system. However, 
underlying reasons for non-participation can vary. In Acholi, some of these reasons are 
attributable to people’s experiences during the war.  
 
I conclude that protracted conflict diminishes a sense of citizenship and radically changes the 
social environment in which active citizenship is learnt, through the narrowing and 
securitisation of institutions and the public sphere. The sense and practice that exist in the 
post-conflict situation are therefore characterised by certain ideas, perceptions, emotions and 
behaviours that were developed during the conflict. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 The Acholi experience of conflict and citizenship 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of how citizenship is constructed, sensed 
and practised in contexts of violent conflict and displacement. The study makes use of ideas 
about (citizen) agency developed in the field of citizenship and citizen participation, ethnicity, 
conflict studies, and forced migration. It aims to advance these academic debates by looking at 
their intersection in one particular post-conflict setting: the Acholi region in Uganda, the 
region that borders South Sudan.  
 
In the Acholi region, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has created large-scale insecurity, mass-
displacement and thousands of victims from the late 1980s until the region returned to 
stability in 2006. This thesis provides a historically contextualised account of how the Acholi 
people lived through different episodes of the LRA war, which includes a period of 
displacement into camps. It unpacks the conflict into different features and shows how these 
set in motion a series of changes in local institutions and the public sphere, with implications 
for citizenship.  This contributes to an understanding of how the Acholi sense and practise 
their citizenship in the post-conflict situation. 
 
At the time of research in 2010, the Acholi region was in the early stages of post-conflict 
recovery. Rebel activities in the region had stopped after a series of peace negotiations 
between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, which had taken place in Juba, South Sudan, 
from 2006 to 2008. A final peace agreement was never signed, but the negotiations had 
resulted in partial peace agreements, after which security in northern Uganda improved 
significantly. In response to this development, both the Government of Uganda and aid 
organisations had transitioned from humanitarian aid to recovery programmes. Challenges 
emerged for local state institutions resuming their functions, having to respond to the needs of 
an impoverished population. Moreover, they had to catch up with the institutional changes the 
rest of Uganda had gone through over the last twenty years.  
 
When stability returned, the Acholi people gradually started to leave the displacement camps, 
which had existed for five to ten years. They faced many challenges in the return areas, but 
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also proved to be very resilient. Many of the livelihood-related problems were visible: lack of 
seeds, tools, and difficult access to services like education and health care. Other problems 
were less visible. Some of these related to the memories of the LRA war and how they shape 
the Acholi’s perceptions of themselves as citizens and their forms of citizen engagement. 
Beneath the surface, past experiences of the war may have shaped people’s current ideas and 
behaviour - as family members, as community members in their localities, as members of the 
Acholi ethnic group, but also as citizens.  
 
The Acholi lived in fear for many years and felt abandoned by a government that failed to 
protect them. This came on top of what was already a problematic relationship between the 
incumbent government and the region. In fact, the alienation of the Acholi region started long 
before the LRA conflict. Then during the war the Acholi experienced insecurity due to both the 
LRA and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which disrupted social and local political 
institutions. In the displacement camps, which were located within the war zone, they became 
recipients of relief as internally displaced persons (IDP), a status with different sets of effective 
entitlements from those of ‘ordinary’ citizens. In the camps the Acholi experienced parallel 
forms of authority: that of the state, of camp leadership, of humanitarian actors, and 
customary leadership - a myriad of actors and power relations the camp residents had to 
navigate their way through. At present they are ‘returnees’, encouraged to be self-sufficient 
and to participate in recovery programmes. The Government of Uganda and aid agencies 
expect the Acholi to participate in Uganda’s economy and political system as ordinary citizens, 
including the multi-layered decentralised governance system of Local Councils (LCs).   
 
This is of great importance to the functioning of a local democracy in the present day. Will the 
Acholi participate as citizens to the same extent and in the same ways as other citizens of 
Uganda who have not experienced war? The central question of this study is: In the case of 
the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, how does the experience of protracted conflict and 
forced displacement affect how citizenship is sensed, constructed and practised? The study 
thus establishes the connections between the past and the present, looking at how citizenship 
unfolded during and after the conflict.  
 
This thesis contributes to empirical knowledge of how citizen engagement unfolds in post-
conflict settings. This is important, as citizen engagement is promoted by certain (post)conflict 
recovery interventions with the objective of repairing social relations within society and 
between society and the state. My study contributes to academic debates on citizenship as 
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participation by unpacking the features of this conflict and relating them to what I have 
termed the sense and the practice of citizenship. My thesis furthermore contributes to 
scholarly debates on the types of agency that evolve during conflict and displacement. Finally, 
with this study I add to debates on how social and political institutions change during conflict 
by identifying how this has implications for learning active citizenship. I will show also that an 
analysis of the perceptions of the public sphere is important for understanding citizen 
engagement. 
  
In this chapter I explain the rationale of this study. In section 1.2 I present the bodies of theory 
that have informed my research. I discuss how the concept of citizenship is used in this study. I 
then explain how I used the literatures on conflict studies and forced migration studies and say 
how these may enhance our understanding of citizen engagement. Next I articulate the gap in 
existing knowledge about citizen engagement in (post)conflict settings. This leads to the focus 
of my thesis: in section 1.3 I explain the contribution of my study and present my central 
research question and my overall proposition. I summarise my key findings in section 1.4. In 
the last section I explain the structure of this thesis and the focus of each chapter.  
 
1.2 Framing the debate: active citizenship and conflict. 
1.2.1 An active notion of citizenship 
 
Distinct theoretical schools agree on the definition of citizenship as membership of a political 
community (E. F. Cohen, 2009; 2000). The theoretical foundation on which this study is based 
is an understanding of citizenship as a status and as active practice, as developed in the 
participatory democracy school (Fung & Wright, 2003).  
 
Conventional liberal understandings of citizenship take a legalistic approach, which emphasises 
its legal status and a set of rights that protect the freedoms and liberties of the individual. 
Critiques of this approach question the notion of the citizen as a passive bearer of rights and, 
pointing out that generations of rights have come about through social struggles, hold that 
citizenship cannot be separated from participation (Delanty, 2000). In the communitarian 
(Selznick, 1992), civic republican (Putnam, 1993), radical democracy (Keane, 1988; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985) and participatory democracy (Fung & Wright, 2003) approaches, the notion of 
active citizenship is developed, each approach differing on the balance between rights and 
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duties, and the purpose of participation. Scholars point out that to conceptualise citizenship as 
participation an understanding of agency is required, as this is the prerequisite of 
participation: ‘Citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the 
political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents’ (R. Lister, 
2003, p. 37). They also point out that the perception of the self as a citizen, one’s citizen 
identity, and the practice of citizen engagement are interdependent (R. Lister, 2003).  
 
An important characteristic of the participatory democracy school is that identity is considered 
to be constitutive of citizenship. This means that a sense of identity shapes engagement (Isin & 
Wood, 1999). A citizenship identity is one identity that people possibly possess and it may or 
may not function as a basis for citizen agency. Particularly in the African context, people are 
members of more than one political community: of the state and of their ethnic group 
(Ndegwa, 1997). Membership comes with a set of rights and entitlements, as well as duties, 
regarding their respective political communities, and with a set of political relationships with 
their fellow members (E. F. Cohen, 2009). Various authors have argued that people have 
differentiated attitudes towards these political communities and therefore engage differently 
with them (Ekeh, 1975; Ndegwa, 1997).  
 
The relationship between ethnic identity and action, engagement and mobilisation is widely 
debated. Rational choice scholars emphasise the instrumental use of ethnicity to further 
individual interests and acquire power and wealth (J. D Fearon, 2006). Social constructivists, on 
the other hand, hold the view that ethnic identity is constructed in the process of interaction 
between groups, and state that rational accounts of ethnicity cannot explain why people 
adhere to communal ideas (Kaufman, 2006). According to this theory individuals do not make 
decisions in isolation, but are influenced by their identities and their relationship to their 
community (Delanty, 2000).  
 
In the context of Africa, debates on citizenship and identity have contributed to understanding 
mechanisms through which (ethnic) populations are excluded. An emphasis on autochthony as 
the basis of citizenship has led to exclusion, marginalisation and social tensions in many 
countries. Processes of ‘adverse incorporation’ experienced by certain groups often started 
during the colonial regime (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007a). For this thesis, understandings of ethnic 
identity and citizen identity are relevant, given the multi-ethnic character of Uganda and the 
framing of the conflict in ethnic terms such as ‘the Acholi war’ by state actors (Mwenda, 2010). 
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As many have argued before me, and as this thesis confirms, the LRA conflict deepened the 
alienation of the Acholi from the state and furthered the process of adverse incorporation. 
 
My definition of citizenship is informed by the work of scholars who emphasise an agency 
approach to citizenship and who understand citizenship as status and as practice (Kabeer, 
2005; R. Lister, 2003). It is also informed by the idea that a notion of identity shapes agency 
and that a citizen identity is important for citizen agency. There is some evidence that the 
memories and experiences  of a past war shape present identities and behaviour (Theidon, 
2003; Wood, 2003). However, the issue of how citizenship evolves in (post)conflict settings still 
remains underexplored.  
 
This study looks at how conflict affected the Acholi’s sense and practice of citizenship through 
various mechanisms. The sense of citizenship encompasses how people feel as citizens, their 
self-consciousness of their citizen identity, and how they perceive themselves as citizens in 
relation to others and in relation to the state. For Ugandans, perceptions of ‘others’ are 
governed by notions of one’s own ethnic group and ideas about other ethnic groups. I define 
the practice of citizenship as the individual and collective actions undertaken by people to 
shape and enact their rights, and influence the politics and governing institutions of society 
that affect their lives. Here I mean the institutions of both the political and the social spheres, 
and define institutions as the formal and informal rules and conventions that govern society 
(North, 1990). The practice cannot be separated from the sense, because a sense of citizenship 
is also developed through participation and actions, and interactions with others. Subscribing 
to the notion that people are members of the political community of the state as well as their 
ethnic group, the Acholi were thus affected by the conflict as Acholi and as citizens of Uganda.  
 
1.2.2 Everyday forms of citizen engagement  
 
The question of when and how citizens engage is not limited to citizenship studies. As I will 
describe in detail in Chapter 2, scholars have described a spectrum of forms of engagement 
and state-society relations: from rejection to resistance, from contestation to critical and 
constructive engagement. Many of these scholars have focused on highly visible forms of 
mobilisation that involved the masses and have related revolutions to processes of state 
formation (Moore, 1966; Paige, 1975; Popkin, 1970; Skocpol, 1982; Wolf, 1969). These scholars 
used various explanatory frameworks: the peasant economy (Scott, 1976), rational choice 
19 
 
(Popkin, 1970), class relations (Moore, 1966; Paige, 1975) and structural explanations (Skocpol, 
1982). Other scholars have analysed a broader range of the ways in which citizens express 
their discontent with the state through contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; 
Tilly, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). A contentious politics framework continues the emphasis on 
mass mobilisation and overt, often disruptive and violent, practices of engagement, while 
presupposing the presence of government (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).  
 
My work follows that of Scott (1985), who argues there is a ‘landscape of political activity’ 
between revolution and quiescence. The approaches that focus on revolutions, riots and mass 
protests ignore the everyday negotiations with forms of authority and the small instances of 
engagement in politics that matter in people’s lives. My study uses ideas developed by 
Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Véron (2005), who have demonstrated that state – society 
relations can be understood in the moments and interactions when people ‘see the state’.  
 
In this study I extend a perspective on citizen engagement from a focus on large-scale 
collective action to a focus on everyday forms of engagement: engagement with local state 
institutions and social institutions in the community, whether through formal or informal 
channels. I am open to analysing instances of rioting and protesting when they occur. These 
instances are ‘ruptures’ in the day-to-day practice and tell us about people’s normative ideas 
about a relationship, because they indicate when a social contract was broken. In the context 
of Uganda I did not expect to find many instances of violent mass-mobilisation. My focus, 
therefore, is on how people engage with public authority and engage in the public sphere in 
everyday life. As this engagement is informed by how people see their citizenship, I need to 
start with a deconstruction of the meaning of Acholi citizenship.  
 
1.2.3 Citizenship and the experience of violent conflict 
 
A citizen identity and expressions of citizenship are shaped by many contextual factors such as 
history, process of state formation and democratisation, but also culture (Cornwall, Robins, & 
Von Lieres, 2011). The LRA conflict and period of forced displacement form important episodes 
in the construction of Acholi citizenship. I use the term ‘construction’ to imply that citizenship 
is always in motion, and that historical events and processes shape citizenship, its meaning and 
relevance. It is not a linear process with a beginning or ending. Citizenship (Delanty, 2009) is 
constructed by people but its meaning can also be imposed by other actors, such as the state. I 
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will deconstruct empirically the meaning of citizenship for the Acholi and how conflict led to a 
destruction or reconfiguration of aspects that the Acholi defined as crucial for their citizenship.  
 
My understanding of ‘conflict’ is informed by Vigh (2006) and Nordstrom (1997), who 
emphasise that the experience of violent conflict does not simply mean the experience of 
violent acts, but is also a particular context comprising structures and processes. Nordstrom 
(1997) terms this a ‘warscape’: a background against which social-political relations and 
institutions develop. Vigh (2006) describes it as a social terrain, and as a volatile environment 
that is constantly ‘in flux’, in which instability has become a stable fact. For a long period of 
time, the situation in the Acholi region and its displacement camps formed such a warscape. 
Yet the construction of Acholi citizenship started long before the war, with the colonial regime 
having a profound impact on this process. Traumatic episodes such as war can result in a 
situation in which the experience and practice of citizenship are reconfigured in a relatively 
short time. 
   
To understand how citizenship unfolded in this context I use various bodies of literature: 
conflict studies, citizen participation, and forced migration. Conflict studies demonstrate that 
citizens develop various strategies in order to cope with volatile, complex situations. Micro-
analysis of conflict situations shows how people adjust to conflict to maintain their livelihoods 
(Justino, 2008, 2009). They make maximum use of the opportunities available in the social 
order produced by war (Utas, 2005). Vigh (2006) uses ‘social navigation’ as a concept to 
describe how people deal with insecurity and multiple authorities in warzones. Agents ‘move’ 
based on their evaluation of their past experience and knowledge, their present environment 
and opportunities therein, and ideas about future developments, while the environment itself 
is continuously in flux, unstable and dangerous.  
 
However, these conceptualisations predominantly relate to how people survive in a conflict 
setting - forms of coping agency. Of late, other scholars have started to distinguish types of 
agency in conflict settings, enhancing understanding of how citizens live through conflict 
(Barter, 2012; C. Moser & Horn, 2012). I follow Lister (2003), who states that citizen agency 
requires an act or issue to be brought into the public realm. In my understanding of citizenship 
these acts or issues may concern a relationship to the state, but also the sub-national social 
setting and the ethnic community, and the politics, forms of authority and decision-making 
that exist within both spheres.  
 
21 
 
A subset of the literature on citizenship looks at the particular challenges to citizen 
participation in conflict and violence-prone settings (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Pearce, 2007; 
Pearce, McGee, & Wheeler, 2011; Wheeler, 2005). This literature emphasises that violent 
conflict affects citizens as well as the state and its institutions, and the interfaces between 
them. It affects citizens as actors, individually and collectively, as well as the spaces where they 
exercise their citizenship (Pearce, 2007). The public sphere, the realm of socio-political 
interactions and discourses, is often curtailed by violence. Both conflict studies literature and 
the literature on citizenship and violence point to the presence of (armed) non-state actors, 
which compete for authority and challenge the legitimacy of the state. Non-state actors may 
take over state functions and become mediators between citizens and the state, but often lack 
accountability towards citizens (Pearce, McGee, & Wheeler, 2011; Wheeler, 2011). This implies 
that citizens develop relationships with a range of actors in (post)conflict settings and that 
their engagement with state institutions should be seen in this light. 
 
Finally, I use the literature on forced migration to study how the Acholi experienced the 
displacement camps. I felt this was relevant, because the camps were a key feature of the LRA 
conflict (Dolan, 2009) and lasted for a number of years. The majority of the Acholi were 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as the camps were located in Uganda. The literature on 
displacement discusses many of the themes that figure in citizenship debates and conflict 
studies, but specifically for displaced people: citizenship and agency of the displaced, rights, 
and governance. This literature speaks directly to how the experience of displacement affects 
a sense of citizenship (Nyers, 2006) and emphasises the forms of agency exercised by the 
displaced in response to their situation (Malkki, 1996; Turner, 2006). Most of this literature 
concentrates on the experience of refugees, not of IDPs. 
 
Thus, while there is some discussion in the literature on coping agency in response to conflict 
and displacement, a thorough understanding of how citizen agency evolves is still lacking. I 
elaborate this argument in Chapter 3. Conflict studies literature has generated important 
insights from which it is possible to theorise about citizen engagement. Despite the 
devastating effects of conflict there are also social structures and practices that persist. Violent 
conflict transforms rather than destroys forms of social and political organisation (Justino, 
2012; Pouligny, 2005; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004; 2005; 2008a). This has implications 
for citizen engagement, because the experience of citizen engagement is often gained through 
local institutions. The literature on forced displacement describes how displacement leads to a 
lack of sense of citizenship. But this literature does not explicitly interrogate the relationship 
22 
 
between the sense and practice of citizenship, and often limits the scope of the inquiry to the 
period of displacement, whereas my study will take people’s histories into account.  
 
1.3 Focus of this study 
 
In this thesis I show that the past experience of violent conflict affects the sense and practice 
of citizenship of the Acholi people, by unpacking the LRA conflict into its different features and 
studying how these features affect the sense and the practice of citizenship, and the relation 
between the two. Through historical analysis and by examining the interaction between the 
sense and the practice of citizenship I contribute to an understanding of how citizen agency 
evolves during conflict, thus addressing the gap identified above. The study furthermore 
contributes to understanding the practice of citizenship after conflict by taking into account 
the full spectrum of forms of engagement and by its focus on the everyday forms of 
engagement.  
 
The central question for this research is: In the case of the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, 
how does the experience of protracted conflict and forced displacement affect how citizenship 
is sensed, constructed and practised? My overall proposition is that the experience of 
protracted conflict and displacement leads to a lack of a sense of citizenship and to diminished 
forms of citizen engagement, due to the limited opportunities for learning active citizenship. 
After elaborating the bodies of theory in Chapter 2, in the next chapter I formulate concrete 
propositions about how the sense and practice of citizenship evolved in Acholi during and after 
the conflict.  
 
Using a comparative case-study design, the thesis describes the construction of citizenship in 
two conflict-affected areas in Acholi and in one non-affected area in Lango. The justification of 
the selection of research locations and the range of qualitative research methods used will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 3. I use an actor-oriented approach to describe the perceptions 
and forms of citizen engagement by individual citizens, while also looking at forms of collective 
agency. The study pays attention to variation in gender and age groups. In this thesis I highlight 
differences in their citizenship experience where relevant.  
 
As I will explain in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3, for the sense of citizenship I use key 
aspects that the Acholi themselves identify as important for their membership of the wider 
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political community and of Uganda as a country, and how they relate to citizens in those 
regions where conflict did not occur. For the analysis of practices of citizenship I study various 
forms of citizen engagement. I look at the everyday interactions between citizens and local 
leaders, the various ways people engage in local level decision-making about services and 
material aspects of development in their area, voice for accountability purposes, and forms of 
community organisation.  For both the sense and the practice of citizenship I adopt a historical 
approach to examine how they develop over time. The analysis concentrates on whether 
changes can be explained by particular features of the conflict.  
 
The conceptualisation of citizenship as the membership of a political community (Delanty, 
2009) and being constituted of a status and a practice (Kabeer, 2005; Lister, 2003) informs the 
scope and boundaries of my study. A focus on the everyday practice of citizenship implies 
observing forms of engagement within a particular location, staying long enough for a deep 
understanding. I therefore limited my fieldwork to the three rural locations and did not look at 
the large Acholi diaspora and the Acholi communities that live in urban areas, who no doubt 
have a different citizenship experience. It was not feasible to include engagement at the 
national level, like with Members of Parliament. Findings about the national level are therefore 
limited to perceptions of these institutions and their performance.  
 
I focus on the Acholi and Langi as citizens of Uganda and as members of their respective tribes, 
while taking into account differentiated experiences caused by gender and age. It was not 
feasible to study other forms of membership of other possible communities; the state and the 
ethnic group are considered the most relevant. Finally, my historical approach was limited to 
modern history. My fieldwork concentrated on post-colonial regimes and particularly on 
citizenship since the NRA came to power in 1986. For the earlier history I relied on historical 
sources and other studies that have carefully documented the history of ‘Acholiness’ 
(Finnström, 2003).   
 
1.4 Main findings  
 
The findings show that the certain experiences from the conflict and the period of 
displacement continue to play a role today, in the post-conflict phase. These experiences 
inform the engagement of the Acholi with state institutions and in community structures. My 
main argument is that the war, as it was experienced in rural areas, eroded crucial aspects of 
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citizenship amongst the Acholi and undermined a sense of citizen agency. It did so by limiting 
people’s experience with ordinary state institutions, and by curtailing spaces for (political) 
socialisation where skills for effective voice and citizenship could be learnt.  
 
Numerous challenges to citizen participation exist across Uganda, affecting both citizens who 
have experienced conflict and those who have not. These factors have been identified by 
others and are corroborated in this thesis. They include a lack of knowledge about the system, 
a lack of self-confidence, and barriers associated with the micropolitics of participation 
(Harriss, Stokke, & Törnquist, 2004). In Acholi, additional challenges to citizen engagement 
exist. Certain challenges are attributable to people’s experiences during the war, and some 
attributes of the conflict have reinforced ‘ordinary’ barriers to citizen participation.   
 
The thesis shows that certain features of the conflict shaped the Acholi experience of 
citizenship and how it evolved during the war: displacement into camps, the presence of 
armed actors, the experience of violence and atrocities, and the role played by the state in 
response to the war. These mechanisms set in motion a series of changes in the public sphere 
and in social and political institutions, causing a lack of a sense of citizenship and creating a 
situation in which the Acholi were unable to build up experience of the practice of citizenship 
during the years of the conflict. As a result, forms of citizen engagement are different in Acholi 
compared with Lango.  
 
At present, there are fewer relationships between the Acholi and their leaders, and less 
awareness about possible channels of engagement, than in Lango.  A persisting fear of the 
state and suspicion of the public sphere limit engagement, particularly citizen engagement to 
hold local leaders accountable. For older citizens, local social and political institutions had been 
important for gaining experience of active citizenship. Since these institutions have been 
disrupted for over two decades, younger generations lack similar socialisation experiences.  
The generation of ‘the elders’ had suffered a loss of legitimacy from the onset of the war and, 
as a consequence,  they do not function as proper role models and lack the ability to mediate 
between citizens and authorities as brokers.  
 
These findings have implications for a number of policy domains, like approaches to state-
building, participatory local governance in (post)conflict settings, and humanitarian operations 
in displacement camps. The literature on participatory governance has, particularly in the 
context of international development, examined the conditions under which participation can 
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actually lead to changes in unjust social structures and policies, placing power relations at the 
heart of the debate (Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Hickey & 
Mohan, 2004). As some authors contend, it could be wise to delay participatory approaches if 
there is no experience with popular agency or where the wider political context is 
unsupportive of it (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). However, others say micro-level democratisation 
could make vital contributions to the depth, quality and durability of peace if addressed from 
the outset (Roque & Shankland, 2007).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis I refer to one of the popular recovery instruments for post-
conflict recovery: Community-Driven Development (CDD), or Community-Driven Recovery 
(CDR). CDR makes use of a participatory approach and has the explicit objective of (re)building 
state-society relations. In Chapter 2 I present the principles of CDR and evidence of its impact 
on social and political relations. Studies from several countries show that the impact is minimal 
in most cases (Wong, 2012). As the feasibility and effects of participatory approaches to 
recovery are being questioned and the effects of conflict on citizen engagement are 
ambiguous, more empirical work is needed that unpacks the complexities of engagement in 
(post)conflict settings.  
 
To design recovery interventions one first needs to know how conflict has affected citizens, 
local government actors, and the nature of state-society relations at a local level. This study 
suggests that a recovery process requires attention to the sense of citizenship, which may fall 
outside the scope of CDR. It also proposes that the design of CDR interventions needs to be 
adapted to enable citizens learn the practice of engagement and to actively facilitate 
interactions between citizens and local state actors. Finally, CDR needs mechanisms that 
address social inequalities within communities that affect citizen engagement of specific 
groups, such as women and young people. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
This chapter has outlined the rationale for this study and summarised the theoretical debates 
to which this thesis contributes. In Chapter 2 I elaborate the sets of theory summarised above: 
citizenship and participation, approaches to state-society relations, ethnicity and citizenship, 
agency and institutions in conflict settings, forced migration, and participatory approaches to 
recovery interventions. In Chapter 3 I present my conceptual framework, which, informed by 
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the literature review, shows how I want to take existing knowledge further and outlines the 
gap that I am addressing. I formulate propositions about how citizenship evolves during and 
after conflict and I explain the citizenship proxies that were studied in the field. The 
subsequent chapters reflect the chronology of events that have shaped Acholi citizenship, as 
compared to that of the Langi. These are the political history of Uganda (Chapter 4), the early 
years of the NRA regime and start of the conflict, 1986-1997 (Chapter 5), the displacement 
camps in Acholi, 1997-2007/8 (Chapter 6), and the post-conflict situation (Chapter 7).  
 
Chapter 4 presents the context of Uganda. Detailed historical knowledge is crucial for 
understanding the process of the construction of citizenship. I therefore use historical sources 
about post-colonial regimes and democratisation in Uganda and on the history of the northern 
regions and the LRA conflict specifically. I start with the political history of Uganda from 
independence up to the first years of the NRA regime under President Museveni. I also discuss 
the development of the local level state and the current system of decentralised governance. 
The last section gives an overview of the LRA conflict in Acholi. The chapter thus presents the 
historical and political contexts in which Acholi and Langi have constructed their citizenship.  
 
Chapter 5 describes how the sense and practices of citizenship developed from 1986 until the 
mid-1990s - the first decade under the NRA/M regime. For Acholi I explain the first phases of 
the war, before mass displacement began in 1996. The emphasis is on presenting people’s 
narratives, based on my empirical data, about how they developed agency in response to the 
insecurity, and how conflict affected local institutions and the public sphere. For the Langi, the 
first years under the NRA regime represented a transition to stability after many years of social 
and political upheaval.  
 
In Chapter 6, I explain the situation of the Acholi while they were in the displacement camps. 
Their environment was characterised by insecurity, a specific governance regime, and lack of 
basic services. Yet, even in these conditions of hardship people developed coping skills. At this 
point I start to analyse how the conflict affected people’s sense of citizenship and forms of 
citizen engagement in the post-conflict phase. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses present-day practices of citizenship at the local level in Acholi and Lango. I 
analyse existing forms of citizen engagement in community-based and government-initiated 
spaces for participation, and for processes of accountability. I show ordinary barriers to 
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substantive citizen participation in Lango, and in the case of Acholi, how these intersect with 
the past experiences of conflict. 
 
The concluding chapter summarises the differences between Lango and Acholi. I return to the 
propositions that were formulated in Chapter 3 and present my contributions to the literature. 
I finish with policy implications for CDR and suggestions for further research.  
  
28 
 
Chapter 2  Literature Review  
 
Introduction 
 
Different scholarly approaches vary in their treatment of what constitutes citizen engagement. 
Conflict affects citizen engagement through several mechanisms. Focusing on the 
conceptualisation of citizenship as participation and agency, this literature review shows a 
variety of approaches to studying citizen engagement and explores what diverse literatures 
have contributed to an understanding of how participation evolves in (post)conflict situations. 
Although various studies have demonstrated that citizens express agency in conflict situations, 
there is not much known about how citizen agency evolves in such fluctuating, adverse 
settings.  
 
Section 2.1 outlines the concept of citizenship and the aspects of citizenship that are of central 
importance to this study: agency, identity and voice. The approach that I adopt in this study is 
‘citizenship participation’, which highlights issues of power and rights. But there are, and have 
been, other approaches to studying state-society relations. I explain several other approaches 
in section 2.2 and highlight the differences in how they see citizen engagement. In section 2.3 I 
extend the discussion about identity by focusing on the interaction between ethnicity and 
citizenship in the African context. Here I also pay attention to how discourses on citizenship 
are used to exclude certain categories of citizens, pushing them into marginalisation.  
 
These first three sections about what constitutes citizen engagement in different scholarly 
approaches prepare the ground for the three sections that follow: what does citizen 
engagement look like in (post)conflict settings? Section 2.4 offers insights from conflict studies 
about institutions and agency in settings of conflict and violence. Although this literature does 
not explicitly address citizen engagement, it is instructive on how people have agency in 
conflict settings, and thus can inform thinking about how citizen engagement evolves. Section 
2.5 presents what is known about citizen engagement in adverse settings, using examples from 
several countries. Section 2.6 explains how citizenship and agency are addressed in forced 
migration studies. I conclude this chapter with section 2.7 on participation in community-
driven development: a popular approach to post-conflict recovery in international aid.  
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2.1 Citizenship as participation 
2.1.1  Approaches to citizenship 
 
Citizenship is defined as membership of a political community (Held, 2006, p. 64). Although 
there seems to be agreement about such a basic definition, the substance and scope of the 
concept remain heavily contested. As Cohen (2009, p. 14) states: it means many things to 
many people, and it is described in many terms to do with status, actions, institutions and 
rights. Complicating the debates is that normative ideas about what citizenship should entail 
are conflated with the actual reality of how citizenship is experienced (E. F. Cohen, 2009). 
Citizenship thus remains a contested concept.  
 
There are many approaches to citizenship. Four are often used: the liberal, the communitarian, 
the civic republican, and the participatory democracy approaches. In this section I introduce 
these four main approaches, focusing on the differences between them in respect of the 
balance between duties and rights, universality versus difference, and citizenship as status and 
as practice. This prefaces an explanation of active citizenship in the next section. 
 
The liberal approach emphasises citizenship as legal status obtained through membership of a 
state. Citizenship and corresponding civil and political rights are ‘granted’ by the state to its 
‘recipients’, and both have their duties and responsibilities. The liberal approach prioritises 
individual freedoms. Everyone has equal rights by virtue of being human, and these rights are 
consequently universal. The focus is on civil and political rights, for these guarantee people’s 
freedoms, whereas social and economic rights are regarded as too much state intervention 
and use of public resources. The state must be restricted in its activity to maximise the 
freedoms of the individual. However, the state must also be strong to ensure the rights and 
freedoms of its members (Held, 2006). For the emphasis on  individual liberty, the freedom of 
the individual is prioritised over that of groups and society. Classical liberal theory informs 
conventional debates on citizenship and continues to be the dominant approach. Yet the 
liberal approach is challenged from various sides for being state-centred in its focus, and 
conceptualising human beings as atomistic rather than as embedded in social relations 
(Kabeer, 2005; R. Lister, 2003; Tastsoglou & Dobrowolsky, 2006).  
 
The communitarian approach emphasises that an individual’s identity is shaped primarily 
through his/her relations to the community. The emphasis on identity is a direct challenge to a 
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strict notion of universality in the liberal tradition (Delanty, 2000). Some communitarians argue 
that a political community is based on a cultural community, and therefore different 
communities have different understandings of citizenship, and the state must recognise 
cultural differences (Selznick, 1992; Taylor, 1994). A good society is made through the 
cooperation of its members, group action and mutual support, as opposed to the atomistic 
individuals as in the liberal approach. To some, this means that the community can limit the 
freedoms of the individual (Bauman, 1993). Communitarians place strong emphasis on citizen 
obligations, while still aiming to guarantee rights, but people cannot expect immediate returns 
for their engagement (Janoski & Gran, 2002).  
 
In the civic republican approach, citizen participation is a duty and a right for the community 
and the broader public good. It thus opposes the liberal, individualistic notion of citizenship 
and individuals as passive rights bearers. Political engagement is an end in itself through which 
people can seek self-fulfilment (R. Lister, 2003). It differs from communitarianism in its reliance 
on civil society rather than on the state, and it emphasises civil society and civic virtue rather 
than obligations enforced by the state (Janoski & Gran, 2002). Identity plays less of a role here 
than in communitarianism, but commitment to a shared goal is emphasised. The self-regarding 
individual need not be in tension with the collective. Citizens can have both an ‘ethnic identity’ 
and a civic identity that is shared by all citizens in pursuit of the common good (Beiner, 1995; 
Ekeh, 1975). This approach was critiqued by radical democracy theorists who argued that is 
not enough to focus on participation as an end in itself while accepting the status quo.  
 
One strand of modern civic republicanism emphasises the benefits of participation through 
associational life. This strand is associated with the literature on social capital (Putnam, 1993, 
2000). Putnam (1993) argues that participation in associations, no matter what kind, breeds 
trust, commitment and solidarity. A strong civil society will produce a stronger state. He 
develops the notions of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital. The former refers to ‘inward-
looking activities’ that emphasise a particular identity, thus often creating homogeneous 
groups. The latter is about activities that encompass diverse people from across social 
cleavages. These groups, particularly, are thought to breed social trust and overcome social 
conflict (Putnam, 2000). His work has been subject to debate. Critics point out that he pays 
insufficient attention to how political structure affects associational life (Tarrow, 1996) and to 
forms of ‘uncivic’ social capital, and to the fact that civic participation sometimes causes less 
political participation (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005).   
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The participatory democracy approach builds on civic republicanism and forms the theoretical 
basis of my study. In this approach the rights and obligations of both individuals and groups 
need to be recognised, and balanced. Citizenship is about the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 
1958), but also about the right to participate in defining those rights and what they entail, and 
not just about accessing rights that are formulated and made available by the state. The 
participatory democracy approach points out that diversity and inequality in society limit the 
opportunities for certain individuals and groups to attain equal citizenship. This is a critique of 
liberal approaches to citizenship. Liberal views on citizenship, based on the premise that every 
person is equally able to realise citizenship, obscure the unequal power relations and forms of 
oppression that exist in reality (E. F. Cohen, 2009). The participatory democracy approach 
stands for the right to empowerment and the inclusion of marginalised groups. It pays 
attention to mechanisms, institutions and power relations in society that lead to exclusion 
from equal citizenship, highlighted particularly by feminist contributions to the citizenship 
debate (Lister, 2003).  Within the participatory democracy approach various strands exist. 
Deliberative democracy scholars emphasise the importance of deliberation among citizens, 
which would lead to better informed and more inclusive decisions (Fishkin, 1993; Mansbridge, 
2010). Other strands address the conditions under which citizen participation leads to the 
desired outcomes that were the objective of participation (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010).  
 
Both civic republicanism and participatory democracy have been influenced by ideas 
developed in radical democratic theory. Radical democracy is primarily a theory of democracy, 
not of citizenship (Delanty, 2000). Radical democracy scholars want to reconnect a notion of 
citizen participation to the state, something lost in communitarian and civic republican 
approaches, which reduce democracy to citizen participation (Keane, 1988; Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985). They see the state itself as often responsible for perpetuating inequalities and therefore 
reject the strict separation of state and society (Pateman, 1985). Radical democracy aims to 
transform politics for social change and the relationship between state and society, making 
citizenship part of the project of democratic transformation. In this tradition democratic 
citizenship is seen as a vehicle for transforming democracy and politics (Delanty, 2000; Held, 
1989; Heller & Feher, 1988).  
 
The different approaches to citizenship and democracy also differ in their perspectives on 
citizen participation. In the liberal approach, participation is encouraged because citizens are 
deemed the best representatives of their own interests. Participation is limited to the 
conventional political arena: in political discussion and through rational voting (Thompson, 
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1970). It argues for representative democracy and thus decisions made by a small group of 
representatives, not through direct citizen engagement.  In the civic republican approach, 
participation is mostly restricted to formal political institutions and mechanisms. Its radical 
supporters feel that all participation should be located in civil society, while others feel that 
forms of representation are unavoidable but need to be ‘democratised’ and complemented by 
other mechanisms (Macpherson, 1977; Pateman, 1970). In the participatory democracy 
approach, participation is considered a way for citizens to shape society and the institutions 
that govern it. Like radical democracy scholars, participatory democracy scholars seek to 
transform the relationship between state and society. Participation is therefore extended 
beyond conventional political institutions, as argued by Thompson (1970), to ‘politics’ and 
decision-making in any setting (Pateman, 1970). The state has the obligation to engage directly 
with citizens, not only through their representatives, in participatory democratic mechanisms.  
 
The debate on citizenship continues and not all lines of thought can be elaborated here. 
Feminist theory has contributed tremendously to the notion of differentiated citizenship, 
inequality and exclusion, positing that differences need to be addressed with special measures. 
State-centred understandings of citizenship are increasingly questioned due to processes of 
internationalisation and migration, or the ‘cosmopolitan challenge’ to citizenship (Delanty, 
2000; Held, 1995). Scholars have advocated more sociologically informed approaches to 
citizenship with a firm recognition of culture and identity as its constitutive elements, in 
addition to rights and participation (Abraham, Chow, Maratou-Alipranti, & Tastsoglou, 2010; 
Isin & Turner, 2008; Yuval-Davis, 2007) 
 
This study is informed by the participatory democracy approach with its emphasis on 
citizenship as status and as practice. Importantly, a notion of active citizenship requires a focus 
on the various mechanisms and tactics through which citizens practice their citizenship, based 
on particular prerequisites for citizen agency and their understanding of political opportunities. 
In the sections which follow I elaborate key aspects of this approach, such as understandings 
of power, voice and agency, and identity.  
 
2.1.2 Citizenship and agency 
 
The participatory democracy approach emphasises that citizenship needs to be understood in 
terms of how it is constructed ‘from below’ (Kabeer, 2005). Empirical studies on citizenship 
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show that people who have been excluded from equal citizenship nonetheless use it for their 
own struggles. Though citizenship has different meanings for different groups of people, 
certain values are shared. These are a notion of justice, a demand for recognition, a claim to 
self-determination, and a sense of solidarity (Kabeer, 2005; R. Lister, 2008). Taking an actor-
oriented approach to citizenship brings to the fore the values people are struggling for, the 
rights they claim, and the collective action they take to attain those rights. This approach to 
citizenship focuses on agency (explained below), the conditions that limit or support agency, 
and the capacities to act as citizens (Nyamu-Musembi, 2005, 2009). A citizen is understood as: 
 
… someone who belongs to different kinds of collective associations and defines their 
identity through participation in activities associated with these different kinds of 
membership. Their sense of citizenship lies in the terms on which they participate in this 
collective life and the forms of agency they are able to exercise. And when they are only 
able to participate on highly unequal terms, or are denied access altogether, citizenship 
relates to their attempts to challenge these exclusionary practices and bring about change 
(Kabeer, 2005, pp. 21-22).  
 
Such a perspective endorses an understanding of citizenship in which social and cultural 
aspects are included. Empirical studies show that citizens often define citizenship, their rights 
and duties not only in relation to the state but also in relation to their social environment and 
collective life. The state is often perceived as distant and the community more relevant for acts 
of citizenship (Wheeler, 2005). Often the object of citizenship struggles is to change society 
itself. Citizens and their various forms of collective action seek not only to transform vertical 
state-citizen relationships, but also horizontal relationships among citizens in society (Kabeer, 
2005, p. 23).  
 
Culture and identity are recognised as important components of citizenship. Distinct groups in 
society make claims for the acknowledgement of cultural diversity, while at the same time 
fighting particular cultural rules that deny people the right to have rights, and produce 
inequality (Dagnino, 2005). Hence the emphasis on a cultural dimension of citizenship and the 
entangled relationship between identity and citizenship: a citizenship identity is constructed, 
continues to evolve, and is one of many identities held by actors (Isin & Wood, 1999; R. Lister, 
2005; Yuval-Davis, 2007). (I will come back to the issue of identity later, in section 2.3.) 
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The concept of agency is important for an understanding of citizenship as practice. Agency may 
be latent: it refers to the potential  to reflect, imagine and act, and may be manifested in 
actual actions (Frie, 2008). People’s agency is shaped by many factors, including their history, 
tangible and intangible resources, and their socio-political and cultural contexts. Lister 
combines elements of the civic republican and liberal approaches to citizenship into a synthetic 
approach, which connects the two traditions, at the heart of which is human agency: 
‘Citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the political arena, 
broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents’ (R. Lister, 2003, p. 37). 
 
Citizenship rights can potentially guarantee a basis for agency. Both formal civil and political 
rights and substantive socio-economic rights enable humans to act, since every form of citizen 
action requires time and resources. Lister’s conceptualisation of human agency locates it in a 
dialectic relationship with social structures and also as embedded in social relations. Following 
Gould (1988), she underlines that individuals become self-aware and develop themselves 
through interaction with others, in particular in collective activities that may constitute 
individual as well as collective goals.  
 
To act as a citizen requires first a sense of agency, the belief that one can act; acting as a 
citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of agency. Thus, agency is not 
simply about the capacity to choose and act but it is also about a conscious capacity, 
which is important to the individual’s self-identity (R. Lister, 2003, p. 39).  
 
While ‘agency’ is important, a further question is ‘what enables agency’? Martin argues: ‘Real 
citizenship reflects and expresses people’s sense of agency, i.e. their willingness and capacity to 
act politically’ (2003, p. 575). It is argued that active citizenship is ‘learnt’ (Delanty, 2003), 
because active citizenship requires a political consciousness and certain skills. Scholars 
emphasise local institutions and social interactions where such skills are learnt and where 
consciousness is acquired from a young age, often through participation in events or activities, 
or through exposure to them (Heater, 1990). A process of ‘conscientisation’ and particularly a 
critical consciousness about the self and society occurs often informally, and primarily through 
interaction with others (Freire, 1986). Socialisation occurs mainly in the direct environment: in 
the family and the community, in groups and associations. For younger generations, schools 
are important places to learn about formal frameworks, but are also important institutions 
where socio-cultural conventions are reproduced (Merrifield, 2001). Social interactions are 
conducive to awareness of causes of exclusion and to building a ‘capacity to aspire’ 
(Appadurai, 2004): to think that a situation can be different. Especially the collective dimension 
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of citizenship, acting with others, is conducive to that sense of agency (Kabeer & Haq, 2009; R. 
Lister, 2008). 
 
Identity has been recognised as important for citizenship. There is a direct relationship 
between one’s understanding of his or her own citizen identity and agency.  ‘A citizen’s identity 
is an awareness of his relationship to his state and to his fellow citizens’ (Heater, 1990, p. 185). 
It is argued that the way people see themselves as citizens has consequences for how they 
understand their rights and obligations, and for whether they are willing to act upon these, 
and in what form (Isin & Wood, 1999). Being aware about one’s citizen identity and 
corresponding rights may help to claim and enact those rights, whereas a lack of awareness 
may result in having less of a sense that one may claim any rights.  
 
Theiss-Morse (1993) demonstrates that different understandings of citizenship lead to 
different forms of engagement. She shows that there is variation in how United States citizens 
understand their citizenship, in terms of how important it is to vote, whether one should 
engage in other forms of politics, and who should participate. She distinguishes four categories 
of perspectives on citizenship: ‘representative democracy’, ‘political enthusiasm’, ‘pursued 
interests’ and ‘indifferent’. She shows that each perspective corresponds with different forms 
of citizen engagement: how politically active or inactive people are and what forms of 
engagement they find useful - like voting or influencing government through group activities.  
This study does not tell us how other identities may have informed engagement. This is 
important, because a citizenship identity is one identity that people possibly possess and it 
may or may not function as a basis for citizen agency. 
 
For a better understanding of how people perceive their own identities I introduce the concept 
‘sense of citizenship’ in Chapter 3. The term refers to how people perceive themselves as 
citizens in relation to other citizens, not only in relation to the state, therefore encompassing 
political relationships to the state and in society. This includes an understanding of how people 
are self-aware about their identity, including the citizen identity. This opens up the possibility 
of investigating how, for instance, ethnic identity informs citizen identity (elaborated in section 
2.3). This is important for a study that is located in the context of East Africa. Accepting that a 
critical self-consciousness and identity shape agency (Lister, Kabeer, and Isin and Wood), a 
sense of citizenship shapes the practice of citizenship.  
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2.1.3  Voice and participation  
 
Having established that citizenship can be understood in an active sense as involving agency 
and participation, a further question is how citizens engage. This question is not new: scholars 
of state-society relations have analysed a spectrum of forms of citizen engagement for 
decades. A recurrent theme is that citizenship is about articulating an issue, referred to as 
voice, and about the effectiveness of expressing that voice. In this section I explain the 
framework developed by Hirschman (1970) on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, which forms an 
important reference point for participation literature. I then discuss how this framework can 
be advanced by addressing power relations and inequalities.  
Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
 
Hirschman’s framework analyses how citizens respond when corporate firms or states do not 
perform to their satisfaction and whether they will opt for critical engagement. When faced 
with declining quality of a product or service the consumers or members of an organisation 
may choose to exit: to abandon the product or organisation and join an alternative. Through 
voice they express concerns in order to restore the quality. The concept of loyalty reflects a 
certain attachment to an organisation or a firm. Because of loyalty, consumers may opt for 
voice even if viable exit options exist, or postpone the decision to exit. Loyalty does not 
predict, however, in which form voice will be exercised. The willingness to opt for voice often 
depends on the trade-off between the certainty of exit and the uncertainties and costs of 
voice, and the estimate of one’s influence.  
 
In the political application of Hirschman’s framework to state-society relations, ‘voice’ 
becomes a form of critical engagement with state actors. While a number of problems with his 
framework have been highlighted by others (Downding, John, Mergoupis, & Van Vugt, 2000), I 
focus on three that I consider relevant to this study. First, exit is often presented as an 
‘either/or’ choice, while voice is a continuum. As I show in section 2.2 there is a spectrum of 
ways in which people engage, or exercise voice, including through non-participation. Thus, 
Hirschman does not adequately explain that there is variation in voice and in how influential 
voice can be. Secondly, Hirschman pays little attention to the social differentiation of voice, 
treating it as a homogeneous whole. This raises issues of which interests are represented once 
concerns are voiced. Finally, Hirschman takes little account of the fact that the cost-benefit 
analysis of exit and voice are context-dependent, and that the behaviour of the state is an 
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important part of that. He only mentions that organisations can forge a very high cost of exit  
(Hirschman, 1970: 97) – not of voice. Thus, Hirschman’s framework overlooks the process of 
interaction, including over time, between states and citizens, which this study highlights.  
 
The issue of social differentiation and how this matters for exercising voice is addressed in 
work on citizen participation. Through a focus on power dynamics this literature, discussed in 
the next sub-section, shows that the scope for exercising voice is different for various social 
identities, such as  men and women, adults and young people.  
Voice and institutionalised participation 
 
In citizenship studies, the concept of participation is central to scholars who emphasise an 
active notion of citizenship. The theme of participation became popular in the field of 
international development throughout the 1980s and 1990s (J. M. Cohen & Uphoff, 1980; 
Esman & Uphoff, 1984; Uphoff, 1985, 1998), first in relation to social and community 
development. Various trends then led to its incorporation in democratic governance 
discourses and interventions (Cornwall, 2011). One was the confluence of the development 
and democratisation agendas, which spurred the support for decentralised governance 
systems.  A second development was the increased awareness of the various democratic 
deficits that could potentially be overcome by enhanced citizen participation (Gaventa, 2011; 
McLaverty, 2011). While traditionally representative democracies function through elected 
politicians that mediate between the citizen and the state, radical democracy theorists argue 
that there should be more direct linkages and a more active citizenry (Held, 2006). 
Mechanisms for state-citizen interactions have been initiated that institutionalise spaces for 
constructive engagement, with the intention of addressing the deficits of representative 
democracies. For instance, McLaverty (2011) describes a range of mechanisms used in western 
democracies and in the global south, showing their variation in design principles and to what 
extent outcomes of participation are binding.  
 
Institutionalised mechanisms for participation aim to include citizen voices in planning, policy-
making, decision-making and, more recently, in transparency and accountability initiatives. 
They are introduced at various levels. At national level, government and civil society actors can 
interact in ‘policy spaces’ for policy design, for instance around poverty reduction or the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Brock, McGee, & Gaventa, 2004). At the local level, 
mechanisms aim to involve citizens in decision-making, planning and budget allocation with 
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the objective of making services ‘pro-poor’ (Cornwall, 2002b; Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 
2007). Frameworks that institutionalise citizen participation in local level budgeting are 
popular in a number of developing countries. It is recognised that interventions need to 
address both strengthening the voice in civil society and building more accountable and 
responsive state institutions (Esman & Uphoff, 1984), referred to by Gaventa (2004) as ‘both 
sides of the equation’. However, many initiatives focus on building the voice of marginalised 
groups, leaving aside state institutions and the nature of state-society interfaces. This risks 
obscuring power relations that inhibit effective voice, downplaying bias against the voice of 
certain groups, and neglecting the reasons why power holders can get away with not reacting 
to increased voice. Since recently, academic thinking focuses on what happens at the interface 
of the equation, where state institutions and citizens interact. There is a ‘blurring of 
boundaries’ and movement across the two sides. Citizens and officials can fulfil multiple 
functions, and through their interactions different perceptions about each other and different 
terms of engagement may emerge (Citizenship-DRC, 2011). 
 
Contributors to the debate challenge certain applications of participation as limited and 
instrumentalised, which bring concepts of power and politics centre-stage (Gaventa, 2004; 
Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Without an understanding of how power operates there is a risk that 
citizen participation will not attain its democratising potential. It is necessary to analyse the 
politics of the local political sphere and power dynamics, for the local level is where the 
micropolitics of participation play out (Brock et al., 2004; Gaventa, 2006b; Harriss et al., 2004). 
This requires an analysis of actors based in political and state institutions and parties, linkages 
across levels of governance,  and linkages between civil and political societies (Chatterjee, 
2005; Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava, & Véron, 2005). Insights from numerous rich empirical 
studies, both on participation and from the deliberative democracy strand in political science 
(Mansbridge, 2010) point to the formal and informal institutions that maintain domination by 
the powerful and the exclusion of marginal voices.  
 
The concept of ‘space’ is often used to analyse power dynamics. A space is conceptualised as 
‘opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, 
discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests’ (Gaventa, 2006a, p. 
26). In such spaces interactions between society and state actors take place for e.g. policy 
formulation and decision-making (Cornwall, 2002b; Gaventa, 2006a; McGee, 2004), but the 
term is extended to citizens seeking to influence any actor - private, governmental or non-
governmental. Spaces and deliberation processes can be biased and reflect existing 
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inequalities and social cleavages in society, such as, for instance, elite dominance. Women, 
youth and people with disabilities face specific restrictions attached to their social identities. 
Thus, to come back to Hirschman’s framework, the analytical focus on micropolitics and power 
brings to light the social differentiation and inequality that exist within the voice category.  
 
Thinking about citizen participation extends from participation through institutionalised 
mechanisms to include forms of engagement that were traditionally not considered to be part 
of the political process. Scholarly work on voice and accountability politics contributes to this 
debate (Fox, 2007; Goetz & Jenkins, 2004; Hossain, 2010). Hossain (2010) speaks of ‘informal 
accountability’ to highlight the informal pressures that poor citizens apply to demand services 
and sanction failures of accountability in the absence of formal accountability mechanisms. 
These pressures take place at the very local level between frontline bureaucrats and citizens 
and can take ‘rude’ or violent forms (Hossain, 2010). Goetz and Jenkins (2004, p. 29) use the 
concept of voice to capture formal and informal tactics, defining it as:  
 
(...) a metaphor for the variety of ways in which people express beliefs, articulate 
preferences and advance their interests. Voice can be expressed individually or 
collectively. It can stake out original claims or react to official decisions. Moreover, 
any of these variants may be peaceful or socially disruptive, and may take place 
within the arenas of civil society, between and inside political parties, through 
interactions between citizens and state institutions or within the state itself.  
 
Collective voice is stronger than individual voice and can exert more pressure on power 
holders. Collective voice can mobilise actions across levels of governance, and across regions 
(Fox, 2007). While voice and accountability are conceptually different, in practice they are 
inseparable. As Goetz and Jenkins argue, to provoke answerability someone has to at least ask 
the question. Participation and the exercise of voice in relation to accountability are about 
interrogation (2004, p. 31). I follow this thinking to distinguish the interrogative voice from the 
petitioning voice (Chapter 3). 
 
Fox (2007) uses the term ‘accountability politics’ to encompass both formal, political 
accountability and social accountability mechanisms, as well as the full range of actors that try 
to seek accountability from power holders in a variety of ways. He conceptualises 
accountability politics as unfolding in arenas of conflict ‘that are broader than formal authority 
structures’, including a wide array of socio-political actors.  
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A number of issues continue to fuel the debates about citizenship as participation. Much of the 
participation literature continues to look at the benign, ‘civic’ forms of participation and does 
not recognise the subversive tactics people use. As section 2.2 will show, other scholars of 
state-society relations have emphasised exactly those subversive forms of engagement. Then, 
questions have arisen as to whether citizenship remains a suitable concept for discussing 
citizen action (Khanna, 2013). Even when it is acknowledged that a state-based definition of 
citizenship is too narrow, some argue that forms of engagement expressed by ‘non-citizens’, 
such as illegal migrants or asylum seekers, need to be understood in a different light. Also, in 
many cases the state is not the object of engagement, especially when it is only remotely 
present in people’s lives, or not considered a legitimate institution.   
 
Finally, and of particular interest for this thesis, is the risk that the meaning of participation 
might degenerate into holding people responsible for their own development and well-being, 
and for the performance of political institutions (Cornwall, 2002a). This ‘responsibilisation’ of 
citizens masks the failures of the state to fulfil its obligations and structural causes of poverty 
that cannot be ‘fixed’ by citizens (Hickey, 2010). This section introduced the notion of active 
citizenship and the debates on participation. In the next section I outline a spectrum of forms 
of engagement and the range of approaches to studying them.  
 
2.2 Approaches to state-society relations 
 
The notion of active citizenship provides one framework for understanding state – society 
relations. This theme is far from new. Scholars past and present outside what we may call 
‘citizenship studies’ have taken various approaches to understanding the state, society, and 
their interactions. The debates have been hampered by a dichotomy in which state and society 
were analytically distinct, almost separated, based on the classic notion of the Weberian state 
that conceptualised it as hierarchical and autonomous from society. For many, the dichotomy 
does not hold and a more nuanced understanding of the linkages that connect state and 
society is needed. Increasingly state and society are viewed as interdependent and constitutive 
of one another (Migdal, 2001; Sellers, 2010).  
 
Within the vast body of scholarly work on this issue a spectrum of state-society relations and 
forms of engagement can be distinguished. At one end of the spectrum of relations is total 
rejection of the state by its citizens, at the other end a constructive relationship. In between lie 
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relationships in which the state is resisted, contested and viewed critically. Along the spectrum 
citizens employ different tactics and strategies to express (dis)content, to support or resist the 
state, to exercise voice and to change its behaviour. Rejection and resistance can be 
manifested in violent and non-violent forms, but also expressed quietly, almost hidden from 
the eyes of the powerful. In terms of contention and critical engagement, citizens have 
different options for expressing voice and there are various mechanisms for constructive 
engagement, from formally institutionalised channels to informal strategies. 
 
This section outlines scholarly work that represents segments of this spectrum of state-society 
relations (Figure 2.1). This should not be seen as an attempt to develop typologies for state-
society relations. Rather, the spectrum is loosely applied as an organising principle to show 
how different authors approach state-society relations and to show a range of forms of citizen 
engagement. This helps to position my own approach to citizen engagement, based on 
citizenship as participation in everyday life. I first discuss the rejection of the state through 
revolution. This is followed by resistance and then contention and engagement in contentious 
politics. I then discuss forms of critical and constructive engagement, which builds on the 
previous section and identifies critical factors for successful participation.  
 
Figure 2.1 Spectrum of state – society relations and tactics of engagement 
 
Rejection  Resistance  Contention Critical 
engagement 
Constructive 
engagement  
                                                  
violent revolution       hidden transcripts/    contentious                                                     
                                       passive resistance      politics 
                                       overt resistance                    
                                           Tilly & Tarrow (2007) 
                                Scott (1985, 1990, 2009) 
Moore (1966), Scott (1976),  
Wolff (1969), Popkin (1970) 
Paige (1975) 
Skocpol (1994) 
              Wood (2001), Petersen (2007)          
                                                      
 
Through informal tactics and/or 
institutionalised mechanisms        
 
 
 
Cornwall & Schattan Coelho (2007) 
Gaventa (2006), Fung & Wright (2003) 
                                           Fishkin (1993)                                                                
             Corbridge et al. (2005) 
 
 
2.2.1 Rejection  
 
In this sub-section I discuss one particular form of rejection: violent revolutions by peasant 
societies. Acknowledging that other, non-violent, forms of rejection also exist, I discuss this 
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body of literature, because it represents a variety of approaches to understanding what drives 
engagement of rural populations – from class struggle, to culture, to rational choice. I first 
discuss scholarly work on peasant revolutions that evolved in the late 1960s and 1970s. Moore 
(1966) was the first to identify the peasantry as crucial force in modern revolutions (Skocpol, 
1994). The Vietnam War then provoked scholarly interest in revolutions in the global south. 
Authors come to different conclusions about what makes peasants revolt and differ on the 
nature of peasant societies (Paige, 1975, 1997; Popkin, 1970; Scott, 1976; Skocpol, 1994; Wolf, 
1969). I then discuss two contemporary studies on peasant rebellion (Petersen, 2001; Wood, 
2003) that advanced the debates - pointing out that engagement changes as conflict evolves 
and that emotions play a strong role for collective action. 
 
Moore (1966) identifies pathways to modern states. In his explanation of engagement in 
violent revolutions, the strength of the bourgeoisie and the coalitions between the 
bourgeoisie, the landed upper-class and the rulers are key variables which determine the type 
of revolution that occurs and the regime it produces. ‘Western democracies’ such as France, 
Great Britain and the United States of America were the result of ‘bourgeois revolutions’. Here, 
commercialisation led to a strong bourgeoisie, while the power of the crown and landed elite 
weakened. A strong bourgeoisie is needed to oppose non-democratic versions of capitalism, to 
shape its relationship to the landed upper class, and to prevent a monarch or aristocracy 
becoming too strong. Fascist regimes such as twentieth-century Germany and Japan were 
brought about by a ‘revolution from above’, which was the result of a coalition between the 
bourgeoisie, the landed elite and the state. In Russia and China, only a weak bourgeoisie 
developed and the landed upper-class maintained weak institutional relationships with the 
peasantry. As these societies had a large peasantry with strong social institutions, a ‘revolution 
from below’ produced communist systems. 
 
Ultimately, Moore understands politics to be about class struggle. Moore ‘... retains the 
position fundamental to Marxist propensity to explain political struggles and structures as 
functions of class structures and struggles’ (Skocpol, 1973: 18). This is why the interests and 
activities of the landed elite form his focus. Therefore, Skoocpol argues, Moore fails to 
acknowledge those state actions that are not class-conditioned and how state organisation 
affects the capacities of the landed elite. But besides class relations, Moore emphasises the 
importance of social structures within the peasant class for their ‘revolutionary potential’ as 
well as their links to the upper strata. Where peasants have some degree of freedom to run 
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communal associations and social institutions a ‘radical solidarity’ can develop and form the 
seedbed for revolutionary organisation.  
 
Paige (1975, 1997) also explains peasant revolution through class relations. Both the income 
base of the peasantry and the economic base of the elites, as non-cultivators, are relevant. The 
elite’s different sources of income, e.g. capital or land, shape their relationship to subordinate 
classes and the state (1997). The likelihood of peasant revolution depends on a combination of 
factors concerning the main sources of income for the elite and peasants (1975). Revolutions 
are more likely to occur where the elite depend on land for their income and therefore cannot 
compromise when wage-earning peasants start making claims to land or wages. The elite will 
resist the peasants’ demand for reforms, and a revolution will follow. Small-holder peasants 
are thought to be competitive, less likely to collaborate, and too dependent on elites. Thus, to 
Paige, the revolutionary potential of peasants does not just depend on their situation or 
mobilising capacities. Paige’s analysis is critiqued by Skocpol  (1982, 1994) for his failure to 
analyse social and political structures.  
 
Skocpol (1982, 1994) proposes a structural approach to the analysis of citizen engagement:  a 
focus on the institutionalised economic relations between the upper and lower classes, 
institutionalised relations among peasants, and the social political context. She critiques the 
tendency to overemphasise class struggles, economic interests and social circumstances of 
peasants. Skocpol’s argument is that peasants have the room to revolt when the state and 
military dominance are temporarily suspended, thus pointing to the power of the state and 
political structures as explanatory factors in the emergence of peasant revolutions. 
Relationships between peasants and revolutionary actors are important, but these can only be 
institutionalised in the absence or easing of state repression.  
 
Wolf (1969) and Scott (1976) argue that incorporation into the capitalist economy prompts 
peasant revolutions. Capitalism poses a threat to communal ties, collective security and 
welfare as economic relations become bureaucratic and impersonal. To be able to revolt, 
peasants need some degree of autonomy or ‘tactical mobility’ (Wolf, 1969); for instance they 
may live in remote, isolated areas away from the control of the elite or the state, or, as 
smallholders, they may depend less on the elite for their income. More than Wolf, Scott (1976) 
emphasises the culture of these communities. Scott argues that state-society relations in pre-
capitalist peasant societies are guided by the principles of the ‘moral economy’.  The moral 
economy is rooted in the local community of the village, but is also networked into the state. It 
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has a ‘subsistence ethic’: community norms that emphasise reciprocity and solidarity, the 
common good, and norms for patron-client relationships that evolve around peasants’ access 
to subsistence. This ethic also shapes the behaviour of peasants as political agents - it informs 
their ideas about justice and legitimacy. The capitalist economy threatens to change the mode 
of subsistence and traditional relationships: the ‘bonds’ between peasants and patrons, or the 
state. Commercialisation violates their cultural system as a whole, their norms about justice 
and the boundaries for what is just and tolerable behaviour on the part of the elite. As a 
consequence peasants will revolt. Like Moore (1966), Scott points at social networks of 
solidarity and the strength of socio-cultural ties within the peasantry that enable mobilisation.  
 
Popkin (1970) uses rational choice theory to explain how peasants invest in relationships with 
the village and their patrons. With his case study in Vietnam, Popkin wants to demonstrate 
that peasants are often opportunistic, and emphasises their rationalist behaviour: calculating 
costs, benefits and risks, and maximising profits. The peasant is competing with other peasants 
for material gain and power. His argument is that an individual’s decision about citizen 
engagement (with the state or in ‘the village’) involves an individual cost-benefit analysis for 
personal interests, thus challenging an overly romanticised perspective on peasants’ valuing of 
social ties. To Popkin, Vietnamese peasants did not revolt to destroy the market economy, but 
to gain some control over it and to remake traditional patron-client relationships. The 
existence of an external mobiliser is a crucial factor for revolutions to occur, because it 
resolves the classic collective action problem (Olson, 1963) through incentives. Members of 
the Communist Party were able to play that role as ‘political entrepreneurs’, encouraging 
other peasants to join the rebellion. Subsequent successes of collective action under their 
leadership nurtured the confidence of peasants that their actions were worthwhile. Thus, 
while Scott argues that engagement is guided by normative principles, Popkin’s rational choice 
model predicts that citizens engage with state actors as long as it is in their material interest, 
regardless of social relations and identity. 
 
One of the important insights in more contemporary work on peasant revolutions is that social 
and political structures change and evolve during conflict (Petersen, 2001; Wood, 2003). Early 
studies suggested that peasants have two options when a revolution occurs: to participate or 
not. Contemporary work shows there is a range of options and that forms of engagement can 
change during the conflict (Petersen, 2001). Petersen describes a spectrum from supporting 
the oppressor, through neutrality and resistance, to violent opposition to the regime. Similar 
to Scott (1985), who highlights the importance of analysing the moments when people move 
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from ‘hidden transcripts’ to public actions, Petersen is interested in what triggers people to 
move from passive to active forms of resistance. His framework explains the mechanisms that 
encourage people to progress along the rebellious side of the spectrum and how rebellion is 
sustained. His explanation underlines the importance of emotions, in particular feelings of 
resentment against an unjust regime and hierarchy. Petersen points to the ‘value of small 
victories’ and (irrational) wishful thinking that motivates insurgents to continue their rebellion 
even when the oppressor is far more powerful and defeat inevitable. Variation in the level and 
nature of rebellious activities across communities is explained by differences in community 
structures and the strength of community institutions such as reciprocity, and the status and 
mobilising capacity of leading figures. The presence of community institutions matters, but 
also their structure: they have to be networked into low-threshold organisations with high 
moral values.  
 
In her study on the civil war in El Salvador, Wood (2003) also shows that emotions and values 
form strong motivations for taking part in insurgency.  In her theory of collective action she 
thus includes moral and emotional reasons for acting, agency that is motivated by the will to 
act in the interest of a community, and the inherent value placed on being part of a process. 
Before political mobilisation started in El Salvador in the 1970s there were tacit forms of 
resistance being performed by campesinos. The value of agency was increasingly manifested in 
insurgent behaviour and collective action. For those who had experienced long-term 
subordination, such as the campesinos, participation in the insurgency offered a ‘pleasure of 
agency’ and a way of regaining a sense of dignity and autonomy. An ‘insurgent political culture’ 
emerged: new values and attitudes developed over time alongside a sense of solidarity. To 
participate in the insurgency was associated with the attitudes of an insurgent political culture, 
which emphasised the making of a more just history (2003, p.243). Even in as extremely high-
risk a situation as this civil war was, these emotions and values were stronger than the fear of 
becoming a victim. As the war evolved and actions led to change, the pleasure of agency 
deepened and this encouraged the population to persist. A major contribution by Wood is that 
participation is valued in itself and that the ‘pleasure of agency’ can stimulate further 
engagement, something Scott (1985) and Gaventa (1982) have also argued.  
 
The studies discussed here give various explanations for what brings about citizen 
engagement. Each of the earlier approaches touches upon aspects that contemporary 
academic work has recognised as important for collective action in relation to the state, such 
as social institutions and political alliances. Other aspects are more problematic. First, the 
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centrality - in earlier scholarship - of the expanding capitalist economy as the driving force for 
revolutionary peasants is challenged. Wood’s work has clearly demonstrated that state-society 
relations are about more than the state’s control over production. Peasants have ideas about 
justice, equality, and dignity and thus have normative ideas of what a relationship with the 
state should look like. This insight is incorporated in this thesis with a comprehensive approach 
to the question of what constitutes a sense of citizenship (Chapter 3).  
 
Secondly, the peasant identity stimulates engagement in a political struggle, again clearly 
demonstrated in the work of Wood (2003). Given this, Popkin’s (1970) characterisation of the 
rational peasant who is in it for personal self-interest is problematic. He removes the peasant 
entirely from his/her context and downplays social and cultural factors that inform behaviour. 
Yet individual behaviour depends on cultural constructions of selfhood and the community, as 
section 2.3 on ethnicity demonstrates.  
 
Thirdly, the emphasis on social institutions within the peasantry as reflected, in different ways, 
in the work of Moore, Wolf and Scott, continues to be relevant. While to Moore this solidarity 
is instrumental in disseminating grievances, I consider it important for constructing citizenship; 
a sense and practice of citizenship is nurtured and built in social interactions. Much as Scott 
(1976) emphasises the embeddedness of peasants in their socio-cultural context, he ignores 
social differentiation within the peasantry. Yet also in pre-capitalist societies, social inequalities 
existed.  
 
Skocpol’s argument to include an analysis of state structures remains relevant for studying 
which tactics of engagement are possible. In this study I discuss the ‘warscape’ as the social 
structure in which agency evolves (section 2.4). However, instead of her focus on elite actions, 
I look at how the warscape affects engagement by citizens. Finally, unless they revolt, peasants 
are depicted as people that lack any form of agency. A focus on peasant revolutions obscures 
other forms of contention and agency by peasants, as the next sections show.  
 
2.2.2 Resistance 
 
An important shortcoming of the earlier literature on peasant revolutions is that scholars 
neglect other forms of political activity among the marginalised. This is Scott’s (1985) critique; 
he argues that there is a whole ‘landscape of political activity’ between silent quiescence and 
47 
 
revolution. Corbridge et al. (2005) state that an understanding of state-society relations 
requires an analysis of the everyday moments and spaces where citizens ‘see the state’: real 
life interactions around concrete issues. Scott (1985, 1990) uses this focus on the everyday to 
show forms of resistance. Although framed as resistance, the tactics he describes can also be 
viewed as the rejection of power holders by people who do not have the means to oust them 
 
Scott (1985) describes how poor, subordinate people possess a repertoire of ‘acts of 
resistance’ that they carry out in their everyday life. Resistance can be expressed through 
‘passive non-compliance, evasion, or deception’ (Scott, 1985). These often symbolic acts 
demonstrate disagreement and lack of support for the powerful elite. These are not just acts 
of resistance against a materially better-off elite. They also represent ideological differences 
between peasants and elites. The acts of resistance, the behaviour, cannot be separated from 
the ideas, norms and social consciousness that inform them. The work on ‘hidden transcripts’ 
examines the discourses and acts of the poor and the powerful (Scott, 1985). Public 
interactions between the powerful and the marginalised are power-laden. Subordinates may 
show conformity and deference when facing their superiors, thus avoiding direct confrontation 
where this may put their subsistence at risk. But in the safety of their homes and other ‘off-
stage’ spaces where they feel comfortable they can share their worries.  
 
The hidden transcripts can prepare the ground for public acts of resistance. To Scott, the act of 
publicly challenging a powerful actor is made possible by ‘rehearsing’ it in the safe spaces 
where these ideas are shared and gain legitimacy. Deciding between public and hidden forms 
of resistance is a careful balancing act. Scott explains how peasants go very carefully about 
finding the limits of this kind of resistance, to avoid it being revealed as such. The boundaries 
are mostly constituted by fear of (violent) repression and the risk of losing the economic 
resources through which the poor depend on the elite. Scott disagrees with Moore (1978), 
who states that quiescence means that the subordinated have become so used to their 
situation that they see it as inevitable, even legitimate. Scott argues that the marginalised are 
able to imagine a different life, but that they are often constrained by the possibility of 
repercussions.  
 
In later work Scott (2009) presents a more radical argument about resistance. To the hill 
peoples of the mountainous area in south-east Asia, ‘civilisation’ meant subordination, and 
hence they resisted the process of civilisation altogether. They migrated from the ‘state 
spaces’ of the valleys into the hills, and adapted their livelihoods, cultures and identities to 
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escape state control. The ‘state space’ of the lowlands, created by the many kingdoms and 
dynasties, was one of appropriation. Scott gives numerous examples of how rulers sought to 
increase food production and manpower as key factors to state formation. Ruling elites used a 
combination of coercion and incentives to bring large numbers of people to their area. They 
also forged modes of production that supported this strategy to increase control. Not only did 
the hill people migrate. Once in the hills, they avoided the modes of production that could 
easily be appropriated by the more powerful and opted for more flexible livelihood strategies. 
They developed ‘state resenting’ social and political structures: hierarchic structures could 
easily be co-opted and therefore social organisation became small-scale and dispersed.   
 
Scott’s work stimulates thinking about certain actions as political acts of resistance. He shows 
that the hill tribes are not simply marginalised communities. Their thriving social practices and 
the institutions they create in non-state spaces constitute a strategy. Although legally 
members of a state, these groups opt out from a form of state citizenship that is not in their 
interest. Scott contributes to thinking about resistance in that seemingly ‘ordinary’ livelihood 
strategies and other activities may be political acts. This may also be its main weakness. Scott 
perhaps attributes too much significance to certain acts. It may for instance be problematic to 
see migration as a form of engagement that equals resistance. Other scholars have 
distinguished different levels of agency in this respect (Barter, 2012), which I explain in section 
2.4.2.  
 
2.2.3 Contention  
 
A substantial part of the spectrum consists of various tactics and strategies of contention. 
These may reflect citizens’ rejection of the state, or their resistance to it, or contestation and 
critical engagement. The work on Contentious Politics (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 2008; Tilly & 
Tarrow, 2007) has made a big contribution to unpacking the various tactics and approaches 
used by citizens to show their discontent and push for change via forms of citizen engagement.  
 
Contentious politics occurs at the intersection of contention, politics and collective action. It 
‘involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading 
to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are 
involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties’ (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 4). 
Contentious politics can take the form of revolutions and violent insurgencies, as well as the 
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demonstrations and social movements that constitute critical engagement. Contentious 
politics is about situations where the public disagrees with a situation and considers the 
institutional mechanisms for voicing disagreements no longer suitable. It is about large-scale 
involvement, often of ‘the masses’.  
 
Forms of contentious political action for claim-making are called ‘performances’ and groups 
engaged in contentious politics build a ‘repertoire’ of performances. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) 
present the argument that seemingly very different forms of contention, such as civil wars and 
social movements, have commonalities when one analyses their mechanisms and processes. 
Mechanisms such as brokerage, diffusion, and coordinated action are most common, often 
complemented with other mechanisms such as social appropriation (when social groups 
become political), boundary activation, certification, and identity shift.  
 
Tilly and Tarrow insist on the presence of government as part of the definition of contentious 
politics. They give a number of reasons why. First of all, political contention may pose a risk to 
those in power. Secondly, governments set rules and boundaries for contention. Third, 
governments control the means of coercion and use of violence. They acknowledge that most 
contention occurs outside politics and that such forms also matter, but state that even these 
actors ‘frequently come into contact with governments’ (2007, p.6). Above all, they feel that 
government-connected contention has distinctive properties.  
 
The question posed is why repertoires of contention vary systematically from regime to 
regime. Tilly and Tarrow point to the political opportunity structure, which is made up of the 
crucial features of regimes that determine the horizon of opportunities, risks and threats that 
will be scanned by political actors when choosing their performances. Changes in the 
opportunity structure can enable or constrain collective mobilisation, thus influencing 
feasibility and costs of performances as well as their possible consequences.  
 
I want to highlight two issues that I consider problematic about the contentious politics model 
(Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). First of all, often citizens do not resort to acts of contention to show 
their disagreement, nor do they choose mass mobilisation. A focus on riots, protests and other 
contentious actions neglects the everyday forms of contestation, hidden or visible.  
 
A second problem concerns the explanation of how social actors become political actors and 
how identity plays a role in this (2007, p.78-81). Tilly and Tarrow acknowledge that social 
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identities can form an important basis for political action. Identities are defined by the 
relationships within the own group and between the own and other groups. In contentious 
politics, often already existing boundaries are activated while certain other boundaries are 
deactivated for the purpose of claim making. This is based on earlier work on social 
movements, which acknowledges that a common ‘we’ is needed for collective action. The 
identification of the ‘we’ requires a negative identification of the ‘other’ who is opposed (Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006; Tilly, 2004). Although I do not refute this, their explanation for how a 
political identity develops is incomplete. The emphasis on a cognitive boundary between ‘us 
and them’ ignores how the emotional attachment to a group and a sense of belonging 
motivate engagement, which has been pointed out by others (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 
2001). It also leaves aside how identity construction takes place through action (Wood, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, the authors state that ‘identities become political identities when governments 
become parties to them’ (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p.79, italics original), in line with their definition 
of contentious politics that includes the government. I disagree with this statement, because 
when citizens make claims on other citizens to recognise certain rights they act as political 
actors. Drake (2010) argues that any social identity is a political one. Social identities are 
constructed in different situations and discursive fields of society. Drake explains that for social 
identities to be effective they require social recognition, but they can therefore be acted upon, 
negotiated and changed, and therefore are political (ibid, p.57).  
 
2.2.4 Critical and constructive engagement 
 
Critical and constructive engagement constitutes the right-hand side of the spectrum. In this 
last sub-section I discuss institutionalised participation, which was meant to offer mechanisms 
for citizens to critically and constructively engage with state actors. Compared to other 
segments of the spectrum, the literature on institutionalised participation is more attentive to 
social differentiation within the citizenry and the power dynamics that obstruct effective 
engagement. It would be beyond the scope of this review to discuss all the democratic 
innovations that have been implemented in both developed and developing countries (see 
McLaverty (2011) for an overview). In the African context, democratic decentralisation has 
been important for opening up possibilities for institutionalised participation. Therefore, and 
because of the importance of local governance mechanisms in this study, I limit this section to 
a discussion of participatory local governance.  
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The wave of decentralisation in Africa and other parts of the world was intended not only to 
improve service delivery and hence development, but also to enhance local democratic 
governance (Blair, 2000). The democratising potential of decentralisation rests on two 
dynamics: participation and accountability. Through popular participation citizens have a 
bigger role in local governments’ decision making, and will be able to hold the local 
governments accountable for the decisions that affect them. These themes, according to Blair 
(2000), make democratic decentralisation different from earlier decentralisation processes 
that emphasised efficient service delivery. Olowu’s work concentrates particularly on the 
African context where decentralisation and related political dynamics are strongly affected by 
multi-ethnic societies and post-colonial histories (Olowu, 2003, 2004). 
 
Decentralisation literature demonstrates that political factors shape the real possibilities of 
democratic decentralisation. The national political context and centre-local relations are 
important: the central state can use decentralised governance to create loyal elite locally, thus 
retaining substantial control over the local level. Central control is a common phenomenon in 
many African countries, and indeed across the global south, where the elites at central level 
are reluctant to give up their monopoly on power (Crook, 2003; Crook & Manor, 1998; Olowu, 
2003). Olowu (2003) argues that political constraints such as these need to be tackled even 
before technical issues are addressed. Limited autonomy of sub-national administrations make 
them merely local ‘implementers’ of state policies, primarily accountable to the centre.  
Decentralisation needs to be accompanied by devolution of powers to both the local 
administrations and elected bodies to fulfil its democratic potential.  
Decentralisation literature also identifies local challenges that can interfere with local 
democratic governance, such as elite capture, a composition of the council that does not 
reflect the social reality, and patronage relations between elected leaders and their 
constituency (Olowu, 2003). A persistent risk is that marginalised groups are not represented 
(Blair, 2000; Crook & Manor, 1998; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). These challenges reflect the 
concerns about the micropolitics of participation mentioned earlier. 
There is a small literature on decentralised governance in post-conflict situations, which has 
highlighted a number of challenges for these settings. Experiences vary for each country and 
there is therefore no consensus about the exact relation between decentralisation and conflict 
mitigation (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Crawford & Hartmann, 2008). Institutional deficits like resources 
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and staff capacities are commonly considered to be worse in post-conflict settings and a 
potential risk to the still fragile legitimacy of local institutions  (Jackson & Scott, 2008; 
Woodward, 2002). Scholars have warned, however, that enhancing technical capacities needs 
to go hand in hand with addressing the political context, since it is this context that can greatly 
interfere with state performance (S. Lister & Wilder, 2007).  
Numerous political challenges may interfere with a decentralisation process (Jackson & Scott, 
2008; Woodward, 2002). Generally, in (post)conflict situations the central state – local state 
relationship is precarious and can even become volatile (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Brinkerhoff & 
Johnson, 2009; Jackson & Scott, 2008; Woodward, 2002). The nature of a political settlement 
and the complex configuration of power relationships between government and non-
government actors shape the prospects for local democratic governance (Jarstad, 2008; 
Söderberg Kovacs, 2008). Recent decentralisation and conflict literature pays some attention 
to the role of citizens in decentralised governance. However, the analysis of the problems 
facing citizens is rather thin. The problem is largely explained by pointing to ‘weak and 
fragmented civil society’ (Brinkerhoff, 2011), rather than looking at the disrupted relationships 
within society and  between state and society. I address this in section 2.7 on community-
driven development. 
 
Scholarly work on institutionalised participatory governance has identified factors which limit 
or encourage citizen engagement. Cornwall and Coelho (2007) highlight conducive factors in 
the case of participatory budgeting in Brazil. These refer to the institutional design as well as 
active citizens and a committed bureaucracy. The design of participatory mechanisms should 
take minority groups into account to make them work in their advantage. Openness of state 
institutions to engagement is relevant, and legal frameworks can form important back-up.   
 
Gaventa and Barrett (2010) map the impact of different forms of participation for four 
democracy and development outcomes: a) construction of citizenship; b) the strengthening of 
practices of participation; c) the strengthening of responsive and accountable states; and d) 
the development of inclusive and cohesive societies. They compare the effects of different 
strategies: local associations, social movements and campaigns, formal participatory 
governance spaces, and the use of multiple strategies. Findings show that using a multiplicity 
of strategies is more likely to produce results, in particular in strengthening state 
responsiveness and accountability. The multiplicity often consists of combining participation 
with broader social mobilisation: aligning with a diversity of actors to mobilise political support 
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(civil society, but also media and actors within the political system) from local to national and 
even global level  (Citizenship-DRC, 2011; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). Strategies for effective 
mobilisation differ for more or less favourable contexts. There is, however, no linear 
relationship between the level of democratisation (stronger/weaker institutions) and positive 
outcomes of participation. Also, in weaker states strategies may have some democratising 
effects, and negative outcomes may occur in stronger democracies (2010, p. 53).  
In a review of numerous Transparency and Accountability Initiatives (TAI) McGee and Gaventa 
(2011, p. 22) identify factors that contribute to increased levels of accountability or 
responsiveness impact. A number of these factors are concerned with the role of citizens and 
civil society.  
 
1) Capabilities of citizen and civil society organisations, like the ability to analyse and use 
available information. Exercising voice depends on other factors like the level of prior social 
mobilisation; presence of active media; the presence of coalitions that can act upon evidence; 
the presence of intermediaries who can communicate information to those affected. 
2) The degree to which TAI interacts with other mobilisation strategies, which may include 
advocacy and campaigns, electoral pressure, popular protests and movements.  
3) Citizens are more inclined to become involved in monitoring when they were also involved in 
the formulation of the policy or programme. 
 
This section has reviewed a range of forms of citizen engagement, from rejection through 
violent revolution to critical and constructive engagement in institutionalised participation. 
This last sub-section discussed the right-hand part of the spectrum, which forms the focus of 
this study. I acknowledge that people use both formal and informal tactics of engagement, and 
can be constructive as well as subversive depending on the circumstances. The work by Tilly 
and Tarrow (2007) is a major contribution in this field. But in the Ugandan context, where this 
study is carried out, the right-hand part of the spectrum is considered the most relevant for 
the particular period of the study. I elaborate this in Chapter 3, where I explain my focus and 
on everyday forms of engagement, informed by the work of Scott (1985, 1990) and Corbridge 
et al. (2005). I also reflect critique of the literature on contentious politics and resistance. 
Before I start reviewing conflict studies literature I discuss a last component that is important 
for understanding active citizenship in African contexts: ethnic identity.  
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2.3 Ethnic identity and engagement  
 
As mentioned in section 2.1, in citizenship studies identity is recognised as a possible basis for 
agency. Because the ethnic identity is so important when working in African contexts, I now 
discuss the relationship between citizenship, ethnic identity, and engagement in some detail. 
In social sciences there are various approaches to understanding ethnicity and how it relates to 
social and political engagement. Section 2.3.1 introduces the social constructivist approach to 
ethnicity (Jenkins, 2008), which is, together with the rational choice approach (Bates, 
Figueiredo, & Weingast, 1998; J.D. Fearon & Laitin, 2003), one of the main contemporary 
approaches to understanding ethnicity. Section 2.3.2 discusses the concept of identity in the 
African context. Here citizenship debates revolve around the differentiated senses of ethnic 
identity and national identity and how these shape attitudes and behaviour towards the ethnic 
group and the state. In section 2.3.3 I present social-constructivist approaches that explain 
how identity has become entwined with the exclusion of certain categories of citizens, leading 
to marginalisation. This debate touches upon how a sense of marginalisation shapes citizen 
perceptions of the state and citizen agency, which may shed light on citizen agency in conflict-
affected settings. 
 
2.3.1 A social constructivist approach to ethnicity 
 
In this thesis I adopt a social-constructivist approach to understanding the Acholi ethnic 
identity (Jenkins, 2008). Social constructivists and rational choice scholars compete to explain 
the role of ethnic identity in collective and political action. Rational choice theorists consider 
reason, interest and the pursuit of personal gain as the basis for political action, while 
constructivists argue that it is emotion, identity and the search for meaning through 
interpretation (Bates et al., 1998). Social constructivists argue that ethnicity comes about and 
is reproduced through social interactions. I find this particularly helpful for an understanding of 
processes of marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, in which the reproduction of stereotypes 
and exclusion based on ethnic identity play a major role. This section thus prepares for the 
discussion on marginalisation in section 2.3.3. As the social-constructivist approach is more 
important for my study I limit myself to presenting only a few key points for the rational choice 
approach.  
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Social-constructivists study how identities and the boundaries between them are constructed, 
and the role of culture in the forging of communities. It was Barth (1969) who shifted the 
perspective from a focus on the tribal identity as the defining feature of social structure to 
ethnicity as an aspect of social organisation (Barth, 1969; Jenkins, 2008). It is also different 
from Fearon (2004), who considers descent the distinctive characteristic of an ethnic group, 
along with shared characteristics such as religion, culture, language and a sense of homeland. 
Key features in Barth’s thinking (1969) are: that an analysis of ethnicity starts from how social 
actors themselves perceive it; a focus on how boundaries are constructed through interactions 
across the boundary; that identity depends on ascription by ethnic group members and 
outsiders; and that ethnicity is not fixed but situational. People imagine the community of 
which they want to be part (Anderson, 1993). When it is acknowledged that culture and 
tradition are dynamic and constantly reinvented through social practice, it follows that people 
have some autonomy to unpack and put together aspects of culture. Constructivists emphasise 
the power of symbols, language and rhetoric, and communication, which are used to give 
political meaning to moments and events.   
 
In the African context, the colonial regime was a major actor in the construction of ethnic 
identities (Young, 2007). The colonial administration divided the population into tribes and 
developed an ‘identity codification’ that simplified and regrouped apparently similar entities. 
Africans themselves were actors in the social-construction process, especially the chiefs who 
could benefit from the way groups and boundaries were defined (ibid, p.251). As the modern 
African state developed, under colonial rule and after independence, an important debate 
evolved over the differences between membership of the ethnic group and membership of the 
state (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 1996; Ndegwa, 1997). This debate is captured in section 2.3.2.  
 
It is argued that the constructivist approach could be improved by paying more attention to 
the relationship between ethnicity, class and stratification, and to power and domination 
between groups (Eriksen, 2002; Jenkins, 2008). Jenkins suggests distinguishing two analytically 
distinct processes of ascription: group identification and social categorisation, which he 
explains thus:  
 
The first occurs inside and across the ethnic boundary, the second outside and across it. 
Social categorisation, in particular, is intimately bound up with power relations and relates 
to the capacity of one group successfully to impose its categories of ascription upon 
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another set of people, and to the resources which the categorised collectivity can draw 
upon to resist, if need be, that imposition (2008, p. 23).  
 
It is particularly this aspect of how ethnic boundaries are constructed in order for one group to 
become dominant over another, or how a sense of domination is perceived by a minority, that 
is interesting for this study. A sense of domination may subsequently affect their citizenship 
and the practice of engagement. 
 
To rational choice theorists, ethnicity is considered primarily instrumental in seeking to 
maximise individual preferences and interests, notably material wealth and power. 
Psychological benefits are usually excluded from the spectrum of interests. This approach 
furthermore assumes that people are ready to make ‘cultural trade-offs’ in order to attain 
their goals (Hyden, 2005). Bates (1990), a rational choice scholar, gives examples of the 
instrumental use of kinship ties. Social and political institutions in kinship societies constitute a 
form of ‘self-insurance’ and a risk-mitigation strategy. Ethnic communities are instrumental in 
building human capital: families will invest in education for clan members in town, knowing 
that this eventually leads to higher returns from their paid employment in cities. Older 
generations are able to resolve the collective action problem by imposing rules and sanctions 
that ensure that the younger generations that migrated to the towns continue to remit funds 
to their rural homelands (Bates, 1990, 2000).  
 
Fearon states that ‘Ethnicity is politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic 
lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity’ (2004, p. 860). 
Bates (1983) shares this view and argues that in post-colonial Africa ethnic groups developed 
coalitions to secure access to resources. A shared language and culture made coalitions easier 
to form along ethnic lines than according to other social categories. Their numbers added up 
to win power with a minimum majority while not having to share the benefits with too large a 
group.  Ethnic diversity may affect the distribution of political preferences and the likelihood of 
cooperation, for example in reaching agreement over policies and the financing of public 
goods.  
 
The rational choice argument for the role of ethnicity in political action has been particularly 
articulated in explaining civil war. Several studies show that ethnicity, or ethnic polarisation 
between two groups, cannot adequately explain state failure (Bates, 2008, for the African 
context) or support for ethnic rebellion (J.D. Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
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argue that ethnic civil wars are not significantly different from other civil wars (J.D. Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003). Fearon and Laitin state that ‘constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend 
to merge with rationalist, strategic analysis...’ (J.D. Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 846) because 
individuals (particularly the elite but also individuals on the ground) seek to advance their 
personal interests by mobilising ethnicity.  
 
Social constructivist approaches argue that rationalist approaches fail to give an adequate 
explanation for the ‘willing attachment to communal ideas’  (Kaufman, 2006). Hyden (2005) 
furthermore points out that this approach fails to consider that socialisation processes 
generate preferences and values. To constructivists, an explanation for ethnic mobilisation is 
that differences are strategically manipulated. Several authors propose that elements of the 
constructivist approach are needed to complement rational-choice theory  (Bates et al., 1998, 
p. 629; Kaufman, 2006).  
  
2.3.2 The ethnic citizen: participation in two communities 
 
Ekeh (1975) distinguished two public realms with different ‘citizenship structures’: the balance 
of an individual’s rights and duties in relation to the public. Most Africans are citizens of both 
these publics in society. The primordial public is constituted by the social ties and is a moral 
public. In terms of rights and duties, the African citizen is obliged to further the welfare of the 
primordial public, to a great extent through material contributions. Importantly, an individual 
considers these duties as moral obligations, expecting few material benefits in return. 
According to Ekeh, what the citizen can expect from this public is intangible: recognition, 
identity and (psychological) security, which form his ‘rights’. The relationship between the 
individual and the primordial public cannot be expressed in material terms as the moral duties 
outweigh the material value of the contributions made. The civic public stems from the 
colonial administration and is constituted by state institutions like the civil service, police and 
the military. This public is amoral and therefore its economic value is emphasised. To the civic 
public, the citizen has no moral duty to contribute anything but can extract as many benefits as 
possible. The two publics are in dialectic relationship with one another: the logic of the 
dialectic is that it is considered legitimate to channel what is gained from the civic public into 
the primordial public. It is the dialectical tensions and confrontations between these publics 
that characterise African politics (1975, p.208). The differentiated attitude towards the two 
publics explains behaviours such as corruption and bribery, work ethos, and associational life. 
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Voluntary associations belong to the primordial public and do not represent the ‘civic culture’ 
in the Toquevillean sense, as described by western political sociologists. 
 
The two publics, Ekeh argues, are the enduring legacy of colonialism, the period during which 
the colonial regime and the educated African elite were contesting claims of legitimacy. The 
post-colonial ruling elites needed to establish their legitimacy, and did so by exploiting the 
ethnic divisions created during colonialism, a process of promoting tradition as the basis of 
legitimacy, and portraying the civic administration as amoral while the (new) ethnic groupings 
were described as moral. This set in motion the dialectic relationship between the two publics, 
legitimising the profiteering attitude towards the civic public for the benefit of the primordial 
public. This process greatly influenced post-colonial statehood as it obstructed the 
development of a sense of duty towards the state.  
 
The membership of two political communities is a theme explored by other authors. 
Mamdani’s famous work, Citizen and Subject (1996) describes the bifurcated state: the duality 
of two forms of power under one hegemonic colonial authority. This duality entailed a system 
of direct rule and modern law in urban areas, creating citizens, and a system of indirect rule 
through customary authorities using customary law in rural areas, creating subjects. 
Citizenship became a privilege of the civilised: in urban areas ‘civil society’ implied the civilised 
society comprising the educated Africans who were employed by the colonial administration 
and who enjoyed civil rights. Uncivilised ‘natives’ were excluded from civil rights and freedoms. 
 
In rural areas, the colonial regime reconstituted the customary chiefs or created chiefs through 
appointment where previously they had not existed (ibid). Chiefs held legislative, executive, 
administrative and judicial powers without any checks and balances and thus formed a 
powerful, authoritarian system of rule. Although the site of customary law was contested, the 
institutional context enabled the chiefs to define its content. Customary law regulated non-
market relations and community affairs, and access to land. It was not about guaranteeing 
rights but about guaranteeing power, hence Mamdani’s stance that this created subject 
identities.  
 
The development of the system of indirect rule was accompanied by a process of tribalisation. 
Rural Africans were organised in tribes, each with their own territory, ascribed culture, and 
leadership. The British colonial regime in particular used ‘culture’ as a way to demarcate 
territorial and administrative boundaries and assumed tribes to be cultural units, even when 
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distinct ethnic groups lived in the same area. The categorisation of rural areas into tribal areas 
each ruled by a Native Authority meant that there were as many sets of customary law as 
there were tribes. The combination of financial autonomy of the tribal units and a powerful 
chieftaincy produced what Mamdani calls ‘decentralised despotism’ (1996, p.57). Abuse of 
power by chiefs was widespread, and the colonial power tried to counter it by making the 
chieftaincy a salaried and appointed, instead of inherited, position, and by transferring chiefs 
to other locations. Despite these measures the practice of extorting resources from subject 
populations continued. 
 
According to Mamdani (1996), the way post-colonial regimes have responded to the bifurcated 
state is the major reason why rural populations continue to be excluded from equal 
citizenship. Conservative regimes maintained the hierarchy in the local state through 
customary authorities after independence, thus reproducing the ‘decentralised despotism’.  
Conservative states thus continued the practice of forcing an ethnic identity onto subject 
populations. Clientelist relations crossed the rural-urban divide, which tended to exacerbate 
ethnic divisions.  Radical African states, however, sought to transform the native authority and 
discard ethnic differences, but often did so by formulating one customary law for the 
countryside that coexisted with modern law for urban areas.  A single, customary law thus 
applied to the entire rural, subject population regardless of ethnic identity. This process went 
hand in hand with a tightening of control over local authorities in the name of ‘detribalisation’ 
and centralising the state’s coercive and administrative power. Thus, instead of reforming the 
local state and making it more democratic the tendency was towards centralised despotism. In 
both conservative and radical states a process of deracialisation occurred, which entailed 
modification of the social boundary between modern and customary law (1996, p. 136). 
Modern law could now be accessed by all people, both natives (of African descent) and non-
natives. However, the urban poor often lacked the de facto means to access modern legal 
institutions. Customary law governed the lives of rural populations that had no physical access 
to modern law as it had no presence in rural areas.  
 
According to Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa (1998, p. 342) it is crucial to recognise that both liberal 
and republican values are relevant to the study of citizenship in Africa, because together they 
address rights and identity. It is especially the (creative) tension between civic republicanism 
and liberalism that is relevant. Liberal citizenship was associated with legal membership of the 
state and an emphasis on legal rights. Much activity by African citizens at sub-national level, 
however, resembles civic republican notions of participation in the institutions that belong to 
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the ethnic community. Ndegwa (1997) writes about the ‘duality of citizenship’ in the ethnic 
community and the nation-state. When it is recognised that ethnic political communities can 
exist at sub-state level, it can be acknowledged that different forms of citizenship can coexist. 
Although these forms of citizenship coexist, there is a ‘hierarchy of attachment’ to the 
different communities and the citizenships are in competition.  
 
Ndegwa (1997) elaborates this competition between ethnic citizenship and state citizenship. 
Membership of and belonging to the nation-state and its authority are codified in legal, 
rational and bureaucratic frameworks, whereas membership of the ethnic community is 
organised through socially constructed definitions (Ndegwa, 1997). The ethnic community is 
defined by membership through descent, and the recognition of a shared history and values. 
The legitimacy of the nation-state rests on the notion that, through democracy, citizens are 
able to affect the institutions that govern society. Authority in the ethnic community is non-
bureaucratic and relies on cultural practices that confirm the authority of institutions, often 
through socially legitimated individuals. This translates into differentiated citizenship practices 
as well, and in particular the balance of rights and obligations one has towards the state and 
the ethnic community. Whereas legal membership of the nation-state qualifies members to 
participate in the nation’s community, ethnic citizenship requires members to participate and 
advance the welfare of the ethnic group. This resonates with what Ekeh (1975) wrote on 
differences in obligations towards each community. Moreover, participation in the ethnic 
community encourages members to compete with other communities, in particular the state, 
unless their own ethnic group ‘owns’ the state. Citizens in the ethnic community are not 
autonomous. They cannot claim rights if it has negative consequences for the group. The 
republican citizenship in the ethnic community dictates that one is a citizen in that community 
through active participation in it, and only by active participation can the ethnic citizen gain 
rights. This explains the vibrant networks between migrants and their home areas, because the 
obligation to participate still holds while they are away. 
 
The tension, or how the two citizenships contests, is manifested in that the demands of the 
ethnic community may undermine liberal citizenship. First of all, membership of the ethnic 
community shapes an individual’s preferences and aims, and attitudes towards the state 
(Ndegwa, 1997). As the authority and legitimacy of institutions in the ethnic community are 
more pervasive in people’s lives, mechanisms in the ethnic community are more effective in 
ensuring compliance. Secondly, the ethnic groups that control the state will use this as an 
opportunity to further the welfare of the ethnic community and, as Ekeh (1975) has argued, 
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this becomes an obligation. In the case of Kenya, Ndegwa shows that the liberal state 
citizenship bestows rights and is unable to demand the meeting of obligations, while the civic 
republican citizenship extracts contributions from the members, so the two citizenships are 
not compatible. This explains the ethnic politics in Kenya’s post-independence transitional 
period.    
 
More recently it has been acknowledged that one should not think in overly dualistic terms: in 
reality people are not either citizens or subjects. Many people, in particular in rural Africa, are 
both, although often rather more subject than citizen for most of their life (Nyamnjoh, 2008). 
Even the rural population can, at various points in their lives, participate in the ‘civic 
community’ (Geschiere & Gugler, 1998). With so many linkages and networks between rural 
and urban communities, the strict separation between the two spheres is hard to uphold 
(Geschiere & Gugler, 1998). Mamdanis’s distinction between citizens and subjects (1996) has 
become too general: in today’s Africa many people are citizen and subject at the same time 
(Geschiere & Gugler, 1998). Hickey (2007) cautions against reducing individuals or groups to an 
essence, to fixed categories such as ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ and ‘citizen’ or ‘subject’, since the 
boundaries only become significant when they are reinforced by institutions and social 
practice.  
 
2.3.3 Identity and marginalisation 
 
While citizenship holds a promise of rights and equality, as was mentioned in section 2.1 the 
reality is different for many people. In many countries ‘hierarchies in citizenship’ exist 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006) and there are both formal and informal institutions that exclude people 
from membership, and from citizenship rights and entitlements. This generates forms of 
marginalisation for certain groups of people. In this section I capture some approaches to 
marginalisation in which ethnicity played a role: exclusion through an emphasis on 
autochthony as the basis of citizenship (Geschiere & Gugler, 1998); historical processes of 
adverse incorporation (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007a); and exclusion through socio-economic status 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006).  
 
Autochthon refers to being a ‘son of the soil’. The meaning seems self-evident, but the debates 
on autochthony and citizenship have shown that it is risky to use it as the basis for citizenship 
(Geschiere, 2011). An ‘autochthon’ is much harder to define than an ethnic group, which has a 
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name and history and is thus more or less clearly defined. Because the meaning of 
‘autochthon’ lacks substance it is therefore open to political manipulation. Like ethnicity, the 
notion of autochthon-allochthon can be mobilised to create boundaries between ‘us and 
them’. Political actors have used this to their advantage and to generate political support 
among autochthonous populations by relating autochthony to access to resources, sometimes 
leading to outbursts of violence (Dunn, 2009). Labelling people as allochthon can easily make 
them ‘strangers’ and exclude them from full citizenship and corresponding rights (see Dorman, 
Hammett, & Nugent, 2007; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006). In practice, an emphasis on 
autochthony erodes the ideal of national citizenship, which was the objective of nation-
building in many African states after independence.   
 
In African contexts a notion of autochthony has increasingly become crucial in debates on 
citizenship and identity in relation to access to rights and resources.  Two factors contributed 
to this: the furthering of political liberalisation and the global capitalist economy since the 
1980s (Dunn, 2009; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000); and the 
weakening of the neo-patrimonial system that created a sense of insecurity, for which political 
leaders found a solution in the autochthony discourse that helped them guarantee resources 
to their supporters (Dunn, 2009). In many African countries the immigrant populations 
expanded due to market economies, which posed a threat to autochthon populations. 
Granting citizenship to ‘strangers’ means that they have voting power and might one day 
outnumber the ‘autochthons’. Political liberalisation and transition to multi-party politics may 
offer these groups opportunities for political mobilisation (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000). 
Regimes can use autochthon ideology to undermine opposition by dividing it, and as a 
consequence can contain the effects of multi-partyism as a divide-and-rule tactic.  
 
The literature on adverse incorporation tells us to make explicit the relationship between the 
marginalisation of certain individuals or groups and the larger systems that shape their lives 
and set the terms for how they can participate in social, political and economic life: markets, 
social systems and networks, cultural belief systems, identities and institutions (Du Toit, 2004). 
‘The concept of adverse incorporation, it is argued, captures the ways in which localised 
livelihood strategies are enabled and constrained by economic, social, and political relations 
over both time and space, in that they operate over lengthy periods and within cycles, and at 
multiple spatial levels, from local to global. These relations are driven by inequalities of power’ 
(Hickey & Du Toit, 2007a, p. 4). There is a need not just to focus on the mechanisms of 
exclusion, but to understand the terms of inclusion of certain groups.  
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Hickey’s (2007) discussion of the Mbororo’en, a pastoralist community in North-West 
Cameroon, illustrates how their process of citizenship construction has been a process of 
‘adverse incorporation’ into the state and that claims over their ‘allochthony’ deepened their 
marginalisation. Their identity is not just defined by their ethnic affiliation, but also by their 
livelihood as pastoralists without a clearly defined home territory. Highly dependent on land 
for their livelihoods, the pastoralist Mbororo’en engaged in patron-client relationships with 
customary leaders and state actors that controlled the land. The process of democratisation 
did not open up spaces for the Mbororo’en. Instead, the patron-client relationships extended 
into the political sphere; exclusionary, neo-patrimonial politics intensified, and public and 
political discourses on ‘autochthony’ further marginalised migrant minorities.  
 
With the case of the Mbororo’en, Hickey demonstrates that marginalisation of a group does 
not simply mean they are excluded from local citizenship status and practice, but the group 
becomes part of the construction of citizenship of other groups. The members and leaders of 
other groups defined themselves in a dialectic relationship to the alien Mbororo’en: the 
internal, alien ‘other’. Furthermore, he shows that marginalisation began during the colonial 
time, which is different from Mamdani’s emphasis (1996) on exclusionary nationalist politics of 
the post-colonial states.  
 
An interesting point for this study is what Hickey notes about citizen engagement among the 
Mbroro’en. He states that due to the patron-client relationships in the incumbent regime - 
which were also nurtured by the Mbororo’en for survival - and fear of negative consequences 
if they were associated with opposition, Mbororo’en refrained from resistance. For example, 
they did not participate when the provincial population engaged in protests in the 1990s. 
Hickey: ‘This episode again revealed the mixture of marginality and self-isolation that 
characterises the Mbororo’en’s experience of citizenship’ (2007, p.96). 
 
Nyamnjoh describes how marginalisation and a ‘hierarchy in citizenship’ is experienced by 
immigrants in South Africa and by maids and migrant domestic workers in Botswana 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006). According to Nyamnjoh the way maids and immigrants are treated is 
directly related to a nation-bound conceptualisation of citizenship. As globalisation produces 
large groups of migrant workers, particularly in Africa, adherence to a nation-bound citizenship 
concept puts all of them at risk of being marginalised. He therefore argues for a more flexible 
notion of citizenship. Nyamnjoh’s analysis of the marginalisation of these groups shows that a 
64 
 
hierarchy of citizenship exists even among the marginalised. His discussion of their coping 
strategies and how they are, to some extent, shaped by citizenship directly addresses what I 
have termed the sense of citizenship and how it is related to the practice. I will summarise his 
two cases here.  
 
 In South Africa and Botswana the term ‘Makwerekwere’ is used for black immigrants and 
refers to someone who cannot speak one of the South African languages, and who comes from 
African countries that are considered  to be more ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2008, p. 79). It is associated with negative stereotypes like being darker-skinned, 
less educated, and engaged in criminal behaviour. African immigrants are vulnerable to 
discrimination and violence by South Africans. The police often worsen the situation instead of 
resolving a case. One coping strategy of Makwerekwere is to learn a local language, which 
helps them fend off the police who use language to find, detain and send back foreign 
migrants.  
 
Maids and female migrant domestic workers in Botswana are vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuse. As Nyamnjoh shows, even within this social category there is a hierarchy in citizenship 
with implications for how maids exercise voice. The Batswana maids, who belong to the ethnic 
majority of the country, are more confident and feel themselves better than maids belonging 
to minority groups and consider themselves particularly superior to Zimbabwean maids. In the 
case of serious exploitation, Batswana maids are more inclined to report to the police than 
Zimbabwean maids, who run away from them and choose exploitation over detention and 
deportation. This fear makes maids reluctant to claim their rights and stand up for themselves. 
Nonetheless, Nyamnjoh describes how they use ‘weapons of the weak’ tactics (Scott, 1985) to 
cope with their masters and their situation. 
 
This section explained the social-constructivist approach to ethnic identity and forms of 
exclusion, contrasting it with the rational-choice approach. Chapter 3 explains how the social-
constructivist approach is deemed most appropriate for this study and how it helps to 
deconstruct the Acholi sense of citizenship. The next section returns to the question of citizen 
engagement, now looking at how it develops in contexts of violent conflict. 
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2.4  Agency and institutions in conflict settings 
2.4.1 Transformation of social and political institutions 
 
There is increasing awareness that violent conflict can transform existing social and political 
institutions, as well as generate new types of institutions (Justino, 2011, 2013). Justino (2011) 
distinguishes two forms of institutional transformation: 1) changes in social relations that 
determine the nature of local norms of conduct, cooperation and trust; and 2) the emergence 
of non-state forms of governance, notably by non-state (armed) actors that replace ‘weak, 
inexistent or inappropriate’ state institutions. This brings to mind the authors discussed in 
section 2.2.1, who demonstrated that forms of social organisation change during conflict 
(Wood, 2003; Petersen, 2001).  
 
Justino (2013) argues that change in social and political institutions and the way people engage 
with them has consequences for the conflict cycle, as well as for governance arrangements in 
the post-conflict situation. An understanding of institutional transformation during conflict can 
help to understand why conflict persists or re-emerges (2013, p.9). This thesis complements 
this understanding with an in-depth discussion of how the transformation of institutions 
during conflict has implications for the practice of citizenship. In this section I discuss a number 
of studies that have demonstrated how institutions can transform during conflict, which may 
provide insights for thinking about citizen engagement. 
 
The conventional idea about social institutions, networks and relationships is that they risk 
becoming ‘fractured’ during war. One cause is overt repression of associational life by violent 
actors: there are no ‘safe spaces’ for people to get together and discuss issues that are 
potentially sensitive. A second explanation is found in the divisive effects of conflict, disrupting 
social networks and social trust, which can make collective action nearly impossible. Although 
the negative effects on social institutions should not be underestimated, scholars have pointed 
out that there is no ‘vacuum’ in social relations (Pouligny, 2005). Instead, they adapt and new 
institutions may emerge.  
 
Wood (2003) demonstrates that in the case of the insurgency by peasant campesinos against 
the landowning elite and the state during the civil war in El Salvador, the formation of 
cooperatives led to a thriving civil society. After the war, the situation did not return to the 
status quo from before the war. Forms of social organisation and rural authority had been 
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forged: the insurgent cooperatives remained in place, often linked up in networks and 
affiliated to political opposition. They formed important socio-political institutions that were 
crucial for the organisation of production and local life. They had transformed patterns of land 
ownership and tenure. During the war these cooperatives had occupied land that belonged to 
the landowners. After the war, under the peace agreement, the cooperatives claimed 
ownership of the land, altering the regime of property rights. They became the legitimate 
political authority that in many cases replaced the alliance between landowners and security 
actors or, where these actors had remained, challenged their authority. Through participation 
in the popular organisation of the cooperatives the campesinos had claimed rights and 
practiced citizen engagement. Although they remained poor, at the end of the war they had 
shifted the balance of power in their favour (Wood, 2003, pp. 86-87). 
 
Concerning political institutions, a key feature of conflict settings is that the state is rarely the 
only form of authority; rather there are multiple authorities present that often compete for 
power with one another and/or the state. Even where the state ‘collapses’, new forms of order 
and governance emerge (Justino, 2013; Kalyvas, Shapiro, & Masoud, 2008). When the state 
fails to guarantee security and a form of political order, this vacuum may be filled by organised 
non-state actors such as customary authorities, but usually by armed groups like guerrilla/ 
revolutionaries (Pearce et al., 2011). These actors considerably shape the local level 
micropolitics for participation, and indeed every sphere of local life. Armed non-state factions 
contest both the local and central state with the use of violence, undermining state legitimacy 
and effectiveness (Pearce et al., 2011). In Afghanistan non-state actors exercise control over 
sub-national governments in various ways, referred to as the dynamics between the de facto 
and de jure state  (S. Lister & Wilder, 2007). In the slums of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, drug 
traffickers, militias and the police constitute ‘parallel authorities’ competing for control using 
excessive violence, and shaping the public spaces. Militias mediate access of citizens to state 
resources and influence what the state can do in the slums (Wheeler, 2011). These actors also 
matter in a post-conflict state, depending on the extent to which they are integrated in the 
state, engage in dialogue with state institutions, support them or challenge and compete with 
them. In fact Cleaver’s point (2004) about ‘old’ forms of authority shaping new opportunities 
for citizen participation seems to apply  particularly to post-conflict settings where governance 
reforms are implemented.  
 
Micro-level research has started to unpack the relationship between a civilian population and 
guerrillas (Bakonyi & Stuvoy, 2005; Justino, 2009; Weinstein, 2007). It shows how insurgent 
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groups establish governing mechanisms. It also shows the factors that influence people in 
deciding whether or not to support the insurgents and if so, how. Support may entail provision 
of food and other supplies, and intelligence. Insurgent groups need a population exactly for 
this. The result can be a co-existence governed by various mechanisms. The way the NRA 
created the RCs in Luwero in Central Uganda is a good example, allowing citizens to take part 
in the anti-government movement and local self-rule (Karlström, 1996; Weinstein, 2007). I 
elaborate on this in Chapter 4. 
 
War economies are constituted by economic and political institutions and networks, which 
create power dynamics that greatly impact the lives of local populations. Nordstrom refers to 
the institutions of the war economy as ‘extra-state’ institutions or ‘shadows’, which emerge 
during war and persist during cease fires or in post-conflict situations. The shadow economies 
that emerge include trade networks from the local to international level. The persistence of 
such networks and arrangements can explain, for example, the failure of peace agreements 
and rapidly rising crime figures. Nordstrom emphasises that the words used to describe the 
shadows (i.e. clandestine, informal, illegal, underground) make it sound as if the spaces of the 
shadows are separated from ‘formal life’ as two different realms. However, she argues that 
‘the shadows exist in the midst of formal state society and the minutiae of day-to-day living.’ 
(p.36). They exist within formal life of government offices, humanitarian organisations and 
military bases.  
 
It was often assumed that, in times of civil war, economic life would come to a standstill, and 
that rural communities would ‘retreat into subsistence’ and no longer engage in wage labour. 
Literature on war economies has demonstrated the opposite. Cramer (2006b) shows that new 
economic networks emerged in the Mozambique war with demand for wage labour, in which 
rural populations also participated. Certain actors, notably party officials, military officials and 
‘wartime entrepreneurs’ benefited from these conditions and attained relative wealth and 
power, through what Cramer calls ‘extraction of war tax’.  Regulations were weak and 
conditions were poor. The rural population got incorporated into the war economy in various 
ways, depending on how they were controlled by Frelimo or Renamo or both. Meanwhile, 
several actors were able to secure pieces of land, evicting the rural population and forcing 
them to look for wage labour. Due to these various processes in the countryside, the war 
economy accelerated a process of social differentiation that had been set in motion under the 
colonial regime. As many actors benefited from this situation, aspects of this war economy 
persisted in the post-war period.  
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Nordstrom (2004) cites a number of examples from her ethnographic work about local people, 
humanitarian workers and government officials, and how they take part in the networks and 
institutions that constitute the war economy. They do not see themselves as ‘smugglers’ or 
‘criminals’. Given their circumstances, participation in such networks is just a way of getting by 
in the complex setting of a war. They are members of a web of relationships that link shadow 
transactions, business development and political power, forming trade networks from the very 
local to the international level. She states that the shadows and ‘politics of invisibility’ are 
created by those who benefit from it (2004, p.34). They use a discourse that justifies the 
necessity of violence and the war itself, distracting attention from how they benefit from 
them. 
 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2005; 2008a) argue that microlevel dynamics in the conflict in 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have led to a series of social and political 
transformations, which play an important role in sustaining the conflict. Microlevel dynamics 
constitute a ‘war complex’: shifting relations between different actors (various militias, local 
entrepreneurs, actors in the local administration, the military, and sometimes foreign military 
actors from Rwanda and Uganda) that have created informal trade networks in DRC and across 
the border in Uganda (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2005). Militant actors needed resources, 
but these informal trade networks and arrangements with armed actors were also produced as 
a strategy by citizens - and especially the local elite - to sustain their lives in the midst of 
insecurity (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2008b). 
 
These dynamics have had several socio-political impacts (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2005, 
pp. 11-12). One is that younger generations have increasingly become dependent on 
participation in these trade networks. Moreover, gains from this form of exploitation have 
offered them a social identity of ‘having’. Furthermore, the authority of customary leaders has, 
to a great extent, been replaced by that of the many militias that operate in rural areas. 
Customary leaders have often been forced to support these armed actors, which has led to a 
further erosion of their authority and associated norms of solidarity and in decision-making. 
Finally, these networks have also produced systems of governance (Vlassenroot & 
Raeymaekers, 2008b) and militias have created their own governance mechanisms, although 
they would often make use of the administrative structures that existed prior to the war. The 
authors demonstrate that there is variation in the types of order in different parts of Eastern 
DRC (2005, 2008). In some cases, the different actors continued to compete over access to 
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resources, leading to ongoing insecurity. In most cases, the militias, local administration and 
local entrepreneurs formed an alliance, in which entrepreneurs shared some of their gains in 
return for protection and mobility. At the same time they held some power, mediating 
between militias and the natural resources. Actors found mutual benefit in these relationships 
and were reluctant to give them up.  
 
It is, however, important to recognise the importance of pre-conflict history. Writing about the 
war in Mozambique, Lubkemann (2008) stresses that people had their social struggles and 
relationships before the war and these shaped how they responded to the war. In fact, he 
criticises Nordstrom (1997) for presenting the people in her book as if they have no history, as 
if everything begins when the war starts. He argues that social and political change during war 
may affect people’s lives more than the violence associated with war. For example, 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2008) show how some of the militias’ strategies developed as a 
consequence of, or in response to, the patrimonialism and the decentralised patronage 
networks that formed a divide-and-rule system imposed in Zaire by Mobutu’s post-colonial 
regime. These networks had serious impact on the local population. Allen (2006, 2010) shows 
how the position of customary leaders in Northern Uganda and the meaning of Acholi peace-
making rituals were transformed over the course of the war. In Northern Uganda external 
actors played a major role in ‘reinventing’ the rituals for reconciliation. These changes had 
implications for how social harmony is guarded in the post-conflict situation. This example will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
From the above review, it is possible to infer that conflict causes transformations in political 
structures, social relations and economic networks. Institutional change impacts the security 
and survival of the population (Justino 2013, p.9). However, the range and volume of literature 
reviewed in this section is not matched by a similar body of literature on the position of the 
citizen in adverse settings: how citizens engage with the new powerful actors, how they can 
find space to negotiate better outcomes for themselves, and how they can act collectively and 
hold actors accountable.  
 
I use this literature to formulate propositions about how citizenship unfolds during conflict. In 
this thesis I argue that changes in local institutions have implications for citizenship. Central to 
an understanding of citizen engagement is the notion that conflict transforms power dynamics. 
If new forms of authority emerge that contest the state, this will affect how citizens engage 
with the state. The conflict may change those social norms and social practices that guide how 
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people engage with state and customary authority. If local institutions are important for 
learning practices of collective action, decision-making and leadership, then changes in these 
institutions will affect the exposure of citizens to learning such practices. If conflict alters the 
formal and informal mechanisms and institutions through which citizens exercise their 
individual and collective voice this will affect how they exercise citizen agency, as I discuss 
below.  
 
2.4.2 Forms of agency and navigation in a warscape  
 
In this section I elaborate how agency in relation to conflict is discussed, mainly in 
anthropology and conflict studies. This will show that academic work has focused on forms of 
‘coping agency’ – the agency to survive in terms of staying safe and maintaining livelihoods - 
while less is known about citizen agency – the agency to take issues into the public sphere, 
engage in decision-making and with public authority.  
 
Anthropological studies describe in detail how people live through war, how they give meaning 
to events in their lives, and how social relations are transformed (Lubkemann, 2008; 
Nordstrom, 1997; Vigh, 2006; E. Wood, 2008). Several anthropologists have argued that war 
and conflict should not be seen as ‘discontinuities’ or as deviating from normal life and peace 
(Lubkemann, 2008; Scheper Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). Rather, conflict and violence are part 
of life like other social phenomena. Of course conflict situations limit, accelerate or generate 
other social processes, but the boundaries between conflict and stability are not clear-cut. In 
Acholi the intensity of the war fluctuated and in relatively stable periods people tried to 
resume life as usual, but in a constant state of alertness. Scholars have introduced terms such 
as ‘warscape’  (Nordstrom, 1997), ‘war as social condition’ (Lubkemann, 2008), or ‘landscapes 
of power relations’ (Halstead, 2008) to discuss the particular realities of life in the midst of 
violent conflict.  
 
What unfolds in these contexts of conflict is a process that Vigh describes as routinisation 
(2006). The conflict becomes the everyday and insecurity becomes anticipated. Routinisation 
entails the continuous reflection and interpretation of this environment and the subsequent 
(inter)actions and forms of organisation. The concept helps to understand how people adjust 
to ever-changing circumstances. War is not seen as a vacuum devoid of social practices and 
relations, but as a social terrain in which routines and practices are produced and recreated. 
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The volatility of the situation requires people to reflect continuously on the intensity and 
movements of the conflict, and therefore they can no longer afford to rely on habits 
(unconsciously repeated actions). 
 
Vigh introduces the term social navigation to describe how people try to shape their life 
trajectories in an environment that is constantly in flux (2006, 2010). He contends that this 
concept complements an understanding of social action in two ways: it first of all tells us that 
agents plan and act upon the real and imagined environment. And secondly, it describes a 
praxis in which social change is an integral part:  
 
...agents act not only in relation to each other, or in relation to larger social forces, but in 
relation to the complex interaction between agents, terrain and events, thereby making it 
possible to encompass social flux and instability, and the way they influence and become 
ingrained in action, in our understanding of a specific praxis (Vigh, 2006, p. 14).  
 
Aware that their context is changing, people adjust themselves and their actions in response. 
The concept thus conveys that people are inventive, and relations and power continue to be 
configured in these settings. Hence, agency exists in dialectical relationship to this very 
complex and dynamic structure that a warscape is. Innovation, flexibility and improvisation are 
important skills for social navigation (Hoffman & Lubkemann, 2005). The process of reflection 
is helped by what Vigh terms social reflexivity; the continuous interpretation of the context 
(Vigh, 2006) but through a higher sense of awareness (Vigh, 2008).  
 
Ethnographic work shows how creative coping strategies help people to make sense of their 
life worlds in the midst of chaos at the same time as it helps their survival. Finnström describes 
how Acholi interpreted and gave meaning to the violence they experienced, as a way of coping 
(2003). Others have emphasised how social relations and institutions form the foundations for 
coping mechanisms (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). Nordstrom describes how the population of 
Mozambique (re)created worlds that were demolished by war violence (1995, pp. 142-148). 
Not only did they find ways to maintain a level of subsistence, they also ‘created culture’. 
Certain artefacts represented their suffering and resistance. Healers were routinely involved in 
‘taking the war out of people’ well after a peace agreement was reached. 
   
Nordstrom (1997) gives numerous examples of people who had the courage to stay in the 
Mozambican war zone and help others, creating new institutions of care and compassion, as 
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forms of creative resistance against war (Nordstrom, 1997). This helped them to have a sense 
of identity and agency. It produced culture, as people created a political culture that 
denounced the use of violence. Although Nordstrom underlines people’s creativity for survival, 
she argues against an association between violence and creativity, often found in social theory, 
as if ‘the phoenix is rising from the ashes’ (p. 15). She shows that people are forced to be 
creative to survive, but it is creativity under adverse conditions. Nordstrom argues that many 
of the survival tactics constitute acts of resistance and forms of political agency, because 
people denounce and delegitimise acts of violence and they resist being killed. However, 
although people resist the negative effects conflict may have on their lives, not all these 
instances address the causes of conflict or the perpetrators of violence.  
 
Recent scholarly work has started to distinguish different forms of agency in violent settings. 
Moser and Horn (2011) distinguish ‘coping’ from ‘resolving’ agency to highlight the difference 
between short-term acts for survival and agency aimed at addressing the causes of violence.  
Based on Hirschman’s typology of exit, voice and loyalty, Barter describes three strategies that 
civilians use, sometimes in combination, to deal with violence: flight, voice and support 
(Barter, 2012). These strategies represent levels of agency, some of which can be considered 
more political.  
 
Barter’s typology is useful for distinguishing ‘survival agency’ from agency that is more political 
in nature; engaging with powerful actors in the conflict. Flight refers to migration away from 
the (threat of) violence. Voice has three sub-categories: defiance, everyday resistance, and 
engagement. Defiance is the most visible and confrontational form and is expressed through 
protests, reporting violations, liaising with international actors, but also  in declaring peace 
zones that challenge the authority of armed actors. Informed by Scott’s (1985) work, Barter 
holds that forms of everyday resistance are often symbolic, require less coordination than 
mobilised guerrilla activity, are less risky and may have potential for social change. These acts 
undermine the legitimacy of armed groups. Engagement is about negotiation between civilians 
and armed actors, with the aim of enhancing security. Support blurs the line between civilian 
and combatant. It entails a form of collaboration with violent actors, often for one’s own 
protection. Barter’s third category of support has been explored by others, who have analysed 
the circumstances under which people opt to support violent actors, the factors that influence 
ordinary people to decide whether to support armed violence or not, and in what form 
(Kalyvas, 2006). There is an increasing understanding of the different forms of support that 
populations give to armed actors, like food, information and services  (Barter, 2012; Justino, 
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2009) in exchange for minimum levels of security, protection (of homes, economic activities 
and trade networks) and even ‘order’.   
 
Thus, scholarly work has shown the multiple strategies people develop in the midst of violent 
conflict. Much of this work, however, shows how people exercise agency to ensure safety and 
maintain livelihoods. There is still limited knowledge about how citizen agency evolves. Yet for 
a better understanding of what people do in the midst of conflict it is helpful to distinguish 
forms of ‘coping’ or ‘survival agency’ from types of agency that are more political. I return to 
this in Chapter 3.   
 
2.5 Citizen engagement in conflict settings 
 
A small number of studies taking a citizenship approach have been carried out in conflict-
affected and authoritarian states. These studies have highlighted a number of factors that 
obstruct citizen engagement, which I discuss here using the concepts associated with active 
citizenship described in previous sections: agency, space, and voice. I pay specific attention to 
Rwanda, Angola and Sierra Leone to compare how citizenship has evolved in countries with 
various conflict dynamics and violence. I also discuss the findings of a number of studies that 
suggest that conflict can have positive impacts on citizen participation.  
 
2.5.1 Narrowing space for citizen agency and voice 
 
The available literature on citizenship and violent conflict suggests that changes in the public 
sphere are equally important for citizen engagement as changes in social and political 
institutions. The central point is that citizens act partly based on the perceived safety of the 
public sphere, and the perceived threat from armed actors. This relates neatly to Vigh’s 
concept of social navigation: people analyse their environment and the fluctuations in the 
warscape and act upon what they interpret as risks and opportunities. 
 
The literature on citizenship and conflict refers to ‘spaces’ for engagement (Gaventa, 2006a). 
The nature of spaces for citizen engagement in (post)conflict settings is likely to be less 
conducive to citizen engagement than the more stable environments. Both state and non-state 
actors can be sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries for citizen engagement. 
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Especially when violence is exercised and a threat of violence persists, this rapidly erodes 
spaces for engagement (Pearce, 2007; Pearce et al., 2011). Citizens feel there is hardly a ‘safe 
space’ left, sometimes not even in the private space of their homes. This perception of the 
available space for participation affects people’s willingness to actually engage, balancing the 
risks and opportunities of engagement.  
 
In this thesis, I find it important to distinguish between space and sphere, because ‘space’ has 
often been used in relation to actions like influencing and claim-making. The public sphere 
refers to how people speak and discuss, without necessarily taking further action (Fraser, 
1990). Several authors have demonstrated that citizen perceptions of the public sphere also 
shape engagement. The perceived safety of the public sphere thus depends largely on the 
configuration of actors and their (previous) use of threat and violence. Of Israel, Ben-Porath 
(2006) has written that the perceptions and expectations people have of the state have altered 
due to the war experience. The relationship between citizens and the state has narrowed 
because security issues dominate the agenda and public debates. As a consequence, insecurity 
alters the priorities citizens expect the state to fulfil (Ben-Porath, 2006). Living in repressive, 
violent environments substantially alters citizen perceptions of their environment, even if 
violence is no longer manifested (Pearce et al., 2011). This has for instance been demonstrated 
in Guatemala (Pearce, 2007; Green, 1999). Several authors argue that this perception can be 
passed on to subsequent generations and hence inform their readiness to engage (Beswick, 
2010; Kisielewski & LeDoux, 2009).  
 
Given that the concept ‘voice’ is so important for citizen engagement in the public sphere, it is 
interesting to note that the concept ‘silence’ figures strongly in conflict settings.  Silence is a 
concept associated with disempowerment of the marginalised. The ‘culture of silence’ is a key 
concept in the work of Freire (1986). It refers to oppression in various forms (i.e. overt, 
through institutions) by the powerful to silence the powerless, which produces the internalised 
image on the side of the powerless that the unequal power relations are not to be challenged.  
Negative self-images, often first created by the powerful, lead people to think they are 
incapable and unworthy to take control of their own lives and how they are governed. Gaventa 
builds on the notion of ‘culture of silence’ and analyses dimensions of power: how they 
operate directly and indirectly to produce quiescence among marginalised people. The 
powerful may directly and openly control information and processes of socialisation that make 
the marginalised think and act in the interest of the powerful. But indirectly they may create a 
situation in which the powerless cannot develop a critical political consciousness about their 
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own situation (Gaventa, 1982). Silence, then, reflects a psychological adaption to living without 
power.  
 
In contexts of violence, silence is often a tactic for survival and becomes part of a ‘survival’ 
mindset (Green, 1999; Scheper Hughes, 2004; Wood, 2003). It helps social navigation during 
insecurity. Also after conflict it can remain an important protective strategy (Uvin, 2009; 
Wood, 2003). Wood writes about how silence operates in interviews and how it signalled 
protective behaviour in the post-conflict situation (2003, p. 39). In people’s narrations about 
the past they leave ‘strategic ambiguities’ (Warren, 1998 in Wood, 2003, p.39). Green 
discusses the ‘legacy of silence’ and how the effects of terror are experienced not only 
individually, but also socially and collectively. In her research communities in Guatemala 
silence has become ‘the idiom of social consensus’ (1999). Various authors have demonstrated 
that silences are strongly gendered (Das, 1997; Hume, 2010), and in the aftermath of conflict 
the silences contribute to the process of the social construction of memories, and reflect 
gender dynamics. Hume argues that the silences need to be interpreted in their own right: one 
needs to understand the reasons why people choose to omit facts. But silence does not have 
to last, as Wood demonstrated. In El Salvador the memories of fear and violence remain vivid 
for a long time after they were experienced and produced a ‘culture of fear’. This can have a 
paralysing effect as much as repression can demobilise agents. But in the case of El Salvador, 
the moral outrage over violence fed the emotions that, in combination with other factors, 
encouraged people to support the insurgency and break though the fear (Wood, 2003: 207). 
 
Studies on citizen participation have identified a number of strategies developed by citizens in 
response to ongoing violence, which have implications for the practice of citizenship. One 
strategy is withdrawal from the public sphere and social networks (Ben-Porath, 2006; 
Citizenship-DRC, 2010; Green, 1995; Hume, 2010; Wood, 2003). A second strategy is to co-exist 
with violent actors and/or collaborate to some extent to guarantee one’s safety. A third 
strategy is to establish parallel governance and security structures, such as vigilante groups 
(Steenkamp, 2011).  
 
The case of Rwanda illustrates how citizens withdraw from the public sphere on sensitive 
issues, and where social cleavages hamper collective action. In Rwanda, the genocide created 
deep social divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. The Rwandan state, although 
applauded by international donors for its progressive strategies for poverty alleviation (Uvin, 
2001), has become increasingly authoritarian according to its critics (Reyntjes, 2004). The 
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public sphere has been restricted by formal legislation and informal strategies of intimidation 
and harassment to suppress dissenting voices (Reyntjes, 2011). One particularly contested 
issue is reconciliation between the two ethnic groups.  A formal process was imposed by the 
state in the form of gacaca courts, a reconciliation mechanism at local level, modelled after a 
customary institution, in which participation is required by law. The state perpetuates a formal 
discourse of national unity. Critics say that citizenship is thus ‘fabricated’ without reconciliation 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Also the promotion of unity is used to silence opposition, since criticism 
of the official discourse may lead to charges of ‘divisionism’  
 
In this context, one form of agency observed among citizens in response to state repression is 
self-censorship and compliance with the regime (Beswick, 2010). Beswick (2010) even argues 
that the authoritarian regime now no longer needs to use overt violence, because its 
disciplining structures remain effective. But acts of resistance do occur. Thomson distinguished 
three categories of everyday forms of resistance used on individual basis (Thomson, 2011). The 
most important is ‘staying on the side-line’, which includes an array of avoidance tactics. For 
instance, because many citizens disagree with the reconciliation intervention, many use 
avoidance techniques that help them elude participation (Thomson, 2011). A second is 
‘irreverent compliance’: people attend all sorts of mandatory meetings and rituals, but send 
out subtle signals that reject the authorities or show they do not believe in the ideology of the 
regime. The third form is ‘withdrawn muteness’: a silence often accompanied by particular 
poses of the body when interacting with state officials, sometimes pretending to be ‘foolish’. 
These three categories help individuals cope with the situation and channel their personal 
grievances. There is little evidence of instances of direct confrontation by ordinary citizens. 
High levels of collective trauma and persisting distrust between Tutsi and Hutu citizens at local 
level and in the state place enormous constraints on collective action and voice (Unsworth & 
Uvin, 2002).  
 
In Sierra Leone, the way political institutions developed during the war affected the public 
sphere and forms of agency in the post-conflict situation. During the war, forms of agency war 
were ‘tactical’ and focused on self-protection (Utas, 2005; Vincent, 2013). Utas (2005) showed 
how women in particular tactically navigated social opportunities inside and outside the rebel 
groups for survival. Vincent describes the emergence of counter-insurgent groups, often 
mobilised by chiefs. In the post-conflict situation, the persistence of certain command 
structures links into the way political parties operate. Christensen and Utas (2008) show that 
social navigation among ex-combatants continued. When competing political parties started to 
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recruit ‘protection task forces’ among ex-combatants and youth gangs, many ex-combatants 
joined.  Former commanders mobilised their rank and file through the command structures 
that had emerged during the war. Ex-combatants compared the 2006-2007 election period to 
the time of the war, pointing out that their security was just as much at risk due to targeted 
actions by government and the police against them. As party-affiliated youth militias they used 
a citizenship discourse to legitimise violence in the campaign process. While ex-combatants 
initially avoided the political scene for safety reasons, they now linked up with ‘big men’ out of 
self-protection. This is an example of how war experiences continue to shape agency, including 
in the domain of politics and discourses in the public sphere, albeit for the specific group of ex-
combatants. 
 
The chiefdoms in Sierra Leone are another institution that was shaped by the war. Certain 
chiefs played a major role in resisting the insurgency, while other chiefdoms nearly collapsed 
during the war (Vincent, 2013). Chiefdoms revived in the post-war situation, partly due to state 
interventions that formalised the authority of the chiefs (Fanthorpe, 2005). One of the post-
war reconstruction efforts to rebuild democratic governance was a decentralisation process. 
The ‘traditional’ chiefs were formally incorporated in the system of district governance and 
given the authority to collect taxes (Jackson, 2005). Also their customary powers regarding 
land and marriage remained strong  (Fanthorpe, 2005). They had considerable influence over 
funds channelled from the diamond industry to the Chiefdom Development Committees, 
which became a classic failure due to elite capture (Maconachie, 2010). It is widely believed 
that it was the arbitrary use of power by the chiefs that led to grievances among the youth and 
a motivation to join the rebellion (Fanthorpe, 2001, 2005; Jackson, 2005). These initiatives thus 
failed to transform underlying hierarchies of society. Hanlon (2005) argues that the 
international community was in fact recreating the conditions that led to the war by 
reinstating the power of chiefs. The literature on Sierra Leone is not clear about how citizens, 
especially youth, saw and engaged with this powerful institution, though from Vincent’s work 
one can derive that there will be variation across the chiefdoms. Fanthorpe (2005) cites the 
example of youth who migrated away from their district to escape the control of their chief: 
the exit option. He also shows that many people continued to acknowledge that the chiefs 
were needed and preferred over corrupt politicians: a form of loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) in 
absence of a better alternative.  In other areas people’s perceptions of the chiefdoms were not 
all negative (Vincent, 2013).  
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This section showed that certain ideas, perceptions and behaviours which develop during a 
conflict situation persist, for certain groups, in the post-conflict situation. To whom this 
applies, and how, depends to a certain extent on the positionality of the individuals involved 
and their relationships to others. If positionalities and relationships change during the conflict 
this shapes engagement in the post-conflict situation. I use these insights to formulate my 
proposition for the post-conflict situation in Chapter 3.  
 
2.5.2 Opportunities for voice  
 
Several authors show that forms of citizen agency are possible even within a repressive 
context. These are often small instances, tacit forms of agency, but can even be vibrant forms 
of community life. Meta-level analyses of a number of case studies on citizen participation 
conclude that in adverse contexts like these, local associations can offer the possibility of 
‘citizenship building’ and providing an environment in which citizens can learn the skills they 
need to engage in governance. It is, however, unlikely that they would spur radical 
transformations of the political system, change policies and governance agenda, or shift the 
balance of power in favour of the citizens (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Schattan Coelho & Von 
Lieres, 2010).  
 
Shah (2011) shows that while the wider political context in Rwanda has become increasingly 
authoritarian, practices of democracy do exist at local level in the system of Ubudehe, 
Rwanda’s formalised participatory local development process at village level. Experiences vary 
and in many cases are marked by the classic participation challenges: elite capture, women 
and the extremely poor households finding it harder to participate, reluctance to challenge the 
more powerful members in the community. Nonetheless, Ubudehe seems to be a useful 
mechanism for learning about deliberation and decision-making and has led to tangible 
development outcomes in many locations. Some questions remain. Citizens develop these 
practices in one particular domain, but will they use this experience of voice in more politically 
sensitive domains, such as that of reconciliation? And to what extent would these local 
practices, in the end, be conducive to transformations in the wider political context?   
 
In Angola, like Rwanda an authoritarian regime context, local democratic spaces emerged too, 
despite a top-down bureaucracy and centralised political culture, and partly aided by the 
process of decentralisation (Ferreira & Roque, 2010; Roque & Shankland, 2007). In the suburbs 
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of Luanda, NGOs supported the creation of citizen-led local water committees, associations of 
water committees, and local development forums in which also local officials took part. While 
the entry point was service delivery, these initiatives had implications for governance and local 
democracy by offering a space for deliberation that had never existed before. It helped to build 
citizenship skills and leadership skills (Roque & Shankland, 2007). Even in a repressive 
environment like Angola, local democratic practices can emerge and thrive. However, decision-
making is still centralised and participation had little effect on the broader context due to 
persistent central control. Thus, even in adverse settings citizenship practices may exist. It is 
important to understand under which conditions this may be, and which issues and spaces are 
considered to be ‘safe’.   
 
2.5.3 Can violent conflict positively affect citizen engagement? 
 
There is evidence that goes against the prevalent idea that the effects of war are solely 
destructive. In this section I discuss three studies that claim that the exposure to war violence 
may lead to an increase in social and political participation, thus leading to positive political 
outcomes. 
 
In the case of Sierra Leone, Bellows and Miguel (2009) show that those individuals whose 
households have experienced violence are more active in political and social institutions. 
Bellows and Miguel refer to post-traumatic growth theory, a theory developed in psychology 
that shows that people can respond positively to trauma by changing attitudes, values and 
preferences. For political participation they show that victims of the war are more likely to 
register to vote and attend community meetings. For civic engagement they show that they 
are more likely to be members of political groups, social groups and communal road cleaning 
activities, and participate on School Management Committees. An alternative hypothesis, that 
those who were already politically and socially active were perhaps targeted by the rebels, 
does not hold. Nor was more participation explained by socio-economic differences. Based on 
their analysis they argue that a short-term legacy of war is ‘increasing political mobilisation, 
community activism and public good provision’ (Bellows & Miguel, 2009: 1145). They anticipate 
that more political mobilisation for the use of public good delivery will benefit Sierra Leone’s 
economic development, thus pointing out a positive effect of the war.  
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DeLuca and Verpoorte (2011) measure the impact of war violence on social capital (measured 
as social trust and participation in community associations) for two violent conflicts in Uganda, 
one being the LRA conflict in Acholi. Using datasets from the Afrobarometer of 2000 and 2005, 
they measure social capital indicators before and after a peak in the conflict in 2003. They find 
that self-reported trust and associational membership decrease substantially during the 
conflict in LRA affected districts. However, their findings suggest a strong recovery of social 
capital indicators once the violence has ended (De Luca & Verpoorten, 2011). Like Bellows and 
Miguel (2010), DeLuca and Verpoorten use post-traumatic growth theory to explain increases 
in social capital indicators.  
 
Blattman (2009) shows that combat experiences and exposure to war violence in Northern 
Uganda lead to greater political participation and engagement among young men who were in 
the LRA. In particular violent acts undergone, as opposed to committed, led to an increase in 
the likelihood of voting, being a community leader or holding a political job, and being a 
member of a peace-promoting organisation. Blattman refers to ‘expressive theories of 
participation’, which hold that people place an inherent value on forms of political expression, 
which motivates engagement.  Moreover, the experience of war violence does not 
systematically affect non-political forms of social participation (community group membership 
or public goods management) and Blattman therefore argues that the impact of conscription is 
‘uniquely political’.  
 
The findings of these studies are interesting and suggest there may be opportunities for 
developing citizenship practices during conflict. As I explain in chapter 3, my study differs from 
these in that I have adopted a broader definition of participation. The studies reviewed here 
looked at engagement in terms of group membership and holding social leadership positions 
(DeLuca & Verpoorten, 2011; Bellows & Miguel, 2010; Blattman, 2009), and at political 
participation in terms of voting (Blattman, 2009). I will look at various forms of engagement 
with political and social actors. Paying attention to micropolitics, I emphasise the depth of the 
engagement. It is also different in that I have adopted a broader definition of violent conflict, 
seeing it as a particular social environment rather than narrowing it down to violent acts 
committed or witnessed.  
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2.6 Citizenship and displacement  
 
The literature on forced migration has contributed to the debate on citizenship by 
demonstrating the differentiated experience of citizenship by displaced populations. This 
section outlines how this literature critiques the notion of citizenship as a status, and how it 
extensively expounded on agency and forms of engagement undertaken by displaced people. 
As I argue, this debate can be advanced by relating it to a sense of citizenship in a wider 
respect, beyond citizenship as status, and by discussing the relationship between sense and 
practice.  
 
2.6.1 Displacement and layers in formal citizenship 
 
Migration constitutes a major challenge to a state-focused conceptualisation of citizenship, 
and the social and legal relationship between citizenship and the nation-state (R. Lister, 2003, 
p. 52; Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010b; Nyers, 2006; Tastsoglou & Dobrowolsky, 2006). In legal 
terms, the state has full authority to decide who is included and excluded from citizenship 
rights within its borders, and on what terms. Migrants and refugees, who are not granted full 
citizenship but do live within the borders of the host state, break the traditional link between 
legal rights and the state. The nation-state is often not  the first reference point for citizenship, 
and new forms of belonging and citizenship emerge (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010b, p. 20).  
 
The large majority of the Acholi population did not leave Uganda, but were internally displaced 
within the Acholi region. A substantial difference exists between Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and refugees in terms of the rights and forms of protection that are accorded to them, 
and who is responsible for their protection (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010b). Refugees leave 
the territory of their home state to settle in host states, and their protection is laid down in 
international human rights law. As IDPs remain within the territory of their original home state 
they therefore fall under the sovereignty, protection and responsibility of their home state. 
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement give recommendations to 
states, but these are not legally binding. Rights of IDPs are therefore much less well-defined 
(Assal, 2008) and the rights and entitlements they can access are very different from those 
having refugee status. On the other hand, states that host refugees do not always meet the 
protection standards stipulated by international law.  
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Thus, IDPs pose a challenge to the conceptualisation of citizenship as status, because they are 
often de facto denied access to their rights, and often more so than their fellow nationals. On 
top of that, displacement will have resulted in the loss of livelihoods and assets at individual as 
well as the collective level, which will have created higher risks of poverty and vulnerability 
(Morvaridi, 2008). Their situation therefore demands additional measures, which may not be 
recognised. To relate this back to what has been said about citizenship as status in section 2.1, 
it can be argued that there are layers in relation to formal citizenship and people can enjoy 
diverse levels of rights according to their status (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010b).  
 
2.6.2 The camp as permanent exception and real-life setting 
 
Displacement can take various forms: in (designated) host communities, self-settlement in 
areas chosen by the displaced themselves, and in camps. As the Acholi displacement camps 
were a key feature of this conflict, this section describes the camp as it is discussed in the 
literature. For this section I use much literature that has addressed the situation of refugees, 
because this literature is more abundant than the literature on internal displacement. 
Although the literature on refugee camps is particularly relevant for this study it must be noted 
that comparisons with internal displacement camps must be made with care.  The relationship 
to the home state and the actors from which rights can be claimed, for instance, are likely to 
be very different.   
 
Metaphorically speaking the camp is described as ‘state of exception’ based on Giorgio 
Agamben’s work: 
 
The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the 
rule. In it, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the 
state of law, acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains 
constantly outside the normal state of law. (Agamben, 1998, original italics)  
 
For those who are displaced into camps the ‘ordinary’ citizenship situation, whereby rights are 
supposed to be guaranteed by the state, is suspended.  As I explain below, ‘the camp’ with its 
spatial, legal and social dimensions changes conventional understandings about who is 
responsible for the protection of rights, and about how duties are defined. 
 
The camp is also the real-life setting of many displaced people, described in numerous 
empirical studies (Agier, 2011; Hyndman, 2000; Malkki, 1996; Olaa, 2001). With its 
83 
 
agglomeration of actors, both residents and external actors, the camp is a socio-political 
setting with social stratification, power dynamics and politics (Turner, 2006). Three aspects of 
camp life stand out in the literature; social relations and politics, the gendered experience of 
the camp, and camp governance.  
 
In international refugee camps the camp population is often highly diverse. In Angolan camps 
in Zambia social strata existed among the refugees defined by which group had arrived and 
settled first, and by ethnic identity. These factors influenced who had power over other 
refugees; ‘new arrivals’ had to negotiate access to humanitarian relief with the group that had 
settled first (Agier, 2011). Turner describes the rivalry of political authority in Burundian camps 
in Tanzania, arguing that public authority emerged in the lacunae produced by UNHRC and the 
Tanzanian government and by the instability of social relations in camp life in general (2006). 
Young men became more authoritative than older customary leaders. Camp politics and the 
‘stronger identities’ that emerge may affect opportunities for the political voice of the 
displaced. 
 
Problems in displacement camps are strongly gendered (Callamard, 1999; Grabska, 2011; 
Hyndman, 2000). Poverty and socio-political dynamics tend to impact particularly negatively 
on women. Tasks that seem relatively simple may become very demanding in the camp setting 
and often involve serious threats to women’s security in terms of their health and bodies, and 
care responsibilities. Displacement camps are settings where women face higher risks of being 
victim to sexual violence by  male camp residents and soldiers (Abdi, 2006). This problem is 
widely reported and recognised by all humanitarian actors, but remains a huge challenge 
(Branch, 2009).  
 
The administration and governance of displacement camps is a complicated matter. A myriad 
of actors is involved in taking care of displaced populations, sometimes to the extent that it 
becomes very confusing to the camp residents (Morvaridi, 2008, p. 58). It becomes a mixture 
of government actors, the military, humanitarian actors and UN agencies that together should 
coordinate relief. Humanitarian agencies together set the parameters within which the camp is 
operated and within which residents live, captured by the term ‘humanitarian space’(Nyers, 
2006, p. 114). In the camp itself, different levels and structures of (self)governance are put in 
place that follow a logic of sovereignty (Nyers, 2006, p. 113). Camp leadership structures are 
often hierarchical, with a central leader at the top who heads different levels of leadership, 
depending on the size of the camp.  
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The governance structure of the camp, but even the camp as a settlement option in itself, has 
been challenged for serving first and foremost the priority of aid agencies to deliver relief and 
services efficiently. The power constellations created by humanitarian and government actors 
combined mean that power is often exercised through coercion and discipline. Malkki 
therefore says that camps are places of ‘care and control’ (Malkki, 2002), others even refer to 
them as authoritarian  (Black, 1998; Branch, 2009; Harrell-Bond, 2002a). More recently 
progress has been made in improving levels of self-governance in camp settings. The Camp 
Coordination and Management Toolkit, widely used by humanitarian actors, dedicated a 
chapter to participation and related it not only to effective camp management, but also to 
enhanced well-being of the residents by giving them back a sense of control (NRC, 2006).The 
reality is still far from satisfactory. In the implementation of humanitarian programmes often 
lip-service is paid to the underlying philosophies of empowerment, and participatory 
approaches risk becoming a ‘tick-box’ exercise. Camp committees formed of residents, for 
example, often offer no more than a system for consultation (Kaiser, 2004, 2005). Although 
partly caused by a lack of time and funds, this problem is symptomatic of an underlying 
problem of seeing the displaced as objects of aid rather than as subjects with agency. 
 
2.6.3 Agency of the displaced 
 
Representing refugees as helpless victims and passive recipients is heavily criticised by many 
authors (Branch, 2009; Harrell-Bond, 1999, 2002a; Hyndman, 2000; Malkki, 1996; Pouligny, 
2005). They are seen as needy, in particular of care and management, as ‘speechless 
emissaries’ to quote Malkki’s (1996) famous phrase. This notion comes with expectations of 
refugees’ behaviour. Images of the ‘good refugee’ depict a person as docile, submissive and 
thankful, while those that contest the power of relief agencies by ‘talking back’ or disagreeing 
with certain interventions are seen as the ‘bad refugee’ and their behaviour as deviance 
(Branch, 2009). This, and experiences with politicisation of camp committees, limits 
explorations of more empowering mechanisms for engagement in camps (Harrell-Bond, 
2002a).  
 
There are deep concerns about how displaced people are denied opportunities for 
engagement and agency. Nyers writes: 
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The central difficulty with portraying refugees as ‘merely human beings’ is that all 
notions of political agency are, in a word, emptied from refugee subjectivity. What is 
most at stake politically with the refugee phenomenon is that refugees are silent – or 
rather, silenced- because they do not possess the ‘proper’ political subjectivity (i.e. 
state citizenship) through which they can be heard. (Nyers, 2006, p. 16) 
 
Although Nyers speaks about refugees and not IDPs, his statement applies to the Acholi IDPs to 
a certain extent. Because of the particular camp governance regime, a particular citizenship 
developed in the Acholi camps which lacked the substance of state citizenship. Nyers refers to 
Hannah Arendt’s argument that refugees represent a problem ‘not of geographical space but 
of political space’ (2006, p. 17): they are denied the mechanisms to voice their concerns and 
interests or to be represented in the political space. Harrell-Bond demonstrated that the 
asymmetric relation between refugees and the humanitarian agencies plays into this. 
Humanitarian agencies have ‘the power to decide who deserves to receive’ (Harrell-Bond, 1999, 
2002a). The often very technical language that is used to describe the ‘refugee problem’, 
including all the maps and statistics, may be well-intentioned and produced with the welfare of 
refugees in mind, but exacerbate the process of depoliticisation (Hyndman, 2000, p. 121).   
 
Empirical studies have demonstrated how agency is exercised by displaced people: by the 
various coping strategies they develop for survival in the areas where they settle. Camp 
residents negotiate forms of authority, including the aid agencies, and engage in rights-
claiming actions (Harrell-Bond, 1999, 2008; Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010a; Turner, 2006). 
They often lack access to formal channels to exercise voice, but employ various informal 
strategies to claim rights. Refugees employed by humanitarian agencies have gone on strike to 
demand better wages. There have been protests by women in camps who actively used their 
‘vulnerability status’ to claim certain goods from humanitarian agencies: the actors who 
allocated them that status (Agier, 2011). Walters (2008, p. 191) poses the question whether 
small, subtle and informal forms of agency actually challenge the nature and logic of the camp.  
 
A final note on non-participation. ‘Passivity’ is a characteristic frequently attributed to a camp 
population. However, beneath the surface of what is interpreted as ‘passive recipient’ can be 
carefully constructed ‘good refugee’ identities. This resonates with Scott’s work on public and 
hidden transcripts. The hidden transcript has the function not only of dealing with the 
humanitarian actors, but also of gaining as much from them as possible. Research 
demonstrates that refugees know very well how they should behave as ‘good refugees’ to 
ensure they will be given hand-outs, and frame their needs in accordance to what they know 
an aid agency has to offer (Kaiser, 2004; Malkki, 1996).  
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Powerless in comparison with the institutional actors, they could have little influence on 
the nature and structure of the assistance regime. As such, their most effective strategy 
was to learn the rules of the game and become adept in playing it. (2004, p. 194) 
 
However, earlier research has suggested that way power is exercised in camps may have 
negative implications for human agency. Mental health research suggests that stress-related 
disorders among refugees were caused by living under hierarchic camp structures in which 
they are rendered voiceless (Harrell-Bond, 1999). The more authoritarian the camp 
administration, the less control people have over their lives and the more likely they are to 
manifest symptoms of mental health problems, including apathy. Though many would 
attribute the problems to the violence experienced during the conflict, Harrell-Bond asks 
whether one of the causes of the stress lies in the nature of the humanitarian regime itself. 
Psycho-social literature on trauma indeed highlights that a felt lack of control is one of the 
important factors that produce the trauma (Frie, 2008). It would be beyond the scope of this 
study to discuss this large body of literature, but it brings up the question of how people 
experience camp governance and their sense of agency in relation to these structures. 
 
To conclude, the literature on forced migration has shown the implications of displacement for 
their experience of citizenship. The camp, with its physical space and a particular governance 
regime, is considered a place where citizen engagement is controlled. In terms of their agency, 
the displaced engage with the actors and institutions that govern the camp, state or non-state, 
to negotiate their entitlements. From this section it is clear that they deploy a wide range of 
tactics that represent a substantial part of the spectrum (section 2.2).  
 
This literature has not explicitly addressed the relationship between the status and the 
practice of citizenship. This applies in particular to the camp setting: little is known about how 
displacement into camps affects the perception of the self as citizen and how this 
subsequently affects engagement. The literature does say this situation leads to feelings of 
marginalisation, but does it affect a sense of citizenship, and in turn, how does this affect 
forms of engagement? Furthermore, the studies discussed in this section miss a historical 
approach that includes people’s histories from before they were displaced. In this study I take 
the period of displacement as a specific episode in people’s lives and include in my analysis 
their citizenship prior to the start of the camps. In this way, a more complete understanding of 
how citizenship evolves can be built.  
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2.7 ‘Participation’ in recovery interventions 
 
If the experience of violent conflict and displacement limits the opportunities for learning 
about active citizenship, what does this mean for recovery approaches that have incorporated 
mechanisms for institutionalised participation? Community-driven Development (CDD) 
programmes are widely implemented in developing countries by governments and aid 
agencies. The World Bank has steadily increased its lending to CDD and supports CDD 
programmes in ninety four countries with an approximate value of thirty billion US dollars 
(Wong, 2012). In this final section of my literature review I discuss the principles of CDD, 
evidence of its social and political impact, and key challenges for implementing CDD 
programmes in (post)conflict settings. 
2.7.1 Community Driven Recovery 
 
Community-Driven Development (CDD) is an approach that supports local communities in 
charge of planning, implementing and monitoring development projects. It is based on 
principles of participation and empowerment, and on the notion that local communities have 
the right to shape their own development and the right knowledge about local needs. CDD 
approaches make various claims: to alleviate poverty, enhance capacities for collective action, 
enhance social trust and cooperation across social divides, and create responsive and 
accountable institutions.  
 
Typical design elements of CDD programmes are the introduction of democratic mechanisms 
for decision-making at local level and the transfer of block grants directly to communities. 
Communities need to elect Community Development Committees (CDCs) to take charge of the 
projects and funds and the projects are likely to be selected by community vote. In most CDD 
interventions a specific objective is to empower women and youth through e.g. installing 
gender parity requirements for the development committees and assigning leadership 
responsibilities. The implementation process involves interaction with state institutions. 
Through exposure to these mechanisms citizens practice new skills, and gain trust in state 
institutions. The approach gives incentives to state institutions to be responsive. The expected 
outcome is that citizens sustain their engagement and states continue their responsiveness 
after the intervention.  
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For various reasons CDD is considered appropriate for conflict-affected settings, in such 
contexts referred to as Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) (Barron, 2010). CDR addresses 
specific challenges associated with (post)conflict recovery: weak social relations and lack of 
trust in state institutions. Through the promotion of collective action around projects inter-
group, social relations may improve. CDR creates new avenues through which citizens can 
voice their needs and exercise claims for accountability, thus supporting demand from the 
bottom up. It is assumed that more frequent interactions between communities and local 
state institutions can breed trust and the responsiveness of the institutions. It is anticipated 
that the institutions and democratic mechanisms introduced under CDR will be sustained after 
the project. Also, a completed project may encourage a community to increase their demand 
for responsive institutions. In this way, CDR seeks to transform unequal and exclusionary 
relations between state and society and bridge social divides that lead to violent conflict (WB, 
2006). 
 
Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner (2003) argue that CDR can build the legitimacy of national 
governments when they are engaged in the CDR process and use it to show their political will 
to support the recovery. For the local level state apparatus, the importance of ‘the 
partnership’ between communities and local governments is emphasised as ‘a critical factor 
for success’ of CDR (2003, p. 11). Where local governments are not supportive of a CDR 
process, the implementing structure can easily be isolated from government structures. At the 
same time, a partnership is considered a governance outcome of CDR, breeding trust in local 
state institutions that have become more responsive. It is recognised that forming a 
partnership can be a huge challenge, and supervision of the implementation process from the 
outside remains necessary, though in order to gain trust central government should not 
interfere in the community decision making process over projects.   
 
It is recognised that post-conflict settings are challenging contexts in which to implement CDR 
programmes(Cliffe et al., 2003; WB, 2006). To what extent have CDR interventions been 
successful in boosting collective action and creating responsive institutions?  
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2.7.2 The social and political impact of CDR 
 
The evidence on the outcomes of CDR is growing and shows mixed results. Generally, any 
positive effects associated with CDR programmes are mostly related to the welfare 
components. Several reviews show that CDR can be relatively successful in delivering 
infrastructure and improving material welfare. Also, some interventions have successfully 
targeted the poor, although there is also evidence that shows that CDR fails to reach the 
poorest households within the more marginalised areas (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). There is hardly 
any evidence, however, that programmes have improved capacities for collective action, trust, 
better and more participation, or state responsiveness (Wong, 2012). The social and political 
outcomes are of interest to this study and this section will proceed with taking a closer look at 
some of the evidence generated by reviews and evaluations.  
 
Some of the reviews point out that CDR cannot address causes of conflict that are at a higher 
political level (Barron, 2010; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010; Rao and Ibañez, 2003). Barron 
(2010) reviewed reports of CDR programmes in conflict affected areas in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Timor-Leste. Only the programme in Indonesia had contributed to 
better relationships between different ethnic groups. Since there was no evidence that CDR 
has improved the capacities of communities to resolve internal conflict, Barron argues that the 
causes of social tensions may be at higher political levels outside the communities. Rao and 
Ibañez (2003) evaluated the impact of a Social Fund (a CDD-type of initiative) in Jamaica. One 
of their case studies was a violence-prone urban neighbourhood where rival ‘Dons’ (non-state 
leaders) caused deep divisions in the community. Interestingly, it was in this community that it 
was impossible to carry out a community driven process for identifying a project, and the 
project was driven by programme staff. The rivalry between the two Dons and politically 
driven violence threatened the positive effects of the project. For the Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) argue that CDD cannot resolve the chronic 
poverty that was caused by factors in the political economy and adverse incorporation of 
northern Uganda into the state (elaborated in Chapter 4). 
 
Over the last couple of years a number of large-scale Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) have 
been carried out to evaluate the social and political impacts of CDR programmes; Humphreys, 
Sanches de la Sierra and Van der Windt in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2012); Casey, 
Glennerster and Miguel in Sierra Leone (2012);  Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein in Liberia 
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(2011), and Beath, Fotini, Enikosolopov and Kabuli in Afghanistan (2010). Only Fearon et al find 
some positive evidence that CDR in Liberia led to an improved capacity to solve collective 
action problems. Outcomes of the other studies show the opposite: there is no significant 
impact on social cohesion, collective action and participation. These studies give us a several 
clues about what goes on at local level. 
 
An evaluation of Tuungane, the CDR programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo, shows 
that the programme had no impact on behavioural change in terms of increased levels of 
participation or the use of democratic mechanisms (i.e. voting) for selecting projects 
(Humphreys et al., 2012). It did not increase the sense of the right to be involved in decision-
making, nor the sense of an obligation to be involved. The observation of village meetings 
brought to light that men and elders accounted for respectively 71% and 55% of the 
interventions in meetings. In Tuungane villages elders and chiefs dominated the deliberations 
even more than in control villages.  On social cohesion, the study found as a slightly positive 
but not significant impact that Tuungane produced higher levels of social trust and 
cooperation, or reduced local conflict.  The requirement for including women increased the 
number of women in committees, but this had not led to a change in attitudes towards the 
roles of women. 
 
Casey et al (2012) find no evidence for lasting impact on social cohesion, decision making, 
collective action, and participation in governance after the GoBifo CDR programme in Sierra 
Leone. GoBifo required that women and young people were elected into leadership positions. 
However, GoBifo had no effect on attitudes towards the leadership capacities of the young and 
women, nor did it improve their position in local level decision-making. Fearon et al (2011) find 
evidence for the positive impact of Liberia’s CDR programme on the capacity for collective 
action. The most likely explanation was that leaders in CDR communities made an effort to 
mobilise the community and share information about the intervention after the intervention 
was explained to them. Communities were then better able to coordinate their participation in 
the intervention. CDR would have increased the number of people with organising experience 
and decision making in respect of collective goods. Also, the study showed some evidence that 
people learnt from their exposure to democratic mechanisms introduced under CDR, in 
particular voting for projects and using elections to select representatives on the Community 
Development Councils.  
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The mechanisms of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in Afghanistan attempt to shift 
powers from tribal institutions to newly introduced Community Development Councils (CDCs)  
(Beath et al., 2010). CDC members are elected through secret ballot and the committees need 
to be gender–balanced. CDCs select, manage, implement and monitor development projects in 
consultation with the community. NSP explicitly intended to change community-level decision-
making; democratising it, and making the process and participation more inclusive and more 
accountable (Nixon, 2008: 48).  
 
The outcomes of the midterm review of NSP show slightly more positive results than for the 
other CDD programmes (Beath et al., 2010). On governance outcomes, NSP led to more 
positive perceptions of government actors and more frequent interactions between them and 
local communities. However, this did not lead to more acceptance of their authority in terms 
of taxation and dealing with crime. The level of participation in village meetings increased 
among both men and women, but there was no evidence that people wanted to make changes 
in decision-making or encourage others to do so. NSP significantly increased the number of 
women that participated in local governance. Among men, but not among women, it had a 
slightly positive effect on attitudes about women councillors, but it had no effect on 
perceptions of women’s participation in elections. The effect on women’s participation in 
community life generally was negligible. On social outcomes, there is no evidence that NSP 
positively affected levels of trust or reduced village-level conflicts. 
 
Other studies have pointed to the complex power relations that interfere with the democratic 
mechanisms introduced under NSP (Brick, 2009; McCarthy, 2011). NSP was developed at a 
time when there were high levels of insecurity across the country. External aid and security 
actors working in Afghanistan assumed that the rural areas were in ‘chaos’ and the NSP 
mechanisms would help to create ‘order’ (Nixon, 2008). In reality NSP mechanisms were 
introduced in a setting that was full of non-state governance institutions that had continued to 
exist throughout the war (Brick, 2009; McCarthy, 2011). NSP attempted to challenge 
traditional and meaningful power structures at the local level, without understanding how 
these institutions operated prior to the Taliban and how they were transformed during the 
conflict (McCarthy, 2011). The study by Beath et al (2010) picked up on the continuation of 
activities performed by customary leaders. Nixon (2008) described in more detail how dispute 
resolution occurred in a ‘hybrid arrangement’ between CDCs, customary leaders and other 
representatives. Tensions emerged where customary leaders were part of the CDCs and were 
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able to appropriate resources. The power dynamics influenced who got elected into the CDC, 
who had actual power once in it, and who were excluded from it (McCarthy, 2011). 
 
Regarding social relations, NSP attempts to create communities and assumes that it can also 
create unity. This overlooks the inherently political nature of communities and their divisions. 
McCarthy (2011) argues that NSP failed to address social differentiation in communities. 
Women that were elected into the CDC faced various challenges in actually playing their roles, 
to the extent that they could not even attend the CDC meetings, let alone negotiate with the 
men. McCarthy also shows that the CDCs were unable to challenge the power structures that 
denied certain categories of people, both men and women, access to CDC resources and 
structures. For these groups, NSP only deepened their experiences of vulnerability and thus 
worsened community fragmentation.  
 
Why is it that the mechanisms introduced by CDD interventions, particularly in conflict-
affected settings, do not lead to better democratic outcomes and more inclusive, substantive 
engagement?  The findings about various CDR programmes, especially NSP, require a deeper 
analysis of the power dynamics. 
 
2.7.3 Power dynamics in community reconstruction programmes 
 
Participation literature has highlighted the diversity within communities and power dynamics 
as important factors that shape citizen engagement in institutionalised mechanisms for 
participations (Harriss et al., 2004). The RCT studies discussed above did not explicitly address 
these issues, but their outcomes suggest that this is also the case for mechanisms created by 
CDR programmes. Missing from the Tuungane study is an analysis of power dynamics and 
inequalities within communities and how these affected the process. Who were the people 
that were not informed, who did not participate, and was this an effect of exclusion by others? 
Among those that attended meetings, was there anyone who could not voice his/her priorities, 
and was it the result of belonging to a particular social category? Who benefited from the 
public good if marginalised people were excluded from the process and outcomes?  
 
A number of CDD studies do address power relations, mainly to do with power dynamics 
within communities and the elite capture of CDD projects (Barron, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 
2004). Generally, social and economic heterogeneity, in particular inequality, is negatively 
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associated with collective action (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Not in all situations is a negative 
impact found, however, which indicates that heterogeneity interacts with other factors. Rao 
and Ibañez (2003) therefore suggest that diversity may be ‘managed’ or that mechanisms 
could be introduced that would mitigate negative effects. Cliffe et al (2003) argue that CDR can 
break existing patronage centres into local patronage networks and mitigate corruption, but 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) state that CDD is ‘no less immune to political manipulation than top-
down programmes’. Abraham and Platteau (2004) show that rural African communities were 
often manipulated by ‘dictatorial leaders’, who took advantage of the lack of information 
among the people.  But then, Rao and Ibañez (2003) show that those who were in control of 
and benefited from the Social Fund projects in Jamaica were the well-educated and networked 
community members, but in many cases the projects were still deemed relevant by the poor. 
They therefore speak of ‘benign capture’.  
 
There is less information available about the dynamics between citizens and local state 
institutions in CDR, or ‘the partnership’ between local state institutions and communities that 
is deemed critical (Cliffe et al, 2003). In the CDR programmes described above, the 
‘partnership’ is considered to exist once local communities finish their project proposals and 
local authorities start the implementation. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of the 
negotiation process and politics that constitute and lead up to a partnership. Common 
indicators for measuring impact are ‘number of meetings’, ‘level of attendance’, ‘knowledge 
about duties of officials’. However, even where studies show increases in these indicators, this 
does not give any information about the quality of participation. If CDR has ‘the explicit 
objective of reversing power relations in a manner that creates agency and voice for poor 
people’ (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 3) then more convincing evidence is required. 
 
Thus, missing from the debates about CDR is an in-depth understanding of what happens at 
the interface between local state institutions and citizens and how these dynamics are affected 
by conflict. CDR assumes that increased levels of trust and state responsiveness will follow 
from increased interactions between communities and local state institutions. But the 
cleavage between state and society is insufficiently addressed. This underlines the need to 
understand the relationship between citizenship and conflict. 
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Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have introduced the important theoretical approaches to citizenship and I 
have explained the approach that forms the theoretical foundation of this study. The review 
focused upon a notion of active citizenship, which emphasises that citizenship as a legal status 
with a set of rights cannot be separated from its substantive features and the practice of 
participation. With an emphasis on agency, this approach recognises the interdependency of a 
sense of citizenship and the practice of citizen engagement: a strong sense of citizenship is 
conducive to participation, and through participation a sense of citizenship is built. It is also 
understood that active citizenship is learnt, partly through institutions and local associational 
activities. An understanding of citizenship as status and as practice requires an understanding 
of how citizens have agency, how they express voice, and how their identity informs their 
agency.  
 
This linked then to a discussion of the ethnic identity and ethnic citizenship. In the African 
contexts people are members of two political communities: the state and the ethnic group. 
Citizens have different attitudes towards the two communities, and different behaviours. I 
explained the social-constructivists approach to understanding ethnic identity, which is helpful 
for an analysis of marginalisation and exclusion based on identity.   
 
The chapter described a spectrum of approaches to state-society relations, from rejection to 
collaboration, and to strategies of engagement, from violent revolt and tacit resistance to 
critical and constructive engagement. The peasant revolution literature, whether approached 
through a focus on class relations or a rational choice framework, overemphasised revolutions 
as the ultimate form of engagement. Since then, other studies have focused on structural 
factors, social relationships and networks, and identity. Wood (2003) and Petersen (2001) have 
advanced the debates significantly by showing that collective action is motivated by norms 
about justice and dignity, other-regarding principles and emotions. The work on contentious 
politics is important for understanding forms of protest and resistance, but cannot explain all 
forms of citizen engagement. From the spectrum of approaches to state-society relations I 
argue that all forms of engagement – violent contention, passive resistance, or critical 
engagement – inform us about citizens’ normative ideas about their relationship to the state, 
about the state itself and how they want to be part of it.  
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When the LRA insurgency started in the late 1980s, outlined in Chapter 4, it reflected a violent 
rejection of the new regime by the population of northern region of Uganda. As it developed, 
it narrowed to a conflict between the LRA and the government, and the population no longer 
participated as supporters of the insurgency.  Among the citizens of northern Uganda I 
expected to find forms of engagement that were predominantly on the critical and 
constructive end of the spectrum, and largely through informal engagements. Were I to 
encounter ‘ruptures’ in the pattern of non-violent engagement then I would take these to have 
meaning and be reflective of citizen perceptions of their relationship to the state.  
 
The second part of the chapter then outlined conflict studies literature that addresses the 
transformation of social and political institutions during conflict. Examples from a range of 
countries showed that, in many cases, silence prevailed among citizens and they resorted to 
hidden transcripts, avoiding public, confrontational strategies to address power. Much of the 
evidence suggests that in conflict situations, opportunities for citizen action narrow, but there 
is also evidence that new opportunities might open up. However, much of the conflict studies 
literature has focused on coping agency – agency that aims to ensure food and safety for 
survival. Informed by recent work that distinguishes types of agency (Barter, 2012; C. Moser, 
2012), I show there is a gap in knowledge about what happens to citizen engagement. Using 
the literature on the transformation of institutions I suggest that looking at the implications of 
changes in institutions for learning and practising citizenship during conflict can help explain 
how citizenship evolves in the post-conflict situation. 
 
The next chapter brings together the ideas on citizen engagement and conflict. It builds the 
conceptual framework and presents propositions about how conflict affects citizen 
engagement. I show how my study addresses the gap in knowledge about how citizen agency 
evolves during and after conflict. My own approach builds on participation and citizen 
engagement literature, the work of Scott on everyday forms of resistance, and Corbridge et al 
(2005) on seeing the state in everyday life. This literature demonstrates that small-scale 
instances of engagement matter, and that citizens use critical as well as contesting and 
constructive strategies for engagement. In the next chapter I explain my bottom-up 
perspective on citizen engagement that starts from the range of perceptions and practices of 
engagement expressed by citizens. I look at the different ways in which citizens express voice, 
and power dynamics between various groups of citizens and between citizens and the state. 
Thus, this approach constitutes an advance with respect to Hirschman’s framework, in looking 
at social differentiation within the citizenry who exercise ‘voice’.  
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Chapter 3  Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter I set out my conceptual framework. In section 3.1 I present my definition of 
citizenship and position my approach to citizen engagement, by explaining how my focus on 
the everyday forms of engagement adds to existing approaches to state-society relations. Here 
I also explain how the other sets of literature that were part of the review - on citizen 
engagement, ethnicity, conflict, and forced migration and citizenship participation - have 
informed my research. I highlight the gaps in what we know about citizenship and violent 
conflict, and how my thesis contributes to current debates. This leads me to the focus of this 
study in section 3.1.3, where I formulate propositions about the nature of citizenship in Acholi. 
Then in section 3.2 I explain how I researched citizenship as a sense and practice and the 
proxies that I identified to study in the field.  
 
Section 3.3 explains the case study design, followed by an overview of the research 
methodology. Section 3.4 discusses methodological challenges and data validity of the 
findings. Section 3.5 outlines the process of data entry. Finally, section 3.6 gives details of the 
analysis process.  
 
3.1 Positioning my approach 
3.1.1 The sense and practice of citizenship 
 
Citizenship literature has highlighted the interdependence of a perception of the self as citizen 
and the practice of citizenship, as explained in section 2.1. Awareness about the self as citizen 
and citizenship rights can fuel agency, and the practice of citizen engagement strengthens a 
sense of citizenship. Rather than using the term ‘status of citizenship’, I want to use  ‘sense of 
citizenship’ for describing how people feel, experience and perceive their status as Ugandan 
citizens. My definition of a sense of citizenship is informed by the work of Isin and Wood 
(1999), Kabeer (2005), and Lister (2003), who emphasise the interaction between identity, self-
awareness and agency. A sense of citizenship encompasses how people feel as citizens, how 
they are aware of their citizen identity, and how they perceive themselves as citizens in 
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relation to others and in relation to the state. This allows people’s emotions to be included in 
an analysis of how they experience their citizenship. 
 
Informed by the debate on the coexistence of ethnic and state citizenship (Ekeh, 1975; 
Ndegwa, 1997), an inquiry into the sense of citizenship allows for both the ethnic and the 
citizen identity to be studied, as well as the relationship between the two. As Nyamjoh (2006) 
argues that there are ‘hierarchies in citizenship’, I assume there are differences in how people 
sense the quality of their citizenship. People who feel marginalised may lack of a sense of 
citizenship or feel like ‘second class citizens’ while others may feel more confident. Based on 
social-constructivist approaches to ethnicity (Jenkins, 2008) and based on the debate about 
marginalised ethnicities (Hickey, 2007), the idea about the existing hierarchy and a lack of a 
sense of citizenship comes about in a dialectic relation to the existence and behaviour of other 
ethnicities, which are higher placed in the hierarchy.  
 
In this study I define the practice of citizenship as the individual and collective actions 
undertaken by people to engage in the politics of the social and political spheres, and influence 
the governing institutions of society that affect their lives. In this thesis engagement in 
‘politics’ entails actions regarding decision-making and relations in the public sphere, which is 
also the community. I focus on the everyday encounters between citizens and state actors. 
This involves an analysis of the various spaces and instances where citizens ‘see the state’ 
(Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava, & Veron, 2005). The fact that in marginalised settings of 
underdevelopment many citizens do not see the state directly means that perceptions of state 
authority are often mediated through ideas that circulate in the public sphere, or through the 
views of others (ibid.). Informed by this notion of ‘seeing the state’ and a notion of ‘the 
everyday’, but recognising that forms of authority other than the state exist, I am interested in 
small-scale instances of citizen engagement and the everyday practices, interactions and 
negotiations between communities and groups of citizens, or individual citizens, and their 
state and non-state authorities.  
 
These everyday practices, citizens and their authorities are very important in the efforts of 
communities to improve their lives. Relying on the literature on institutionalised participation I 
look at formal mechanisms for participatory governance. I also study engagement outside such 
institutions. Such informal strategies are relevant, in particular when people considered formal 
channels inappropriate. Engagements can be respectful of authority or ‘rude’, as in the case of 
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‘rude accountability’ (Hossain, 2010). Informal strategies includes the more subtle tactics that 
are akin to Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985).  
 
This understanding of citizenship informs the scope and boundaries of this study. I concentrate 
on the sense and practice of citizenship of the Acholi and Langi in relation to their political 
communities of the state and their respective ethnic groups. Other possible political 
communities are not considered. For a focus on everyday engagements the fieldwork was 
limited to studying citizenship of the Acholi and the Langi in the three rural field sites, while 
acknowledging that citizenship would look different in the diaspora and in towns. Finally, the 
study emphasises recent history: from Independence to the present, but mainly since the start 
of the NRA regime in 1986. I acknowledge that the construction of citizenship is a long-term 
process that has no clear beginning.  
 
A focus on the everyday distinguishes my approach from other approaches to state-society 
relations, which were discussed in Chapter 2. As mentioned, the early work on peasant 
revolutions took revolution by the masses to be the ultimate form of engagement. Relevant 
for this study are the idea that it is necessary to understand the social structure of peasant 
societies, and the recent insight that emotions and a sense of dignity motivate engagement 
(Petersen, 2001; Wood, 2003). Petersen (2001) furthermore shows the factors that encourage 
people to move along a spectrum starting from neutrality to armed insurgency. 
 
My study adds to the contentious politics model by focusing on the everyday engagements 
and on the factors that enable or constrain the political agency that is required for citizen 
engagement. Claims, demands, but also discontent and disagreement are not only expressed 
through large- scale mobilisation and contentious actions (Tilly, 2008; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). 
Where Tilly and Tarrow (2007) aim to disaggregate the mechanisms and processes of 
contentious political actions to find patterns, I seek to bring out the prerequisites for forms of 
engagement. Also, in my approach citizen engagement can focus on social and political 
institutions, whereas a definition of contentious politics necessarily involves the government 
as a party. I agree that government-related contention has distinctive properties, but a sole 
focus on government downplays relationships with other forms of authority. This applies in 
particular to the African context where the ethnic community too is important for the 
construction of citizenship.  
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Scott’s work (1985, 1990) shows that the marginalised have clear ideas about justice, dignity 
and legitimacy, and about the relationships that maintain the social contract between them 
and the powerful state or non-state elites. They will resist when these are violated, carefully 
balancing how much of this is possible in public, and carefully treading the line between fear, 
resistance and support. Yet I differ from Scott over his interpretation of ‘silences’ on the part 
of the marginalised. Scott seems to think that behind every form of silence there is a form of 
resistance. I do not want to refute Scott’s explanation that forms of resistance exist among the 
marginalised even when not expressed in public. But different ‘forms of quiescence’ exist. As 
Gaventa (1982) has shown, the perception of the self as ‘powerless’ leads to the thought that 
one’s action would not lead to any improvement and therefore people remain silent. Many 
authors have demonstrated that silence can persist in situations where people have 
experienced repression or fear for a long time, even when the sources of repression no longer 
exist (Beswick, 2010; Thomson, 2011). Informed by Scott’s work on weapons of the weak and 
by Gaventa’s work on feelings of powerlessness I further explore whether silence reflects a 
form of fear, a fear related to the experience of violent conflict.  
 
3.1.2 Towards an explanation of citizen engagement in post-conflict settings 
 
In this section I weave together the ideas from the sets of literature discussed in Chapter 2, 
which help to find an explanation for what Acholi citizenship looks like in the post-conflict 
situation. Based on the understanding that the construction of citizenship is a historical 
process, I analyse the construction of Acholi citizenship prior to, during and after the war. I 
have two tasks. I first need to demonstrate how Acholi citizenship evolved over history, 
particularly what happened during the LRA conflict. Secondly, I need to demonstrate how 
certain experiences are carried into the post-conflict situation. This section prepares the 
ground for formulating the propositions for this study. 
 
The relationship between conflict and citizenship: including the ‘sense’ 
 
I start from the premise that the sense and the practice of citizenship are interdependent 
(Heater, 1990; Theiss-Morse, 1993). The literature review brings out that the sense of 
citizenship is hardly discussed in conflict studies, which tends to look at people’s observable 
behaviour. Few scholars highlight the importance of emotions and sense of personhood 
(Petersen, 2001; Wood, 2003). Although the literature on forced migration discusses both the 
100 
 
sense and the practice of citizenship it does not interrogate a possible relationship between 
the two. The situation of internally displaced people is not as widely documented as the 
situation of refugees. The sense of citizenship of IDPs needs to be studied in its own right, 
because they need to engage with their home state to claim rights and the UN framework for 
IDPs is not as strong as international refugee law.  
 
Missing from both the conflict studies literature and the literature on forced migration is the 
analysis of the interconnection between how people see themselves as citizens and 
understand their agency, and how this subsequently shapes agency. Yet Wood (2003) 
demonstrates that people’s perceptions of themselves were very important to their 
willingness to participate in violent insurgency, as explained in Chapter 2. Her theory directly 
addresses the connection between the ‘sense’ and ‘practice’ of citizenship. In particular this 
‘sense’ and what it is constituted by is missing from conventional collective action theory. This 
also applies to the studies that suggest that conflict can have a positive impact on citizen 
participation (Bellows & Miguel, 2009; C. Blattman, 2009; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2011). These 
studies do not recognise the sense of citizenship as informative of the practice of citizenship, 
and do not address the substantiveness of participation. My study addresses this gap in the 
literature by distinguishing the sense and practice of citizenship, and by studying how these 
concepts are related in the post-conflict setting of Acholi. 
 
The literature on ethnic citizenship speaks of differentiated attitudes towards the two political 
communities of which citizens are members - the ethnic and the national - resulting in 
differentiated behaviour (Ndegwa, 1997). The literature on ethnic citizenship furthermore 
underlines the differentiated sense of belonging to the nation-state and to the ethnic group, as 
well as hierarchies in that sense of belonging. This means it is necessary to explore the 
meaning of ‘Acholiness’ and being an ‘Acholi citizen’. Using a social-constructivist approach I 
view identity as something that is developed in a dialectic process (Jenkins, 2008). 
 
If it is acknowledged that the political communities of the ethnic group and the state are both 
important for developing citizenship, then the sense and practice of citizenship need to be 
studied in both political communities. In Acholi, both ethnic citizenship and state citizenship 
will have been affected by the conflict, although possibly in different ways. I agree with 
Ndegwa that ethnic identity can shape one’s preferences in relation to the national community 
(Ndegwa, 1997). From here it is imaginable that the way ethnic identity is affected may 
influence citizen identity, and vice versa. Existing literature on the Acholi shows that the LRA 
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conflict had negative implications for Acholi culture and therefore Dolan purposely uses the 
term ‘cultural debilitation’ (Dolan, 2008, p. 168). Through my concept of the sense of 
citizenship I want interrogate how this relates to, or informs, national citizenship and 
engagement with the state.  
 
The literature on ethnicity and marginalisation provides useful ideas for thinking about how 
the sense of citizenship evolves in (post)conflict settings. As alluded to in Chapter 2, there are 
various views of what marginalisation entails. I discussed examples of regions where ethnic 
groups who are legally citizens have been actively marginalised in processes of citizenship 
formation (Hickey, 2007), as have vulnerable migrant domestic workers (Nyamnjoh, 2006, 
2008). For these people, who are pushed to the margins, a lack of a sense of citizenship 
discourages citizen engagement. The case of the domestic workers illustrates that their sense 
of citizenship – or, more precisely, their lack of sense of citizenship, weakens their will and 
capacity for citizen engagement. Interestingly, the groups demonstrate instances of passive 
resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990), but they shy away from direct confrontation with the actors 
that marginalise them. This insight may be relevant to understanding conflict settings. An 
important difference is that in conflict settings citizen engagement can even be more high risk, 
and fear may be a dominant emotion affecting engagement.  
 
Based on this discussion, the overall proposition of this study relates to the effects of conflict 
and displacement on both the sense and practice of citizenship. This is based on the notion 
that the sense and practice of citizenship are interdependent. The propositions will be 
presented in full in section 3.1.3. 
 
What happens during conflict?  
 
My definition of violent conflict is informed by the notion of a ‘warscape’ (Nordstrom, 1997) 
and Vigh’s idea of war as a social terrain that is constantly in motion (Vigh, 2006). This is partly 
informed by Skocpol’s argument that actions are possible within a particular structural context 
(Skocpol, 1982). I see conflict as a diverse set of experiences as well as a dynamic environment 
in which people navigate the actors and structures. This is thus firmly rooted in Vigh’s 
conceptualisation of conflict: a social terrain with various structures and processes (Vigh, 
2006). This is different from the definitions of Blattman (2009), Bellows and Miguel (2009), 
who concentrate on violent acts that were committed, experienced or witnessed as central to 
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the conflict experience. Rather, similar to Lubkemann (2008), I want to focus on how social and 
political processes unfold during conflict and not make war violence itself the central question. 
 
In the field of conflict studies it has not been common to systematically unpack ‘the black box 
that is conflict’ (Kalyvas, 2006; E. J. Wood, 2008) and to relate different features or 
mechanisms of violent conflict to citizenship. In this thesis I unpack the LRA conflict into its 
different features, and demonstrate how these features individually or in combination affect a 
sense and practice of citizenship. I distinguish the pre-displacement phase of the war from the 
camp situation. For both episodes I look at the actors, institutions and processes that produced 
the warscape in which citizen engagement occurred. Different social identities within the 
affected population (through for instance gender and age differences) may be affected 
differently by the conflict. I need to be aware of different social relationships and social 
struggles, which may be reconfigured and shaped by war (Lubkemann, 2008).     
 
For unpacking the conflict into its mechanisms I use the literature that highlights the 
transformation of social and political institutions that occurs during conflict (Justino, 2012, 
2013). Pre-existing social and cultural institutions inform how people respond to conflict 
(Lubkemann, 2008; Finströmm, 2003). New networks and institutions may emerge 
(Nordstrom, 2004; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2008b). Existing knowledge concentrates on 
changing forms of authority, in particular on the emergence of governance structures created 
by armed non-state actors (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004, 2008b), and the networks that 
constitute informal economies (Cramer, 2006a, 2006b; Nordstrom, 2004). This work 
demonstrates that citizens continue to participate in economic activities and governance 
relationships, but these institutions take new forms. Local power dynamics are complicated 
due to the presence of competing powerful (armed) actors, which citizens have to navigate 
(Vigh, 2006). Based on the work of Allen (2006, 2010) on customary justice mechanisms in 
Acholi, and Finnström (2003) and Dolan (2009) on Acholi customary leadership, I make the 
focus on cultural institutions explicit. Political institutions in theory include customary 
leadership, but to understand how they are embedded in society their cultural meaning needs 
to be included in the analysis.  
 
In the case of the Acholi region, displacement into camps within the war zone was another 
feature of the conflict. The literature on forced migration describes displacement camps as 
particular spaces of confinement, where camp governance regimes dictate citizenship practice. 
Within the camps, too, changes in institutions may occur. Dolan (2009) documented how the 
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camp situation undermined customary leadership. In addition to studying this institution, I 
focus on Local Councils (LCs) and the camp leadership itself.  
 
A question that emerges is whether the transformation of institutions in Acholi would have 
positive or negative implications for Acholi citizenship. The literature review suggests that both 
are possible. It is not exactly clear under which conditions institutional transformation has a 
positive or negative impact and it is beyond the scope of this study to come up with such a 
meta-level analysis. Likewise, it is an interesting question: under which conditions social 
relations and social institutions are weakened or strengthened during war. (But this is not the 
question I am asking in this thesis.)  
 
Chapter 4 presents existing literature on the LRA conflict. This literature does not show which 
forms of agency developed, in which spaces and institutions. Nor does it reveal which local 
institutions continued to operate, and how. The literature does give some indications of what 
local spaces for citizen engagement looked like, within a narrowing, securitised space for 
public engagement and through new institutions that were imposed. I assume that the LRA 
conflict negatively affected social relations, because this is what the literature on displacement 
camps particularly demonstrates (Dolan, 2009; Nyers, 2006). I ask how this subsequently 
affects the practice of citizenship. Since the literature on participation argues that forms of 
collective agency are conducive to substantive participation  (McGee & Gaventa, 2011) I expect 
that the weakening of social institutions has negative implications for the practice of 
citizenship.  
 
I want to relate the transformation of social and political institutions to learning citizenship. If, 
as indicated in Chapter 2, citizenship is ‘learnt’ through building awareness about rights, 
building confidence, the practice of participation in social and political institutions that builds 
experience through exposure, and through socialisation into political cultures (Delanty, 2003; 
Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Merrifield, 2001), then surely we cannot ignore people’s pre-conflict, 
or extra-conflict, histories. It requires little imagination to see that processes of socialisation 
look different from war-torn settings. This raises an important question. If someone grew up in 
conditions where basic rights were not secured and even violated, where opportunities for 
participation were curtailed by multiple armed, violent and oppressive authorities, where 
social relations ‘froze’ due to mistrust, where coping strategies were transmitted over 
generations, how can people learn and develop forms of citizen engagement?  For the LRA 
affected areas in Uganda, this question remains largely unanswered.  
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The literature on institutional transformation suggests at least two implications for citizenship. 
First of all, where institutions were important for channelling ‘voice’ it is likely that expressions 
of citizen agency have changed. Secondly, assuming that certain institutions nurture 
citizenship, the transformation of institutions will affect learning citizenship. This includes the 
possibility that new institutions have emerged that offer opportunities for learning, practising 
and expressing citizenship. It is looking at institutional transformation from a citizen 
perspective that is missing in the micro-analysis of conflict, which emphasises ‘how civilians 
cope’ rather than ‘how citizens act’. I therefore chose to distinguish ‘coping agency’ from 
‘citizen agency’, in an attempt similar to Barter (2012) to unpack how people have agency in 
the midst of conflict. This helps to address this ambiguity in conflict studies.  
 
Apart from a focus on institutions I analyse the nature of the public sphere and the perceived 
role of the state. The public sphere is the arena of public interaction and discourse (Fraser, 
1990). The public sphere is distinct from the state apparatus, market relations and the range of 
civil society associations. It is the arena of language and discourse where people deliberate 
about, for instance, political and economic life; therefore the public sphere can be critical to 
the state and the economy. Trust in the state in the post-conflict situation may be determined 
by past experience. Citizens may have certain expectations of the state and opinions about 
how it responds to the conflict. In (post)conflict settings where forms of violent repression 
occur, the perception of public spaces for engagement is that they are unsafe (Beswick, 2010). 
It is furthermore suggested that the relationship between the state and the citizens ‘narrows’ 
because the public domain is dominated by security issues. I assume that such conditions have 
implications for citizen agency. 
 
The literature review provided some suggestions for what citizen agency might look like. 
Existing studies on citizenship in conflict settings highlight the strategies citizens employ in the 
midst of violence: withdrawal from public spaces, silence and self-censorship, and as a form of 
self-protection collaborating with the forms of authority (in various degrees) that are not 
necessarily benign, democratic and accountable (Pearce et al., 2011; Wheeler, 2011). Like the 
conflict studies literature, citizenship studies points to the changes in mainly social institutions. 
In many cases social networks among citizens ‘freeze’ and can be difficult to form, and the 
prevalence of violence curtails the spaces for engagement (Pearce et al., 2011). As a 
consequence, there are fewer possibilities for citizen engagement.  
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Finally, a number of lessons from studies on citizen participation in relatively stable settings 
can be taken on board. This literature stresses the importance of institutional design and legal 
frameworks (Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007; Fung & Wright, 2003), active bureaucrats and 
active citizens (Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007), and citizen capabilities (McGee & Gaventa, 
2011). Most of all it highlights the need to analyse power dynamics and politics between 
citizens and the state, but also among citizens. There is no homogeneous voice category 
(Hirschman, 1970). The social differentiation within the citizenry, based on ethnicity, gender 
and age, affects the participation of different social identities (Abraham et al., 2010; R. Lister, 
2003). The collective capacity of citizens, their ability to use multiple strategies for engagement 
and build alliances with political and civil society actors contributes to effective engagement 
(Gaventa & Barrett, 2010).  
 
Using this literature, I formulate proposition (II) about changes in local institutions and the 
public sphere and proposition (III) about how these changes affect citizenship (section 1.3.1).  
 
What happens in the post-conflict situation? 
 
This study seeks to establish the linkages between past and present and to demonstrate how 
the past experience of conflict shapes present-day engagement. What follows from the above 
is that significant events or episodes that belong to the collective memory of a particular 
political community can shape a sense of citizenship and inform citizen engagement. When 
acknowledging that active citizenship is learnt and shaped by socialisation processes, it is likely 
that the past experience of protracted violent conflict affects citizenship in the post-conflict 
situation. This informs proposition (IV) of this study, which relates to the enduring effects of 
the conflict (section 3.1.3). 
 
There is not much scholarly work that addresses this question directly, which is why this study 
fills an important gap. The literature that is most relevant is the work done on violence and 
memory. These studies in (post)conflict settings emphasise the prevalence of silence in the 
public sphere, due to persisting fear (Hume, 2010). Due to this fear citizens continue to 
withdraw from the public sphere and refrain from public engagement, particularly on issues 
that are considered politically sensitive. Studies in other contexts show that citizens continue 
to use avoidance tactics and social navigation, or strategic alliances with powerful actors. This 
is the case for youth in Sierra Leone (Christensen & Utas, 2008). The example from Rwanda 
shows that people rely on hidden transcripts and silent acts of resistance (Thomson, 2011), 
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while public practices of engagement occur in a space where people feel safe: Ubudehe (Shah, 
2011).  
 
Also in other contexts citizens and their organisations gained confidence and skills after certain 
successes, after which efforts were devoted to expanding arenas for participation or other sets 
of rights (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). However, as the cases of Rwanda and Angola show, 
building capacity for voice in one arena (service delivery and development) does not 
automatically lead to strengthened voice in other, often more politicised, arenas 
(reconciliation in Rwanda and accountability in Angola). This may indicate an important 
difference for conflict settings: certain arenas remain too difficult, sensitive or risk-prone to 
allow for citizen engagement. 
 
3.1.3 Research questions and propositions 
 
As has been seen, this study pulls together knowledge about state-society relations, citizenship 
and citizen participation, micro-level conflict studies and forced migration. It aims to advance 
these academic debates by looking at their intersection: how is citizenship sensed, constructed 
and  practised in a post-conflict setting like the Acholi sub-region in Uganda. The overall 
objective is to contribute to an understanding of a construction of citizenship in contexts of 
violent conflict and displacement by unpacking the dynamics of the LRA conflict.  
 
The central question that guided the research was: In the case of the Acholi region in Northern 
Uganda, how does the experience of protracted conflict and forced displacement affect the 
construction, sense and practice of citizenship by Acholi citizens?  
 
I compare how Acholi in two conflict-affected areas and Langi in a non-affected area sense 
their citizenship, and how they practise citizenship. I pursue four propositions. One is the 
overall proposition for my research, closely related to the central question. Two propositions 
were formulated for what happened during the conflict. Finally, one proposition was 
formulated for the post-conflict situation. I will now present these propositions. In the next 
section I present the proxies that were studied during fieldwork. 
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I. The overall proposition of this study is that the experience of protracted conflict 
and displacement leads to a lack of a sense of citizenship and to diminished forms 
of citizen engagement, due to the limited opportunity for learning and 
experiencing the practice of citizenship.  
 
From the previous discussion it is possible to derive the conceptual model shown in Figure 3.1.  
I start from the premise that the sense and the practice of citizenship are interdependent, as 
stated in the literature (Lister, 2003). Therefore, I will analyse how the conflict affects both. I 
will explain present-day forms of citizen engagement by analysing what happened to 
citizenship during the conflict and by analysing the sense and practice of citizenship in the 
present. 
 
I have distinguished four features of the LRA conflict: displacement; the experience of 
insecurity, violence and abductions; the presence of violent armed actors; and the role of the 
state. Three of these features directly affect the sense of citizenship (dashed arrow, X). All four 
features indirectly affect the practice of citizenship (bold arrow, Y) through a series of 
transformations at the local level. I study the changes in political, social and cultural 
institutions and in the nature of the public sphere, for which I formulate the following 
proposition: 
 
II. The LRA conflict led to a securitisation of the public sphere and to narrowing, 
securitised civic and political institutions.   
 
In the thesis I test the proposition that the public sphere became securitised and I add 
empirical detail to what the securitisation of the public sphere entailed. Based on the literature 
reviewed, I expect to find that the presence of armed, violent actors leads to fear and the 
(perceived) lack of safe spaces, and therefore to a reduction in the forms of citizen 
engagement during the conflict. Furthermore, securitisation of the public sphere would narrow 
the scope of state-society interactions to security issues and affect citizen perceptions of the 
state (A). 
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of how violent conflict affects citizen engagement 
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As explained, I relate the literature on the transformation of institutions (Justino, 2013) to 
learning citizenship. I expect to find that the social, cultural and political institutions at local 
level were curtailed or securitised due to (features of) the conflict (B). As a consequence, 
citizens have few opportunities to learn and experience citizenship practices (C, D). This leads 
to the third proposition:  
 
III. The lack of safe space and the narrowing of local institutions limited the 
opportunities for learning the practice of citizenship during the conflict. 
 
This is one of the reasons for limited forms of citizen engagement in the post-conflict situation: 
there is little prior experience with individual and particular collective citizen engagement (E). 
Finally, for the post-conflict situation, I expect that certain ideas and experiences developed 
during the conflict are carried over into the post-conflict situation (F). This produces the final 
proposition:  
 
IV. In the post-conflict situation, certain ideas and practices that emerged during the 
conflict persist and result in a lack of citizen engagement.  
 
The ‘lack of’ citizen engagement is referring to a limited level and scope of citizen engagement. 
I expect that citizen engagement in Acholi is not as wide in scope and not as substantive as in 
Lango. By ‘scope’ I mean the range of mechanisms and tactics used for citizen engagement and 
the range of themes or issues engaged with. The examples from post-conflict settings suggest 
that the dynamics of having voice can vary for different issues. There could be themes or 
arenas that Acholi would consider too sensitive to talk about, whereas the Langi may 
experience less difficulty. That said, even in volatile or repressive environments people may 
develop tacit agency (Utas, 2005) and everyday acts of resistance (Scott, 1980). By 
‘substantiveness’ I mean the extent of influence in decision-making and the intensity in the 
interaction between citizens and authorities. 
 
In Lango I expect to encounter a range of ‘ordinary’ challenges to participation that have been 
widely covered in the literature in stable contexts, including for Uganda: issues to do with 
representation and mechanisms and micropolitics that exclude some citizens from effective 
participation. In Acholi, I expect these challenges would be deepened and complemented with 
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another set of challenges that, directly or indirectly, resulted from the mechanisms that 
emerged during the war. 
 
The findings show that there is indeed a qualitative difference between Acholi and Lango. For 
post-conflict Acholi I have gathered evidence that fear and suspicion of the public sphere and 
the state persist. It was, however, a real challenge to find this out, because many Acholi are 
reluctant to speak about this in public. In Chapter 7 I present quotes from several respondents 
who did dare to express this verbally. Apart from this I relied on observations and I discuss the 
validity of these findings in Chapter 7. Any research to test these findings has to be equally 
capable of overcoming this reluctance.  
 
The empirical material is structured in chronological order, tracing the changes that occurred 
during the conflict and their implications for citizenship, leading up to the present post-conflict 
situation. In Chapter 4 I describe the context of Uganda and the background of the LRA war. 
This shows the contours of the construction of citizenship of the people in Northern Uganda. In 
Chapter 5 I focus on characteristics of the conflict and how citizenship evolved before the 
period of displacement started. In Chapter 6 I show how citizenship was recast in the 
displacement camps. Chapters 5 and 6 thus present the data in relation to propositions (II) and 
(III). In Chapter 7 I test proposition (IV), about the practice of citizenship in the post-conflict 
situation. 
 
3.2 Researching the sense and the practice of citizenship 
 
The sense of citizenship  
 
For studying a sense of citizenship I took key aspects that Acholi themselves identified as 
important for their membership of the wider political community of Uganda as a country, and 
how they relate to citizens in those regions where conflict did not occur. I adopted a historical 
approach to examine how a sense of citizenship developed over time. The proxies for a sense 
of citizenship were not predetermined before the fieldwork started. I adopted an inductive 
approach to use people’s own definitions and the aspects they considered relevant in their 
relationship to the Ugandan state and to other Ugandan tribes. By looking at how the Acholi 
constructed their citizenship in relation to the state and in a dialectic process to other tribes I 
aimed to address both ethnic citizenship and state citizenship.  
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From the interviews about Acholi identity I derived that a ‘good relationship’ to the state 
depends on a) whether the state treats all tribes equally in terms of distribution of resources 
and political power, b) whether the state treats all tribes with respect and leaves them their 
dignity, and c) how the state responds to insecurity. The data analysis process that led to this 
threefold definition is explained in section 3.6. In relation to other tribes in Uganda, aspects 
that came out strongly were: a) equality in terms of assets and development, and b) whether 
other tribes respect one’s tribe. The key concepts reflected here, equality, dignity and security, 
figure throughout the thesis when I discuss a sense of citizenship. 
 
The practice of citizenship  
 
From the literature on rural Ugandan communities (F. Golooba-Mutebi, 2004; Jones, 2009) I 
expected the predominant forms of engagement in the post-conflict situation to be small 
instances of day-to-day interactions with state and non-state authorities through formal and 
informal channels. To set the boundaries for this research and to keep fieldwork manageable 
my study concentrated on the forms of engagement that seemed most important: the 
everyday forms of citizen engagement that constitute the critical and constructive end of the 
spectrum described in Chapter 2. The proxies for the practice of citizenship therefore belong to 
this part of the spectrum.  
 
The spectrum shows that citizens have a range of options for engagement. Acknowledging the 
full spectrum of forms of engagement I decided to analyse forms of collective action that 
openly resisted authority, should these occur. Thus, although the focus was on everyday 
engagement, I would not ignore any instance of rejection, resistance or contestation. I was 
mindful that expressions of discontent can be violent or non-violent, expressed through open 
confrontation or through hidden acts or transcripts. From the literature on Uganda I expected 
that instances of violence would be personal conflicts, or a riot at most. I saw such instances as 
events that had meaning. Scott (1990) emphasises these moments in which the codes for using 
hidden transcripts are broken and people transgress to the public. They reveal important 
information about citizens’ normative ideas about relationships to authority.  
 
For both Acholi and Lango I first established what citizen engagement had looked like prior to 
the start of the insurgency in 1986, during the second Obote regime (1981-1986). For the Langi 
the regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979) was also important for their construction of citizenship. I 
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then studied how practices of engagement and forms of agency developed from 1986 
onwards. For the Acholi, this meant the start of the LRA insurgency, i.e. in the early stages of 
the war when they were still living at home, and then in the displacement camps. In Lango, 
citizen engagement developed in a context that was increasingly stable and peaceful. I then 
studied citizen engagement in the present. Of course, the level of detail was richer for 
contemporary life , and I had less detail for periods longer ago. From the Acholi narratives 
about daily life during distinct episodes of the conflict it is possible to see how practices of 
citizenship were adjusted to the conflict situation.  
 
I studied citizen engagement in relation to both state and customary institutions, and also in 
the social sphere of the community. This was based on the notion that citizen engagement 
occurs not only in formal spaces as defined by the state, but encompasses engagements in 
local level politics (R. Lister, 2003). This is participation in a more general sense, encompassing 
all other forms of authority in society with which people need to negotiate, where decision-
making takes place and problems are solved, hence including both the social and political 
domains of citizenship. These are the ‘real-life’ interactions between state agencies and 
population groups as political society, as distinct from the more formally organised state-civil 
society interactions (Chatterjee, 2005).  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, the concept ‘voice’ is an important concept for citizenship and 
participation (Delanty, 2000; Hirschman, 1970). Informed by the conceptualisation of voice by 
Goetz and Jenkins (2004) I distinguished the ‘petitioning voice’ from the ‘interrogative voice’ in 
this study. This enabled me to be more specific about the forms of engagement observed. The 
former refers to engagement for material aspects of development and services, and the latter 
to accountability processes. For accountability purposes ‘to have voice’ refers to the strategies 
and effectiveness of people to hold leaders accountable for their performance. It is a voice that 
interrogates actors, processes and decisions (Goetz & Jenkins, 2004), and, in cases of failure, 
initiates the actions taken to sanction officials, or to set procedures in motion that eventually 
lead to punishment or correction of the responsible officials (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006). 
 
I furthermore looked at both individual and collective voice (Fox,2007). The importance of 
social relationships and social institutions for mobilisation capacities has repeatedly been 
emphasised by scholars working across the spectrum of state-society relations (Moore, 1966; 
Scott, 1976; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; Wolf, 1969). To understand the interplay between individual 
and collective strategies for engagement, and between individual and collective voice, is 
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important for an understanding of prevailing norms about what constitutes the collective and 
the community (Menkiti, 1984). Cultural norms about the community prevalent in many 
African contexts shape people’s behaviour and ideas about what is appropriate to say and do 
for one’s own good and the common good, and thus shape forms of citizen engagement.  
 
This led to the following proxies for the everyday practice of citizen engagement:  
 
a) Involvement in cultural and social institutions. 
This includes community groups such as farmer groups, savings groups, and social organisation 
through the clan, which I assumed to be ‘safe spaces’ for engagement with possible links to 
local government. Not included were the cultural dance groups and church groups. 
 
b) Everyday interactions with state and customary forms of authority. 
Regarding the state, I studied both formal openings for citizen participation and informal 
interactions between state officials and citizens. The proxy for formal spaces is the LC system 
itself, particularly the planning process. Prior to my fieldwork I had no knowledge of the 
informal interactions and these were identified in the field. I included all forms of day-to-day 
interaction between village residents and the bottom three levels of the Local Council (LC) 
system; LC1 (village), LC2 (parish), LC3 (sub-county), as well as technical officials such as the 
Parish Chief, Sub-County Chief, and the Community Development Officer (CDO).  
 
Regarding customary institutions, I looked at the role of customary leaders in the community 
and the types of issues the community put to them. I examined the possible cross-over 
between customary and formal governance institutions and how customary leaders might play 
a role in mediating with local state actors. 
 
c) Involvement for development purposes (the petitioning voice). 
I looked at how people use the formal framework for participatory development planning 
through the LCs, claimed by the government to be the genuine ‘bottom-up’ structure for 
citizen participation. The informal interactions mentioned under b) were also analysed for the 
petitioning voice. 
 
d) Engagement for accountability (the interrogative voice) 
Regarding the interrogative voice for accountability, I looked at formal and informal strategies, 
including ‘weapons of the weak’ tactics’ used to hold leaders accountable for their 
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performance. I examined which issues people find most disconcerting and how they take 
action and looked at the factors that inhibit any such actions.  
 
The remaining sections present the justification for the research design, an overview of the 
research methodology and responses to methodological challenges that I encountered in the 
field. I finish with a description of the data analysis process. 
 
3.3 Research Design and Methodology  
3.3.1 Comparing ‘conflict-affected’ and ‘non-affected’ cases 
 
A comparative case study of three sites, two located in the heavily conflict-affected Acholi 
region and one located in a non-affected area of Lango region, was considered the most 
appropriate design for this study. This section presents a justification of the case study as a 
method and the selection process of the cases. 
 
The case study can be considered a method in itself (Yin, 2009). It is suitable for seeking to 
understand a certain phenomenon in its contextual conditions, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clear-cut. This is exactly how I see the 
complex reality of a (post)conflict situation. Violent conflict is a setting, but cannot be seen as 
an independent variable as it deeply penetrates the domain of social relations, political 
processes and institutions, and also the psyche of human beings. It has to be unpacked into its 
multiple features, or variables. A case study enquiry can cope with a plurality of variables, as it 
relies on multiple sources of evidence and benefits from prior development of theoretical 
propositions that guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009). I did just this, as detailed 
above. It is argued that case study research does not aim to be generalisable to a wider 
population. Rather, cases are selected to serve the objectives of the study in such a way that 
‘we can learn the most’ (Stake, 1995). Furthermore, the case study is used for generalising to 
theoretical propositions rather than populations (Yin, 2009), as I do for the effects of conflict. 
 
The criteria for selecting the research sites were formulated through an inductive approach, 
during a one-month pilot visit to Uganda in 2009. The important difference between the cases 
to be compared would be the intensity of the LRA conflict, in terms of ‘affected’ and ‘non-
affected’ cases, which Gerring calls the ‘diverse case method’ for selecting cases (2007). I 
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carried out a mapping exercise with 35 respondents from academia and CSOs, all of whom had 
worked within the region for a considerable length of time. This resulted in 35 maps of Acholi 
and Lango that showed the areas that were heavily affected by LRA activities, based on criteria 
the respondents themselves had formulated.  
 
I selected two conflict-affected sites in the Acholi region and one non-affected site in Lango 
region. The cases are ‘typical’ in terms of two cases representing conflict-affected areas and 
one a non-affected area (Gerring, 2007). The following descriptive characteristics were used to 
select the research sites within Acholi region: 
1) A rural parish. A considerable distance away from the region’s main town where services and 
military protection were concentrated, in order to avoid regional bias.  
2) Having experienced sustained insecurity and LRA attacks.  
3) Having experienced long-term displacement to camps within the region. 
4) Absence of repeated attacks/ incursions by Karamojong cattle raiders (the neighbouring 
region). This would add another layer of complexity and more variables, which cannot be 
studied within the scope of this research.  
 
This led to the selection of two research sites in Chua and Lamwo districts (Table 3.1). Both 
districts are in the far north of Acholi on the border with South Sudan. The area was heavily 
affected by the activities of the LRA starting in the late 1980s. The rationale for selecting these 
two particular locations and the differences between the two require further justification.  
 
Table 3.1  Overview of case study locations 
 Conflict affected   Non-affected 
Case Sub-county 1 Sub-county 2 Sub-county 3 
Displacement 4-6 years 9 to 10 years - 
    
Region Acholi Acholi Lango 
District Chua  Lamwo Kole 
Sub-counties 1 1 1 
Parish  1 1 1 
Villages  6 4 7 
    
 
The research site in Lamwo is a more remote area than the one in Chua, and its population 
was displaced for approximately ten years, whereas the population of the site in Chua lived in 
camps for approximately five years. The Lamwo site is located on one of the ‘LRA corridors’ 
from Sudan to Uganda, and experienced extreme insecurity. The population from this research 
site was displaced in 1997, following a series of LRA attacks in the area. The site in Chua is 
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nearer to Kitgum town and therefore closer to large military barracks. Here the displacement 
camp started in 2002/3 when the government launched the military operation Iron Fist against 
the LRA in Sudan. Prior to this event, the population of Chua experienced insecurity in their 
homes due to frequent attacks by the LRA and aggressive behaviour by the military.  
 
I started my fieldwork in the site in Chua. During fieldwork I found that many people referred 
to ‘life in the camp’. I then wanted to have an in-depth understanding of how life in the camp 
had been and what forms of agency had developed during displacement. I therefore decided 
to include a research site where the camp had been in existence for a long time, which led to 
the selection of a site in Lamwo. Because this site was located in a more remote area there 
were other differences too. Security dynamics had been different: the military detachment 
was smaller and the site was on the LRA corridor. Also, it meant that the people in the Lamwo 
site had had less access to town. 
 
Although there was a difference in the length of displacement of approximately five years, I did 
not observe a significant difference in citizenship outcomes. It was, however, not an objective 
of this study to explain variation in citizenship outcomes by looking at differences in the length 
of displacement. In Chapter 7 I present some reflections: although people in Chua were 
displaced for only five years, during the other five years they experienced other aspects of the 
conflict that negatively impact citizenship. It would require more research, comparing a larger 
number of camps in different parts of the region, to draw valid conclusions about differences 
in displacement patterns1 and citizenship outcomes.  
 
The comparative case was located in Lango region. Ideally the non-affected case would also be 
situated within the Acholi region. However, this was impossible, as the entire Acholi region and 
its population was heavily affected by the LRA. The matching case for this comparative case 
study was a non-affected area in Lango region, the southern part of Kole district. Parts of 
Lango region suffered extremely violent attacks and insecurity, in particular after Operation 
Iron Fist. However, the residents of the southern parts of Kole district never experienced 
attacks or displacement, nor was the work of local government institutions and social 
infrastructure ever disrupted by the conflict. 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, there were also differences in settlement patterns: in some camps the population settled 
according to their villages of origin, whereas in other camps people ended up living mixed up with 
people from other locations and therefore other clans. In my two research sites, however, the 
population settled according to their villages. 
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Measures were taken to make the Lango case a match for the Acholi cases. Criteria no. 1 and 4 
were used in the selection process. The distance to the district town, which may be a factor in 
access to district offices, and the year in which the district was created were also taken into 
account. The population of the field sites were similar in size. Each site was ethnically 
homogeneous: Acholi in the Acholi sites and Langi in the sites in Lango. The Acholi and Langi 
share the Luo language and cultural practices, as well as livelihood strategies.  
 
As in all case study research in social sciences, cases will not be perfect matches apart from the 
variables one wants to single out to study. In this case, an important difference between the 
affected and non-affected sub-counties is that the Acholi and Langi people, though similar in 
many aspects of their lifestyle and language, see themselves as distinct ethnic tribes. In a 
multi-ethnic country like Uganda tribes have their own political histories and developed 
relationships with subsequent regimes.  
 
The Acholi and Lango regions are similar in that they are part of the ‘greater north’ of Uganda, 
together with Karamoja and West-Nile, which is important for understanding the ‘north-south 
divide’ in Uganda, which will be explained in Chapter 4. Both regions have had a problematic 
relationship with the NRM government, which is still a factor in the relationship with the 
regime at present. Differences between Lango and Acholi in terms of citizen engagement 
might (partly) be explained by their different tribal affiliation rather than to their different 
experience of conflict. (I come back to this in section 3.4). However, I concluded that the 
distinct ethnic identities did not invalidate the selection of the Lango site as a matching pair to 
the Acholi case. 
 
Within-case selection: sub-counties and villages  
 
Throughout the thesis I use the names of the regions to refer to the conflict-affected area 
(Acholi) and non-affected area (Lango). District names are used when quoting research 
participants: Chua and Lamwo districts in Acholi and Kole district in Lango. 
 
I use the administrative unit of the sub-county (LC3) to demarcate ‘the local level’. The sub-
county level is an important level of decision-making and budget allocation for development in 
the area. Furthermore, it is from this level downwards that there are opportunities for direct 
interaction between citizens and elected leaders and officials, thus allowing for my focus on 
the everyday (Corbridge et al, 2005).  
118 
 
 
In each district one sub-county was selected. In Chua’s sub-county six neighbouring villages 
were studied, followed by field research in four villages in Lamwo’s sub-county. Field research 
took place from January to June 2010, and from August to September 2010. In Kole, field 
research took place in six villages in one parish, from September to December 2010. Within the 
sub-counties, the selected villages were all between five and ten kilometres away from their 
respective sub-county offices.  
 
Moving from one village to the next, it was possible to replicate research methods and findings 
in the process. When certain patterns started to emerge for some of the central study themes 
from the first six villages in Chua, I used the last two case study villages as ‘extra cases’ within 
the Chua case to test those ideas (Maxwell, 2005). For example, when mapping the reasons 
why villagers are reluctant to approach local officials several factors emerged that I could then 
pursue in the last two villages.  
  
3.3.2  Overview of research methodology 
 
In each research site a range of qualitative research methods was used. In this section I explain 
and justify the choice of methods and techniques. Respondents were sampled through 
stratified sampling according to age and gender, and clan based on village maps. The sample 
size and sampling strategy are elaborated in the next section.  
 
In both the Acholi cases and the Langi case I worked with one male and one female research 
assistant. All were graduates and residents of the particular region. With both teams I 
intensively discussed the research objectives and questions, worked on the wording of the 
interview guides, and practised the research methods. In both Acholi and Lango the knowledge 
of the researchers was invaluable. They helped me understand people’s narratives with the 
understanding of an insider, yet with the analytical lens of an outsider. 
 
Life history interviews  
Life history interviews provide information about historical developments and changes in 
society and its culture by capturing how an individual responded to change, and what were 
his/her underlying strategies and motivations (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). It was considered 
an appropriate method for researching how the conflict - and also the situation under various 
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political regimes before the conflict started - affected the lives of the Acholi, how it affected 
social relationships and their relationship to the state. Trust-building was crucial, as this 
determined to what extent people dared to ‘open up’ (E. Francis, 1993). 
 
In this study the life history interviews started with a very open request to the respondent to 
tell me about any memorable episode or event in the respondent’s life, for which the 
respondent was given as much time and opportunity to recall any event or episode that 
mattered. This was followed by a semi-structured interview that took the events or episodes 
as reference points. There were further questions about the respondent’s role, the role of 
other family and community members, and the possible role or expected role of government 
institutions, and how these roles had changed over time. Most events involved questions 
about different types of agency, in particular when state institutions figured in the event. The 
material collected through life histories was useful in analysing changes in socio-political 
relationships and roles over time, and how these were linked to the experience of conflict.  
 
Participatory research methods 
Participatory appraisal was used to map out general information about the field study 
locations, such as outlining the history of the area by time line exercises in focus groups. After 
that, a series of participatory appraisals was carried out to study the effects of violent conflict. 
These instruments were adapted from Moser and McIlwaine’s participatory research 
instruments, which were designed to examine the effects of conflict in urban settings (2001, 
2004).  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
The instrument I used most was a number of semi-structured interviews that were designed 
for specific themes (Annex 1). From the interviewees a number of key respondents were 
identified based on their knowledge and ability to explain with clarity, who participated in 
follow-up interviews to pursue certain themes further. I also interviewed elected leaders and 
government officials in each sub-county, and a small number of district officials.  
 
In district towns and in Kampala, I met with a wide range of academics, civil society 
practitioners2, representatives of bilateral and multilateral donors, and national government. I 
                                                          
2
 Most civil society organisations (CSOs) I encountered were formalised, Non-Government 
Organisations, but these represent only a sub-set of actors within the arena that is civil society (Howell 
& Pearce, 2002).  
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interviewed each of them on the role of their particular institution in the Acholi and Langi sub-
region, and their perspectives on the central themes of this study. 
 
3.3.3  Sample size and sampling strategy 
 
The fieldwork was carried out at the level of the sub-county and below. At this level, a total 
number of 156 focus groups and 369 semi-structured and open interviews were carried out. 
Table 3.2 shows the final sample size for each research site. At district and national level a total 
of 75 interviews were carried out with government officials, Ugandan and international NGOs, 
and academia (overview – Annex 1).  
 
Table 3.2  Final sample size per research site 
 Acholi – Chua Acholi – Lamwo Lango – Kole 
Focus groups 67 42 47 
Interviews 148 62 157 
    
 
At village level, I used stratified sampling for identifying participants (gender/age/ethnicity). As 
a sample strategy I relied on the maps that indicated clan territories and homesteads to ensure 
each clan would be represented. In each clan area we then identified men and women from 
different age groups (youth3: age 18-35; adults: age 35 – 60, elders: age 60 and above). To 
have each clan represented was important for understanding interactions between clan 
members and local authorities, over issues like patronage and land disputes in which clan 
membership may play a role. I had no reason to believe that different clans experienced the 
conflict differently, since all of them are Acholi, which was confirmed by the findings. 
 
In total, 109 focus groups were held in Acholi and 47 in Lango. All participatory methods were 
used in the focus groups: timeline, institutional mapping, leadership mapping, leadership 
ranking, flow diagram and well-being ranking. Time line exercises were carried out with 
relatively more focus groups composed of elders, in order to gather data about citizenship 
under different post-colonial regimes. For other exercises all social categories were included in 
equal numbers. Annex 1 shows how many of each type of focus group took place. In every 
village and clan area, we held separate focus groups for men and women, and organised them 
according to age groups within each clan territory.  
                                                          
3
 In the Ugandan context, the category ‘youth’ is a broad category that includes adolescents under 18 
years old as well as young adults up to the age of 35. 
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A total of 210 individual interviews were carried out in Acholi, and 157 in Lango. I had 
developed ten interview guides for semi-structured interviews, each interview guides covering 
a particular theme. In Annex 2 these different interviews are listed, the title representing the 
theme of the interview, and how many were carried out in each site. For individual interviews I 
used the same sampling strategy: identifying gender and age groups in each clan territory. 
Because some of the women were sometimes very shy I included more women for some of the 
interviews in order to get better data about their experiences.  
 
I also carried out open interviews with key informants. Key informants in the community were 
particular leaders, such as the clan leaders or LC members, who were identified in the 
community profile. Open interviews focused on their particular roles in the community and 
patterns of interaction with state authorities. Clan leaders were also interviewed about inter- 
and intra-clan relations, and Acholi identity.  
 
3.4 Methodological challenges and data validity 
3.4.1 Adjustments in research instruments 
 
In the course of the research changes were made in methodology. Here I describe the reasons 
for the adjustments made, in order to account for dependability in this study (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 
First of all, the word ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ do not have equivalents in the Luo language. I 
had to go by certain ‘citizenship proxies’ such as how people look at membership, 
responsibilities of themselves and of state institutions - all words that had meaning in the Luo 
vocabulary. Most proxies were generated from the literature and adapted through 
conversations with respondents in the initial stage of the fieldwork. The wording of questions 
was thoroughly discussed with the research assistants, who had valuable knowledge about 
language and local discourse. During the interviews and focus groups, all statements were 
translated from Luo into English by the research assistants and written down verbatim in 
notebooks. Each day started with a reflection on the previous day with the research assistants, 
during which we discussed all the interviews done, paying specific attention to how questions 
122 
 
and answers were translated. This enabled me to cross-check the translation and ensured that 
the research assistants used the same language when doing the interviews.  
 
Secondly, recall was a problem when trying to reconstruct the history of that particular area. 
To counter this problem, life history interviews became more important than initially planned. 
People felt much more comfortable speaking about their lives, deciding themselves where to 
start and what to include, than responding to specific questions in the semi-structured 
interview about history. Another strategy was to start interviews with descriptive questions to 
let people talk about how they handled certain issues, before asking for their reflections. The 
questions thus first connected to someone’s personal life, which made it an easier start, before 
going into deeper understandings of assumptions and opinions.  
 
Another challenge was how to approach local understandings of collective identity and social 
trust, while most interviews were carried out with individuals and thus refer to individual 
agency. This might lead to a bias towards the liberal understanding of citizenship that portrays 
the collective as the sum of individuals. This view does not correspond with the perspective on 
the individual and the community in many cultural contexts, especially in southern Africa 
(Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Menkiti, 1984). I therefore pursued the collective as a theme if it 
emerged in individual interviews, for example when respondents spoke about ‘unity’. Again 
the research assistants identified the correct language to discuss this. In addition, I dedicated a 
small number of focus groups to discuss such concepts as the community and co-operation.  
 
3.4.2 Validity of my argument  
 
The most important validity threat in this study is the risk of attribution effect: to what extent 
can the patterns of engagement in Acholi be attributed to their conflict experience? Aware of 
this risk I tried to mitigate it in several ways.  
 
This problem was first addressed by establishing a ‘baseline’ of what the sense and practice of 
citizenship had looked like prior to the conflict. I asked older respondents to compare their 
citizenship over time, under different regimes, and how they had interacted with local 
government officials in the past. Of course, recall was again a potential problem. To include a 
research site in Lango into the research design as a matching pair for the war-affected Acholi 
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sites was another strategy. Here, many people – mostly men – did speak openly about the 
state.  
 
Cultural norms of behaviour formed the main alternative explanation for observed patterns of 
engagement. This emerged in Lango, where the clan structure in Lango was more organised 
than in Acholi. This raised the issue of whether the level of clan organisation helped explain 
forms of citizen engagement. I then pursued the overlap between clan leadership and formal 
leadership, and the extent to which clan leadership mediated the relationship to government 
institutions. I also investigated how the clan structures had developed over time. Lower levels 
of clan organisation in Acholi turned out to be another effect of the conflict.  
 
In interviews I addressed this by asking people about their motives for behaving in a particular 
way to towards their leaders. I then traced changes in this behaviour by asking about 
differences before the conflict. I also focused specifically on norms and values underpinning 
social relations and interactions in different types of relationship (e.g. between husbands and 
wives, villagers and leaders). On several occasions I tested emerging ideas through respondent 
validation in the villages. I also asked informed outsiders to validate my ideas: Acholi people 
who have the capacity to reflect on it from an outsider’s perspective, because of their 
professional background. In Chapter 7 I elaborate on culture as a factor for citizen 
engagement. It is difficult to distinguish culture and conflict as separate variables, as the way 
people have dealt with insecurity is also informed by their culture (Finnström, 2003; 
Lubkemann, 2008). 
 
Also, I realised that my research methods relied on the capacity of people to communicate 
their ideas and perceptions verbally. But certain experiences were not directly communicated 
to me, because they were not put into words. Few people were able to articulate how past 
experiences affected their present behaviour. I did not have methods that could bring out tacit 
knowledge, or behaviours that were adopted almost unconsciously. That said, a number of life 
story interviews did strongly suggest such information. To establish connections between the 
past and the present I relied again on my own interpretation. In interviews about perceptions 
of the state certain silences occurred and I relied on observations and interpretation to 
understand their meaning. I started to write silences down and discussed their meaning with 
the research assistants to interpret them correctly. 
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Finally, personal ideas and biases influence the researcher’s selection of data or lines of 
enquiry (Marshall & Rossman, 1995; Miles & Huberman, 1994). As a researcher, I select the 
issues I want to focus on and this selection influences the course of the research and which 
data are generated. I therefore needed to interrogate my assumptions about the post-conflict 
setting and citizens’ attitudes, and my strategy for mitigating research bias in data collection 
and interpretation (Bloor & Wood, 2006, p. 21).  
 
When I started the fieldwork I hoped to find clearly identifiable examples of citizen 
participation. What I encountered was far from institutionalised forms of participation or 
participatory spaces. Formal structures for participation did not function in practice, and at 
first sight citizens did not demand anything at all. Yet there were numerous occasions where 
people organised to develop their area, sometimes involving the local state authorities and 
sometimes not. Broadening the lens opens up understandings of other forms of engagement 
than the ‘active and vigilant citizen’ that are much more embedded in the local context.  
 
Another strategy was to maintain a level of ‘thick descriptions’ (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). All 
interviews were transcribed verbatim, not leaving out a single line or section. Where 
respondents seemed to ‘wander off’ this was allowed, and only when they had finished that 
part of the story did I return to the intended topic of the interview. 
 
3.4.3 Triangulation 
 
To enhance the validity of my data and findings, data was triangulated in three different ways: 
by data source, data type and by using different research methods (Maxwell, 2005), depending 
on the availability of sources for the particular themes in this study. Because of scholarly 
interest in the war there is a rich literature about Acholi, while there is none for Lango. For 
Lango I could therefore not triangulate my data with findings from other studies. Here I used 
various methods to investigate issues during the fieldwork, and tested the findings in other 
interviews. 
 
For specific sub-themes within my study, like for the political history of Uganda, its 
decentralised governance system and the LRA conflict, a rich documentation exists. Regarding 
the local governance system, my data corroborate the weaknesses in the system that have 
been identified in other research. My data also points to more variation in reasons why citizens 
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are reluctant to engage with the system, which had not been discussed in other studies. For 
historical events the literature allowed me to cross-check information that came out during 
focus group discussions. At the same it helped me to concentrate on how respondents had 
experienced local life during episodes of the conflict or under previous regimes.  
 
For other themes it was necessary to triangulate by using different methods and (groups) of 
respondents, for example, the development of the local government system in Acholi during 
the war. To triangulate data about these themes I compared data from the interviews with 
focus group discussions and observations, in particular when evidence was contradictory. Data 
was also double-checked by repeating the interviews and focus groups. In the process 
inconsistent data was continuously filtered out and re-examined.  
 
For present-day forms of engagement, two perception surveys carried out in the Acholi region 
are relevant for this study (Pham & Vinck, 2010). A USAID (2009) funded study by the Northern 
Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI) shows, among other issues, citizen perceptions of state 
institutions and their levels of trust in the national and local governments. Pham and Vinck 
(2010) present survey results on perceptions of authority, a sense of security, the prevalence 
of social conflicts and perceptions of unity. In Chapter 7 I refer to these studies where relevant. 
I identified no contradictory findings in these studies. The Pham and Vinck study confirms that 
the Acholi have limited contact with authorities. Both studies confirm the importance of LC1 as 
a channel to report issues.  
 
3.4.4  The ‘munu’ without projects 
 
Apart from the effect of my assumptions about the situation, my own presence affected the 
social setting where I stayed. Perhaps, it resulted in social behaviour and reactions by 
respondents that otherwise would not have occurred. Here I explain how I dealt with this 
problem of reactivity (Maxwell, 2005). 
 
The people in Acholi are quite used to seeing foreigners (munu) in their area, which are all 
expected to be related to UN agencies, humanitarian and development organisations. At the 
start of every meeting and every interview it had to be carefully explained that this research is 
for study purposes only. And as the word spread, people knew I was not ‘bringing projects’. Of 
course, my presence affected the research in various ways. Simply being there, even without 
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doing research, was something different from ordinary local life in the village. People made all 
kind of assumptions about me.  
 
Conscious of the importance of rapport building (Bloor & Wood, 2006; E. Francis, 1993) I 
followed the required protocols for accessing the community: reporting to the sub-county 
authorities and then down to the LC1 level, followed by meetings with ‘respected community 
members’ such as elders, teachers and clan leaders. I ‘integrated’ by shopping at the local 
market, hanging out in social spaces, chatting in the ‘drinking groups’ and attending services at 
various churches. The priests and reverends introduced me to the community. I was as just as 
conscious of the risks of ‘over-rapport building’ (Bloor & Wood, 2006, p. 71) and I reflected on 
my interactions with people in the research journal.  
 
3.4.5  Ethical issues  
 
At the start of each interview or discussion people were informed about the objectives of the 
study, the themes that would be addressed in the interview, and anonymity. They were then 
asked again whether they were willing to be interviewed and give their consent. Consent was 
not given in written form, because many people could respond with anxiety to a formal-
looking document. It was explained to respondents that they could pause or end the interview 
at any time, if they so wished. The personal details of each respondent were recorded and 
stored separately. This was primarily for the purpose of finding someone for a possible second 
interview at a later stage. The interviews were numbered to guarantee anonymity.  
 
Many people expected ‘sitting allowances’4 for their time. However, I considered monetary 
allowances inappropriate, because of the prevailing alcohol abuse by both men and women. 
After consultation with the residents all respondents were therefore given consumer goods 
such as soap, salt or sugar.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The term commonly used in Uganda for money, soda or snacks to compensate people for the time 
they spent in a meeting. 
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3.5 Documentation and data processing 
 
In this section I explain how I stored and coded the interviews using the NVivo programme 
software. I used NVivo only for the data that was generated at village level. Interviews that 
were carried out with NGO workers, academics and government officials at the district level 
and at national level were analysed separately. 
 
I typed all the handwritten notes up using Microsoft Word. All interview notes, notes from 
focus groups, the research journal and observation notes were imported into NVivo. Details of 
each interviewee and focus group participant were recorded (stored separately from the 
interview notes): name, age, gender, clan name, and name of his/her village. The respondent 
details were imported into NVivo and respondent numbers were linked to their interviews. 
After the coding process was finalised this allowed comparison between men and women, and 
different age groups in the analysis.  
 
In the coding process in NVivo all trees, nodes and child nodes were created inductively while 
going through each individual interview. I created separate trees for Acholi and Lango. The 
names of the trees (highest level) represented key topics of the research. Where relevant 
under each tree in NVivo levels of child nodes were created, representing sub-themes, 
depending on the topic. Some trees had one level of child nodes, while other trees had more 
than one. Table 3.4 below is an example of a tree and child nodes for the sub-themes. (A) 
represents the tree, (B) the first level of child nodes, (C) the second level, etc.  
 
Table 3.3 Example of a part of the NVivo ‘tree’ – Acholi history* 
A B C D 
Acholi history Obote II Daily life in this period Food 
 
  Forms of citizen engagement in 
this period 
Myumba kumi 
Nyampara/ Mokungu 
  Forms of coping Livelihoods 
Acholi history Early NRA period 
1986-1993 
Daily life in this period Food 
Security 
  Forms of citizen engagement in 
this period 
RCs 
Customary  
  Behaviour of the military Incidents  
  Forms of coping Coping for security 
*Please note this is only a small section of the tree. For Lango I created a separate tree on Lango history. 
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The tree ‘Acholi history’ (level A) was formed of the child nodes that represented key events 
identified in the data from focus groups and individual interviews, like ‘Karamojong cattle 
raids’, ‘regime Idi Amin’, ‘regime change NRA’ (level B). When talking about such events or 
time periods, interviewees often explained how daily life was at that time, how citizens 
engaged with leadership, and coping strategies. Sometimes these themes were raised because 
of interview questions. These different themes were coded at the next level child nodes (C). A 
number of themes at level C could be unpacked further during the coding process. For 
example, when talking about coping mechanisms (level C), people mostly talked about how to 
secure livelihood and food, and security of lives. These strategies were categorised as such in 
the next level of child nodes (D). Another example of a tree, ‘camp life’, is shown in Annex 2. 
 
The coding system allows for gaining insights in terms of frequencies of - or patterns in - 
certain attitudes and behaviour, although not in the same way as survey research which allows 
claims about significance to be made. For instance, coding with which leaders people interact 
about community problems clearly shows that the Langi interact with many different types of 
leaders (Chapter 7). Also data collected through participatory methods could be aggregated. 
Moser & Horn (2011) explain that when methods are consistently implemented in the same 
way, as I did it, ranking exercises from various groups can produce a community-level picture. 
Institutional diagrams and leadership rankings often produced similar results, i.e. the relative 
importance of certain institutions.  
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
 
The coding process helped to structure my thoughts and make a start with the analysis. During 
the analysis process I went back and forth between the propositions, the data set and my 
research journal. I analysed the data in NVivo by selecting the sections (trees, nodes and child 
nodes) in NVivo that corresponded to the propositions, and the historical period of a specific 
thesis chapter. When analysing the data on, for instance, coping strategies, I selected this child 
node and NVivo gathered everything participants had said about this issue for different 
episodes of conflict and insecurity, grouped by location. 
 
For the descriptive analysis I looked at the structure of the child nodes that were created in the 
coding process to see which patterns had emerged per theme. Using the tree on Acholi history 
as an example: each important moment/episode was captured in a child node. Comparing 
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Lango and Acholi this showed that the Langi had spoken more about the Amin era than the 
Acholi. For current patterns of interaction between citizens and authorities I looked at the 
range of leaders (each on a different child node) approached by Acholi and Langi, as well as the 
range of issues raised with them, and the challenges they encountered. I looked at the 
differences between men and women, and different age groups. From here I wrote the 
synthesis of the themes and sub-themes that related to the propositions, for Acholi and Lango 
separately. Where significant differences between men and women or between age groups 
had appeared, this was woven into the analysis and descriptions in the chapters. Examples are 
the gendered experience of displacement and how the legitimacy of Acholi elders was 
negatively affected during the war. I often went back to the original interviews to review them 
as a whole, to understand how respondents had viewed a range of issues. Of course 
particularly the life history interviews had to be analysed as a whole, in order to see how 
agency had developed and how perceptions had changed over time. 
 
To test the propositions I looked at the differences between Lango and Acholi. The coding 
structure also allowed me to look for alternative explanations, for instance to look for how 
culture influences patterns of engagement. Here I give a concrete example of differences 
between the Langi and Acholi trees coded for ‘interaction with authorities’. In Annex 2 I 
describe this process in detail for the sense and practice of citizenship, showing parts of the 
relevant trees that were coded in NVivo.  
 
 For Lango, there were many more records under the child nodes that captured interactions 
with various leaders at different levels. There were also more nodes that described 
engagement in local accountability mechanisms. In Acholi, few people had taken an issue to 
the sub-county and many issues were ‘stuck’ at LC1 level. This related directly to the overall 
research proposition. One of my arguments in this thesis is that persisting ideas and fears 
cause diminished levels of engagement in Acholi. This emerged from NVivo from the range of 
reasons people gave for not following up issues or criticising leaders (Chapter 7). In Lango, 
child nodes referred to lack of education and offensive attitudes of officials. But in Acholi the 
fear of reprisal was an additional reason, also captured in a child code.  
 
After analysis and writing up from NVivo, which contained the village-level data, I looked at the 
relevant sections of interviews carried out at the district and national level for comparison, to 
see whether they confirmed or contradicted data from the sub-counties. Note that this was 
also done during fieldwork in order to verify certain information and I pursued contradictory 
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information when back in the villages. I consulted literature and secondary sources where 
relevant, for triangulation purposes and to fill gaps (e.g. accurate names, years).  
 
Using this process of coding and analysis I worked from chapter to chapter, comparing Acholi 
and Lango; from past to present. The next chapter presents the contextual background of the 
study, describing the contours of the construction of citizenship in Northern Uganda. My 
empirical findings are presented in Chapters 5 to 7. 
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Chapter 4   Citizenship in Uganda: A Historical Perspective 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter explains the historical and political context for the construction of Langi and 
Acholi citizenship. It outlines the political history of Uganda and the post-colonial regimes, with 
references to the northern regions Lango and Acholi. Since 1962, subsequent governments 
have consolidated their power base and handled the issue of ethnic identity, and the 
distribution of power and wealth, in ways that would have significant implications for ‘the 
North’ as a region and its tribes5. This chapter explains how the Acholi, as a northern tribe, 
experienced a process of ‘adverse incorporation’ (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007a) into the Ugandan 
state and elaborates how these historical developments led up to the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) conflict.  
 
Considerable attention will be paid to developments in the local level state apparatus from 
when Yuweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power in 1986. The 
introduction of Resistance Councils (RCs) was a guerrilla tactic to regulate contact with the 
civilian population, but also an attempt to reform the top-down system of rule. These 
Resistance Councils were institutionalised and transformed into ‘Local Councils’ (LCs) in the 
1990s to become the formal local government system. The RCs/LCs could not consolidate in 
the Acholi region as long as the LRA conflict went on, but the literature on Acholi does not 
clearly say what happened to the LCs there.  
 
This chapter outlines the chronology of the LRA conflict: its major events, the role of the 
government, and what happened at the local level. This provides the background of the 
conflict as a ‘warscape’ (Nordstrom, 1997). The rich literature on Uganda enables me to 
explore the key concepts of this study for the Acholi context: local institutions, the public 
sphere, and forms of agency. This shows the gap in knowledge concerning citizen agency 
during the LRA conflict. The following chapters present my empirical findings and describe how 
local life evolved from 1986 onwards, in order to test the propositions presented in Chapter 3. 
                                                          
5
 Although the word ‘tribe’ is associated with the labelling of ethnic groups by the colonial regime it is 
commonly used in contemporary Ugandan English when referring to ethnic groups like the Baganda, 
Acholi, Langi, Karamojong, and others, and I use this term in my thesis in this way. The greater ‘North’ is 
formed by the West Nile, Acholi, Lango and Karamoja regions. The southern regions are populated by 
predominantly Bantu tribes, whereas the tribes of the northern region are of Nilotic and other origins. 
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Section 4.1 describes the political developments under the post-colonial regimes in Uganda, 
after which section 4.2 discusses the developments in the local state apparatus since the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power in 1986. It must be noted, however, that the 
history of the Acholi region is much better documented than that of Lango due to academic 
interest in the conflict in Acholi. Contextual information for Lango, especially empirical work at 
local level, is scarce. Hence less detail is provided for the Lango context. Section 4.3 gives an 
overview of the LRA conflict in the North, after which section 4.5 focuses on existing 
knowledge about the transformation of institutions during the war. The last section, 4.5, 
describes the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, a Community-Driven Recovery intervention 
for Northern Uganda.   
 
 4.1 State formation in Uganda 
 
Ethnic and regional differences have been important factors in Uganda’s colonial and post-
colonial history. Different regions and their ethnic groups experienced each regime very 
differently, partly depending on how each group developed relationships with the political 
leadership, including the colonial regime, whether or not it supported the leadership, and 
what alliances were formed. These factors played a role in the process leading up to the LRA 
war in the North, and still affect the position of Acholi and Lango regions today. This section 
explains the history of state formation in Uganda from the colonial time to the present day, 
and a number of mechanisms that furthered a process of adverse incorporation (Hickey & Du 
Toit, 2007a) of the Acholi region. I will also indicate how each regime organised its 
administration at the local level. This will show that Ugandans had had little experience of 
direct participation in governance when the NRA/M rolled out a multi-layered governance 
system from 1986 onwards. 
 
4.1.1 The colonial heritage for ethnic identities in Uganda 
 
The British colonial regime had organised and divided the population of Uganda around 
assumed ethnic identities to form administrative units, which Branch (2010) refers to as the 
process of ‘ethnification’. As in many of the colonies of the British Empire with multiple ethnic 
groups, the territorial boundaries defined by the colonial regime did not necessarily 
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correspond with the actual boundaries of ethnic groupings. In many cases the ethnic groups 
had not even clearly existed prior to the colonial era. The colonial government in Uganda did 
not grant an equal level of authority to all ethnic groups. The kingdoms of southern Uganda 
enjoyed a degree of autonomy, with most powers given to the Buganda kingdom, whereas the 
rest of Uganda, including Lango and Acholi, was divided into districts with district authorities.  
 
Lango region illustrates the principle of indirect rule in the districts. In pre-colonial Lango the 
authority of clan leaders was localised and limited (Hayley, 1947; Tosh, 1978). In 1912 the 
British divided Lango into sub-counties for which ‘chiefs’ were appointed, who often were clan 
leaders. By 1920 a four-level chiefly hierarchy from village to county was instituted. Effectively, 
certain clan leaders were placed in higher positions over others. The result of this policy was 
increased inter-clan competition, and increasingly abuse through patronage networks when 
the chiefs were allowed to appoint lower level chiefs (Tosh, 1978).  
 
Scholars agree that the Acholi shared cultural and linguistic characteristics, but before the 
colonial regime came there was not a sense of a unified Acholiness with an overarching 
political identity. Finströmm (2003) emphasises that the Acholi identity was not only imposed 
by the colonial regime, but also formed as the result of factors internal to the region and 
through interactions between the Acholi and other ethnic groups before the colonial regime. 
On the eve of colonialism, approximately sixty clans (kakha) existed in what is now Acholi 
territory, which were autonomous from one another and each ruled by a customary chief 
(Rwot Moo). Certain clans were larger and had developed political alliances with other ethnic 
groups like the Bunyoro, and they were therefore stronger. This is the case for the Payira, and 
for this reason the Payira provided the Acholi paramount chief in 2000. Because the Acholi 
leadership was dispersed, the colonial regime felt there was a ‘lack of’ government, comparing 
it to the centralised powers of the King of Buganda. The colonial regime therefore sought to 
create a political entity, not to empower the Acholi, but to make the administration of the 
district easier. Administrative chiefs were appointed (Rwot Kalam, or the ‘chief of the pen’), 
who were not perceived to be as legitimate as the Rwot Moo. Even in present-day Acholi Allen 
(2006) found there was wide disagreement about who the ‘real’ chiefs were, as some 
descended from chiefs appointed by the colonial regime or those involved in pre-colonial slave 
trade (Allen, 2006). 
 
Near the time of Independence, Acholi intellectuals encouraged changes in the Acholi 
authority structure. According to some this was a direct response to Baganda demands for 
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self-determination in the transition to Independence (Carbone, 2008). A paramount chief from 
the Payira clan was endorsed, a decision contested by other strong Acholi chiefs but realised 
with the support of Obote’s Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party. Already during the colonial 
era the tribes had gradually started to organise according to the level of authority granted to 
them to make claims based on a ‘created’ tribal identity. Thus the ascribed ethnic identities 
subsequently became political identities (Branch, 2010; Finnström, 2003). These boundaries 
were largely maintained in the post-colonial era. Although political and ethnic identities did 
not necessarily overlap the political leaders used them to strengthen their position within a 
region.  
 
Branch describes how such a political ethnic identity evolved for the Acholi region. Here, the 
customary hereditary chiefs aligned with the emerging petty bourgeoisie to influence decision-
making in the district councils. When political parties started to organise in the 1950s these 
became an important mechanism for the lineage-based leaders and bourgeoisie to link to 
national level politics. They used this not only to make claims based on an overall Acholi 
identity, which was perceived to be the legitimate thing to do at national level, but also to 
confirm their authority internally, within the region (Branch, 2010).  
 
To many, the beginning of a politicised north-south divide started under the colonial regime. 
The small chiefdoms in the north were considered ‘backward’, leading to stereotypes about 
the north (Finnström, 2003, p. 98). The British even considered themselves instrumental in 
creating an overall sense of unity among the Acholi and Langi to unite them in tribes 
(Finnström, p. 61). In reality, however, they failed to recognise the socio-political organisation 
of the chiefdoms among the groups in the northern region as ‘real’ government. The 
hierarchically structured kingdoms in the south were more easily identified as a political 
structure that the colonial regime could use for its model of indirect rule. The small chiefdoms 
in the north lacked an overall authority and were scattered, and therefore deemed to lack 
coherence. Economic development, such as the tea and coffee plantations, was concentrated 
in the southern parts of the country. By contrast the northern tribes, in particular the Acholi, 
were recruited into the army. At independence, there was a vibrant productive economy in the 
south that was lacking in the north, and in the north the youth considered recruitment into the 
army their ‘natural’ vocation. Branch (2010) argues that this created the divide between the 
Bantu south and the Nilotic north, which he refers to as ‘regionalism’. He contends that this 
regionalism gave rise to another political identity, also ethnic in nature, alongside the ethnic 
identity of the different groups that made up the northern and southern regions. This divide 
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was politicised by the regimes, especially by the first President, Obote, to further their own 
political agendas. 
 
4.1.2 Post-colonial regimes  
 
After Independence in 1962, the politicisation of ethnic identity and regional territory was 
strongly reflected in how the political system developed. Uganda remained with the political 
institutions that had been established by the colonial regime. It was a semi-federal state that 
maintained the asymmetric distribution of power between the kingdoms in the south and the 
districts in the rest of the country. At national level the prime minister’s office, parliament, and 
multi-party elections were in place, but any form of local representation with institutional 
linkages to the national level was lacking (Carbone, 2008).  
 
The first government was formed by a coalition of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) with 
the party of the Baganda kingdom, Kabaka Yekka (KY- ‘the King alone’), with UPC leader Milton 
Obote as prime-minister and the Buganda King as the president. However, since the UPC was 
essentially anti-Buganda, the coalition collapsed in 1964. Tensions rose high and after a coup 
Obote proclaimed himself President. He abolished federalism and the Kingdoms, and the King 
was forced into exile in 1966.  
 
At this point in time, political parties were new, poorly organised, and divided along religious 
and ethnic lines (Kasfir, 1998). They lacked any experience with political organisation and the 
political and economical alliances they formed were unstable due to the many differences 
within each region. Two broad divisions existed along which political parties aligned: Catholic 
versus protestant and pro- versus anti-Baganda dominance (Carbone, 2008). The Democratic 
Party (DP) found its support mainly among Catholic Christians in the North, in Acholi and 
Lango, and among the Baganda Catholics in the south. 
 
Subsequent constitutional reforms increasingly undermined power sharing mechanisms. The 
1967 constitution merged the roles of the head of state and head of government into the 
presidency, rendering political parties practically insignificant. Democratic institutions such as 
political parties and the Consitution were abolished, and the kingdoms lost their autonomy 
and were divided into ordinary districts (Carbone, 2008).  
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Obote, who originated in Lango region, expanded the army from 700 troops in 1962 to 9,000 
by 1970, of which more than one third were Acholi. Both Langi and Acholi were appointed to 
important positions in the government, the military and other security forces, which resulted 
in a system of intense patronage (Branch, 2010). Under his regime the division between the 
north and south was further politicised. After the coup of Idi Amin in 1971, which forced Obote 
into exile, this trend only worsened. 
 
During Amin’s military dictatorship (1971-1979) tribal politics figured strongly. He recruited his 
security forces from his West-Nile region and members of his ethnic group were favoured for 
important positions. Amin purged the army of the Acholi and ordered the killing of thousands 
of Acholi and Langi. His regime is often described as a targeted oppression: violence targeted 
particularly at the intellectuals and businessmen, the elite and middle-class. The immigrant 
Indian population, owning and running most of the companies, was expelled in 1972 and this 
led to the breakdown of the economy (Kasfir, 1998). Acholi and Langi elites were specifically 
targeted, and either were killed or fled the country. The two regions were now deprived of the 
political leadership that had previously connected their regions to national level politics 
(Branch, 2010; Mamdani, 1976). Large sections of the rural population did not experience 
violence directly, but since the local administration was run by the military they lived under 
constant threat (Sathyamurty, 1986). Customary leadership, the kings and clan leaders, could 
potentially generate political opposition and were therefore disempowered. The orders 
imposed from above severely circumscribed social life and clan-based organisation. In Lango 
this had major implications for community life, as will be explained in Chapter 5.  Amin’s 
troops were defeated in April 1979 by two Ugandan armed groups that had formed in exile 
and were backed up by Tanzanian forces: the UPC-driven Kikosi Malum troops and the Front 
for National Salvation (FRONASA) led by Museveni.  
 
A transitional government was installed. Obote returned from exile in May 1980, when the 
run-up to the national elections began. The new army, Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA) was again dominated by Acholi and Langi, who were UPC loyalists. Obote won the 
December presidential elections after a campaign of intimidation and violence by the UPC and 
UNLA. Obote maintained the majority of Acholi and Langi soldiers in the UNLA. However, the 
patronage system of political appointments as existed under Obote’s first regime (Obote (I) 
was not restored to the same degree. The Acholi and the Langi now had little opportunity to 
re-establish their local and national political leadership base, because many of their people 
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had not returned from exile and they were no longer favoured for political appointments 
(Carbone, 2008).  
 
The second Obote government (Obote (II) introduced a local government system, ‘Mayumba 
Kumi’ (adapted from the Swahili nyumba kumi: ‘ten houses’), which was copied from the 
Tanzanian local governance system. Units formed of 10 households selected a local leader to 
preside over the unit. The main function of the Mayumba Kumi was security, to monitor the 
presence of ‘strangers’ in the area, and to serve the administration of the regime. Mayumba 
Kumi were thus not in place to check state power, they were exclusive, and citizens were not 
allowed to elect the local chiefs (Mamdani, 1996, p. 201). Tidemand  (1994) finds that the 
Mayumba Kumi had little influence on local level politics. 
 
In the south, resentment against the UPC was growing. There the UNLA was known for its lack 
of discipline and for using terror and ex-judicial killings to counter any form of opposition. 
Again Obote refused to restore the authority of the kingdoms, since these were still perceived 
to be a source of political opposition. Many southerners thus felt Obote’s second regime was 
again one of ‘northern domination’. When tensions between the Langi and Acholi factions 
within the UNLA started to rise and the Acholi generals Tito Okello and Bazilio Okello ousted 
Obote from power, these feelings only deepened.  
 
Yuweri Museveni had dismissed Obote’s 1980 election victory and started a bush war in 
Luwero, Central Uganda, with his National Resistance Army (NRA). This civil war would last 
until Museveni seized power with a coup in 1986, overthrowing the Okello regime. The NRA 
was largely made up of Banyankole, Museveni’s ethnic group from Western Uganda. When it 
established its base in Baganda it thus had to start building relationships with the local 
population in order to overcome ethnic divisions, gain support and recruit more fighters. One 
way in which the NRA gained local support was to play to anti-northern sentiment, exploiting 
and reinforcing the regional division between the Bantu and Nilotic populations (Branch, 
2010). Another way they mobilised support was by creating the Resistance Councils (RCs) at 
local level, elaborated below. 
 
As the bush war in Luwero intensified the UNLA became all the more violent, which only 
fuelled anti-Acholi sentiment. When the Okellos ousted Obote from power they invited 
Museveni to join their side. He signed the agreement, but within 6 months after the Okello 
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coup Museveni overthrew Okello. The following section will discuss how the NRA established 
its authority at national level. 
 
4.1.3 From Movement System to multi-party politics  
 
After years of political repression the NRA was left with a country in ruins: an impoverished 
population, huge economic debts, social and political cleavages. Its own support base was still 
narrow and limited to the southern and western regions. Rebellion and resistance broke out in 
the northern and eastern parts of the country. ‘The NRA was caught in a dilemma. Having 
taken power by force, it nonetheless aspired to a democratic justification for its rule’ (Kasfir, 
1998, p. 52). The NRA promised a radical break-away from the post-colonial authoritarian 
regime. Parliamentary democracy, popular democracy and rapid economic transitions became 
the cornerstones of the NRA’s manifesto and its Ten Point Programme (Hickey, 2005; Kasfir, 
2000; Mamdani, 1996).  
 
As multi-party politics was considered a threat to national security and unity, the democratic 
reforms took the form of the creation of a ‘movement system’ (Mugaju, 1996; Mugaju & 
Oloka-Onyango, 2000): a form of no-party democracy and a system in which all voices and 
interests would be represented under one body, the National Resistance Movement. Especially 
in the beginning the government used ‘movement’ democracy to build its legitimacy, reaching 
out to diverse groups in society. Increasingly, it would use the Movement system to entrench 
its powers in the state apparatus and diminish the possibilities for political opposition. 
Although presented as something ‘new’, the Movement system would in fact be a single-party 
system that was supported by the state, and marked by an increasing fusion between state 
and party. The term ‘movement democracy’ hid the fact that Uganda was, effectively, a single-
party system (Kasfir, 1998, 2000; Oloka-Onyango, 2000).  
 
The restrictions on political parties, initially presented as temporary, were enshrined in the 
1995 Constitution. It was prohibited to organise public rallies and party conferences, to set up 
local party branches, or support election candidates. Candidates had to contest on the basis of 
individual merit, running individual campaigns, and not on a party ticket. Only in Kampala was 
some party activity allowed. The 1997 Movement Act banned political organisations 
altogether. It integrated the powers of the Movement into the state and provided for NRM 
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structures across the country, thus consolidating the single-party state structure (Oloka-
Onyango, 2000).  
 
Then in 2003 the intention to return to multi-party politics was announced, arguably due to 
declining support for the NRM in the 2001 elections. The internal conflict within the NRM, 
exposed in the 2001 elections when Kiisa Besigye challenged President Museveni from within 
the NRM, would have been a strong factor in pressuring for change (Makara, Rakner, & 
Svasand, 2007). A referendum in July 2005 let the Ugandan public decide whether to maintain 
the Movement system or to adopt a multi-party system. After a 92.5% vote in favour of multi-
party politics the transition was formalised in December 2005 (Atoo, Okiror, & Tostensen, 
2008). Both the ruling party and opposition parties had consented to the transition, but the 
NRM shaped the rules of the game in its favour. A controversial amendment to the 
Constitution in 2005 removed the two-term limit of the Presidency, which made it possible for 
Museveni to stand for the Presidential elections in 2006. The 2006 elections happened so soon 
after the multi-party system was formalised that the opposition parties had very little time to 
organise for them (Atoo et al., 2008). The NRM won the elections and Museveni entered his 
third term as President. Since 2006, the political parties have been trying to strengthen their 
capacities and relations to their local constituencies, but are still considered to be weak and 
too fragmented to form an effective opposition to the NRM. In 2011, it was again Museveni 
that won the presidency. 
 
4.1.4 Acholi identity and adverse incorporation  
 
The historical processes described above played a major role in the construction of the Acholi 
identity. As explained in section 4.1.1 there is a literature that describes the social-political 
organisation of the Acholi ethnic group before, during and after the colonial regime. Here I 
elaborate on what constitutes the Acholi identity by linking their ethnic identity to the process 
of their marginalisation, which links back to the issues of ethnic identity, citizenship and 
marginalisation as outlined in chapter 2. In subsequent empirical chapters I will describe how 
the Acholi themselves described their identity.  
 
The historical process of state formation in Uganda, as described above, led to marginalisation 
of the Acholi region. As part of the greater North, the Acholi experienced economic 
marginalisation from the colonial time onwards and political marginalisation deepened when 
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the NRA came to power. Similar to what Bastian (2000) observed to have led to 
marginalisation of the Tamils in India, marginalisation was also the result of a regime that 
failed to create a sense of national unity or a national Ugandan identity or to establish political 
institutions that were representative of all regions. Although the Movement system was to be 
all-inclusive on paper, certain ethnic groups were not well represented.  
 
The situation of the Acholi region is an illustrative example of ‘adverse incorporation’, as 
explained by Hickey and Du Toit (2007) and Hickey and Golooba-Mutebi (2010). Hickey and Du 
Toit consider the structure of the economy under the colonial regime, which banned 
plantation development in the north, and the incorporation of the people from the North into 
the state solely through the military and security sectors to be key features of the process of 
adverse incorporation in Acholi. Northerners were scarcely employed in the civil service sector 
and also lacked representation in the Movement System (2007, p.14). They draw a link 
between state formation and violence, following Bates (2001), by pointing out that it was not 
in the interest of the regime to end the LRA conflict. This argument is also made by Finströmm 
(2003), who - referring to Barth’s (1969) social constructivist approach - explains how the 
NRA/M regime needed to construct the ethnic identity of the Acholi as violent and oppressive 
to gain support among the southern tribes. This was reflected in the debate over who caused 
the atrocities in the Luwero bush war: the Acholi-dominated UNLA, or the NRA. The NRA 
subsequently used the LRA war to perpetuate stereotypes about the Acholi. The Acholi, for 
their part, experienced the NRA regime as southern domination. This concurs with Petersen’s 
work (2001) about the resentment, frustration and a sense of injustice as the result of a 
transformation in social hierarchies after a political regime change. The anger among the 
Acholi about the NRA as a southern oppressor is indeed described by many (Branch, 2010; 
Finnström, 2005). The Acholi felt betrayed when Museveni cheated Okello in 1986. The 
subsequent role played by the NRA in the LRA war was felt as a form of dominance.  
 
Thus, diverse groupings that formed the Acholi initially shared territorial and linguistic 
characteristics and an origin - much like Fearon (2004)’s definition of ethnicity. They became a 
political identity when the colonial regime forged a tribal grouping, which was used by Acholi 
politicians used to strengthen their authority vis-à-vis the state as well as internally within the 
region. The construction of ethnic boundaries between the north and south reflects a dialectic 
process (Barth, 1969; Jenkins, 2008) between northern and southern tribes, with post-colonial 
governments as important actors (Dunn, 2009). The North-South divide became increasingly 
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politicised, which contributed to the adverse incorporation of the Acholi region into the state. 
The adverse incorporation of the Acholi was deepened by the LRA war.  
 
4.2  The state at local level  
4.2.1 Resistance Councils: a guerrilla tactic and democratic innovation 
 
The NRA introduced the Resistance Councils (RCs) in Luwero as a guerrilla tactic to gather 
intelligence from and build relationships with the local population, but also with the intention 
to reform Uganda’s political system and to democratise local rule. As an instrument of guerrilla 
warfare introduced in an unstable political environment, the RCs embodied a new form of 
order. Thus, the RCs were part of a new governance order, theorised in conflict studies 
literature (Justino, 2013), and they subsequently transformed the hierarchically structured 
systems of rule and brought about a radical change in local level politics.  
 
Depending on how the population perceived the new regime, the regions responded 
differently to the introduction of the RCs. In Luwero, the population either actively or passively 
supported the RCs and the NRA, which promised to counter northern domination and put an 
end to UNLA violence (Weinstein, 2007). Moreover, the population responded positively to the 
opportunity for self-rule, which allowed them to break away from the hierarchical leadership 
structure of the kingdom and hereditary chiefs (Karlström, 1996; Weinstein, 2007). This, too, 
was a deliberate NRA strategy to muster support among the population, especially the 
peasantry, against the Obote (II) regime (Mamdani, 1996). A significant departure from the 
past was that participation in RCs as a right was extended to all residents of a particular area 
and not to members of a particular ethnic group.  This brought indigenous and migrant groups 
together in the struggle for regime change (Mamdani, 1996, p. 208).  
 
In the North, however, particularly in Lango and Acholi, the populations perceived the RCs not 
as democratising but as a mechanism of control.  Indeed, the nature of the RC system in Acholi 
was to a certain extent different from how the RCs were implemented in the rest of Uganda. 
As in other parts of the country, the RCs were made responsible for security and intelligence: 
to liaise with the NRA and report on the armed resistance, and to supervise the Local Defence 
Units (LDUs). Where in other regions the LDUs were meant to serve as a form of community 
policing and a check on military power, this was not the case in Acholi (Finnström, 2003). The 
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NRA anticipated widespread resistance from the Acholi people and therefore they had no 
intention of using the RCs as a mechanism for democratic empowerment. Thus, unlike in 
Luwero, there were no efforts to democratise local self-rule in Acholi. In Acholi the RCs were 
used for security purposes only and, as I will show in the next chapter, cooperation was 
coerced. Due to the insecurity and difficulties the NRA faced in controlling the remote areas, 
vast areas of land were without RCs for a long time6. 
 
Much as there is written about the regime change and the RCs, there is very little documented 
about how the Acholi population interacted with the RCs in everyday life. In 1987 a country-
wide assessment of the RCs was carried out, which was tasked with reviewing their 
functioning. The report mentions that the team was unable to carry out the assessment in 
Acholi due to the ongoing insecurity (GoU, 1987). A comprehensive content analysis of 
newspaper articles concerning the Acholi region during that period reveals how people 
mistrusted the RCs and were reluctant to cooperate after the RCs were increasingly used in the 
NRA’s counter-insurgency in the North (Branch, 2007). Still today, many Acholi continue to 
think of the LCs as the intelligence agents of the state (Finnström, 2003, p. 129). 
 
After the victory of the NRA in 1986, the RCs were rapidly institutionalised to become part of 
the new democratic system. Already in 1987 the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute 
formalised the RCs, which formed a multi-tiered system from the village level, RC1, up to the 
district level, RC5. Only the RC1 was directly elected by the adult village population: the 
executive committees at each level elected the committees at the level above (Carbone, 2008, 
p. 33). The democratising effect of the RCs was, however, reduced in many parts of the 
country post-1986, when the NRA started to ‘discipline’ the RCs into following NRA directives 
(Mamdani, 1991; Oloka-Onyango, 2000). Moreover, as I will demonstrate in subsequent 
chapters, the RC/LC system in Acholi never had the chance to transform and adopt the 
democratic functions that it developed elsewhere in the country. Whilst the LCs outside the 
conflict areas consolidated during the 1990s, in Acholi this was not possible due to the 
insurgency.  
 
  
                                                          
6
 Interview, Gulu NGO Forum, 05/03/2010. 
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Figure 4.1 The Local Council System of Uganda 
 
 
Local Council 5 (LC5, district) 
Local government 
 
 
Local Council 4 (LC4, county) 
 
 
Local Council 3 (LC3, sub-county) 
Local government 
 
 
Local Council 2 (LC2, parish) 
Administrative unit 
 
 
Local Council 1 (LC1, village/ward) 
Administrative unit 
 
The district and sub-counties have technical staff as well as elected political leaders, 
while parishes and villages only have elected LCs. LC4 does not function as an 
administrative level, but marks the constituency represented by an MP. 
 
 
The local government system was further developed throughout the 1990s. Initially, 
deconcentration and accountability mechanisms  were weak (Ahikire, 2007, p. 49). Measures 
were required to enhance the democratic potential of the RCs as well as their capacity to 
implement policies. With the 1993 Local Government Statute, decision-making authority was 
transferred from line ministries to districts, which were now in control of expenditure on the 
services for which they were responsible. The 1995 Constitution firmly consolidated 
decentralised governance and democratic mechanisms, and the Resistance Councils (RCs) were 
renamed Local Councils (LCs) (Figure 2.1).  
 
The 1997 Local Government Act adopted more gender inclusive language, and stipulated that 
30% of council members at all levels should be women (Ahikire, 2007). From now on the 
population could directly elect the chair persons and councillors for the levels of LC1, LC3 and 
LC5, for a 5-year term. However, in the 2006 local elections there were no elections for LC1 
and LC2 level, because in the change to a multi-party system the government could not reach 
agreement about whether the candidates at LC1 and LC2 level should stand on a party ticket. 
Officially the LC1 and LC2 thus served for 2 terms, although many members dropped out along 
the way, effectively leaving gaps in LC capacity and in the chain of communication to other 
levels.  
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Thus, until the arrival of the NRA/M government in 1986, structures for participation in local 
governance barely existed. Under the British system of indirect rule, appointed chiefs had 
wielded substantial powers, which they used for self-enrichment. Under Obote (I) the 
institution of chiefs remained in place, as well as their patronage networks. Amin abolished the 
local governments altogether and replaced them with a military administration. The system of 
Myumba Kumi under Obote (II) was the first instance of village level participation, but it served 
the interests of his government rather than the people. Thus until 1986 Ugandans had not 
experienced local government as emancipatory self-rule, but as a form of top-down control by 
the state. To conclude, rural Ugandans thus had little experience with citizen engagement in 
local public affairs prior to 1986. Although the system for decentralised governance developed 
under the NRA/M, the insecurity in Acholi did not allow the LC system to consolidate. This does 
not mean, however, that the implementation of the LC system in stable regions of Uganda was 
without challenges. In the following section I explain the most important flaws in the system 
that have been described in the literature on local governance in Uganda.   
 
4.2.2 Functioning of the Local Council system at present 
 
In the Ugandan 1995 Constitution ‘citizen participation’ figures prominently. In particular 
chapter 11 on the functioning of Local Government explicitly states its importance, but 
participation is considered crucial for all levels of governance, as well as ‘empowerment’. The 
Local Council system is one of the key policy frameworks for citizen participation. However,  
existing literature on the LC system in Uganda has identified major gaps between the design 
and implementation of the reforms carried out in the 1990s (Dicklitch, 1998; Steiner, 2008). 
These gaps reflect the challenges in local governance, participation, and accountability 
observed elsewhere, which were elaborated in Chapter 2. I will discuss some of these 
criticisms in terms of Uganda. Others have concentrated on aspects that I consider beyond the 
scope of this review, although not unrelated, like the technical capacities of local governments 
(Manyak & Katono, 2010; Steiner, 2010), and on challenges for fiscal decentralisation (P. 
Francis & James, 2003; Steiner, 2007). Given the focus of this study on citizen engagement, I 
will concentrate on the problems experienced in the LC system that pose a challenge to the 
promise of popular participation for local democratic governance. 
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Relation of centre state to local state 
 
The political context and state-centre relations matter for the functioning of local government 
institutions (Crook, 2003). In this chapter I have underlined the importance of the historical 
context: the roots of Uganda’s local government system are in the guerrilla war. Despite the 
explicit commitment in the legal frameworks and in public speeches to enhancing democracy 
and citizen participation, the NRM state has retained a high level of control over local 
governments (Wunsch & Ottemoeller, 2004). Political, and – particularly – governmental 
stability have often had priority over devolution of powers. In his attempt to hold on to power, 
Museveni diminishes the democratising potential of the LC system. The NRM government uses 
various strategies to stay in control, of which I will discuss a few.  
 
Compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, Uganda’s functions and funds are more devolved. 
However, in 2006, certain technical offices were recentralised, to be appointed by the central 
government instead of by the districts (Manyak & Katono, 2010; Tidemand, 2009). Line 
ministries, then, limit the autonomy of local governments by having the power to determine 
development priorities, and by maintaining financial control. Local governments largely 
depend on Conditional Grants, and the conditions for spending them are stipulated by the line 
ministries. In 2003/4 about 80% of the grants were conditional (Steiner, 2008).  
 
Secondly, the appointment of the President’s representative to the districts, the office of the 
Resident District Commissioner (RDC) is considered a form of control7. RDCs are charged with 
the monitoring of government programmes and district security, which is considered a factor 
that undermines local democratic politics. The RDCs are all known to be NRM loyalists 
(Manyak & Katono, 2010).  
 
Thirdly, the NRM consolidates support through creating new districts, which the district 
population associates with the creation of jobs and better service provision. The number of 
districts increased from 45 in 1993 to 81 in 2009, with many more up for discussion. For the 
NRM, a new district helps to ensure loyal supporters among local leaders, by promising them 
important district posts (Manyak & Katono, 2010).  
 
                                                          
7
 Interview, Makerere University, Kampala, 26/01/2010; Interview, donor agency, Kampala 20/01/2010 
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Finally, the NRM government, the party and the state have become deeply entangled (Oloka-
Onyango, 2007). It is argued that the NRM used the decentralised system as a patronage 
network to further entrench the party into the state apparatus (P. Francis & James, 2003; 
Tripp, 2010). In the past, then, the NRM has effectively used the LC system to mobilise its local 
support base. Whether it still uses the LCs in that way is subject to debate. One academic 
interviewed argued other strategies are even more effective8: through political appointments 
Museveni ensnares the political elite who will mobilise local support. Also, the NRM is able to 
dominate politics because it has much greater resources than any other party and uses state 
resources during elections. It therefore has more local presence. Another academic 
interviewed emphasised that most LCs are dominated by the NRM, which at local level sends a 
strong message to people that there are no alternatives to NRM leadership9. 
 
Micro-politics of participation in the LCs 
 
The LC system is designed to ensure bottom-up planning and participation in decision-making 
(MinLG & UNDP, 2009). The channelling of interests through the LC1 and LC2 to the sub-
county and from there to the LC5 at district level is the central mechanism for communicating 
issues to the higher level. Village priorities are submitted to the Parish Development 
Committee (PDC), a committee of nine members from one parish, assisted by the Parish Chief. 
The PDC is supposed to function as a forum for development planning at parish level, and 
writes a Parish Development Plan based on the village priorities. The sub-county collects all 
parish plans and consolidates them into a sub-county development plan, which is sent to the 
district to be included in the District Development Plan (DDP) (P. Francis & James, 2003).  
 
As for local authorities, their technical capacities still need improvement, as the annual Local 
Governance Assessments demonstrate (MinLG, 2006). Primarily concerned with the internal 
institutional mechanisms of local governments, this assessment ignores another major 
weakness in the system: accountability to the population. Critics argue that LCs have failed to 
transform into inclusive, accountable institutions (P. Francis & James, 2003; Ssewakiryanga, 
2004). Although participation for planning purposes is stipulated, the framework offers no 
mechanism for citizens to monitor the functioning of local government.  
 
                                                          
8
 Interview, Makerere University, Kampala, 26/01/2010 
9
 Interview, Makerere University, Kampala, 10/08/2010 
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The framework for planning offers a set of ‘spaces’ for citizen engagement. The literature on 
the LCs shows that challenges commonly associated with the ‘micropolitics’ of participation in 
spaces like these are also common in Uganda.  Patronage, kinship and ethnicity continue to 
dominate council politics (Brock, 2004). Exclusionary practices exist that disadvantage people 
of a certain age, ethnicity or gender in becoming involved in the LCs. Another flaw is that LCs 
rarely involve the wider community, resulting in a widening gap between the people and local 
government and leaving decision-making in the hands of a select few. Furthermore, rather 
than true deliberation, the meetings adhere to strict rules: ‘there seem to be few opportunities 
to use the spaces on offer to create solutions, rather than to carry out a ritualised series of 
exchanges between a narrow range of actors’ (Brock, 2004, p. 152).  
 
Prevailing attitudes in society and public opinion affect how people evaluate and use 
opportunities for participation, and their relevance. Golooba-Mutebi (2004) challenges the 
assumption that local citizens would want and have the ability to participate once those 
opportunities emerge. Both leaders and citizens lack the knowledge of rules and procedures. 
Many people feel it is the duty of LC members to make decisions and take initiatives on 
development problems, since they were elected and hence ‘delegated’ to decide on their 
behalf. The LC members themselves are stuck in trying to find solutions to non-participation in 
meetings and community work; there are no resources to reward participation, nor do they 
want to impose fines that would make them unpopular.  
 
Brock (2004) and Ahikire (2007) have described the gender dimension of this process. At every 
council level, women encounter challenges in deliberative processes, including lack of 
education and self-confidence, the use of formal/English language, and the masculine political 
culture that seemed more ‘defensively patriarchical’ (Ahikire, 2007) at the local than at the 
national level. The gender identity of female councillors was more emphasised in politics than 
that of men, which undermined their political power and prevented them from doing anything 
‘radical’. Norms about ‘a good woman’ also guide the LC election process. The morals that 
dominate the existing conceptualisation of feminity include e.g. humility, obedience and 
respectfulness to men. In campaigns women ‘had to prove that they were “real” women 
despite the fact that they sought public office’ (Ahikire, 2007, p. 118) by kneeling and begging 
for votes.  
 
The reality in certain areas of Uganda is that the state does not even have a presence. In his 
ethnography of a rural area in Teso, Jones (2009) describes how ‘the state’ exists as a paper 
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administration in towns. In rural villages it is unseen and largely irrelevant since districts barely 
have any resources to make any visible improvement in services. The churches and burial 
societies are the social institutions through which people assist one another and which matter 
for their livelihoods. This can be seen as another form of marginalisation: geographical 
isolation exacerbated by the lack of Iteso people holding high-level positions in government. In 
this context, in the absence of conflict, the Iteso exercise agency outside the state in numerous 
ethnic and community institutions. 
 
Finally, a few authors discuss the legacy of previous regimes for participatory governance at 
present. Steiner mentions how past authoritarian rule in Uganda has affected the ‘culture for 
participation’ in the country. People were not at all used to participation and developed a 
sense of cynicism towards public affairs, resulting from years of experience with dictatorship 
and a strict social and political hierarchy (2007). Golooba-Mutebi states that the world view of 
Ugandans simply favoured a top-down model of decision-making rather than one based upon 
popular participation (2004). The effects of long-term authoritarian control are hinted at by 
others in similar contexts, raising the question of how receptive society is to participatory 
governance (Blunt & Turner, 2005; Unsworth & Uvin, 2002). As I will show in Chapter 7, my 
findings suggest that, contrary to Golooba-Mutebi (2004), the Acholi do have a normative 
understanding about how citizens should be involved, but the legacy of the conflict - and 
particularly state repression - limit their opportunities. Concerning the difficulties there have 
been in citizen engagement with the LCs ever since their inception, the literature does not take 
into account that the LCs in Acholi only started functioning as ‘ordinary’ LCs from 2006 
onwards, when stability returned to the region. It is, however, important to view citizen 
engagement with the LCs against the historical background of the war.   
 
4.3  The LRA conflict in Acholi  
 
The LRA conflict is well documented from different angles. A chronology of events and stages 
of the war are described by various authors and institutions (Accord, 2010; Allen & 
Vlassenroot, 2010; ARLPI, 2001; Dolan, 2009) and they discuss both the peaks and lulls in the 
intensity of the conflict, government interventions and peace negotiations, how the conflict 
played out at national level, and its international dimensions after the involvement of Sudan 
and international actors. The events leading up to Uganda’s referral of the case to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, The Hague, The Netherlands), the subsequent ICC 
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indictments and how this affected the dynamics of the conflict internally is discussed by Allen 
(2006). Detailed descriptions exist of the structure and organisation of the LRA as a rebel group 
and of its leader Joseph Kony (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010; Bevan, 2007; Dolan, 2009). 
Finnström has done valuable and detailed ethnographic work on Acholi life during the war 
(2003, 2005). Several authors have analysed the situation in Acholi IDP camps and the work of 
humanitarian actors (ARLPI, 2001; Branch, 2009; Dolan, 2009; Hurifo, 2002, 2006). Work exists 
on the lives of (returned) child soldiers and the psychological effects of the war on youth (C.  
Blattman & Annan, 2008; C. Blattman & Annan, 2010); on the effects of the war on gender 
relations (McKay, 2004; Oosterom, 2011); and the international dimensions of the war (Allen, 
2006; Atkinson, 2010; Perrot, 2010).  
 
The findings from my study do not contradict what others have found about what happened 
during the conflict period, but add new empirical detail about the functioning of the Resistance 
Councils and forms of citizen agency. Concerning the post-conflict situation, my findings are 
different from what Blattman (2009) found about increased levels of participation among ex-
combatants. I reflect on his findings in Chapter 8, where I suggest that my focus on the general 
community may explain the difference. Allen (2006) and Branch (2009) have written about the 
crisis in customary leadership in the post-conflict situation. Here too, my study generated 
different findings. Whereas their findings suggest a weakening of the customary leadership, I 
show, in Chapter 7, that there are signs of its recovery within the ethnic political community, 
although it has not re-established a brokering role in the political community of the state. A 
possible reason for this difference is that I carried out my study later than Branch and Allen, so 
customary leadership had had time to revive old practices in the home areas.  
 
The history of the conflict and certain sub-themes have been documented in detail. Section 
4.3.1 therefore presents a summary of events to depict the warscape that emerged in Acholi 
from when the NRA came to power in 1986. Section 4.3.2 highlights what the literature has 
said about two central themes of this study: agency and institutional transformation. This 
shows the gap in existing knowledge about citizen agency in Acholi.  
 
4.3.1 Northern rebellion after regime change 
 
After the coup in 1986, the NRA started to extend its control across the country. When the 
NRA expanded its power base to the North it expected intense armed opposition. The NRA 
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thus went into the Acholi region to counter all forms of resistance and break the rural support 
base of the UNLA.  In the areas where the NRA managed to penetrate, many atrocities took 
place. Whereas the political wing of the NRA had previously controlled and disciplined its 
soldiers, it could now not prevent them using physical violence against civilians, and looting 
large stocks of cattle (Finnström, 2003; Gersony, 1997).  
 
In response, various insurgent groups became active in Acholi and Lango, as well as elsewhere 
in the country where the NRA met with resistance. UNLA fighters had quickly retreated to their 
home areas in the north, afraid of reprisals, and many reorganised as the Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA). Joseph Kony fought the NRA as a member of the UPDA from 1986 
(Finnström, 2003, p. 111). The UPDA signed a peace agreement with the NRA in June 1988. 
This did not bring an end to NRA violence against the Acholi population, however, as the NRA 
continued the war all over the region (Finströmm, 2003). 
 
The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), led by Alice Lakwena, was formed in 1986. Behrend 
describes the emergence and organisation of the movement, and the spiritual mobilisation of 
its followers (Behrend, 1999). In August 1986, a woman called Alice Auma, possessed by the 
Lakwena spirit, was ordered to build up forces to fight ‘the evil’. ‘The evil’ consisted of a threat 
to Acholi soldiers - and their families - from the spirits of those whom they had killed. This 
belief is one expression of a number of cultural belief systems among the Acholi in which 
various spirits play an important role. The goal of Alice’s war was the reconciliation of the 
various ethnic groups in Uganda, and to that end she was fighting the NRA as well as the 
UPDA. The organisation of the movement and its battle techniques were entangled with rituals 
and symbols. It fought and sometimes even defeated UPDA as well as NRA troops in the 
region. The HSM went further south as far as Jinja with the ultimate goal of reaching Kampala. 
In October 1987 the movement was defeated by the NRA. Her father, Severino Lukoya, 
attempted to continue her struggle and formed a group of his own. Lukoya’s movement was, 
however, not as popular as the HSM and he surrendered to the NRA in August 1989. 
 
As the NRA violence against the Acholi went on, from 1988 groups of UPDA defectors as well 
as former HSM fighters and Lukoya soldiers joined Kony in a new insurgent group called Holy 
Spirits. At that time it was a former UPDA commander, Odong Latek, who led the movement’s 
military force and Kony gave spiritual guidance. After Latek was killed Kony took over and 
renamed the movement the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). There are believed to be links 
between the HSM and the LRA. Joseph Kony is an alleged second cousin of Alice Lakwena 
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(Finströmm, 2003, p.77) and her father Lukoya served directly under his command. As in the 
HSM, new recruits in the LRA underwent spiritual initiation rituals and spiritual rituals 
characterised the LRA methods of warfare. Among the Acholi there are people who believe 
that the spirits that had possessed Alice Lakwena were taken over by Joseph Kony, while 
others disagree and feel that the spirits that guided Kony were far more ‘evil’ and not even 
Acholi spirits (Finströmm, 2003).  
 
4.3.2 From insurgency to protracted conflict  
 
By 1990 the LRA was the only active rebel group in the north. Especially in the early stages of 
the war the NRA seemed to consider the LRA as a highly localised, internal issue to the Acholi 
region, and would only respond with armed attacks, not sparing the local population. 
Museveni even appointed a Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda in 1988, the 
Acholi Mrs. Betty Bigombe, which signals that the NRA perhaps considered the insurgency 
insignificant. When the LRA violence waned between about 1989 and 1990 Bigombe and 
Museveni declared the war to be over. The LRA however stepped up its activities in 1991.This 
partly provoked the first major military operation, Operation North, in 1991. Another reason 
for this offensive was that the World Bank had agreed a stabilisation grant on condition that 
the situation was secure. A key feature of this operation was that Bigombe mobilised Acholi 
civilians into ‘Bow and Arrow groups’ to counter the LRA. Initially, the LRA had attacked only 
government agents and soldiers, but now the LRA found the Acholi populations guilty of 
collaboration with the regime and reacted brutally, with symbolic acts of violence such as 
maiming to punish the disloyalty.  
 
The first attempt at peace negotiations was initiated by Bigombe in 1993. The talks ended 
abruptly, however, after Museveni imposed an ultimatum in February 1994 for the LRA to 
surrender within one week. The LRA immediately resumed its violent operations. From now on 
the LRA also had bases in Sudan, which gave substantial financial and logistical support to the 
LRA as retaliation for Uganda’s backing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Uganda 
cut off all diplomatic relations with Khartoum in 1995. After mediation by the Carter Centre in 
1999 diplomatic engagements gradually, though carefully, resumed (Dolan, 2009). LRA 
activities were intense from 1997 until early 1999, when a lull in the conflict occurred. 
However, within two weeks after the agreement with Sudan, the LRA renewed its operations 
because it had not been involved in the negotiations (Dolan, 2009). 
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From 1996 the NRM embarked on what would become another key feature of the war: forced 
displacement. It established ‘protected villages’, mainly in the western parts of Acholi. These 
camps were not primarily for the protection of civilians, but to cut off the supply links between 
the rebels and the population and to allow the military a free fire zone. Many people were 
forced into the camps by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). After a wave of LRA 
attacks in Kitgum district in January 1997, the people in the affected sub-counties fled their 
homes and formed camps around the sub-county trading centres. The NRM launched 
Operation Iron Fist against the LRA on Sudanese territory in 2002, which caused a deepening 
of the humanitarian crisis (Perrot, 2010). The LRA retaliated with a series of attacks across the 
Acholi region and beyond, going deep into Lango and Teso regions. This provoked the last 
phase of displacement. Between 2002 and the 2005 the number of IDPs had increased from 
400,000 to 1.6 million (over 90% of the Acholi population) (UNOCHA, 2004).  Camps were also 
established in Lango.  
 
The Amnesty Act was enacted in January 2000 following the efforts of various civil society 
groups, despite huge resentment by the political establishment, notably President Museveni 
himself. The situation stabilised locally and attempts to negotiate with the LRA were 
undertaken by the Carter Center, though without success. While the Amnesty Act was 
considered part of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, Museveni remained reluctant to 
implement it. Only from 2003, after developments in the international context, did the process 
of implementation became more serious. By 2004 around 5,000 LRA fighters had made use of 
the act to return to their homes in Acholi (Allen, 2006). That so many LRA fighters returned 
caused, unfortunately, a backlash when the LRA responded with a period of attacks, which 
were the last to take place in Uganda – at the time of writing.  
 
Meanwhile, several events at international level had profound implications for the local 
situation and the role of the Government of Uganda. First, during the 1990s Uganda had built 
up a reputation of being a ‘success story’ in terms of economic reforms and development, 
meaning its strategies towards the north were not questioned by the international donors 
(Mwenda, 2010; Perrot, 2010). This changed after 2000 when the Nordic countries in 
particular denounced the military approach to the conflict and argued for a much harder 
diplomatic line. 
 
However, the United States (US) government put the LRA on its list of terrorist organisations in 
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2001 and this led to some US support for Operation Iron Fist (Allen, 2006, p. 72). In March 
2002 the Government of Uganda adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act, which greatly undermined 
the possibilities for implementing the Amnesty Act. In the war on terrorism President El Bashir 
of Sudan was pressured to cut his country’s support to the LRA. He agreed to the joint military 
operation Iron Fist. With US involvement, the Government of Uganda was under more 
pressure to improve the performance of the military and open up space for political 
negotiations and the implementation of the Amnesty Act. Then in 2003, the UN Under-
Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Egeland, visited the Acholi region. He declared it 
required the immediate attention of the international community. This led to an influx of 
humanitarian organisations from 2004. Finally, in late 2003 the Ugandan government referred 
the case of the LRA, Kony and some of its top commanders to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague, the Netherlands. The ICC issued arrest warrants in July 2005. Ugandan civil 
society feared it was now impossible for the LRA leadership to surrender or for abductees to 
return.  
 
Then in 2006 peace negotiations started in Juba, South Sudan, known as the Juba Peace Talks. 
These were mediated by Riek Machar, then vice-president of southern Sudan. These were the 
most promising talks in years of repeated attempts and repeated failures.  The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between North and South Sudan in 2005, which offered 
the Government of South Sudan incentives to end the LRA conflict (Atkinson, 2010). The LRA 
moved its bases to south-western Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
Government of Uganda, Museveni’s public statements especially, expressed conflicting 
messages about engaging in the peace talks, undertaking military offensives in the DRC, and 
withdrawing/supporting the ICC warrants. In the end, a delegation was sent to Juba.  
 
The Juba Peace Talks did not evolve smoothly and there were many barriers to success. At 
least the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was reached (August 2006), which was crucial for 
restoring stability. Yet at the same time, the ICC indictments formed a major obstruction to the 
negotiations (Atkinson, 2010), increasing mistrust. The talks were even suspended in late 2006 
and could only resume in May 2007 after major efforts by Joaquim Chissano, then UN Special 
Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas.  
 
The parties reached an agreement on comprehensive solutions to the war, which addressed 
the reintegration of ex-combatants, return of the displaced, and the disparity between the 
north and south in government institutions. The delegations subsequently reached agreement 
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on Accountability and Reconciliation. Thereafter, however, the talks stalled again due to 
divisions within the LRA delegation. Vincent Otti, who had led the LRA delegation, was 
assassinated by Joseph Kony. Talks resumed in early 2008. The final peace agreement was due 
to be signed in April 2008, but Kony failed to show up, nor did he come to sign at a second 
meeting in November. When in December the governments of Uganda and DRC started 
operation Lightening Thunder the end of the Juba Peace talks was definite. Thus no final 
agreement was attained, yet the region nonetheless returned to stability.  
 
The LRA kept its base in Garamba national park in the north of DRC, from where it occasionally 
attacked villages in the border area of Central African Republic, South Sudan and DRC. 
Operation Lightening Thunder in 2008 also failed to bring out Kony, and the LRA reacted with 
attacks and abductions in the border area. In October 2011 the US government agreed to send 
a relatively small number of soldiers to DRC to work as military advisers to the DRC army, in 
order to track down LRA leaders. 
 
4.3.3 The role of the NRM government  
 
The way the Government of Uganda responded to the ongoing conflict has been heavily 
criticised. Although the LRA was the aggressor in the war, the actions of the government, and 
of the military in particular, often harmed the Acholi population directly or indirectly. I argue 
that the role of the government and the army had lasting effects on how the Acholi perceive 
their citizenship. In this section I highlight some of the actions of the Ugandan government 
that have damaged its relationship with the Acholi region.  
 
In the first stages of the war it seemed the government significantly underestimated the power 
of the LRA, and even purposely ignored it to convince the rest of the country and the 
international community of its own strength in consolidating peace and democratic 
institutions. This partly explains the government’s discourse portraying the LRA as ‘bandits’ 
(i.e. without a political cause, such as establishing an alternative regime or representing the 
interests and grievances of the Acholi people) and its attitude of belittling and humiliating the 
LRA during negotiations. 
 
The discourse of state actors about the war, most notably of President Museveni himself, 
deepened the Acholi region’s sense of alienation from the rest of the country. On several 
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occasions Museveni expressed his view of the LRA conflict as an internal Acholi affair, 
perpetuating the stereotype of the Acholi as barbaric and as warriors. Customary institutions 
such as the role of the Acholi elders and certain ritual blessings were misrepresented so as to 
demonstrate that the Acholi inflicted the war upon themselves by supporting an anti-
government insurgency. In this way the government attributed the cause of the war directly to 
the Acholi ethnic identity (Finströmm, 2003, p.219). 
 
Throughout the conflict the government has alternated between military offensives and peace 
negotiations to stop the LRA. Also in public statements, in the media and in speeches, 
Museveni often mentioned openness to dialogue and military threat in one breath. This 
undermined possibilities for negotiations by closing down any space for dialogue as soon as it 
had been opened. In the late 1990s various civil society organisations were trying to establish 
talks with the LRA which were disrupted by UPDF attacks (Dolan, 2009, p. 98). The government 
persistently ignored the pleas of Acholi civil society and parliamentarians to resolve the war 
through mechanisms for reconciliation, reparation and compensation. Their efforts were 
compromised by the referral to the ICC, which provoked a huge debate about the relevance of 
international law versus ‘domestic’ justice mechanisms. The Anti-Terrorism Act was seen as a 
major fall-back that compromised the Amnesty Act, which Museveni had always been 
reluctant to extend to the LRA. Finally, Operation Iron Fist put a definite end to the Juba Peace 
Talks, stalled as they were.  
 
Altogether, the Acholi received strong signals that the government was not willing to end this 
war and that it was in its own interests to prolong and even deepen it. Although the 
government often declared it was unable to defeat the LRA due to a lack of resources and 
army personnel, huge corruption scandals about e.g. defence procurements, large numbers of 
‘ghost soldiers’ on the payroll (Mwenda, 2010), and the deployment of Ugandan troops in DRC 
and later Somalia contradicted these statements. The Acholi population was therefore inclined 
to think that the main reason for the government’s failure was a lack of political will. Findings 
from my own research show that people continued to think that the government had 
prolonged the war on purpose, which will be elaborated in the next chapter.  
 
4.4 Transformation of institutions in Acholi 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed conflict studies literature that points to the transformation of social 
and political institutions during wartime, which has implications for local power dynamics.  
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Vlassenroot and Raymaekers (2005, 2008) therefore speak of a ‘war complex’. I related 
institutional transformation to ‘learning citizenship’, as the practice of citizen engagement is 
partly learnt through involvement in the institutions in people’s social environment (Heater, 
1990; Merrifield, 2001). In this section I recount what the literature says about institutional 
transformation during the LRA conflict, focusing on the introduction of the Resistance Councils 
and the changing role of customary leaders. I point out how the issue of citizen engagement 
remains underexposed.  
 
The historical literature outlined above shows how the introduction of the Resistance Councils 
was closely entwined with the origins of the NRA as a revolutionary power, and the 
institutionalisation into the Local Council system was entangled with the political consolidation 
of the Movement System. As a new governance institution that was part of the NRA guerrilla 
warfare, the RCs illustrate how a new governance order can emerge during conflict (Justino, 
2013). Their creation was enabled by the openings in the unstable political order that existed 
in Luwero (Weinstein, 2007). The case of the RCs shows how the transformation of political 
institutions can have lasting effects in the post-conflict order, as the RCs were formalised and 
consolidated into a major component of the country’s formal institutional democracy. They 
were, however, used by the NRA/M to entrench its power. This illustrates another point in the 
literature: political actors seek to transform state institutions that influence the future 
distribution of political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Cramer, 2006a; Justino, 2013). 
 
In section 4.2 I explained the differences in the nature of the RCs between the North and the 
South. This is relevant for this study when thinking about the implications of institutional 
transformation for the practice of citizenship. Because the RCs in Acholi were associated with 
NRA oppression and control this may have affected the ways in which the Acholi engaged with 
them and other leaders. There is, however, little information about how this affected everyday 
practices of engagement with the RCs. I address this gap in subsequent chapters.  
 
The changes in cultural institutions constitute another instance of institutional transformation 
that is well-covered in the literature on Acholi. The institution of Acholi customary leadership 
changed because its legitimacy had deteriorated during various episodes of the conflict (Allen, 
2010; Finnström, 2003). Section 4.1 showed that this was explained by the inability of 
customary leaders and elders to help reintegrate Acholi UNLA soldiers into society (Behrend, 
1999; Branch, 2010). On top of that, numerous customary leaders had encouraged 
participation in anti-NRA rebellion, including the LRA, but as the war evolved they condemned 
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the activities of the LRA (Finnström, 2003). Therefore ex-combatants often lacked respect for 
the elders. The situation in the displacement camps also weakened the legitimacy of 
customary leaders (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 explains how this affected social relations and the 
leaders’ role as political brokers. Interestingly, Jones (2009) shows how Iteso elders in the Teso 
region (western Uganda) try to re-establish their authority over young men by disciplining 
them through court rulings, whenever a case comes up involving young adult men. He argues 
that such rulings by the elders are informed by the idea that disobedient, rebellious young 
men were the major cause of the Teso insurgency (1986-1993). The wider community supports 
the elders and endorse the norm that young men need to learn to respect authority. This is an 
example from a different post-conflict situation in Uganda that illustrates proposition (IV). 
 
Cultural institutions changed not just because of the internal conflict dynamics but also due to 
the involvement of local and international aid actors in the field of justice and reconciliation. 
Aid agencies supported ‘traditional reconciliation’ mechanisms, starting from the end of the 
war.   However, Allen is critical of claims that these are more ‘appropriate’ and states that 
traditions were ‘invented’ (Allen, 2006, 2010). Historically, different Acholi groups had 
practiced a variety of rituals to solve social problems and there had not been a uniform 
approach to reconciliation in the region. The ritual ‘mato oput’ (‘to drink a bitter potion made 
from the leaves of the ‘oput’ tree’) was originally performed only in cases of homicide 
committed by individuals within their own social circles, not after warfare. Allen found that at 
the local level, even in the displacement camps, spiritual healers adapted some of their rituals, 
other than mato oput, to reintegrate ex-combatants. But aid actors promoted mato oput for 
use by former LRA combatants. In the process it became misinterpreted as a generic term for 
reconciliation, using aspects of different rituals.  The aid community carried on supporting the 
material requirements for rituals and the reinvigoration of the customary leaders to perform 
them. Allen (2010) shows that not all the Acholi were in favour of reintegrating LRA 
combatants and instead preferred a formal court procedure and imprisonment. But support 
for traditional justice had become so entrenched that any critique was considered provocative. 
Allen (2010) points out the risks of codifying and reifying selected practices and external 
support to forms of authority without understanding the historical and cultural complexities.  
 
Thus, important changes occurred in both the sphere of the local state, through the RCs, and in 
the customary sphere.  As argued by others, both are important spheres of citizenship and one 
may affect the other (Ndegwa, 1997). Allen’s work (2010) brings out some of the attitudes the 
Acholi have towards the state and towards customary authorities. But his work does not 
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indicate how this informs everyday interactions between Acholi citizens and authorities, 
especially for other issues than reconciliation. The literature does not specifically address 
social institutions, or the public sphere. My study contributes to empirical knowledge about 
Acholi by addressing both. 
 
Finally, although the conflict itself has been well documented, less has been written that links 
this history to the present and the implications of the war for the future prospects for local 
and national democratic governance. What is missing is in-depth knowledge of how the Acholi 
sense of citizenship has been constructed against this background, and how it informs Acholi 
practices of citizen engagement.  
 
4.5 Post-conflict recovery in Acholi  
 
In Chapter 2 I discussed a number of Community-Driven Recovery Interventions. In Northern 
Uganda, too, a recovery intervention based on the principles of community-driven 
development (CDD) is funded by the World Bank and bilateral donors. At the time of research, 
this Northern Uganda Social Action Fund had just entered its second phase (NUSAF 2, 2010-
2014). The design of NUSAF 2 was meant to overcome several weaknesses experienced in 
Phase 1 (NUSAF 1, 2006-2010).  
 
Robinson (2007) and Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) reviewed NUSAF Phase 1 and 
presented a critical analysis of the discourses around poverty in the North. The studies show 
that the framing of the northern region as needing to ‘catch up’ was crucial in how the solution 
to its poverty was understood: the communities had to do it themselves. In essence, local 
communities were made responsible for overcoming their situation of chronic poverty and for 
‘catching up’. NUSAF failed to address the underlying causes of poverty through which the 
north had structurally been excluded and alienated from the rest of country over a long period 
of time.  
 
‘It was hoped that communities would identify conflict mitigation measures to overcome the 
legacy of violence and address its underlying causes.’ (Robinson, 2007, p. 263). It was 
recognised that the grievances in the north were about fear and anger towards the NRM 
regime. The design team had acknowledged the wider political grievances, according to 
Robinson, but had translated this into the need to include a community reconciliation 
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component. NUSAF thus addressed horizontal relations in communities, between citizens and 
ex-combatants, rather than between communities and the state (Frederick Golooba-Mutebi & 
Hickey, 2010; Robinson, 2007). This component did not reappear in Phase 2. 
 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) examined whether NUSAF had made a positive impact on 
citizenship by looking at three dimensions: social citizenship (horizontal relations in 
communities), economic citizenship, and political citizenship (relations between citizens and 
the state whereby citizens are actively engaged and state institutions are responsive). They 
found no evidence that NUSAF had strengthened horizontal relations or forms of ‘social 
citizenship’. On the contrary: they came across many cases in which engagement in projects 
had led to social tensions. Concerning economic citizenship, their findings showed that 
projects did have some effect on asset-holdings among the poor. However, these were not 
used to start sustainable businesses, but to fulfil short-term needs. Regarding political 
citizenship, there were some instances in which more frequent interactions between citizens, 
NUSAF staff and local government had increased people’s confidence that it was their right to 
follow up on applications. For the majority of the people, however, the prevalent 
unresponsiveness of state institutions was discouraging. It confirmed their idea that citizen 
engagement was pointless and that the state was not interested in them.  
 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey identified the failure to address historical and political causes of 
poverty, as explained above, as an important cause of the ineffectiveness of NUSAF. Another 
problem was that communities were expected to have a high degree of agency in order to 
make community-driven development work. However, they found that many failures were 
caused by the communities’ lack of skills to handle budgets and to contract and monitor 
constructors, which made them vulnerable to abuse by private companies. There were no 
adequate mechanisms in NUSAF to give guidance to community groups to perform such tasks. 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey thus questioned whether CDD is an appropriate instrument in 
settings like these, where the causes of chronic poverty lie in higher politics and the political 
economy.  It makes poor people responsible for their own recovery without genuine 
empowerment (Craig & Porter, 2006).  
 
However, none of these challenges has been addressed in the design of NUSAF 2. What has 
improved is that the implementation no longer runs parallel to local governments. NUSAF2 
funds now need to be aligned with district planning cycles and local governments are in charge 
of the monitoring, thus giving them a bigger role. But NUSAF 2 is based on the same 
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assumption that the people are able to exercise agency and fully participate in the programme. 
In Chapter 8 I will present my reflections on this assumption, based on the empirical findings of 
my study. Populations in a post-conflict setting like Acholi cannot be expected to have the high 
levels of political agency required to fulfil their roles in a community-driven recovery 
programme. Such interventions could improve with a focus on learning citizenship and 
facilitated interactions between communities and the state.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the historical background against which the sense and the practice of 
Acholi citizenship developed. It showed that the process of Acholi citizenship construction 
needs to be seen against the wider historical background, in which the colonial era and the 
continuation of the North-South divide are important markers. In Acholi, the war was a 
consequence of the North-South divide, as well as a mechanism that deepened it and 
furthered the process of adverse incorporation. Although large parts of Lango region were 
unaffected by the war it nevertheless belongs to the marginalised north.  
 
The chapter described what constituted the ‘warscape’ as it emerged in Acholi. From 1986 to 
1990 various rebel groups were involved in fighting the NRA, which shaped the dynamics of 
the warscape. The Resistance Councils that were introduced were part of the securitisation in 
the north.  From 1990 onwards the LRA and the military were the two violent actors that 
remained and perpetuated physical violence, while the national government played its own 
role in deepening the insecurity of Acholi citizens.  
  
The LRA conflict has been documented from various angles, some of which shed light on the 
Acholi sense of citizenship. Scholars have described the negative perceptions of the state 
among the Acholi as the result of the conflict (Branch, 2005, 2009; Dolan, 2009). This indicates 
a link between ethnic citizenship and state citizenship: the Acholi felt that the war targeted 
them as an ethnic group.  
 
The chapter also outlined what happened to local institutions. This contributes to a reflection 
on the second proposition presented in Chapter 3, about the securitisation of the public 
sphere and institutions. The following chapters add the empirical detail that allows me to test 
the propositions. Chapter 5 describes the start of the insurgency in Acholi through a citizenship 
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lens, providing Acholi commentaries on their history. For the Lango it shows how their sense 
and practice of citizenship developed in a relatively stable context from the late 1980s. For the 
Acholi it describes the events and episodes they themselves identified as important for the 
construction of their citizenship. It also describes how, in Acholi, forms of agency, including 
citizenship practice, were adjusted to a context of war. As later chapters will demonstrate 
these experiences informed forms of citizen engagement in Acholi in the post-conflict 
situation.  
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Chapter 5 Construction of Citizenship in Acholi and Lango 
Introduction  
 
History is one of the many contextual factors that shape a process of citizenship construction, 
but is often ‘invisibilised’ since the historical legacies of a country are enclosed in people’s 
minds (Cornwall et al., 2011). The previous chapter highlighted historical episodes and events 
that preceded the conflict in Acholi, and the LRA conflict cannot not be interpreted in isolation 
from them. This chapter is written from the perspective of Acholi and Langi citizens and 
reflects their commentary on the political history described in the previous chapter, thus 
focusing on what happened on the ground.  
 
What has been called historical memory is valuable precisely because it is not 
necessarily an accurate memory – that is, it is not the historical veracity of a 
statement or memory that gives that statement or memory constitutive power. The 
thing that happened, and the ideas transmitted by its distorted reporting, silencing, or 
even and most especially invention, reveal a space of colonial and postcolonial 
conflict. (White, Miescher, & Cohen, 2001, pp. 15-16) 
 
In line with this quote, the objective of this part of the research was thus not to obtain a 
chronological and accurate, factual representation of what happened, but to get an empirically 
informed citizen perspective on history. Using important historical events, brought forward by 
participants, as anchor points in my interviews I explored people’s own accounts of their 
process of citizenship construction.  
 
After a description of the moments and events that are important for the construction of 
Acholi citizenship the chapter continues with an analysis of the warscape that developed from 
1986 onwards. I discuss the forms of agency that developed during the 1986-1997 conflict 
period, when the Acholi were still living at home. I then describe the changes in local 
institutions: the Resistance Councils as new political institutions on the ground, the challenges 
for customary institutions, and the disruptions in social institutions. The chapter ends in 1997 
when the displacement camps started in this part of Acholi, marking the start of a new episode 
in the war.  
 
After the presentation of empirical findings about the Acholi region, I present the historical 
narratives from Lango. After a brief period of political turmoil in 1986 the region remained 
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stable. I show how in Lango certain social and political institutions were consolidated over the 
past twenty years, while in Acholi they were curtailed as a result of the LRA conflict.  
 
5.1 Citizenship construction in Acholi: milestones in recent history 
 
In this section I discuss the events that were identified by the Acholi as crucial moments in 
their history, starting from when the Obote II regime ended, after Okello’s brief regime was 
overthrown and the NRA took control in the north. I start with this period because when asked 
about their history most Acholi were inclined to start with the moment when the NRA came to 
power in 1986, which they strongly associated with other events in the years that followed: 
the emergence of various insurgent groups, the cattle raids by the Karamojong, sustained 
violent repression by the NRA, and the LRA insurgency. The narratives of how these events 
were experienced are elaborated in this section, which will illustrate a number of concepts and 
mechanisms that were explained in Chapter 3.  
 
Data was gathered in three ways. First of all, participatory time-line exercises were elaborated 
in separate focus groups for men, women, youth, and elders10. I took an open approach to the 
exercise, meaning that participants were not restricted in how far back they wanted to go. 
Secondly, life story interviews were carried out with individual respondents. Interviewees were 
asked to identify and explain events or episodes that had been important in their lives. Starting 
from the events and stories that the participants themselves came up with enabled them to 
give a lot of detail, because the issue was something they cared about. Most of their events 
and stories could be related to citizenship. For example, for many events it was possible to ask 
what the interviewees expected from the state or customary authorities, what these actors 
did, and how their actions were perceived. The narration of events was followed up by 
questions about feelings and agency in response to these events. This provided detailed 
accounts of people’s histories and local life, as well as about their process of citizenship 
construction. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews about everyday life during different episodes 
of the conflict generated data that could be used to study forms of agency.  
 
                                                          
10
 The social category of ‘elders’ includes both male and female elders. I carried out a number of mixed 
focus groups with elders and several for men and women separately.  
164 
 
5.1.1 1986: The regime change to NRA 
 
Yoweri Museveni and his NRA started extending their control over Uganda soon after they had 
seized power in January 1986. Northern Uganda was declared a ‘war zone’ and in March 1986 
the towns Gulu and Kitgum were taken (Behrend, 1999, p. 24). But since the NRA met with 
strong resistance locally it could not immediately control the entire region, particularly the 
remote parts.  
 
Acholi soldiers in the UNLA retreated back to the north as soon as Museveni captured 
Kampala. There they spread the news of Museveni’s victory and also the rumour that ‘this 
government will come and kill all Acholi!’: a phrase often used by my research participants. The 
Acholi became frightened of a backlash, knowing that the Acholi soldiers had committed large 
scale atrocities in other parts of the country under Obote and Okello. Many Acholi civilians 
therefore decided to leave their homesteads and, in the case of those in my research locations, 
fled to Sudan, often accompanied by ex-soldiers. Fear of NRA violence was so great that ‘flight’ 
(Barter, 2012) seemed the only viable option to survive the regime change. The Acholi stayed 
in various places along the border for a couple of months, but a few people stayed as long as a 
year. Many remembered this abrupt departure and their stay in Sudan as a period of intense 
fear, and hardship. 
 
We stayed 2 months in Sudan. From January. We were not getting any assistance 
from any government or NGO. We just stayed in Pajok. The major problem was food. 
By the time Museveni came in we still had cattle, we were living from the milk from 
our cattle. There was no other problem, but we got a hard life in Sudan, until we got 
back. [...] When we were there, a few of us went to Pajok in Magwi, there was a 
camp. They were kept by Sudanese soldiers, who did security. It was a big camp for 
Ugandan refugees. Those stayed for 1 year. The SPLA rebels made them come back to 
Uganda, because they were fighting the government about Magwi. 
Acholi: focus group, 3 Elders, Chua district 
 
We went to a place called Pajok in Sudan and the journey took 3 days. There we had 
not enough food. The little we had when we went, finished. From this area, we 
decided to come back and witness the situation. Three men and six women came to 
see the situation here.  
Acholi: focus group, 5 men, Chua district 
 
Their living conditions as refugees in Sudan were so challenging that the ‘flight’ option was no 
longer sustainable and people looked for ways to come back and see whether life was at least 
manageable. Some Acholi went to inspect the situation at home and whether it would allow 
their return, or enquired around when they went to the home villages to look for food. People 
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from my research sites found that the situation was not as bad as they had expected: in their 
sub-county only a relatively small battalion of NRA soldiers was stationed. They had been 
afraid that the NRA intended to systematically kill all Acholi, but according to the few 
remaining residents this was not happening. It surprised me that there had not been incidents 
of large-scale violence, since in other parts of Acholi, and around Gulu town particularly, the 
NRA behaved extremely violently against the population (Dolan, 2009). A possible explanation 
is that around late 1986-1987 the NRA did not yet have a sizeable presence in this remote 
area. What was clear from many accounts is that many Acholi decided to move back from 
Sudan, calculating the risks of living with NRA presence at home or facing scarcity on the 
border. Their careful analysis of the situation, of the risks and possibilities for making a 
livelihood, mark the start of their social navigation (Vigh, 2006).  
  
When they came home, the NRA was still trying to round up ex-soldiers or potential ‘rebels’. At 
times there were opportunities for voluntary demobilisation of ex-soldiers, or they were 
invited to join the NRA. There were, however, plenty of stories about coerced demobilisation, 
night searches, arbitrary arrests and violations. 
 
When people went to Sudan, they [government soldiers] deceived them to come back 
and said they would peacefully stay with them. When people came back, they started 
arresting people at night and killing them at the barracks. They gave the excuse that 
they were killing former soldiers of the former government, but even civilians were 
being killed. This made many men and boys join the Lakwena [insurgent] group.  
Acholi: man, age 40, Chua district 
 
Not long after the majority of the people had returned, a massacre did occur. An NRA general 
known as Abiriga had many men killed in the trading centre of the Lamwo sub-county. A mass 
grave was said to exist near the river11. The general population avoided encounters with the 
NRA as much as possible and therefore restricted their movements to the villages. This 
severely limited local trade and economic activities, because people were afraid to pass 
through the trading centre of the sub-county where the NRA was based. Parents also stopped 
sending their children to the only school in the centre. At some point, one man who was a 
parish chief had the courage to go and talk to the military. He persuaded them that they 
should allow people to come to the trading centre, because the standstill in economic life was 
also harmful to them. It was one of the few expressions of political agency, or engagement 
through negotiation (Barter, 2012), that I found.  
                                                          
11
 This general was believed to be a Resident District Commissioner in one of the West Nile districts at 
present. This contributed to negative perceptions of the state later on.  
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At this point in time, the Acholi were uncertain about how the situation would evolve and 
expected the worst. Military violence was the face of the new regime and this prompted many 
men to join insurgent groups.  
 
5.1.2 Organised resistance by the ‘Cilil’  
 
Groups of UNLA soldiers decided to counter the NRA after the NRA battalions had used 
extremely violent measures against the population in search of ex-soldiers, and especially after 
a general disarmament of Acholi was ordered (Behrend, 1999). Under the command of Odong 
Latek they formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). The UPDA members were 
nicknamed ‘cilil’ by the Acholi, which means ‘you go and report [to government]’ and referred 
to how they were threatening the civilians in case they tried to report them to the NRA. The 
cilil operated across the region, launching attacks on the NRA.  
 
The cilil were the first people who were against government. When we left for Sudan, 
they were soldiers for Tito’s regime. So when the new government took over, they 
went home with their guns. The soldiers came from Kampala and told us the new 
government would kill all people. They then organised themselves. [...] By that time, 
anything that happened in the community, instead of going to local government and 
following the right procedure, they go to report to cilil if you know someone there.  
Acholi: Focus group, three men, Chua district 
 
The cilil had overwhelming support from the population, due to violence inflicted upon them 
by the NRA (Gersony, 1997, p. 23). UPDA factions were based in the bush around the villages 
and collaborated with the population. They needed the people for supplies and respondents 
related examples of how people sometimes called in the cilil in case of problems, e.g. in case of 
a fight among neighbours. However, the cilil also exerted a level of control. They started to 
restrict people’s mobility, became violent, and supplies were sometimes taken by force 
(Finnström, 2003, p. 105). 
 
This rebel group stopped people from eating anything that contained salt12. Like food 
and sauce people could only eat without salt. They stopped people from going to 
town and once you go to town, they would kill you. They also didn’t want people to 
reach the sub-county. They considered people who went to town and to the sub-
county that they supported the new government.  
Acholi: Focus group, 8 women, Chua district 
                                                          
12
 Sugar, salt and soap are goods people need to buy in the trading centres or town. These products 
were prohibited, as purchasing them implied moving to town and possible contact with the NRA. 
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The cilil thus attempted to establish a governance regime (Justino, 2013). But the Acholi now 
found themselves in an ambiguous situation. They strongly opposed the new regime, but the 
cilil did not provide a viable alternative and was itself abusive at times. People were often 
caught in between; soldiers suspected the population of collaborating with the cilil, whereas 
the cilil exercised control to prevent collaboration with the NRA. This situation ended in June 
1988 with a peace agreement, after which numerous cilil demobilised or joined the ranks of 
the NRA. Some were unable to re-integrate into the rural life (Behrend, 1999, p. 19) and joined 
other insurgent groups that were active in the region, such as those led by Alice Lakwena and 
Joseph Kony.  
 
5.1.3 Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and Severino Lukoya 
 
Customary leaders and elders were unable to perform reconciliation mechanisms, cleansing 
and demilitarising rituals to help UNLA soldiers reintegrate back into society (Behrend, 1999). 
The ex-soldiers no longer respected their authority. Having difficulties in readjusting to rural 
life, many ex-soldiers were drawn to insurgent groups. The insurgents gained support from the 
population, which was facing NRA repression. To some, joining an insurgent group seemed the 
only viable option to protect their homes and properties, and resist the NRA (Finnström, 2003, 
p. 107).  
 
In the field research locations in Chua and Lamwo, several villages experienced the activities 
of, first, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and, later, the group led by her father, 
Severino Lukoya. Their activities did not extend to all areas in the Acholi sub-region, but the 
stories about Alice Lakwena especially were widely known. The populations in the villages 
where I was based remembered Lakwena’s groups not as violent, but as the groups that 
convinced the youth to come and join their ranks. Not everyone supported her strategies and 
goals, associating them with the loss of their family members.  
 
In that same year [as the Karamojong], Alice Lakwena’s rebels came. She was around 
for 2 to 3 years. They never did many bad things here, but she recruited people to 
fight and most of them died in the fights in Kitgum town. Those years, Lakwena and 
the Karamojongs were the most important problem. 
Focus group, 5 men, Chua district 
 
After Alice Lakwena was defeated her father, Severino Lukoya, made an effort to continue her 
168 
 
work by starting a new rebel group. In one of the researched villages Lukoya had established a 
base camp, a yard, for some time. The village population had to provide food and firewood, 
and participate in its spiritual activities. As for the HSM, the men who formed the youth at that 
time were intrigued by the rituals, but their parents were afraid this insurgent group would 
take away their sons and were reluctant to support Lokoya. Although the different insurgent 
groups enjoyed some support among the Acholi, they also threatened their security. Many 
respondents looked back and felt they had ‘lost their children’ to these groups. To an extent 
they blamed the NRA too: a ‘good’ state would have prevented this from happening. 
 
5.1.4 Karamojong cattle raids  
 
Another event that marked recent history was the Karamojong cattle raids, which took place 
between August 1987 and early 1988. The Karamojong is the neighbouring tribe on the eastern 
side of Acholi, and is formed of several pastoralist groups. Cattle raids along the Acholi – 
Karamoja border have been a regular phenomenon for decades. This time however, the 
Karamojong reached as far as Gulu. The cattle of the Acholi formed their wealth, their pride 
and their social security system. To own cattle meant to have assets that could be used for 
paying school fees, and for health care, funerals and dowry. It was all taken away within a 
short period of time. Apart from the raids, the Karamojong carried out many atrocities against 
the population. That this has been a traumatising experience is reflected in the following 
quotes: 
 
The Karamojong raided all the cattle, the goats. They did not kill anyone from this 
ward, but in the nearby villages they killed many people. The Karamojong looted 
many things like clothes, and household items like saucepans. They seriously beat 
people using anything. They undressed people to take their clothes. 
Acholi: focus group, 6 women, Chua district 
 
When the Karamojong asked my father in law to show him where he had hidden the 
cattle, he refused to show them. The Karamojong beat him seriously, but still he did 
not show them the cattle. The Karamojong decided to look by themselves. They left 
some people to guard my father in law. When they found the cattle, they told my 
father in law to go and look after the cattle as they moved out of the ward. But before 
even moving any long distance, they shot him and he died immediately. 
Acholi: woman, age 29, Chua district  
 
There is widespread suspicion about why the NRA did not intervene. In many instances people 
reported the moves of the Karamojong to the NRA soldiers, but they never took action. Others 
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even witnessed men dressed in army uniforms among the Karamojong, which encouraged 
them to believe that the NRA collaborated for its own gain.  
 
They [Karamojong] had guns. There were soldiers among them, in military uniform. 
You could see the ranks on their arms, some of them were corporals or like that. If 
they were not soldiers, then the government had provided them with uniforms and 
guns. That is how we know that government was behind the Karamojong raids. They 
wanted to make us poor.  
Acholi: man, age 55, Chua district 
 
It must be said that uniforms were used by both the NRA and Acholi insurgents, and that 
during that period of upheaval the Karamojong could also have acquired army uniforms. But to 
many Acholi, it meant that the big cattle raid was ‘a government plan’13. The Acholi region was 
being punished for resisting Museveni’s regime and weakened to prevent further resistance as 
an opposition area. The data shows that the loss of cattle is one of the major reasons why they 
have little trust in this regime even today, and vote for opposition parties. Because of the 
timing of this event and because of the ways it is narrated by the Acholi, I see the raids and the 
loss of cattle as part of the conflict dynamics of this period. It is therefore included in the 
analysis of how conflict affected citizenship: the sense of citizenship in particular.  
 
As elsewhere in Uganda (Jones, 2009), in Acholi cattle are important for social identity. With 
the raids an important part of their identity and dignity was taken from the people. They 
related this event to their feelings of identity and belonging, but also to the roles of the state. 
The impact of the raids on their wealth and self-esteem and the scale on which violations took 
place was directly related to the failure of the state to protect their bodies and properties. 
When Acholi compared themselves to other tribes in Uganda they felt inferior due to the cattle 
that were lost.  
 
The government is the owner of authority and has power to make something bad 
stop happening or continue happening. I wanted the government to stop the 
Karamojong. On the Karamojong it did nothing. 
Acholi: man, age 40, Chua district 
 
This has made us to hate the government so much, because we are not happy with 
what the government did. The wealth of the Acholi was taken away. The government 
promised years later to pay back our cattle, but up to now it did not do it. 
Acholi: man, age 40, Chua district 
 
                                                          
13
 Jones (2009) finds this in Teso, where Karamojong raids occurred in the same period of time. Also the 
Iteso experienced the loss of cattle as incredibly harmful to their social identity.  
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Ever since the raids, the Acholi have not been able to restock due to the war. The government 
has initiated a restocking scheme, but most ordinary villagers did not know about it or did not 
trust that they would benefit from it. The procedures seemed too complicated and the courts 
that handle cases were not trusted. Most Acholi I spoke to felt the loss of wealth and dignity 
had not been adequately addressed, a problem that continued to stand between their region 
and the state.  
 
5.1.5 ‘Then Kony came in’: the start of the LRA insurgency 
 
After the defeat of Lakwena and Lukoya in 1987, Joseph Kony’s group emerged. The previous 
chapter indicated the possible links between the HSM and Kony’s rebel group (Behrend, 1999). 
Also in my field sites the people thought that Kony might be ‘another HRM’, because of the 
similarities in the rituals and Kony’s claim to be possessed by spirits. Also, they knew of people 
who had been members of the earlier rebel groups and who had crossed over to Kony. Initially 
the LRA only fought the government troops. From 1991/2 the LRA actively turned against the 
Acholi population, after the NRA had mobilised civilians in ‘home guards’ to fight the LRA. The 
population, who had initially supported an anti-NRA insurgency, quickly changed its 
perceptions of the LRA, as illustrated by this man: 
 
Kony started fairly. He proved to be a good rebel leader, good fighter, respectful to 
the people. They confused14 people that they would take over the government. Those 
were the words they used; people admired and believed them. Later the people 
realised that they were lies, they were deceiving us. When people started criticising 
them they started killing. The government used the people to direct them to the 
rebels. Then the LRA started killing and abducting.  
Man, age 62, Lamwo district 
 
As the LRA became increasingly violent and the NRA repression continued, the Acholi became 
aware of how this affected local life. The following quotes show emerging effects on social and 
political institutions in the early stage of the LRA conflict. Fear was widespread and restricted 
mobility and communication. How this trend proceeded is the topic of the following sections.  
 
Then the LRA came. In the beginning they were not so bad, but the people had just 
fear, but they interacted ok. They got worse, especially for local leaders. But from 
here they didn’t get anyone. It was not easy to work with the sub-county, because 
they also feared the LRA. We could not go to Kitgum town to buy things, because we 
                                                          
14
 This word is often used to describe the (alleged) behaviour of political actors who try to manipulate 
the population. It can refer to  e.g. forms of propaganda, politicians making false promises, telling lies 
etc. 
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also feared the NRA. There was no security. The UPDF was only posted at the border 
with Sudan, not yet within our area. 
Focus group with three women, Lamwo district, on 27/08/10 
  
During the insecurity I expected government to settle the people in an area where we 
would not be affected by rebels. To protect people from rebels by preventing that 
they would be abducted and killed. The conflict lasted so long, because the 
relationship between civilians and soldiers came late. In the end, soldiers came to the 
civilians to give them information and that was part of a solution to the problem. We 
could direct them where to go and advise them on the location if they wanted to lay 
an ambush. Before that, soldiers did not ask for such advice and they were just 
beating the people.  
Man, age 45, Chua district 
 
The narratives about historical events have generated insights about key concepts of this 
study: forms of agency and the nature of the warscape that was emerging. The narratives 
relate to the literature about human agency during conflict, by showing how the Acholi used 
social navigation and expressed agency for their survival, while insecurity was fluctuating 
constantly. Secondly, these narratives add empirical detail to our understanding of the 
warscape in Acholi, by showing how it was lived and how certain institutions were transformed 
that were important for learning citizenship practices. Thirdly, these events, the Acholi felt, 
had implications for their sense of citizenship. 
 
5.2 The warscape, 1986-1990  
 
The events narrated above demonstrate the intense fluctuation in the actors and structures 
that constituted the Acholi warscape: the social terrain of actors, institutions and processes 
that is constantly in motion (Vigh 2006). In the period 1986-1990 the NRA and various 
insurgent groups were the main players and shapers of the warscape. It is a clear example of a 
conflict situation where multiple forms of authority exist and compete for power (Pearce et al., 
2011): because not only did the insurgent groups challenge the state, the HRM even contested 
the UPDA.  
 
The population had to navigate these different actors and developed different relationships 
with each. The UPDA attempted to establish governance mechanisms and collaborative 
relationships with the Acholi population, in a way that has been discussed in conflict studies 
literature about the transformation of political institutions and the emergence of non-state 
governance (Justino, 2013). At this point in time, the LRA employed tactics similar to the HSM 
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to cleanse the population, but it had not yet started to use the types and levels of violence 
against the Acholi for which it later became known. The insurgent groups thus enjoyed various 
levels of support (Barter, 2012).  
 
In relation to the NRA, the general population had no other option than to endure and 
minimise the contact with NRA soldiers. The instance of the former parish chief who 
negotiated access to the trading centre, described above, was exceptional. Local leaders had to 
be careful not to be labelled as cilil and ordinary people who refrain from such engagements. 
For their own protection the local population sometimes had to collaborate by supplying the 
NRA with food and firewood, in line with what Petersen (2001) has written about giving in to 
collaboration when a regime is violent and abusive. The aggressive behaviour of the NRA as a 
‘southern’ army, compounded by the perceived role of the NRA in the Karamojong raids, 
would have lasting impact on Acholi perceptions of the state and influence post-conflict citizen 
engagement with state actors.   
 
The warscape changed, however, after the reconfiguration of its main actors from 1988-1989. 
The HSM was defeated, Lukoya surrendered and the UPDA signed a peace agreement with the 
NRA. From 1989 the LRA was the only insurgent group left. Initially, the violence experienced 
was between the LRA and the NRA and due to NRA repression. The subsequent turn of events, 
when the LRA decided to subject the Acholi population to violence, marked a second change. 
The actions of both the military and the LRA were meant to control the population. The NRA 
had to counter the LRA attacks and tried to limit any form of civilian collaboration with the 
rebels. The LRA engaged in acts of violence, often very symbolic and exemplary acts of 
violence, to send out signals to the population not to collaborate with the NRA.  
 
Kony’s insurgency developed into a situation of protracted conflict, marked by peaks and lulls 
in intensity, by various military interventions and peace negotiations, and later on by the 
displacement camps. Insecurity dominated the physical environment and restricted the 
mobility of people. High-risk areas were shifting: at times the road between Gulu and Kitgum 
could not be used, other times between Kitgum and Lira. At the higher level, leaders decided 
about peace negotiations or military interventions. At the local level, the political environment 
was dominated by powerful actors such as the state military and the LRA. Military 
detachments were scattered across the region. Power dynamics evolved among these actors 
and the population. Only few aid agencies were operating in the region at this stage. This was 
now the warscape that would last until the peace agreements were brokered in Juba in 2006, 
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dominated by the army and the LRA as the main players and by both as perpetrators of 
violence against the Acholi. 
 
The change in the nature of the warscape was accompanied by a change in forms of agency. 
The next section shows how people adapted to the conflict situation and expressed agency in 
various ways. They were still navigating the terrain (Vigh, 2006). But, using Barter’s (2012) 
categorisation of flight, voice and support: the Acholi population had given support to rebel 
groups earlier on, but now there was a shift from support for insurgent actors (a political form 
of agency) to coping agency for survival. Furthermore, in the face of sustained conflict 
dynamics important social and political institutions changed. Subsequent sections elaborate 
how types of agency developed in Acholi in response to the conflict. They describe how 
important local institutions changed during the conflict and explain to what extent there were 
opportunities for citizenship practices. I focus on forms of authority, social and cultural 
institutions. I then reflect on how this had implications for engagement for development 
purposes (‘the petitioning voice’).15 
 
5.3 Adjusting livelihoods: coping agency for food and security 
 
Insecurity had become the new social order in Acholi. As Vigh emphasised, during war the 
environment is constantly in motion and a population continues living life using social 
navigation (Vigh, 2005, 2006). This means that the environment is constantly scanned and 
reflected upon and actions are adjusted accordingly. Indeed, the intensity of the LRA conflict 
fluctuated. LRA activities decreased at times, which made the conflict recede to the 
background, but it was always present. The population thus lived in a constant state of 
alertness. Respondents described how LRA activities were often seasonal; they could stay in 
Sudan for months during the dry season. During the rainy season, when the landscape was 
bushy and crops were harvested they would come into Uganda, attack the population on the 
way down and abduct and loot on the way back. The Acholi demonstrated a great deal of 
resilience and creativity in coping with the ever changing terrains of uncertainty. My findings 
show how they focused on what they considered as their primary needs: food and safety. 
                                                          
15
 The proxies for citizen engagement (Chapter 3) refer to forms of engagement in the present. 
Narratives in this chapter are based on people’s memories and the proxies could not be applied in the 
same manner. 
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People adopted various strategies to ensure these were maintained at a minimum level in 
order to get by.  
 
Acholi adjusted their farming activities to the seasonal pattern of the rebels. They selected 
crops that would not take long to yield and did not have to be stored at home, for they would 
be violently taken away by the rebels.  
 
We used to dig, sometimes we had good produce that the rebels took away. We had 
some people who could dig well and they were abducted. Those were our problems. 
In the early 1990s we were working in farming groups like now, but rebels would 
come to our garden, surrounded the garden and would pick the people they wanted, 
mostly young boys. The only solution was to spread big groups of twenty people over 
small groups of four to five people. It reduced the number of gardens to dig. They 
were taking seeds away that we used to store for next year.  
Acholi: Farmer Leader, age 45, Chua district 
 
Farming is an important collective activity, for which several institutions are in place. These 
include the Farmer Leader (Rwot Kweri), farming groups (grup mephu), norms of reciprocity 
among group members such as working on each other’s lands by rotation, and social 
gatherings after a day’s work to drink the local brew. These social institutions adjusted to the 
insecurity. Because gatherings increased the risk of rebel attacks, many groups split up and 
many people said they even preferred to work alone at that time. Working hours were shifted; 
people would no longer walk together and took different routes home. They rarely met for 
sharing the local brew after work. This did not just affect the levels of productivity, but also the 
intensity of social interaction decreased.  
 
As the war evolved, livelihood opportunities closed and opened up, even offering new 
opportunities to a few people (Shaw, 2003). Cramer (2006a) and Vlassenroot and Raymaekers 
(2005, 2008) have demonstrated how complex war economies emerged. In this study I did not 
investigate large-scale war economies that involved civilians and high-placed individuals in the 
warring parties, but I did ask how citizens at local level developed economic activities as part of 
their social navigation. The story of Otim, from Lamwo, is an example of this. He started selling 
sweets and biscuits in the early 1990s. With the little profit he made, he moved on to selling 
soda. When he was able to buy a second hand bicycle he could ride around the area and sell to 
the soldiers. With four others, two men and two women who also sold small goods, he used to 
cycle to market days in nearby areas. From them he learnt how to select his products, and he 
picked up some Kiswahili from the soldiers, so ‘he could socialise’. One day, his companions 
were ambushed by rebels, and killed. Otim stopped his trade for a few years. In 1997 he 
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started again with a friend, now selling goats to the soldiers. Sometimes they cycled to another 
sub-county to buy goats and came back the next day, tying three goats at a time to their 
bicycles. They cycled up to the border, to Waligo, where a big battalion was stationed. They 
made good profits and were able to start trading cows. They travelled between sub-counties 
on foot now, making a tour of several days and ending in Waligo. Otim said it was not too risky, 
as long as the rebels were in Sudan. Once he took cows to Waligo as the rebels came to 
Uganda, but they went south to Pader. He always listened carefully to any information about 
where the rebels had gone. ‘I was very sharp in listening to where the rebels were moving. 
Then I would sneak through.’ The soldiers in Waligo contacted the barracks in his sub-county 
when they needed meat and other goods. They informed him about the security situation 
along the road and an escort would meet him on the way. When the insecurity became too 
tense he stopped the trade and opened a shop in his trading centre. He had established a good 
network among soldiers and ‘other high people’, who bought his goods. From the money he 
saved he built a brick house.  
 
During intense LRA activity people left their village homes and stayed in hideouts they had 
created in the bush. This could last a couple of days, until rebels moved away from their area. 
In the hideout people had to make do with little food and water. Women sometimes slept 
separately from the rest of the family, as otherwise crying babies might reveal the hideout. 
Young boys had to keep watch and alarm the families when rebels were seen. Neighbours tried 
to communicate their presence as quickly as possible. During the day some people sneaked 
back to their gardens and huts, where the women prepared food to take back to the hideout.  
 
If someone was cooking in the house, at least one person would climb up the tree to 
see if rebels were coming. That person will climb the tree with some stones in his 
hands so that in case he sees the rebels, he will throw the stones to the house. 
Because if he would shout, then the rebels would hear this. Sometimes the bigger 
children were put in different locations to hear and see if the rebels are coming while 
someone is cooking in the house 
Acholi: Man, age 40, Chua district 
 
We used to time the rebels; we would wait until 9am and then go to the garden, 
come back and cook so fast, then go back to the bush at 3pm. This is because the 
rebels liked to move in the morning and stop at around 8:30am, and at around 3pm 
they would again start moving. The soldiers used to go on patrol at 9am and stop at 
3pm, maybe the rebels used to fear them. People used to pass information to each 
other on hearing that the rebels were nearby. People could be home between 9am 
and 3pm and the rest of the time they would spend in the bush.  
Acholi: Woman, age 33, Chua district 
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The army was considered the responsible source of protection. Communication mechanisms 
between the population and the barracks were in place, mediated by the Resistance Council 
members. However, numerous accounts told how the military failed to provide security. The 
lack of army responsiveness is something many Acholi were frustrated about. To many, it was 
a sign that the government was not willing to end the conflict. 
 
It was the government that made [the] insecurity last so long, because the 
government soldiers did not follow up the rebels, even when report was taken to 
them. They used not to follow up. Sometimes they could come after three days to 
fight the rebels, yet they even had enough and better weapons than the rebels.  
Acholi: Man, age 40, Chua district 
 
In this early war period the Acholi had to find ways to protect themselves by adjusting their 
daily routines. Indeed, as Vigh (2006) has shown, it was not possible to have routines. Even 
where people developed strategies for cooking and fetching water, described above, the 
decision to use them had to be made ad hoc. Many of my respondents recalled they had 
sometimes stayed in the bush for days without food, when they felt it was too unsafe to go 
out. 
 
During various stages of the war civilians were involved in protecting communities and fighting 
off the LRA rebels in ‘home guards’ and groups that operated under various names. The Bow 
and Arrow Groups of the early 1990s were formed after a government order. This provoked a 
violent response by the LRA, which accused the civilian population of collaboration with the 
government. People felt strongly that participation in the home guards made them rebel 
targets (Finnström, 2003, p. 126). Also, the home guards themselves sometimes formed a 
security threat to the population. In later stages of the war groups formed spontaneously, 
although they were quickly brought under the control of the military (Dolan, 2010). While the 
Bow and Arrow Groups were very poorly equipped, over time these home guards became 
increasingly militarised in terms of training and equipment. People’s responses to recruitment 
of civilians seemed to vary from place to place.  
 
In my field work locations in Chua and Lamwo districts, respondents talked mainly about the 
Local Defence Units (LDUs) that came into existence from 2002 onwards. By that time the 
majority of the Acholi lived in displacement camps. Engagement in the LDUs is discussed in 
Chapter 6, which describes camp life in detail. Apart from those periods of the war when 
people were actively engaged in the LDUs they mainly relied on their own strategies for self-
protection, which usually meant withdrawal, hiding and isolation.  
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Thus, the Acholi navigated the threats of unpredictable LRA attacks as much as sustained 
military repression. In this situation the Acholi were preoccupied with securing food and safety 
as their two main priorities, which were always short-term goals. Although their tactics 
demonstrate creativity, emphasised by various authors, this section showed that the emphasis 
of  their agency was coping, for survival. As Justino (2013, p.8) notes, in these circumstances 
people’s preferences and time-horizons changed. I disagree with Nordstrom’s argument that 
this is a form of political agency. There was no opportunity for ‘voice’ other than limited forms 
of engagement (in Barter’s sense) to collaborate with the army through the RCs. The next 
section explains how insecurity and repression impacted the public sphere. 
 
5.4 Local institutions and everyday engagements 
 
In Chapter 2 I explained how conflict studies literature addresses the transformation of social 
and political institutions. This literature recognises that the transformation of institutions has 
implications for the onset and duration of conflict, as well as for changes in conflict dynamics, 
and for post-conflict developments (Justino, 2013). I argued that the transformation of 
institutions has implications for citizenship when those institutions changed that are important 
for learning and experiencing citizenship. This subsequently affects the nature of state-citizen 
interactions in the post-conflict situation.  
 
5.4.1 The Resistance Councils 
 
In this section I elaborate the changes that occurred in political, social and cultural institutions: 
the Resistance Councils and customary leadership. In Chapter 4 I explained how the Resistance 
Councils (RCs) were introduced as a new institution and instrument in the NRA revolution. In 
Luwero they had a reformist purpose (Karlström, 1996; Weinstein, 2007), while in Acholi they 
were used as a control mechanism. I also indicated that there is not much information 
available about how Acholi citizens engaged with the RCs on a daily basis. In this section I show 
that the RCs were indeed perceived as control mechanisms initially, but the Acholi increasingly 
needed them for their security. 
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The military, although challenged by the LRA, was a powerful actor in the lives of the Acholi, 
but the Resistance Councils (RCs) became another important authority at local level. When the 
NRA started, the RCs in Acholi primarily functioned as the local security organs of the regime 
and mechanisms of control (Branch, 2010). The local population therefore strongly resisted the 
RCs. My findings show that, indeed, the population felt the system as being imposed and 
perceived it to be another mechanism used by the NRA to subordinate the Acholi people. This 
was reflected in interviews when respondents told how they had to elect the RC members with 
the military present, and described the RCs as the ‘eyes and ears of government’. Afraid that 
any skilful leader would be killed by rebels, because of this association with the NRA, they 
elected ‘drunkards’ or people who were ‘not social and useful anyhow’.  
 
However, the population increasingly needed the RCs when the LRA turned against the 
population, because the RCs mediated with the army for their protection. RCs became vital 
channels for information about the rebels. It was members of the RCs who communicated 
between the sub-county, the military and the village population. The RCs had to report to the 
soldiers about the whereabouts of the rebels, about incidents involving rebels, attacks, 
abductions, and the return of youth that had escaped from the LRA. During the episodes of the 
war when home guards were mobilised the RCs/LCs usually mobilised and led them. 
Furthermore, the population needed the RCs to secure the wellbeing of family members who 
were arrested by the military on suspicion of being/supporting rebels, or when a family 
member had escaped from the LRA.  
 
Their work often put the RC members at risk. As agents of the NRA regime they had become 
LRA targets. Respondents told how the rebels were always ‘looking for the homes of the RCs’. 
They often had to walk long distances to report to local authorities and the military, which 
made them extra prone to being caught by the rebels. Moreover, if rebels were thought to be 
in a certain place it was an RC member who had to guide the soldiers to that location, 
unarmed. I spoke to former RCs who felt that ‘the first bullet would be for them’ when it came 
to a confrontation with the rebels. One of the RCs said he did not even dare to go work in his 
garden, fearing he would be singled out.  
 
For their own protection, RC members would keep their notebooks, pen and stamp outside 
their huts, often buried somewhere, so they could not be identified as RCs if rebels searched 
the home. Like other people, they would stay in hideouts. Many of them would keep a low 
profile as much as possible, avoiding any unnecessary activity. Others simply resigned. 
179 
 
 
If the rebels got you while [the community was] having a court, they just started by 
killing the LC and continued with the committee members, which made that I did not 
hold any court because of fear of losing my life.  
Acholi: Former RC, age 42, Chua district 
 
During that time the war interrupted my work. You had to be cautious all the time. You 
hear they [LRA] are on this side, that they abducted on that side, that they took an LC on 
the other side... I was always outside. I was not settled. All the time, I had to think what 
would happen. During the night I thought what could happen to me. I could not do my work 
optimally. I had already married and had children. They were supposed to go to school, but 
could not go. It affected my family life.  
 
We had village meetings about the insecurity. We used to go to the Sub-County 
where we got information about where the rebels were moving. After that meeting, I 
had to call a meeting with the community and tell the people ‘the rebels were here 
and here, you have to be careful’. We only called village meetings to discuss the 
insecurity. Maybe a bit on education sometimes, but insecurity dominated.  
Acholi: LC chair person, age 60, Chua district 
 
During lulls in the conflict the RCs were able to organise other activities, such as mobilising the 
people for community work. However, throughout the 1990s their work was dominated by 
security issues and protecting their own lives and families.  
 
Thus, formal local leadership was very security-oriented. Whereas the RCs/LCs were meant to 
serve local democracy and development, especially after the 1995 constitution and the 
introduction of the Local Government Act, the situation did not allow them to be used or even 
seen in that way. Although some RC members remembered they had had to submit 
development priorities to the sub-county, they said they would do it with two or three 
members and security was much more important to discuss.  
 
It must be said that the RCs were often very capable of organising around security matters and 
they demonstrated courage in interacting with the army, still not a reliable and trustworthy 
force at that time, in circumstances that were very risky for them. However, as a result of the 
circumstances, generations of leaders did not experience what it implied to mediate between 
citizens and higher authorities about development in their areas, nor could they set the 
example for younger generations. Many people said that ‘leaders at the sub-county were as 
much affected as the people’ and expected little from them.  
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5.4.2 Customary leadership  
 
The changes in the position of the customary leadership as a cultural institutions had 
implications for the relationship between them and Acholi society. This is an example of 
changes in social relations (Justino, 2103) with possible implications for power dynamics in the 
post-conflict situation. As explained in the previous chapter, the Acholi clans (ateke) were 
organised according to the leadership of the Rwot (plural Rwodi) with clan leaders or Rwodi at 
different levels of the clan’s territory (Finnström, 2003; Allen, 2006). Historically there was no 
Acholi paramount chief, but numerous Rwodi heading their clans. Later the Kal Kwaro Acholi 
was established: the paramount Acholi chief who comes from the Payira clan and to whom all 
Rwodi report. The clan leadership is inherited and the Rwodi are supported by committees of 
elders. The most important roles of the clan leaders are performing cultural rites, dispute 
resolution and reconciliation, demarcating the borders of land that belongs to clans and 
resolving land disputes, and educating the youth about Acholi history and culture and on how 
to live a good life. Two other forms of leadership other than the clan leaders came out as 
important. ‘Opinion leaders’ (mio tam) are elders that play an important advisory role in the 
community, and are not necessarily clan leaders. They are often invited by the LC chair persons 
to participate in LC courts. Then there is the Rwot Kweri (leader of the hoe), which is an 
elected function at village level. The Rwot Kweri heads the farmers, appoints the portions of 
land to be cultivated by a group, and resolves minor disputes over gardens and cattle. Group 
members often come from different clans and therefore the Rwot Kweri may settle minor land 
disputes between two clans, while the more difficult cases are forwarded to clan leaders.  
 
In Chapter 4 I outlined how the literature on Acholi has highlighted how customary leadership 
lost legitimacy in the course of the war (Allen, 2006, 2010), particularly with respect to 
performing reconciliation rituals. This started during Amin’s oppressive regime when the 
Acholi intellectual and political elite was decimated (Branch, 2010) and the remaining form of 
authority was the customary leadership of the Rwodi (clan leaders). During the war, certain 
prominent customary leaders have played a role in the peace negotiations with the LRA. 
Research participants commended their role, and that of the religious leaders, for speaking to 
the government on behalf of the Acholi. In terms of ethnic citizenship these high-level 
customary leaders thus maintained their authority in the Acholi ethnic community to a certain 
extent. But, as Branch (2010) and Allen (2006, 2010) have argued, the populations in my 
research sites questioned to what extent the Kal Kwaro Acholi from Payira (Gulu district) 
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represents other Acholi clans. Therefore the question of who should perform the ‘real’ 
reconciliation rituals remains. My findings however suggest that, because of their involvement 
in the negotiations, the authority of high-level customary leaders from Gulu district accrued 
some legitimacy in the eyes of the Acholi of Lamwo and Chua.  
 
At lower levels, however, the LRA war seriously exacerbated the weakening of the customary 
leadership of the numerous clans and sub-clans. Like Allen (2006, 2010), I found that the 
weakening of their position was associated with the inability to perform certain rituals due to 
the insecurity. Public gatherings in which their positions were confirmed through cultural 
practice did not take place. Yet these institutions and the practices that take place are 
important for how customary authority is established (Ndegwa, 1997) and confirmed (Jones, 
2009). Customary leaders lost an important source of their legitimacy: their ability to practise 
and perform functions. Especially after displacement had become permanent and leaders 
were dislocated from their areas, they no longer had the natural sites they needed to perform 
the rites and were rendered ‘useless’. Secondly, the camp situation further undermined their 
legitimacy, which is similar to what Dolan (2004) found. In the camps they had to line up just 
like anyone else to receive relief. ‘They became ordinary people,’ is what respondents said 
about them. This went contrary to Acholi culture in which certain customs confirm social 
hierarchies, especially of elders and leaders, which were now eliminated. At the same time, 
younger generations and RC members gained authority, because they were active in the 
protection of communities.  
 
Thus, other scholars have emphasised the implications for ethnic citizenship, because the 
authority of customary leaders in the local Acholi communities was destabilised. My findings 
suggest this had a spill-over effect on social relations in the community and on state 
citizenship. See the following quotation: 
 
The role of clan leaders has changed. Those days they could perform rituals on the hill and 
the river side. But starting from the time of insecurity, these were no longer performed 
because they lacked the items to perform them, like goats and cows. This changed the role 
of the clan leader in the community. Before the people came to the camp, a clan leader 
could advise the youth in the clan. Due to the insecurity and the camp it has changed. 
Community members lived in different parts of the camp. Gathering people together was a 
problem for clan leaders, they could not advise them.  
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Their status in the community changed. Clan leaders are no longer respected as before. 
People are now mixed up, bad ones and good ones. They cannot listen to clan leaders, so 
they lost their power as leaders that they had before the camp and insurgency. What also 
changed their role and also their status is religion. Because what the clan leaders used to 
do, like ritual and cleansing, is what the Pentecostals take as coming from Satan. So clan 
members and youth follow religion and no longer listen to clan leaders. 
 
It worries the clan leaders. The rituals are inheritance they have to follow. Now 
members are not following their advice, clan leaders get annoyed and leave the 
rituals, which leads to problems in the community. I myself am worried about change. 
When children meet others, they despise our advice. They say we are now old and 
that we are giving them old advice, which annoys us. Before, the clan leader advised 
the LC1 during meetings, when LC1 meets with the community. Then they had a 
chance to tell LC1 how to handle issues or how to behave. Now, people are not 
listening. They call us stubborn. Now people are ‘a rwot ki oda’, which means 
everyone is a chief in his own home, the head of the household. Only when someone 
kills another man they need the Rwot for a court.  
Clan leader, man, Lamwo district 
 
The quotation shows that the conflict did not just affect the legitimacy of customary leaders. 
Their weakened positions subsequently affected the community and mechanisms for linking 
with the local state. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 7 the erosion of the position of clan 
leaders and elders had effects on their role as ‘brokers’ (Corbridge et al, 2005): their capacity 
to speak for their people was weakened. This undermined their capability for holding leaders 
to account, which had hitherto been an important function of elders and opinion leaders. 
Secondly, it created friction between the elders and the younger generations. This, too, would 
have implications for local governance in the post-conflict situation. 
 
Before I discuss changes in social institutions, I need to reflect briefly on the possible 
emergence of rebel governance mechanisms. As indicated in Chapter 2, this is a key issue in 
the literature on institutional transformation during conflict (Justino, 2013). There is no 
literature that suggests that the LRA ever established governance mechanisms. I briefly 
pursued the issue, but I did not find any evidence for any form of LRA governance. My findings 
show that only the UPDA attempted to establish governance mechanisms in 1987-1988, but 
was unsuccessful.  
 
Comparing my findings and the existing literature on the LRA to Weinstein’s framework (2007, 
p. 170), there seemed to be few incentives for the LRA to establish governance systems. 
Weinstein argues that the incentives to establish power sharing mechanisms are shaped by: 1) 
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the rebels’ stake in the (economic) productivity of the population, as a resource base; 2) 
whether they fight for short term gain or longer term political power; and 3) the capacity to 
credibly commit to an agreement with non-combatants, which relates to their capacity to 
discipline the behaviour of members and control defection. 
 
It seemed unlikely that the LRA wanted to gain territorial control of the area or take over the 
rule in towns or camps, which would then require a form of governance. They controlled the 
population by using force and by instigating fear, not by forming collaborative relationships to 
get what they needed. Frequent support from the Sudanese government made the LRA not 
completely reliant on the local population. The level of violence inflicted upon the population 
and the ways in which the LRA would sometimes breach peace negotiations left them with 
little credibility, even though the NRM government itself equally failed in the negotiations.  
 
5.4.3 Social institutions  
 
Scholars emphasise that people living in conflict areas continue to experience the ‘ordinary’ 
problems they already faced prior to conflict, such as drought and famine, and social problems 
such as inter-clan rivalries and patron-client relations. The existing social structures and 
networks in place to address such problems may change during war (Lubkemann, 2008; E. 
Wood, 2008). In Acholi, I found that certain social institutions and spaces for engagement were 
affected by the insecurity. Compared to the RCs and customary authority, these social 
institutions have not been addressed in the existing literature in as much detail. In this section 
I show how the functioning of certain important institutions was limited, and how existing 
spaces for engagement were securitised. Possibilities for collective voice were limited and local 
leaders were preoccupied with security issues rather than public services.  
 
In Acholi, social life and all kinds of mechanisms that regulated community affairs were 
extremely constrained by the insecurity. Individual families spent much time in the bush on 
their own and communication was limited. As indicated above, this affected group work such 
as farming, an important institution for collective organisation and co-operation. The farming 
groups do not just have a function in livelihoods and productivity. The groups are important 
for maintaining social relations and norms of reciprocity. Group members come from the 
different clans in the area, thus group work is said to be important for ensuring that ‘people 
stay well together’. But they also constitute important entities where information and politics 
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is discussed. To me, groups were spaces where a collective voice could emerge and be 
strengthened. Furthermore, youth often have groups of their own, where norms for co-
operation and also the new generation of farmer leaders (Rwot kweri) are nurtured.  
 
Another social institution that was disrupted, highlighted by respondents, was the ‘Wang oo’; 
the social gathering around the fireplace at night in which elders teach the younger 
generations about how to live a respectful life. Particularly the adults and elders expressed 
how its disruption had been damaging for Acholi culture, for community cohesion and 
especially for the relationship between youth and elders. It was in the wang oo that the elders 
could expose their wisdom and experience, for which they were respected by the youth. Here 
they could also give examples of good leadership by telling stories from the past about how 
issues had been resolved. Often this was done through the telling of stories and parables 
about the Acholi ancestors. Both wang oo and group work were considered institutions where 
people learn good behaviour and practice Acholi culture. Respondents brought forward that 
particularly the youth had suffered the consequences of their disruption and had developed 
‘bad morals’, like alcohol consumption and sexual relationships between young boys and girls. 
Furthermore, not only had social institutions in the community been disrupted: youth 
experienced gaps in formal education, which for many only resumed in the camps. 
 
5.4.4 The public sphere  
 
Concerning the public sphere for engagement, narratives about the past show that the public 
space narrowed and became securitised, similar to what Ben Porath (2006) described about 
Israel, and Beswick (2010) about Rwanda. It has been widely accepted that the politics of the 
local political sphere matter for citizen engagement (Brock, 2004; Harriss et al., 2004) and that 
conflict impacts on power dynamics. In Acholi, the LRA and the military and the ways in which 
they controlled the population affected the public sphere (Fraser, 1990) and spaces for 
engagement, to the point that the only ‘safe space’ was an isolated hideout in the bush. 
 
In the Acholi social set-up public village meetings and court meetings are important for 
deliberation and decision-making. But it became practically impossible to hold public 
gatherings, because noise could attract the rebels. As rebel targets, LCs often refrained from 
convening meetings. Many respondents did not recall any meeting during that time, saying 
there were ‘hardly any disputes’, which were settled by very small groups of elders. If meetings 
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did take place security was the most important issue for discussion, during all those years 
before the camps were established.  
 
People were hiding in the bush, which made mobilisation very difficult for me, in case 
I had to call a meeting or announce information from the Sub County. There was no 
gathering as we do right now, because it would be a good opportunity for the rebels 
to either kill all of you or abduct all of you and make you carry heavy luggage.  
Acholi: LC2 member, age 42, Chua district 
 
Yes, village meetings were there. Always about the movement of rebels and LC was 
also advising people not to report to rebels where the ex-soldiers and LC members 
live. The boys were advised to take care when they go drinking so that they were not 
abducted by the rebels. 
Acholi: Man, age 48, Chua district 
 
Also the military shaped the public sphere. Although challenged by the LRA, the army was the 
most dominant authority throughout the war, overshadowing local political leaders. On top of 
its lack of response, army misconduct continued to be a problem in Acholi also after UPDA had 
signed a peace agreement (Finnström, 2003, p. 99). The Acholi were often caught in between, 
as both the LRA and the military could easily accuse someone of collaboration with the other 
side. Finnström (2003) found it was often used by local political leaders to discredit their 
opponents. Respondents recalled various forms of harassment, violent assaults and arbitrary 
arrests, and felt subjected to this military control, lacking the power and mechanisms to hold 
the army accountable. Afraid of being labelled rebel collaborator, people (youth in particular) 
refrained from any overt criticism and suppressed their interrogative voice. Apart from 
reporting LRA activities to the army, mostly done by members of the Resistance Council, the 
populations preferred to stay away from the soldiers. This shows that withdrawal became an 
important coping strategy in situations where public contestations of powerful state actors are 
likely to be punished, just like other studies have found (Beswick, 2010; Thomson, 2011). Not 
just physical withdrawal into the bush, which was mainly a tactic to stay safe from the LRA, but 
also withdrawal from the public space in the sense of avoiding public discussions and 
contestations out of fear for a very powerful military. The only kind of everyday resistance 
against the military I heard about was in the form of jokes, in the Luo language and spoken 
‘quietly at home’. The general perception of the public sphere was that it was unsafe, and that 
engagement was risky. 
 
Not only had the public sphere for resolving social problems at community level narrowed 
down. Also the scope for interaction with higher level authorities was limited. During the early 
stages of the war the main object of citizen engagement with formal institutions concerned 
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their security, for which citizens tried to seek the right pattern of interaction with the sub-
county and the army. This shifted attention away from engagement around ordinary 
government functions such as service delivery, as illustrated by this quote:  
 
The war disrupted the voice of people in that it brought a lot of trauma and fear. They 
could not think of any developmental issues, but only survival to the next day. There 
was a lot of psychological torture to many people, so they could not do much to raise 
any issue affecting them. They only mourned the dear ones they lost during the war. 
Acholi: Man, age 52, Lamwo 
 
Reflecting on Acholi narratives about life during the war I noticed that service delivery hardly 
came up as an issue, not even in the interviews with former RCs. I therefore went back to 
some of the respondents to specifically ask about this. 
 
According to the research participants the provision of services such as health care, water and 
education was limited during this period, or in their words: ‘they were unseen’. There may be 
some truth in this statement: the policy for bottom-up development planning had not yet been 
put in place and district authorities had very few resources. In the Acholi region the 
implementation of services was further complicated by the unstable situation. But already in 
the early 1990s there were government programmes, partly funded through international aid, 
also in Acholi. However, in the perceptions of the respondents security issues dominated the 
state agenda, not services. It is possible that this is an instance of what Ben-Porath (2006) 
described about Israel: insecurity alters the priorities citizens expect the state to fulfil. Many 
research participants thus stated that ‘there was no such thing as development those days’ and 
that development of services only took off in the camps in the late 1990s, due to the 
humanitarian actors. One former RC2 chair person remembered: 
 
The government services rarely reached the village those days. The boreholes started 
late, the community roads started of recent. Before the camp there was nothing like 
that. (...) Most times, when the government brought something, it was without asking 
the people what they need. They just bring and you received without complaining. 
Later you had to ask for it, for [school] blocks and other materials. When Universal 
Primary Education started they gave you a fixed budget and a school facility grant for 
building blocks. But before the camp, you just waited for what comes. (...) Most 
development started in the camp. We worked directly with NGOs, [we did not] mind 
to go to government, because government was just there by name. Especially at Sub-
county level they were dormant. 
Acholi: Former RC2 chair person, age 62, Lamwo district 
 
Before the camp started, people were unfamiliar with asking the government for services. 
People only asked the authorities for assistance in case of disease outbreaks, i.e. the guinea 
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worm disease. There was minimum provision of health and education services, but as the 
quote demonstrates there was not much sense of actively engaging in enhancing service 
provision. Also other respondents indicated that, generally, people would wait and see ‘what 
came down’ and were mostly concerned with security anyway. There was thus little 
opportunity to exercise the ‘petitioning voice’.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the literature on citizen agency and voice emphasises the 
importance of social interactions for developing collective voice and political consciousness 
(Kabeer, 2005; Martin, 2003). This section demonstrated that a number of social spaces that 
were important in Acholi social life were disrupted. Due to the insecurity the possibilities for 
social interactions were limited in the rural areas. From the narratives about what was going 
on in such social institutions prior to the war it showed these institutions were not just 
important for Acholi culture and social fabric, they had also been important spaces for learning 
and experiencing the practice of citizenship.  
 
The public sphere that people grew familiar with was one that was heavily securitised, which 
shifted the attention from public services to security. The public sphere was dominated by the 
military that acted unaccountable to the population. In line with Thomson’s (2011) findings on 
Rwanda, this suppressed the exercise of voice in the public sphere and led to withdrawal. 
Although the use of violence by the NRA subsided from 1992, the sense of military repression 
persisted and continued in the IDP camps. This implies that the Acholi population has lived in a 
narrow public sphere for a long time and this, I will argue, limited their experience with active 
citizen engagement.  
 
5.5 The Acholi sense of citizenship  
 
In Chapter 2 the relationship between citizenship, ethnic identity and marginalisation was 
discussed, referring to the debates on autochthony (Geschiere, 2011; Geschiere & Jackson, 
2006), adverse incorporation (Hickey, 2007; Hickey & Du Toit, 2007b), and hierarchies in 
citizenship (Nyamnjoh, 2006). In Chapter 4 I explained how authors have argued that the 
situation of the Acholi region is a case of adverse incorporation, emphasising that this part of a 
longer historical process of state formation. In this section I want to show that the process of 
adverse corporation and the LRA conflict created a sense of marginalisation and a sense of 
inferior citizenship. A sense of inferior citizenship was described in Chapter 3 as awareness 
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about marginalisation and attributing the causes of marginalisation to other, dominant actors. 
Thus, in this section I relate the notion of adverse incorporation to how this felt by the Acholi 
people and show how there is awareness about a hierarchy in citizenship. As other scholars 
have argued for other contexts (Eriksen, 2002; Hickey, 2007) the Acholi identity is constructed 
in dialectic relationship to other ethnic groups, namely those tribes that have not experienced 
war and are higher-placed in the citizenship hierarchy. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3 the proxies for a sense of citizenship were not predetermined before 
the fieldwork started. From the narratives about historical events and how they were 
experienced it was possible to inductively derive an understanding of the sense of citizenship 
in Acholi. From the analysis of the narratives in NVivo it showed that, according to Acholi 
citizens, a ‘good relationship’ to the state depends on a) whether the state treats all tribes 
equally in terms of distribution of resources and political power, b) whether the state treats all 
tribes with respect and leaves them their dignity, and c) how the state responds to insecurity. 
In relation to other tribes of Uganda aspects that came out strongly were; a) equality in terms 
of assets and development, and b) whether other tribes respect one’s tribe. I will discuss each 
of these components.  
 
When asked about what it means to be a citizen of Uganda in the present, the Acholi strongly 
associated this with their ethnic origins. Almost all interviewees defined ‘citizen’ as being born 
in a certain area and in a certain tribe. Indeed, since they were born in Uganda they 
acknowledged that they officially belonged there, but people felt first and foremost Acholi. 
Many respondents therefore said that a ‘citizen’ refers to tribe and answered the question 
with the simple answer: it means being an Acholi. This illustrates the sense of belonging to 
both the political community of the state and of the ethnic group. However, in terms of 
belonging to the state they did not feel they were equal members, a point I elaborate below.  
 
In my conversations about Acholi identity the experience of insecurity and resulting poverty 
were brought up very often. It was as if the experience of the LRA conflict had become a 
defining element of their identity. ‘The Acholi are the ones that experienced war, no peace’, 
was a common phrase used to describe themselves. When speaking about their relationship to 
other tribes in Uganda many used the metaphor of a hill: ‘Other tribes are on the upper side of 
the hill, while we Acholi are on the slope of the hill.’ The experience of the war and the level of 
poverty were the distinguishing factors that made them say so. ‘Other tribes did not have to 
run, they could stay in their homes and dig [cultivate]. We Acholi were always moving up and 
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down, in the bush and in the camps’. While leaving the IDP camp to return home marked 
another change in the experience of citizenship, it did not immediately reconstitute it. In their 
home areas they lacked the basic services and livelihood assets that would give them a sense 
of equality, and moving back did not overcome the damage done by the state to their sense of 
dignity. Although now no longer threatened by the presence of the LRA the Acholi still felt 
uncomfortable knowing that Kony was still ‘out there’ and on top of that their physical security 
was still at risk due to the lack of livelihoods and services.  
 
A sense of insecurity was directly related to the role of the state in the war. When looking back 
on the war the narratives of research participants reflected strong feelings of being abandoned 
by the state, grief and anger about its failure to protect lives and properties, and suspicion of 
purposely trying to weaken the Acholi tribe. Respondents often acknowledged that 
government did ‘fight the rebels’ and ‘bring us home from the camps’. However, the actual 
actions of the state did not match people’s expectations of a responsive, responsible state.  
 
Respondents felt the state had never made enough efforts to stop the war in its early stages 
and had undermined the peace talks. Others have documented similar findings from across the 
region (Dolan, 2009; Finnström, 2003). This was attributed to the regime’s alleged wish to 
break Acholi opposition to the president and the ‘hatred against the north’. While people 
admitted that the LRA was hard to fight, because it operated in small factions from Sudan and 
was from time to time supported by the Khartoum government, they strongly felt this could 
have been mitigated by better interventions. The sense that the NRA/M regime purposely 
prolonged the war was still felt by many. The weak response by the army and its continuous 
misconduct deepened these feelings. During the next stage of the war, when displacement 
camps were formed, the forced internment of the Acholi into the camps and the fears that the 
NRA government tried to grab their lands exacerbated the sense that the NRA government 
fought a war against the Acholi.  
 
Because the Acholi people were fighting among themselves, that is why government 
did not take it serious. We are not united here and we are not supporting 
government.  
Acholi: Man, age 28, Chua district 
 
During insecurity, government just let Acholi people to suffer, because the rebels 
could not defeat government anyway. If rebels were too powerful [e.g. a serious 
threat to government] then government could have called soldiers from other 
countries. Like now, Ugandan soldiers were fighting in Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan. 
The president left us like brothers fighting among ourselves. He recruited Acholi to 
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fight Acholi. In the camp and even before, the Arrow groups those days. The president 
gave us the task to fight rebels. At first government gave us bows. Yet the rebels had 
guns! Later they gave us guns.  
Acholi: Man, age 55, Chua district 
 
The behaviour of the government also damaged the dignity of the Acholi, which is the second 
aspect of their sense of citizenship. They felt that the NRA used the war to stigmatise the 
Acholi as ‘primitive’, ‘barbarian’, and violent. The feelings of stigmatisation that they expressed 
resonated with what other scholars found in their studies (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999; 
Finnström, 2003). A frequently quoted statement by Museveni was how he compared the 
situation in Acholi to putting grasshoppers in a jar, which evidently leads to the situation in 
which ‘they will eat each other’. The regime used the image of the Acholi as a violent group to 
convince the southern regions that it could prevent future domination by northerners.  
 
The Acholi dignity was also undermined due to the loss of cattle during the Karamojong cattle 
raids in 1988 and subsequent years of war, and due the loss of the ties to their land when they 
were displaced (both when the Acholi fled to Sudan in 1986 and in the displacement camps). 
This has directly to do with the meaning of land and cattle in Acholi culture. Land and cattle 
constituted the building blocks for self-fulfilment as citizens. With this, their wealth and pride 
were lost, a feeling that extends to the present and continues to limit opportunities for social 
becoming, adulthood and exercise citizenship. It meant that the government had failed to 
protect their lives and security of their bodies, their homesteads and properties. The right to 
be protected in one’s own home was considered of great importance, because the clan’s soil is 
crucial for one’s identity. In the next chapter I elaborate how confinement in the camps further 
undermined this sense of dignity.  
 
Regarding the first aspect of a sense of citizenship, equality, the Acholi strongly felt that the 
state was not working for all Ugandans and disadvantaged the Acholi by allocating resources in 
other parts of the country. ‘This government is not treating tribes equally’ was a common 
phrase heard among Acholi. They acknowledged that poverty was also caused by the war, but 
felt they were actively discriminated against by the NRA/M, throughout the war and in the 
post-conflict situation, in terms of development. Most respondents found an explanation in 
the distribution of power over the tribes. First of all President Museveni belonged to a 
different tribe and the Acholi had opposed the NRA regime when it came to power, making 
them an ‘enemy’. The Acholi continued to vote for the opposition, making it ‘their own fault’ 
that this government neglected them. One elder explained, almost justified, the tendency of 
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the regime to ‘favour’ other tribes; ‘If I as a father have eight children, I cannot love them all in 
the same way’.  
 
Comparing themselves to other tribes the aspects of dignity and equality figured strongly in 
their descriptions of the Acholi identity. The label of the Acholi as a violent ethnic group is still 
felt by every Acholi I spoke to about this, and by most people were convinced that other tribes 
perceived them as such. When I spoke to Acholi youth that attended higher education in other 
parts of Uganda, for example, this became very clear. They felt being treated rudely by 
teachers or lecturers, were ignored in class, given lower marks, and were called ‘Kony’. To 
prevent being excluded by fellow students, they avoided speaking Luo to one another and did 
not tell their surnames that would reveal their ethnic origin. This, compounded by the idea 
that the southern tribes were better-off in terms of wealth and the allocation of resources, led 
to the notion that the Acholi were on the ‘slope of the hill’ and contributed to a sense of 
inferior citizenship.  
 
5.6 Citizenship construction in Lango  
 
About eight months into the fieldwork I settled in a village in Lango region. On Friday 
afternoons I made my way to a weekly village market. Three or four groups of men waited for 
the local brew to arrive. They were ‘Akiba’ groups: group of 10 to 15 members that shared an 
alcoholic brew and ran a saving scheme together. Men and women from surrounding villages 
arrived with their produce to sell. From further away tradesmen came to sell salt, soap, 
cooking oil, and clothes. The market chair person made his round among the sellers to receive 
the rent for the market stalls. In front of a row of brick stone shops the ‘workshop’ of a group 
of bicycle repair men produced the noise of hammering metal.  
 
On one of those market days I was accompanied by an Acholi friend. He was amazed by the 
liveliness of the market, pointing out that having those at the village level was a sign of 
welfare. ‘In Acholi you will barely find these occasions. People are still busy to grow food to eat, 
they have nothing to sell’. He also identified markers in the landscape that were evidence of 
progress and stability in this region, like the many families that had several huts and a brick 
house on their compounds. But also, the incredible numbers of bicycles people were riding. 
Though the Langi in this area had experienced considerable political turmoil in the past, these 
markers indicated they had experienced long-term stability to develop all this.  
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When I asked the population in the Lango research site about their history, they often started 
with narrating how life was under Idi Amin. They would then discuss Obote’s 2nd Presidency, 
their subsequent fear and anger when the Acholi general Tito Okello ousted Obote, and mixed 
feelings when soon after that Museveni’s NRA seized power. The fact that most participants 
started their historical narrative with Amin’s regime, thus starting from much earlier in history 
than the Acholi narrative that often started in 1986, already signalled a different process of 
their construction of citizenship. Whereas in Acholi the regime change to NRA formed the start 
of a lot of political turbulence, in Lango it meant something different.  
 
In Lango I thus found out a lot about their perspectives on the current political context and 
how their citizenship had been constructed, by comparing the different regimes. By narrating 
how daily life looked under previous regimes, especially what had been difficult, Langi could 
reflect upon their expectations of a state and how it should behave towards the citizenry. The 
next sections therefore start with accounts about life under Amin and Obote II, followed by 
sections that describe the evolving relationship between Lango and the NRA/M, and emerging 
opportunities for citizen engagement. 
 
5.6.1 Life under Idi Amin 
 
Respondents referred to Idi Amin as the ’military regime’ under which they had fear all the 
time, had to struggle to sustain a minimum livelihood, and limit the social activities that were 
most important to them. In the Langi research site, the sub-county chief was killed and the 
entire staff replaced with soldiers from Amin’s tribe from West-Nile. More soldiers were 
stationed in the trading centre. The Langi were very afraid of them and their aggressive 
behaviour. Although violence was not used very frequently in the rural areas, it mainly 
targeted the intellectuals and business men in Lira town, the threat of violence made people 
use avoidance tactics and stay away from the army. They would often sleep in the bush and 
they were reluctant to use the roads, especially the road to Lira town. Usually only the men 
would travel and women remained home.  
 
Amin’s regime was also remembered for the difficulties in making ends meet. Commodities 
like soap, salt and sugar were almost impossible to get. After Amin had expelled the Indian- 
Ugandan population, descendants from the Indian immigrants, in 1972 many industries 
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collapsed, as many of them had run those industries and trades. As in Acholi, having to miss 
these goods were considered signs of hardship and isolation. The cotton industry was suffering 
for the same reason. There were no more markets where the population could sell its surplus 
and they resorted to subsistence farming. At the same time, the production of cotton and 
payment of taxes were imposed and non-compliance was punished. 
 
Social gatherings became prohibited and this greatly affected social life. Farming was no longer 
done in groups, limiting productivity. One could attend funerals only briefly. The Akiba drinking 
groups and any saving and loan group were prohibited, to prevent people saving money to 
send out to Amin’s opponents. The regime’s most disruptive effect was on the Langi clan 
organisation. The clans and their support for Obote were considered a great threat to the 
regime. The Won Nyasi, the highest cultural leader presiding over all Langi, was killed and the 
clan leadership forbidden. At the local level this had implications for day-to-day governance of 
the clan. Members could not carry out the elections for clan leadership and those in positions 
stayed on for the length of Amin’s era. Gatherings like courts and clan meetings could not be 
organised and in case of disputes one would secretly call two or three of the ‘most able’ clan 
leaders and elders to come and settle it. The constant fear and violence people had to live with 
and the way the regime suppressed their clan organisation constituted their sentiments 
against Amin. Great was their relief when ‘their’ Obote came back to power in 1980. 
 
Although the forms of agency during Amin’s regime were not studied in great detail in my 
study, a number of similarities between Amin’s regime and the situation in Acholi during the 
LRA conflict can be observed. The militarisation of the social environment and the repression 
of social activities were similar. To an extent, the source of threat was visible. The repressor 
was known, and so were the rules for behaviour that would not provoke violence and the 
places where the violence could be encountered. Like in Acholi, public gatherings and social 
institutions were disrupted and spaces for citizen engagement shut down completely as the 
military regime replaced the local administration. But in a way, social navigation was easier in 
this context. A regime of political oppression was more stable, at least in rural Lango, and 
easier to read, interpret and navigate than in the fluctuating war context of Acholi during the 
LRA.  
 
5.6.2 Obote’s second Presidency 
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‘The clans woke up again’ was what the Langi remembered the most of what happened after 
Obote returned to power. The people were allowed to perform all their functions and 
gatherings at local level. However, the position of the Won Nyasi was not recognised due to 
Obote’s tense relation with the kingdoms. Equally important was the resumption of 
agricultural work and proper management of the cotton societies, which made productivity 
increase. To help the impoverished population, basic necessities as soap, salt and clothes were 
distributed by the Obote II administration, and seeds and insecticides to support the 
agriculture. What the Langi especially appreciated was that social services were provided 
again. Pupils did not have to buy any materials since the schools were provided with all.  
 
The local government system introduced by Obote ‘myumba kumi’ (Chapter 4) grouped 10 
households together, led by a committee that would settle minor issues and organise 
collection of taxes. After Amin’s regime that had muted citizen voices this was welcomed, and 
Langi felt that the Langi officials at the sub-county were open to them. Above all, Obote was a 
Langi; ‘People were happy. This [Obote] was our son. Even if he did not do many things he is 
still our son!’, one man said. However, Obote did not re-introduce the patronage of political 
appointments among the Langi and under his second presidency fewer Langi occupied 
important positions in the government (Branch, 2010, p. 30). Nonetheless, after the 
devastating Amin era the relative improvement in living conditions, a government that was 
‘theirs’ and, at least in Lango, provided basic services and recognised the clans were 
characteristics most appreciated.  
 
This came under immediate threat when Tito Okello took over. The Langi were afraid they 
would return to the situation as it was under Amin. Okello’s soldiers were mainly Acholi and 
caused a lot of havoc in the area while chasing Obote’s soldiers, making it very clear that 
Obote would not return to power. 
 
We were angry about the new government. Nothing good he did. He was not 
educated, he had little knowledge and could not run a country. Obote had put Acholis 
on high positions in the army and they [Acholi] used it to overthrow Obote. There is 
now tension between Acholi and Langi, up to today. During Tito they looked for the 
Langi with good jobs and killed them.  
Lango: Focus group with 6 male elders, Kole district 
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5.6.3 Return to stability under the NRA  
 
When the NRA ousted Okello the Langi initially did not know whether it was for better or for 
worse. Definitely, it was better not to have Okello as a ruler and the NRA put an end to 
arbitrary killings by Okello’s army. But clearly, the NRA would consider Lango an opposition 
area and would do anything to keep it under control. Also here, Obote’s ex-soldiers formed an 
insurgent group referred to as ‘olum olum’ [in the bush], joined by young men from the area. 
However, the respondents in my field location considered them more as armed robbers, men 
who did not know what to do with their lives, known for harassing the population and robbing 
local traders. The olum olum were pro-Obote, but were not thought of as serious insurgents, 
contrary to the cilil in Acholi, neither seemed the Langi to believe they would actually 
overthrow the NRA.  
 
The arrival of the NRA was thus initially treated with great suspicion and fear, but the fact it 
ousted Tito Okello was a relief. The NRA did not launch a lengthy violent operation to round up 
Obote’s soldiers and in the research site there were few incidents involving violence against 
civilians and cattle raiding. In my research site the NRA soldiers were not as omnipresent and 
aggressive as expected.  
 
The army was brought here at the Sub-County to take care of life and property of 
local people. The NRA did not much disturb this place. People were arrested if they 
suspected you had a relationship with Obote. They looked for Obote’s soldiers, but 
not disturbing local people. Some of Obote’s soldiers were taken, some came back 
and others not. We don’t know whether they joined the NRA and were taken 
somewhere.  
Lango: Focus group with 6 male elders, Kole district 
 
Starting from the 1990s, the population started to witness the reconstruction of social 
infrastructure, but much to their regret the cotton societies were not revitalised. Yet there was 
slow progress in service delivery. Respondents narrated how the Langi thus gradually came to 
terms with the NRA regime and with the fact that Obote would not come back. ‘We wanted 
Obote to come back at first’ was a common phrase when talking about the regime change. But 
as the situation evolved Langi developed what they called a ‘working relationship’ with the 
NRA/M, in which they acknowledged that some progress was made in terms of service 
delivery. Although many believed Obote could have done even better, as a Langi, people 
showed a certain acceptance, as expressed by this proverb: ‘We are like widows; when 
someone comes to inherit me to help me, I must simply accept [it as it is]’. 
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5.7 Consolidation of social and political institutions in Lango 
5.7.1 Political leadership 
 
Political representation had been a sensitive issue under previous regimes. Then the NRA 
made a step towards Lango when it formed a broad-based coalition at the start (Kasfir, 1998):  
 
He [Museveni] put his effort on the few Langi that went to parliament. He put them in 
position of ministers. One Langi was a prime minister, the 1st minister. Very 
important ministries were given to Langi, like the Ministry of Land. We have fertile 
land, people used to fear Museveni would overtake it.  
Lango: Man, age 68, Kole district 
 
Many respondents referred to the fact that political representation of Lango under the NRM 
was to them a signal that the NRA would not be a military government ‘like Amin’. This 
resonates with Bastian’s emphasis on inclusive political institutions (Bastian, 2000). He wrote 
that adverse incorporation of a group is furthered when political institutions do not include 
certain groups. With its initial broad-based coalition the NRA countered such feelings and 
perceptions.  
 
At the local level, the NRA initially appointed individuals from the West of Uganda as sub-
county officials. Then ordinary local government institutions were put in place and the 
Resistance Councils (RCs) were formed. As in Acholi, the RCs were initially treated with 
suspicion, but this changed in a few years. What appealed to the Langi was a form of self-rule, 
which was very different from what had taken place under Amin and therefore countered 
citizen perceptions that the NRA would be a military regime. It gave people the confidence 
that they were allowed to rule themselves and would not be subject to the authority of 
another tribe. The following quotes refer to the early days of the NRA and illustrate the 
difference vis-a-vis the Acholi region.  
  
At first people feared the NRA a lot, but when the government brought in the policy 
that people must elect their leaders as RCs it was fair. We elected RCs. People 
expected there would be no peace, we feared for most of us supported UPC and since 
this was a new party NRM we thought they might kill. Fear decreased when we 
elected the RCs.  
Lango: Focus group with 6 male elders, Kole district 
 
Under the NRA, at first people had fear. The RCs, people did not like to be RC initially. 
They thought it was a military government [...]. After some years it changed, due to 
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proper management and policies of the government. And they did not harass people. 
They realised Obote would not come back and they started to get to know Museveni.  
Lango: man, age 67, Kole district 
 
Despite the flaws in the functioning of the RC system, which occurred in Lango just as in the 
southern regions (F. Golooba-Mutebi, 2004), it gave Langi a sense of regaining control. But 
there was more to it. Without the disruptive effects of the war, the RCs could start and 
consolidate from the very beginning. This had implications for the practice of citizenship. 
Whereas in Acholi the RCs were predominantly involved in security issues, in Lango they 
started to mediate about basic needs and services, and engaged in dispute resolution. People 
had the chance to develop leadership practices and experience with the RCs/LCs as channels 
that mediated with higher level authorities, right from the start. Also the population itself had 
the chance to learn about the procedures.  
 
5.7.2 Social and cultural institutions  
 
Clan organisation 
 
In Lango clan leadership is multilayered, each layer having a name, a leader with a committee, 
and area of jurisdiction. The lowest level of clan leadership is the Won Pacu, who presides over 
10 households. The next level is that of the Jan Jago Atekere who heads several clusters of 10 
households, followed by the Jago Atekere who is responsible for the clan in a territory 
comparable to the size of the sub-county. The next level is that of the Rwot County, followed 
by the Awi Tong, which is the highest level of leadership for one and the same clan. The 
ultimate leadership position is that of the Won Nyasi, who heads all the Langi clans. 
Interestingly, in Luo some titles of local government officials in resembled clan titles; the Jan 
Jago is the Parish Chief and the Jago is the Sub-County Chief, but ‘Atekere’ indicates that it is a 
clan position. Ethnographic work suggests titles were copied from the clan functions (Curley, 
1973). 
 
Historical sources describe how the structure of the clan leadership developed over time, 
diversifying its functions. Tosh writes about how in pre-colonial Lango the authority of clan 
leaders was very localised and based on a combination of lineage and territory, but their 
authority was limited (1978). People organised themselves in neighbourhood groups (wan tic) 
for agricultural work, in which clan leaders were expected to participate. Under British rule 
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Lango was divided into sub-counties for which ‘chiefs’ were appointed, often clan leaders, and 
eventually a four-level tier chiefly hierarchy from village to county was institutionalised. 
Effectively, certain clan leaders were singled out and placed in a higher position over others. 
The system became increasingly corrupted as it was abused by the chiefs for patronage 
networks, which eroded their legitimacy. In post-colonial Lango, the multiple levels persisted, 
but each clan now installed their own leaders at the different levels. Hence, no longer one clan 
was in a ‘chief’ position over others.  
 
What was remarkable was that clan leaders at all levels are elected. At the very local level clan 
members elect their leader, whereas for the higher levels clan leaders constitute the electoral 
assembly that elect the leaders for the next level. All respondents, including the elders and 
clan leaders that were interviewed, were confident that clan leadership had never been an 
inherited function, but Tosh writes that it certainly had been in the pre-colonial era. However, 
the elders would select the right ‘son’ based on individual merit and if there were no capable 
sons even a remote cousin could be identified (Tosh, 1978, p. 189). The electoral system for 
clan leaders developed in the post-colonial era, and is now a key characteristic of clan 
governance: 
 
Langi look for competence in leaders, which is not possible if leadership is inherited. 
In the past there was always election but the way we elect has developed. Now all 
clan members participate. Under the British I heard there was no proper election, but 
the people would see that if you are capable, like had some education, and then they 
appointed you. Roles were quite different. There were less people and now some clan 
leaders do some tasks that government is also doing.  
Lango: man, age 62, Kole district 
 
The election system became more sophisticated over time. Nowadays both men and women 
vote and the process is done by lining up behind (representatives of) candidates at local level 
and by secret ballot at higher levels. Aspiring candidates even campaign, but people hastened 
to say that these campaigns are very different from the formal political elections in that 
candidates will ‘not use money’, e.g. buy votes. It is also possible to remove a clan leader from 
office when people are not content with his/her performance. It is even considered easier to 
hold a clan leader accountable than government leaders, an issue I return to in Chapter 7. 
 
At present, clan leaders at every level chair committees that in composition are very similar to 
the LC secretarial posts; a chair person, vice chair person, general secretary, treasurer, and 
secretaries for youth, women and widows, health, education, environment, and security. In 
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addition, there are secretaries for land (Adwong Kila), for Culture, and for Reconciliation 
(Adwong Kwor), which did not exist in the formal local government system. The committees 
expanded after Amin’s regime, but during fieldwork it did not become clear how much later. 
Many respondents said that it was copied from the LC system introduced by Museveni.  
 
The clan system had benefited from over 20 years of stability during which several clans had 
accumulated assets with which they assisted their members, using complex loan and 
distribution mechanisms. Meanwhile the clan committees had expanded functions and 
responsibilities to maintain reciprocal, social security networks. Many of my respondents were 
in leadership positions of their clan at some level, depending on the size of the village 
population and number of clans present. As such, the clans formed an important basis where 
the capacities for social organisation and co-operation were learnt. 
 
Thus, as Lango region remained peaceful and stable the clan leadership in Lango at local level 
could further consolidate. This is an important difference with the Acholi region. Although the 
Acholi benefited from the reinstatement of the paramount chief, who could act as a 
spokesperson in the war, the functioning of local level clan leaders was interrupted during the 
LRA insurgency. Their status was seriously undermined in the beginning of the conflict and 
later on in the displacement camps.  
 
Social institutions 
 
Community groups figure prominently in the daily life of rural areas. The most important 
groups are for farming (grup mephu in Acholi, Alulu in Lango) and saving systems (‘bol i cup’), 
which have been in existence for long. Government facilitated credit and loan programmes 
(Village Saving and Loan Associations - VSLA) have encouraged new groups to form. Across 
Lango region the ‘social drinking groups’ (Akiba) were widespread, which combines sharing 
local brew with a saving and loan system. Also in Acholi the sharing of local brew was an 
important social event, but mainly an activity for a farming group after cultivation work and 
convened at the compound of the person whose land was cultivated that day. This had been 
the case in Lango (Curley, 1973), but nowadays Akiba groups also existed independently of the 
farming groups; Langi may cultivate in one group in the morning and then join an Akiba group 
with other members in the afternoon, though these naturally often overlapped. Burial 
societies did not exist in contrast with other parts of Uganda (Jones, 2009), because funerals 
and financial contributions were organised through the clans. Only recently people have 
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started to form ‘emergency groups’ with mixed clan membership, for savings and loans in case 
of death and illness.  
 
Farmer groups are led by farmer leaders, Adwong Wan Tic, whose function is similar to that of 
the Rwot Kweri in Acholi. But in Lango the farmer leader had several other responsibilities, like 
the organisation and monitoring of organising community work such as clearing the roads. The 
Adwong Wan Tic decides the type of community work to be carried out and communicates 
with the LCs to mobilise the community members. If someone fails to show up the person is 
fined by the Adwong Wan Tic.  
 
Community groups are vital social institutions in which villagers from various clans collaborate. 
As such these groups offered opportunities to learn norms of co-operation, leadership skills, 
and skills for local problem-solving and decision-making. Previous sections demonstrated that 
groups in Acholi could not function properly due to the war and especially the younger 
generations had missed out on years of group membership. Yet in Lango, groups were able to 
consolidate and sophisticate their functions. As will be elaborated in Chapter 7, this built their 
experience with citizenship practices over time.  
 
5.8 The Lango sense of citizenship  
 
I feel we are equal members of Uganda but the government does not treat us equally. 
We don’t have resources like other tribes. I mostly look at wealth as the major issue 
that has divided the Langi and other tribes. 
Lango: Man, age 27 
 
In the beginning we were not in good terms with the government. We rejected his 
words. He was leading us astray. We are beginning to like him now, entering the 
yellow bus. We have learned he is also someone who can be good in the future, so we 
need to come together. We had the UPC party, but the person who maliced Obote 
became president of the UPC; Otunu. But not to our liking. So people started looking 
for other presidential candidates and started to follow Museveni. We dislike one thing 
about Otunu: he Acholi and this is a confusing tribe. They maliced Obote, created 
rebels and they have a bad culture, we know this as we are near to them. 
Lango: Man, age 52 
 
In terms of security, the Langi did not complain much about the NRA. Where the NRA 
committed atrocities when it took power in 1986, it was to round up former the UNLA soldiers 
that had regrouped as the olum olum. The fact that the NRA had stopped a potentially 
oppressive regime of Acholis had been such a relief that any NRA violence against the Lango 
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population seemed forgiven and irrelevant. In this way, security did figure as an important 
aspect of the relationship between the ethnic group and the state. In this part of Lango, where 
the LRA had not reached, there was no mentioning of how the state had failed to protect the 
population against the LRA, even though other parts of Lango region had suffered rebel 
activity from 2003 to 2006. The two other aspects that were identified in Acholi, dignity and 
equality, were more prominent in the narratives that described the relationship between 
Lango and the state. 
 
Important for the dignity of the Langi was the official recognition of the clan leadership by the 
NRA regime. In 1993 the Traditional Rulers Statute was adopted through which the powers of 
the kings and traditional leaders were restored. This was a measure by the NRA to prevent 
political parties from rallying support in Buganda when it was still consolidating its own power 
(Carbone, 2008). But in Lango, after strong repression of the clans under Amin and the Obote’s 
cautious approach to the kingdoms and chiefdoms, this act was important in reconstituting the 
cultural component of Langi citizenship. The highest level of clan leadership, the Won Nyasi of 
Lango, was elected for the second time in history after the first Won Nyasi had been killed 
under Amin’s regime. In Lango, feelings of stigmatisation did not figure as prominently as in 
Acholi. There was a sense that southern tribes considered the Langi to be more ‘backward’, 
but this was not as prominent as the Acholi had talked about themselves.  
 
The biggest complaint about the state, illustrated by the first quote above, was the perceived 
inequality in the distribution of resources, along the same lines as the Acholi has mentioned 
this. Although the NRA/M had started off with a notion of inclusiveness, in the present there 
was a strong sense that the NRM was more a regime for southerners than for northerners. Like 
the Acholi, also Langi felt that their region was not being developed as fast as other (southern) 
parts of the country, because of Langi support to the opposition. This sense of inequality based 
on tribal difference continued to stand in between Lango region and the NRM regime. Thus, 
although service provision had somewhat improved, respondents felt development could have 
been more rapid if not for the NRM’s tendency to ‘favour’ other regions.  
 
Thus, in Lango the stability that followed the initial turbulence when the NRA came to power 
allowed the (re)construction of important aspects of the Langi’s citizenship. Although the Langi 
by and large felt that the NRM regime was not ‘theirs’ they did acknowledge the NRA/M had 
contributed to their security. To re-establish the important institution of the clan leadership 
had enhanced their sense of dignity. The most important strain on their relationship to the 
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state was constituted by their sense of inequality and the belief that their region remained 
underdeveloped compared to southern tribes.  
 
Conclusion   
In this chapter I described the nature of the warscape that developed in Acholi and 
demonstrated how this affected local institutions, the public sphere and forms of agency. I also 
described which historical moments were identified as important for the construction of Acholi 
citizenship. This was then compared with political developments in Lango, where social and 
political institutions developed in a relatively stable context.  
 
The chapter provided the empirical data in relation to proposition (II) about the securitisation 
of the public sphere and narrowing, securitised civic and political institutions. Both the 
activities of the LRA and the military directly impacted on the security of Acholi civilians and on 
the public sphere. This set in motion a process of institutional transformation. Social 
institutions and spaces where people could come together as collectivity, for co-operation and 
decision-making, were curtailed. These spaces were important for learning the skills that are 
important for citizen agency, for leadership skills and norms for co-operation.  
 
Securitisation of political institutions occurred when Resistance Council members gained 
importance because of their function as mediators between communities and the military. 
This only increased during periods when Local Defence Units were organised. At the same 
time, the customary leadership weakened, which changed the relationship between youth and 
elders. Change in political institutions thus entails more than the emergence of new 
governance mechanisms; it is about changes in existing forms and patterns of authority too. 
The public sphere securitised as the military presence dominated the lives of the Acholi and as 
security became the most important issue. It was also reflected in how people had to adjust 
their language in the public sphere, in order to avoid being labelled ‘rebels’. 
 
In discussing different forms of agency, it became clear that immediate needs such as safety 
and food were prioritised over ‘ordinary’ development and governance issues with a longer 
time-frame. Forms of coping agency were more important than citizen agency. As collective 
life became more fragmented there was less opportunity to build collective voice for 
development, what I called the ‘petitioning voice’ (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the situation did 
not allow the population to express and develop an ‘interrogative voice’ and hold the state and 
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military accountable for its failure to protect Acholi citizens. This, too, had implications for 
citizenship as the Acholi gained less experience with citizenship practice, which relates to 
proposition (III). 
 
In Lango, a consolidation of social and political institutions was observed. After the turmoil of 
the regime change in 1986 had subsided, Langi citizens started to build certain experiences 
that were useful for engagement in local governance and community institutions: with RCs, in 
the clan institutions, and in community groups. The Langi contrasted this period of time with 
the period of Amin’s regime when all of these activities were impossible.  
 
This chapter highlighted key aspects for the relationship between citizens and the state, as 
defined by Acholi and Langi citizens: equality, dignity and security. This also shows the 
connection between ethnic citizenship and national citizenship. Both Langi and Acholi reflect 
on their own citizen identity by referring to the relationship between their tribe and the state.  
 
The next chapter focuses entirely on the Acholi region at a time when displacement became a 
structural feature of the war, from 1996/7 onwards, and examines how the Acholi sense and 
practice of citizenship unfolded in the camps. 
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Chapter 6 Acholi Citizenship Recast during Displacement  
Introduction  
 
The long-term displacement of the Acholi into camps within their region was one of the key 
characteristics of the LRA conflict. Occasional displacement had occurred in the early 1990s, 
particularly in Gulu district, but it became more permanent in parts of the region from 1996. At 
its peak, over 1.4 million (92%) of the Acholi lived in camps across the region as Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). Formally living within state boundaries, they remained under the 
sovereignty and responsibility of the Ugandan state. In practice, the rights and entitlements 
they experienced were different from those accorded to ordinary Ugandan citizens.  
 
The camps reconfigured the nature of the warscape. In this context, how did a sense and 
practice of citizenship develop? Given that many people lived in these camps for five to ten 
years, some even longer, this was a considerable period of people’s lives, especially for the 
youth that grew up there. In interviews the period of displacement came up as significant in 
the construction of Acholi citizenship. It is therefore important to study how people have 
experienced this episode of the war in detail.  
 
This chapter presents a description of the lived experience of the camps in Acholi with an 
analytical focus on forms of agency that developed in the camp setting, how displacement 
reconfigured social and political institutions, and the nature of the public sphere. I show how 
the camp led to particular forms of citizen engagement and to the repression of others, the 
implications of which are elaborated in Chapter 7. These findings relate to propositions (II) and 
(III) about changes during the conflict, but in the camp setting. 
 
The findings show how the camp situation undermined and recast an Acholi sense of 
citizenship, using the characteristics of a sense of citizenship explained in Chapters 3 and 4: 
equality, dignity and security. Already reconfigured prior to the camp situation, these 
characteristic were further eroded in the camps. This discussion addresses an important gap in 
forced migration literature: the link between the practice and perceptions of citizenship for the 
internally displaced.  
 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the nature of displacement in the Acholi region in 
section 6.1, based on existing literature. Section 6.2 then describes forms of coping agency in 
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the camps and how life in the camps was experienced. Section 6.3 explains the transformation 
of social institutions. In section 6.4 I describe the challenges to exercising the petitioning voice 
and the interrogative voice in the context of repressive power structures in the camps, and 
show how political agency was discouraged. A number of observations about the implications 
of camp life for the practice of citizen engagement are made in section 6.5. Section 6.6 
presents a reflection on the implications of camp life for Acholi citizenship: pointers that 
inform Acholi citizenship at present. 
 
6.1 The IDP camps in Acholi 
 
In Chapter 2 I described key characteristics of international refugee camps found in other 
studies (Kaiser, 2004; Malkki, 1996; Nyers, 2006; Turner, 2006). Many of these apply to the IDP 
camps as they existed in Acholi: the basic needs of the population were fulfilled by 
humanitarian actors, the military was present for camp security, and a camp governance 
system was institutionalised. There are also important differences. The state remained 
present: physically mainly through the military and with limited operations at sub-county and 
district level, but also in how it handled the conflict at higher levels. Then, the camps were 
located inside the war zone and on-going insecurity had an impact on camp life. Finally, the 
camp population was ethnically homogeneous, although social stratification occurred through 
other factors.  
 
This section describes the Acholi IDP camps: under which circumstances they were formed, the 
governance regime put in place, and the security situation. I complement existing literature 
with the perspectives of former camp residents from my field data. I show how the camps 
were characterised by a markedly hierarchical set of power relations, in which the military and 
camp leadership had significant powers over the camp population. 
 
6.1.1. Phases of camp formation 
 
Displacement in the Acholi region occurred in several phases, starting from 1996. 
Displacement patterns were not uniform across the region. Due to the phases the 
displacement experience of people varied in duration, the magnitude of the population that 
got displaced, the extent of humanitarian assistance, and whether displacement was coerced 
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or voluntary. Detailed studies exist on the camp situation as well as reports produced by the 
many aid agencies that have been active in the region (Allen, 2006; Branch, 2009; Dolan, 2009; 
Finnström, 2003; Hurifo, 2002; NRC, 2003). Many of the camp studies were carried out in Gulu 
district, while camps in my research sites were less researched.  
 
In Gulu district people experienced short-term displacement periodically during the early 
1990s. Then rebel activities worsened from 1995 as the LRA operated from its bases in Sudan. 
People began commuting: they worked their gardens during the day and slept in safer areas at 
night (Dolan, 2009, p. 46). In late 1996 the government began to establish ‘protected villages’, 
using military force to move people to the designated areas. The excessive violence used by 
the military made people feel more afraid of staying in the ‘protected villages’ than at home. 
From 1996-2006 the overall number displaced increased steadily. The first World Food 
Programme (WFP) operation in January 1997 provided relief to 20 protected villages in Gulu 
district for an estimated number of 110,000 people. In May 1999 this went up to 325,000 
people, including 81,000 persons in villages in Lamwo and Chua districts (Dolan, 2009). 
 
In Lamwo and Chua districts displacement started in January 1997 following a series of attacks 
by the LRA in the border area of Lokung, Padibe and Palabek. These attacks resulted in a 
massacre in which over 400 people were killed within a few days. Here, people went for 
protection to the sub-county centres, which is how displacement started in seven sub-counties 
on the border, and around the ‘LRA corridor’ leading south. District authorities responded 
quickly and started to coordinate the settlement with the help of Oxfam GB, which had 
previously carried out development programmes in the area. The process of camp formation in 
this area was therefore said to have taken place in a ‘more orderly’ fashion than in other 
districts (Olaa, 2001). 
 
In 1999 the situation seemed to calm down and there was a period of relative stability. All over 
the region people started to go back to their villages, though carefully, and initially only to 
cultivate their gardens. Then in December 1999, following a peace agreement between the 
governments of Uganda and Sudan in which the LRA had not taken part, the LRA launched new 
attacks all over the region, forcing the people back to the camps. 
 
Military operation Iron Fist (March 2002) caused the last wave of displacement. The LRA 
reacted by rapidly expanding its violent operations across and outside the Acholi region into 
Lango and Teso. Now also the population of the remaining east Acholi sub-counties, thus far 
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not displaced permanently, was ordered to form camps at sub-county centres. By 2004 over 
90% of the Acholi population was displaced. 
 
The visit of Jan Egeland, UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Humanitarian 
Affairs, in November 2003 sparked an influx of humanitarian agencies across the affected 
regions. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) rolled out its cluster 
system16, which effectively sidelined the district authorities. Nonetheless, local government 
structures continued to exist at different levels. Throughout the conflict, friction emerged 
between district local governments and humanitarian actors about who was managing whom. 
Both sides claimed the coordination role. But from interviews with humanitarian actors17 and 
with district officials18 it appeared that the district authorities were back in charge only after 
2006, when the camps started to be dismantled. After the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
in August 2006 and subsequent protocols for comprehensive solutions, people gradually 
started to leave the camps. A little later the formal ‘camp phase out’ process began.  
 
The population of my two research locations in Acholi moved to the camps at different 
moments in the conflict. The site in Chua is ten kilometers away from Kitgum town. 
Throughout the war members of the communities in that sub-county periodically sought 
refuge in town, in an area called Gangdyang [place where the cattle graze]. Due to the 
proximity of their villages the population from the Chua research site was inclined to go home 
when the situation improved. Then in 2003, after operation Iron Fist, the entire sub-county 
population was ordered to form a camp at their sub-county centre. They lived there for about 
five years before the return process started. At the time of research in 2010, most had moved 
home.  
 
The research site in Lamwo was in located the area where the wave of attacks happened in 
January 1997. Immediately after these attacks the entire population of the sub-county ran to 
the trading centre near the army barracks. Then the organisation of the camp started. A small 
group of villagers who had the means fled to Kitgum, specifically to Gangdyang. Gangdyang 
developed into a big camp inhabited by people from all over the district. At some point it 
became too big to manage and the district made an effort to decongest the site by sending 
                                                          
16
 When a cluster system is in place the UN agencies and implementing humanitarian actors take over 
the coordination and implementation of service provision from the government for, e.g. water, 
sanitation and hygiene, protection, livelihoods, education.  
17
 Interviews with AVSI (11/02/10), AVSI (14/02/2010), NRC (04/02/2010), Oxfam GB (18/12/2010) 
18
 Interviews with RDC (06/05/2010), Assistant CAO (18/080/2010) 
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people home. The villagers from my research site returned to Lamwo and settled in the camp 
at the sub-county. The people spent at least ten years in the main camp, after which they 
moved to smaller satellite camps near their homes. In 2010 many were still living in the 
satellite camps and busy constructing homes again on their original land. 
 
The reason for including the Lamwo site in the study was to gain in-depth understanding about 
life in the camp. This raises the question about a comparison between Lamwo and Chua, 
because the length of displacement may affect engagement. It was not, however, an objective 
of this study to explain the effects of variation in the length of displacement and its 
implications for citizen engagement. In Chapter 8 I present concluding observations about the 
differences between the sites in this respect, but these are reflections and not based on 
substantive empirical evidence. Rather, Lamwo was a case that allowed me to learn about 
camp dynamics in their own right.  
 
6.1.2. Camp governance regime 
 
In Chapter 2 I explained that camps become places where a myriad of actors are involved in 
governing them (Morvaridi, 2008). Since humanitarian actors are important in shaping the 
parameters of camp governance, Nyers refers to the camp as a ‘humanitarian space (2006, 
p.114). In the Acholi IDP camps a multi-layered structure of camp governance was introduced. 
During fieldwork I heard that, initially, existing governance structures such as the LCs, elders 
and Rwodi Kweri (farmer leaders) had coordinated the settlement of the people. In Gulu 
district the existing cultural leadership of Rwodi Kweri were incorporated into the lower levels 
of camp leadership19, but I did not hear of this in Lamwo or Chua. In the Lamwo research site, 
the early organisation of the camp in 1997 was done by LC2 and LC3 members. Thus, before 
the humanitarian actors took over the coordination role and rolled out the camp leadership 
structure, the Acholi population first used existing social and political institutions to respond to 
this new crisis situation.  
 
Humanitarian actors then introduced a system of self-governance in the Acholi displacement 
camps, with slight variations between districts. As a structure to ‘create order’ in a 
humanitarian crisis situation this was a political institution, although different from what has 
been discussed in conflict studies literature regarding the transformation of political 
                                                          
19
 Interview, Gulu NGO Forum (03/02/2010) 
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institutions (Justino, 2013). It was introduced by external aid actors. This authority would 
profoundly shape the local politics (Harriss et al., 2004) in the camp and affect the political 
voice of the camp residents, much as Turner (2006) described for the refugee camps in 
Burundi.  
 
The camp leadership (or later: camp management system) was intended to enable efficient 
distribution of relief and to act as a communication channel. The hierarchical structure started 
from the top with the ‘camp commandant’, a camp resident who chaired a committee 
composed of other camp residents. The next level was the zone, called block or parish in some 
cases, which was headed by the Block Leader or Parish Leader and again a committee. The 
lowest level was the cell or village level, headed by a village leader and committee. In my two 
research sites people had largely settled according to their original parishes and villages, while 
in many camps such orderly settlement had not been possible and people from different areas 
lived mixed together. 
 
The camp leadership structure was thus established parallel to the formal LC system. On top of 
that the clan leadership continued to exist, forming another form of authority with different 
functions again (Dolan, 2009, p. 113). The reason for separate camp leadership was that 
humanitarian agencies considered the LC leaders to be politicians, hence unsuitable for relief 
structures that needed to adhere to the concept of humanitarian neutrality. Yet the LC system 
in the North was not suspended during the insurgency. Since the Lamwo/Chua camps were in 
most cases established at the sub-county centres, the LC3, LC2 and LC1 levels formally 
continued to exist and all Local Government elections were carried out. According to many aid 
actors the LCs became completely ‘redundant’, while officials themselves said they were 
‘dormant’ but insisted they were in place. Field data in this research suggested they continued 
to perform certain tasks, but were definitely overshadowed by the camp leadership. The 
introduction of camp leadership often led to friction with the LCs, because the LCs felt 
deprived of their functions, authority and status:  
 
During camp time, we had some difficulty. Even with the NGOs. Most of the NGOs 
who were coming here, were coming directly to the camp leadership, not to the LCs. 
They were thinking, the LCs are somehow political. So when it comes to distribution 
of materials, maybe they will take sides with somebody who has voted him or her, 
who is a supporter. But they were going to the camp leaders. So that one created 
gaps between the LCs and the camp leaders. 
LC3 chair man, Lamwo district 
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Since the humanitarian agencies communicated directly with the camp commandant they 
legitimised that authority and undermined the legitimacy of LCs. However, in many cases LC 
members doubled as camp leaders. For example, the camp commandant that had been in 
charge of the camp in Lamwo was LC2 chair person before the camp started. A former camp 
commandant in Chua declared he had been ‘a rebel’ in the UPDA fighting the NRA when it took 
over, but had later crossed over to the NRA. People had elected him as camp commandant, 
because he was educated and knew how to engage with the military.  
 
Humanitarian actors organised the election of camp leaders in all camps. In the Lamwo camp, 
which started in 1997, the LC3 and LC2 chairmen had coordinated the settlement process prior 
to the election. They registered people and planned their settlement, village by village and 
parish by parish. One of these LC2 chairpersons was elected camp commandant, as he 
recounted: 
 
In February 1998 I was elected as Camp Commandant. This was a directive by the 
Community Development Officer at the district and was implemented under 
surveillance of Oxfam GB. They [the camp residents] started by electing village 
leaders, nine people in a committee for each village. You nominated a name, and they 
were seconded by someone. People discussed and the nominees got some time to 
talk to the people. Then there was election by lining up behind the candidate. Then in 
the parish, the village committees formed the electoral college. They selected a 
committee for the parish, from among themselves or outside. The parish leaders 
came together and elected a Camp Commandant from among themselves. Also the 
vice, secretary, women affairs, mass mobilisation and education, health, security, 
treasurer, information & publicity. 
Former camp commandant, Lamwo district 
 
Initially the main task of the camp leadership was to oversee the distribution of relief, starting 
from the registration of camp residents and people with special needs, to supervision of the 
distribution when relief arrived. The scope of its responsibilities soon broadened to overseeing 
all basic services in the camp such as water and sanitation, health and education, in close 
collaboration with the aid agencies. The camp leadership was the implementing body. The 
secretaries on the committees of the camp leadership had designated roles and 
responsibilities, e.g. for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, education etc. For 
example, the secretary for WASH at the village/block level inspected whether the residents 
maintained hygiene in their compounds, the secretaries at parish level checked the 
maintenance of latrines in the zone, and at the camp commandant level the NGO interventions 
were discussed. The levels of the camp leadership structure also became the channel for 
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information from humanitarian agents downwards. Dates for ‘cleaning the camp’, special 
distributions and projects were announced following the structure.  
 
As the responsibilities of the camp leadership expanded they gained increasing control over 
the camp residents. Not only did they have control over food distribution and services, but also 
over people’s mobility and behaviour. When someone wanted to travel to town or to visit 
relatives in a different camp he/she had to obtain a letter from the camp commandant, 
stamped by the LC1. For security purposes the camp leadership played an important role in 
interacting with the UPDF. Furthermore, they were involved in managing social relations and 
dispute resolution, although this also remained a function of the LCs.  
 
To manage the camp affairs, camp leaders created ‘by-laws’ or let the zone population create 
rules themselves in the same way it was done in the LC system. They also oversaw compliance 
with the regulations, thus adopting ‘judicial powers’, as reflected in this quotation from the 
camp commandant:  
 
When I was in office I thought, how do I manage so many people? How do I put them 
down [discipline them]? The idea of the by-laws just came to me. I sent the secretary 
for security to explain the situation everywhere. By-laws were passed: fighting and 
violence were not allowed. If you do so, you will be caned. In each village they had to 
make by laws to protect themselves. [...] I put in a by-law prohibiting the selling of 
distributed food. If they make an offence, a person is brought in front of his village 
committee and the entire community. If it meant strokes, then this is given. That 
system eased my administration.  
Former camp commandant, Lamwo district 
 
To the camp residents the camp leadership was seen as the highest authority in the camp. Due 
to their multitude of tasks and formalised powers they were considered more important than 
the LCs. As the roles of camp leaders expanded, the functioning of the LC system was severely 
disrupted. Dolan writes how the Gulu district authorities appealed to NGOs and UN agencies to 
‘respect the legal basis of the Local Council Government when working in or visiting the camps 
and always approach them first’ (2009, p. 114). In the last stage of the conflict the district 
government started to restore the authority of the LC system, until the camp leadership was 
formally abolished in 2008. The camp commandant in Lamwo remembered that especially 
after the 2006 elections ‘The government wanted that the government leaders started to work 
with us, because people were forgetting them. So from now there was a bit change and we had 
to work hand in hand with them.’ However, as explained in Chapter 2, due to the change to a 
multi-party system no elections were carried out for LC1 and LC2 level in 2006. This meant LC1 
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and LC2 members that were elected in 2001 officially continued to serve up to 2013. Yet many 
positions became vacant because members had died or migrated, or simply ‘lost interest’. This 
was a problem all over Uganda, but further complicated in Acholi due to the camps. 
 
6.1.3 Camp security  
 
The UPDF was another powerful authority in the camp and the key actor to deliver protection. 
Some argue that the government actively intended to use the camps for political suppression, 
in which the military played an active role. Aware that the failures in relief could lead to 
resistance the government stepped up the security in order to prevent popular protests 
(Branch, 2009). This may be one explanation for the fact that no large-scale protests against 
the failures in humanitarian relief emerged in Acholi (2009, p. 495).  
  
Military barracks were located in the middle of the camp, surrounded by the huts of the 
residents, prompting the question of who was protecting whom (Dolan, 2009). In various ways 
the military contributed to the insecurity Acholi experienced, first of all by not taking action 
when rebel movements were reported to them, or responding late. Respondents gave 
numerous accounts of when the UPDF told people off and refused to leave the barracks. 
Secondly, the military itself engaged in criminal activities against the population, like theft, 
rape and other violent forms of abuse, which have been widely covered (Dolan, 2009; Hurifo, 
2002).  
 
In various stages of the conflict the government stimulated the formation of groups of armed 
civilians to fight alongside the army, against the LRA. In 1992 ‘Bow and Arrow groups’ were 
formed, as explained in Chapter 4, which provoked a backlash. Later on the government again 
recruited people, now as Local Defence Units (LDUs), provided them with training and armed 
them with guns. This intervention was heavily criticised by civil society, but since the security 
situation had deteriorated significantly this made many men join the LDUs to engage in 
protection activities. From mid-2003 more than 30,000 male civilians across Acholi, Lango and 
Teso took up arms (Dolan, 2010).  
 
Insecurity persisted in the camps. During periods of high-intensity LRA activity the LRA 
attacked the IDP camps. They looted shops, stores and markets, and killed and abducted 
residents. Branch explains how residents in camps in Gulu left the camp to sleep in the bush 
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after distribution of relief due to the likelihood of the rebels coming for it (Branch, 2009). 
There were also attacks on camps that were of a symbolic nature: to demonstrate that the LRA 
disagreed with the displacement camps as a government measure, to demonstrate their 
strength or avenge attacks launched against the LRA. They could destroy a large part of the 
camp by setting only a few huts on fire, since the fire easily spread. Several camps experienced 
massacres in which many people were killed in a matter of hours.  
 
To conclude, the ‘myriad of actors’ (Morvaridi, 2008) involved in governing the camp 
population did not just create a ‘humanitarian space’ (Nyers, 2006) in the camps. It also meant 
a continuation of insecurity due to LRA activities and an extension of the militarised 
environment due to military control, like people had experienced at home. The population in 
the Chua research site continued to experience the warscape at home, until they were 
displaced into camps in 2003. Until 2003 they continued their way of life as described in 
Chapter 5. The population in the Lamwo research site was displaced in 1997 and lived with 
camp leadership from that moment onwards, until the camp started to be phased out in 2007. 
The following sections describe how life evolved in the camps, elaborate on the camp politics 
and show how the configuration of powers in the camps affected the ‘petitioning voice’ and 
the ‘interrogative voice’ of the population.  
 
6.2 Daily struggles: coping agency in the camps 
 
It is not difficult to imagine that camp life, thousands of people confined on a small area of 
land, was full of hardships. The harsh living conditions, deteriorating health situation and social 
problems have been described in detail by others (Branch, 2009; Dolan, 2009; Finnström, 
2003). In individual interviews and ranking exercises in focus groups respondents prioritised 
the problems they experienced in the camps. Food and security were people’s primary 
concerns, just as before the camps, and stood out head and shoulders above all other 
problems. Next in priority was a category referred to as ‘social problems’, signalling changes in 
social institutions (Justino, 2013). Health and water were ranked next. The overpopulated 
camps and poor sanitation facilities made the population extremely vulnerable to epidemics, 
especially the young children. 
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In this section I elaborate the forms of agency the Acholi developed in response to camp life 
and the problems they faced. I start with how they sought to maintain their livelihoods, 
including the gendered experience of it, followed by security. 
 
6.2.1. Securing food and livelihoods 
 
The distribution of relief by humanitarian actors did not guarantee that households had 
enough to eat. When the camps had just formed it was particularly hard, since food 
distribution started later and sub-county centres offered few facilities for so many people. 
Food and water were the first issues that were addressed by humanitarian actors, but involved 
many challenges. Respondents said that the rations were too small and were finished before 
new supplies were brought. Often the relief did not come on the expected date, sometimes 
being delayed for weeks. In a few instances it happened that the relief supplies were of bad 
quality or even rotten. One woman said: ‘In the camp I had the problem of food. My children 
and I would sometimes sleep without eating food’. A major problem was that names were 
regularly missing from the distribution list. This could take months to be rectified, leaving 
entire families in a difficult situation. The problem could be caused ‘in town’ e.g. at the WFP 
office by a ‘computer problem’, but the camp leadership itself was notorious for ‘embezzling’ 
the food rations.  
 
My life was not fine when I was in the camp, because my name was not included 
among the names of the other community members who were getting food. I stayed 
for 8 months without getting relief and then later my name was entered. I went 
together with other members to the camp and our names were written together, but 
when the cards came out my card was not there and you cannot get food without a 
card.  
Man, age 48, Chua district 
 
Security regulations, such as the restrictions on mobility, limited livelihood opportunities 
around the camp. One woman said with much frustration: ‘My life during the insecurity was 
hard. I had no land for digging. I just had to wait for food from the government, yet I was 
capable of digging!’ As a consequence, it was a daily preoccupation of the camp population to 
secure food, and a livelihood more generally:   
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I used to come and collect firewood from our village for sale to earn a living since my 
name was not included among the people who were getting food. I also dug for the 
people that had gardens near the camp and in return they either gave me food or 
money. I was also doing metal work like making hoes and axes.  
Man, age 39, Chua district 
 
People tended to sell the posho or maize from WFP to get money and buy better 
food. Women mostly used posho to make the local brew called ‘kwete’ and then sell it 
to buy better food for themselves.  
Man, age 46, Lamwo district 
 
The land directly surrounding the camp was cultivated by its owners, at least when the security 
situation allowed. Some of them rented out plots to other camp residents. Numerous small 
petty businesses developed. Local smiths who had brought their tools continued their work. 
Men worked at construction sites in the centre as ‘helpers’. Women started small canteens to 
cook for the military and later for the NGOs to cater for their ‘training lunches’ in large 
numbers. They also did paid work for the army, like fetching water, sweeping the compounds 
and washing clothes. A big business was to brew and sell the local alcohol.  
 
Apart from these economic activities a range of informal strategies developed. Stealing from 
neighbours, renting out the same plot of land to several people and getting away with the 
money were some examples. Tricks with relief supplies constituted another. Though it was 
prohibited to sell relief supplies some people did so to get money for buying basic necessities 
or simply to ‘diversify their diet’. Some people lied about the number of persons in the 
household to increase the food ration. Around Kitgum town, where mobility was easier, some 
people were registered in more than one camp and received food in both places. Most camp 
residents considered these activities not as a form of cheating, but as a necessary response to 
shortages or poor quality relief supplies. Then there were instances where cheating with relief 
became a ‘business’, usually organised by better-placed actors such as camp leaders. The trade 
in sacks that ‘dropped off the trucks’ (sometimes to the disadvantage of other camp residents) 
must have involved networks of residents, volunteers of agencies and sellers in town.  
 
There was also a darker side to these coping mechanisms. Parents were accused of forcing 
their older children to engage in prostitution. Other people took the real risk of breaking the 
rules and secretly left the camp to cut firewood or bamboo or find crops still remaining in 
home villages, and sold these things in the camp. These activities reflected the gravity of the 
situation, and what people were forced to do in order to make ends meet. 
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The daily struggles of camp life disproportionally affected women. Fetching water was 
traditionally a woman’s responsibility in Acholi, which in the camp meant lining up for hours in 
the sun. Another task was to collect firewood. With military escorts they moved further away 
from the camp to find wood, which was a safety risk. Women described it to me as something 
they feared. On the way back they were told to slash the bushes on the sides of roads leading 
to the camp to enhance visibility: a security measure to prevent rebels from approaching 
unseen. 
 
Then, given the shortage of food and cash, while under pressure to feed their children, 
respondents explained how women engaged in highly unequal sexual relationships with men 
in camp leadership positions, shop keepers, soldiers and even humanitarian volunteers. Abuse 
of power was even clearer in a few cases where women were denied food rations if they 
refused to have sex. Though the specific vulnerabilities of women in displacement camps must 
be recognised, so must their agency. Their strategies to meet the livelihood needs of their 
families, the caring for neighbours and relatives demonstrated their strengths. Their agency is 
a double-edged sword, however, because in practice it meant they had more responsibilities 
than men. 
 
6.2.2 Engagement in protection 
 
People in any [camp] meeting could try to talk to the government officials and leaders 
to add more soldiers to the place, but always little was done. Then the issue of 
recruiting ‘Acholi Okeco’ [Acholi are angry] came in and the ex-soldiers, youth and LC1 
got recruited to protect their own people, since they complained that government 
was doing very little to protect them and they got trained by the soldiers and got guns 
and fought off the rebels from their different areas.  
Man, age 46, Lamwo district 
 
When asked who were important for the protection of the camp population, the majority of 
respondents first spoke about the Local Defence Units (LDUs) and not about the army. In the 
past there had been strong resistance against the Bow and Arrow groups, mainly because it 
had put all people at risk. But later on the security situation worsened and the military 
responded so badly that the balance tipped over to the other side. Any form of protection was 
better than none and the LDUs could provide it. Naturally, there was also a downside to it. 
Many lost their lives or were permanently injured. But also, membership of an LDU gave a 
form of power, which led to instances of abuse. 
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Opinions about the recruitment of civilians in both research sites were diverse. Many 
respondents first of all showed their appreciation for the work of the LDUs, since they played 
such an important role in the protection of the population. ‘We thank the government for 
providing them with guns’, was what I heard several women say in the focus group discussions. 
However, the wide appreciation of the intense work of those who joined the LDUs did not 
mean that people uniformly agreed with the creation of the LDUs as a security intervention by 
the government. In various parts of the region people opposed this action (Finnström, 2003, p. 
145). But the government’s failure to provide adequate protection left people with no other 
option than to engage in LDUs. On top of that, for many men the LDUs offered a way to regain 
control over one’s life and enabled them to fulfil their male responsibilities, which were 
important aspects of an identity that had been lost.  
 
Few respondents commented that in principle protection ought to be a state responsibility. 
However, given the state of emergency people were in, many now perceived the arming of 
civilians as a form of state support. The following quotations show this contrast: 
 
That [LDUs] was a brilliant idea, because if it wasn’t for the LDUs the rebels could still 
exist up to now. LDUs could fight seriously and had proper coordination with the 
civilians and therefore the civilians could show them the direction of the rebels. 
Man, age 26, Lamwo district 
 
It was a bad decision because the soldiers were the ones to fight the rebels, not 
civilians themselves. If the soldiers were not enough in number, the government 
should have recruited more and also could have brought them from other divisions 
from other parts of the country. But it was the plan of the government to finish the 
Acholi as a tribe by letting them fight their own brothers. 
Focus group, 2 men, age 45 and 32, Lamwo district 
 
It was a good idea because if they had left only the soldiers to protect us I think 
almost every one of us would have died. It was a good decision, because we were 
going to be finished by the rebels. 
Woman, age 30, Chua district 
 
To see this intervention as government support first of all reflects the hard situation, and 
secondly it shows that people’s ideas about state responsibilities had shifted. I come back to 
this issue in section 6.5. The second quotation shows how the Acholi felt the government was 
against them, which is telling for their sense of citizenship at this point. I will now discuss forms 
of social organisation and how social roles changed in the camp 
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6.3 Social institutions in the camp 
 
The camp was a unique but enduring setting for social life. The proximity of neighbours and 
relatives definitely helped in surviving the harsh camp conditions. However, with thousands of 
people in a confined space, with huts sometimes only a metre apart, social problems were 
bound to emerge. This section describes both the positive and the negative consequences of 
the camp for collective life, with specific reference to how social roles altered. On the one 
hand, the narratives demonstrated how important social relations are for coping with war 
(Colletta & Cullen, 2000). On the other hand, it shows that the challenging camp conditions put 
pressure on social relations, and led to a transformation of certain roles (Justino, 2013).  
 
In the autonomous social spaces for engagement that existed independently from the camp 
governance regime a lot of activity and initiative occurred. Numerous support networks were 
formed to help neighbours and relatives in times of need. It was mostly women who were 
involved in caring, taking responsibility for the sick, widows and orphans. Through these 
networks the Acholi managed to secure livelihoods and care in a variety of ways:  
 
People used to help each other by selling food at lower prices to those whose names 
were not on the list for food distribution.  
Man, age 39, Chua district 
 
Through borrowing from the neighbour and relatives. Through giving things on credit 
if someone has a problem and needs help, like money and also help in providing 
transport like a bicycle in case someone is sick and unable to walk. 
Man, age 40, Lamwo district 
 
Social networks and institutions were also important for maintaining a sense of collectivity. 
Funerals were important social gatherings where everyone paid a small contribution, but also 
confirmed their relationships through mourning with the family of the deceased. Forms of 
organisations like the farming groups (grup mepwu) and savings groups (bol i cup or kalulu) 
were already in existence before the camp started. In the camp many groups stopped 
functioning, but the system of group work continued to exist. New groups formed to cultivate 
the small plots around the camp.  
 
Many NGOs that came in from 2004 onwards started to form a diverse range of groups for 
their projects: for farming, youth and women’s groups, and cultural groups for traditional 
dances. Savings groups were boosted with credit programmes that introduced modern 
features such as interest rates and loans.  
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There were very many small savings groups in the camp which brought many people 
together. In those groups, members have specific amounts that they have to save 
every week, then after some time like 6 months they open the box and count the 
amount and give it to each member of the group; the exact amount they contributed, 
because a member is entitled to get a loan from their groups. Not more than the 
amount he/she contributed, in case they want to start a business or have a problem. 
Man, age 26, Lamwo district 
 
Later on groups formed in response to government programmes such as Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund (NUSAF). Many NGOs selected group members from different villages in 
order to realise broader coverage of beneficiaries. Now that most people have returned home 
many of these groups have been dismantled, because the distances between villages are too 
big to maintain the group. In Chua, where the displacement lasted about five years, I 
encountered instances of ‘old’ groups that had existed prior to the camps and reunited after 
their members had returned home. In Lamwo, where displacement lasted ten years, I did not 
hear of this and I only encountered new groups. This suggests that the duration of 
displacement affects how easily people can resume old institutions, as too much may have 
changed in the meantime. 
 
However, many social problems arose in the camps. Increased crime and violence were part of 
the daily reality, often as a result of excessive alcohol consumption among both men and 
women, but also due to boredom as the result of ‘having no garden, no work, no purpose’. And 
as much as the Acholi formed supportive relationships to secure food, the scarcity of food and 
commodities also formed a source of social conflict.  
 
People never wanted their things to be touched - for example: jerry cans - and some 
people never wanted other children to get into their compounds. For example if they 
lend your child a jerry can and it gets broken, they would make you pay. 
Woman, age 33, Chua district  
 
There was jealousy between people or groups. For example, during the registration in 
the camp, I have registered seven people in my house. When the list came out, I 
found that I have 8 names. People started shouting at me that I have included a ghost 
person and they went and reported me to the village leader.  
Woman, age 43, Lamwo district 
 
Social divisions in the camp and politics formed another source of low-level tension. These 
often played out between ordinary camp residents and the family members of camp leaders, 
and between supporters from different political parties. Around election time tensions 
between supporters of different political parties occurred. But party membership also became 
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a mechanism in the distribution of the scarce resources that were available to people, e.g. 
when the camp leadership only hired NRM supporters for paid work.   
 
People felt strongly that social problems such as disputes, petty crime and alcohol abuse had 
worsened significantly due to camp life. At the same time, the social structures and 
mechanisms for dispute resolution that were part of the Acholi culture were affected (See 
Mariana’s explanation, Annex 3). Elders and clan leaders traditionally played a leading role in 
reconciliation between those involved in a fight. However, their social status had been eroded 
in various ways. First of all, when they moved to the camp they had to leave behind objects 
used in reconciliation rituals and could no longer access sacred areas such as hills, rocks and 
streams. Secondly, the teaching of the younger generations was disrupted. Wang oo, the 
evenings sitting around the fire in which the elders educated the youth about adult life, as 
explained in Chapter 5, were now disrupted due to the curfews. Thirdly, clan leaders lost 
authority over people, since they left the soil that formed the basis of that authority. Finally, in 
the camp they became ‘ordinary persons’, because they had to line up for food like the other 
camp residents. This loss of status was exacerbated by their drinking, since they now no longer 
led an ‘exemplary life’. Thus, during the camp situation the legitimacy of elders and customary 
leaders suffered, which came on top of the challenge to their legitimacy at the beginning of 
the war, as explained before. They were, however, important authorities when it comes to 
ethnic citizenship, which I come back to in the last section. 
 
The war and encampment impacted heavily on social relations between men and women, 
among youth, and between youth and elders. This became clear from the many ‘social 
problems’ that were brought up by respondents. The elders felt that their authority was 
challenged. On top of that the generation gap between the elders and the youth widened, 
because the opinions of elders did not relate to the camp situation and problems of the youth.   
Adults, and especially the elders, pointed out the difficulty of ‘raising children in the right way’. 
‘The war spoiled the relation between men and women. They were young and not mature’ said 
women in a focus group. The youth developed habits such as playing cards and drinking. Boys 
and girls became sexually active at very early age, with girls often bearing the burden of early 
pregnancy, school drop-out and sexually transmitted diseases.  
 
Female respondents always raised ‘problems between men and women’, which underlined the 
impact of the war on gender relations (Annex 3). Domestic violence increased tremendously in 
the camps, which is considered as a symptom of the broader impact of the war (Dolan, 2009). 
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Alcohol abuse resulted in child neglect, domestic violence, and spending the little money 
families possessed on alcohol rather than fulfilling household needs. Since people have 
returned home, this situation seems to have reversed very little. Women indicate they are still 
the ones who bring up and ‘teach’ the children and do the bulk of the household and 
gardening work. Even though men work in the gardens, according to the women they work 
less than before the camps. 
 
My difficulties in the camp were domestic issues. My husband was not responsible in 
taking his duty as a man because he got things like food in the house, and my 
husband could sell it off and drink the money without doing something productive. 
My husband was beating me time and again. My husband could sell the food we get 
from UN and the little we cultivate. There was serious domestic violence which made 
me go back to my parents, up to only two months ago. There was a quarrel between 
me and my husband, and he chased me away. Chasing me from his home was 
something that made me very upset until when I came back. Quarrelling was a daily 
problem that I had with my husband when he is drunk and could abuse me.  
Woman, age 38, Chua district  
 
Dolan (2009, p. 191) explains how the war affected gender relations by altering masculinities 
and female identities. A common complaint among Acholi men, also in my data, was that the 
war ‘made them lose their masculinity’. In the camps men were deprived of their providing 
roles due to the distribution of relief, which moreover was allocated to the women in the 
households. Previously existing imbalances in the workload were exacerbated. Masculinities 
‘collapsed’ in two ways. In the first place, a ‘hegemonic masculinity’ emerged in the course of 
the war and the space and opportunities for alternative interpretations of masculinities 
disappeared. Secondly, this hegemonic masculinity forced forms of behaviour on men, while at 
the same time undermining their lived experiences of masculinity. The hegemonic masculinity 
Dolan (2009) writes about involved particular relationships of power over women and youth. 
Men were unable to meet gendered expectations of them, which led to frustration and the 
experience of feelings of impotence and humiliation. This caused various social and 
psychological problems such as alcoholism, suicide, engaging in violence (domestic, inter-
personal), but also found expression in enlistment in the armed forces.   
 
In the last phase of the war, from 2004-2006, the number of humanitarian actors that worked 
in the camps increased. Many of them created ‘IDP groups’: beneficiaries of skills building 
programmes, such as farming and saving, and ‘sensitisation’ campaigns on rights and various 
issues such as health and hygiene. People valued some of this training, in particular farming 
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skills and health-related knowledge. I return to how this has nurtured citizen engagement in 
section 6.5. 
 
6.4 Forms of citizen engagement  
 
Within the boundaries of the confined space that is the camp, living with a military presence 
and a hierarchical camp leadership structure, how did people organise themselves and what 
spaces did they find for citizen engagement over issues that critically affected them? The camp 
leadership structure and the committees offer potential channels for engagement. But Kaiser 
(2004, 2005) criticises such institutions, arguing that they do not offer opportunities for camp 
residents to participate in decision-making in camp affairs, but are mainly used for top-down 
dissemination of information. Turner (2006) and Malkki (1996) demonstrate that certain 
‘stronger’ actors may emerge from the camp population that take control of the mechanisms 
for engagement. In the Acholi case these were mainly the members of the camp leadership 
itself. 
 
The sections above showed the various strategies people developed to secure their food and 
safety, again demonstrating the creativity of the people in responding to a crisis situation as 
they had before they came to the camps (Lubkemann, 2008; Nordstrom, 1997). These were 
forms of coping agency. As for citizen agency, I sought to identify how it was expressed by 
asking about how people brought two priorities, food and security, into the public sphere, as 
the public sphere is a defining characteristic of citizen agency (R. Lister, 2003). As I was 
interested in political agency I asked how they exerted the petitioning and interrogative voice 
in their interactions with the camp authorities, as engagement with power holders is what 
Barter (2012) considers distinctive about political agency vis-a-vis coping agency. 
 
6.4.1 The petitioning voice  
 
To bring issues regarding relief into the public sphere, the camp leadership imposed a 
structure of strict procedures that forms of engagement had to follow. Basically, the 
population had two options. First of all, residents could report to one of the individual leaders. 
For example when the quality of relief supplies was below standard or even rotten this caused 
a lot of anxiety among the camp population, and they expressed themselves quite angrily to 
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the camp commandant, and let him take it up with WFP. Most of the time, however, people 
raised issues through the camp hierarchy: 
 
People could have voice through the camp Village Leaders, because they were the 
ones with much power during the camp situation, more than LC1. The welfare of the 
community was given in their hands and the Camp Commandant, for they could easily 
send the voice of the people to Camp Commandant and later it goes to WFP. The LC1 
could not do much because some of their powers were taken away by the Camp 
Commandant, therefore they could handle only small cases of theft and assault.  
Man, age 26, Lamwo district 
 
Both the camp leadership and the aid agencies strongly adhered to using the system and camp 
leaders discouraged any direct engagement with the NGOs. The effect was that the population 
was drilled to use the system as the primary channel for engagement.  
 
People were not having any power at all, but they had a say. When things are not 
good they should talk about it. I was very strict on them. They should not go directly 
to an NGO but come to me. At times the agencies brought rotten food. I would tell 
them ‘We are also human beings, we are in problems but we have the right to have 
food that is good for human consumption’. I would say this to the field staff of WFP 
and to the NGOs. The people respected me. They know I could talk better to NGOs 
than them. The NGOs also responded well to me. 
Camp commandant, Lamwo district 
 
Secondly, concerns could publicly be addressed in camp meetings, which frequently took place 
at the village and parish level, and at overall camp level. These were formal, invited spaces 
(Gaventa, 2006) called by the camp leadership, in which Block Leaders and the camp 
commandant, NGO representatives and sometimes LCs addressed the community. The agenda 
was set by camp leaders, who followed the agenda of the agencies. Although meetings did 
offer a space for people to react, it was largely a top-down channel of communication to 
inform the people about distribution of relief, day-to-day matters concerning the basic services 
in the camp, and to give instructions about the maintenance of the camp, e.g. dates for 
communal cleaning, work at the schools, and slashing the vegetation alongside the roads 
around the camp.  
 
In essence, the Acholi had very little power to actually influence or change how matters were 
run in the camp, including the nature of the governance regime itself. Their petitioning voice 
was to be exercised through the systems that were in place. Even the camp committees, which 
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the humanitarian actors considered a form of citizen participation, were mostly used for 
information transfer and consultation.20   
 
The community itself rarely called for public meetings, nor did I encounter instances of spaces 
created by the camp population in which they collectively mobilised to ensure better quality of 
relief supplies. Mostly they relied on smaller, informal strategies to express issues of concern, 
for instance, waiting for any meeting to be called by the camp leaders and raising their 
problem at the end. Also, people used other public gatherings attended by the camp leaders to 
raise issues, such as funerals or when food was distributed.  
 
The community themselves were putting pressure on the leader especially during 
food distribution which tends to bring together all the leaders and people, then 
people could express their views to the leaders with a lot of anger. 
Man, age 46, Lamwo district 
 
One of the reasons that people were not more persevering in pressuring the camp leaders and 
agencies was that they were to a great extent dependent on them to fulfil their most basic 
need, food. Although they would express their discontent about relief, their negotiating 
powers were severely limited: 
 
People brought into the [camp] meeting what they needed. They don’t demand. Any 
organisation can come in and give and they just appreciate it, for they were in 
problems.  
Camp commandant, Lamwo district 
 
In general people thus refrained from openly challenging the gaps in relief and other services. I 
now present the barriers to exercising the interrogative voice, including challenging the 
systems and discipline exercised by the camp leadership. Instead, they abided by the formal 
mechanisms and filled the gaps with the livelihood strategies they developed. These were also 
their main strategies regarding security matters. 
 
6.4.2 The risks of exercising the interrogative voice 
 
As described in section 6.1, the military and the camp leaders were the most powerful actors 
in the camp, having significant control over the mobility of the camp population, access to 
food and services, and information. In this section I zoom in on some of the problems 
                                                          
20
 Interview, AVSI (02/08/2010); AVSI (14/02/2010)  
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associated with the complex web of power relations between the military, the camp 
leadership and the camp population. In both research sites the presence of the military was 
experienced as a source of insecurity and control. In this section I show how the Acholi 
experienced their power and present the various strategies used to negotiate the power of the 
camp authorities and hold them accountable.   
 
Respondents highlighted the repressive characteristics of the military power. The curfew and 
mobility restrictions were implemented with force: anyone seen outside a certain distance 
from the camp was considered to be rebel and risked being shot. Whoever left the house at 
night after curfew could be arrested, jailed and beaten. If someone openly resisted, they risked 
being labelled a rebel or rebel collaborator. The army thus used its formal powers, but its more 
hidden coercive strategies of control were what people feared the most. Individual soldiers 
often harassed camp residents, but there were no functioning accountability mechanisms that 
could be used to seek redress. The following quotation is an example of this, which shows how 
connections between the military and the camp leadership created barriers to the Acholi using 
their interrogative voice.  
 
Soldiers were defiling our daughters and when you take the issue to leaders, then 
soldiers give them money and as the parent of the girl you are poor, you will be 
dodged by the leaders because of the money they took from the soldiers.  
Man, age 36, Lamwo district 
 
The camp leadership itself could not be held accountable either. The camp leadership united 
crucial functions: implementing powers (directed by the humanitarian agencies), maintaining 
law and order, and formulating by-laws (sometimes with input from the population). In other 
words, it was the legislature, executive and judiciary in one, with no separation of powers. 
Moreover, there was no form of ‘camp parliament’ or other body to provide the necessary 
checks and balances. Nor were there any mechanisms in place to make the camp leadership 
answerable or to give the population some control over their performance and hold them 
accountable21. Possibly because the entire camp situation was seen as something temporary, 
leaders were only elected once and there was no ‘term limit’. The population could thus not 
vote leaders out of office. Only towards the end of the camp phase did the district authorities 
in Kitgum town decide that new elections were to be held for the highest level of the camp 
commandants, after widespread complaints about their corruption. 
                                                          
21
 This information was validated in interviews with camp residents and humanitarian actors in Kitgum 
town. 
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Probably as a consequence of a lack of accountability mechanisms there was widespread 
abuse of power among camp leaders. Respondents listed numerous ways in which they had 
seen the camp leaders use their powers in their own interest, mostly to accumulate wealth. 
Some of their strategies did not necessarily harm the welfare of other camp residents, such as 
registering ‘ghost names’ or leaving the names of deceased camp residents on the lists in order 
to appropriate their food rations. Other practices actually did have negative impacts on other 
camp residents, as in the cases where camp leaders said that people’s names were ‘missing’ 
from the list and stole their relief, either to sell or consume it. They also corruptly diverted 
special distributions for vulnerable groups, for example when they were charged with the 
registration of orphans, widows, elderly or disabled people, they registered their own relatives 
and thus further disadvantaged already vulnerable camp residents. 
 
Camp residents encountered various barriers to using their interrogative voice for protesting 
such abuse. Because the camp leaders decided who was on the relief list many camp residents 
were reluctant to challenge their abusive behaviour.   
 
If you were an enemy of the camp leader your name would be removed, if it was 
already registered. Or your name would be registered but would not appear on the 
list when relief came. For example, I registered several times but did not get food 
relief. 
Woman, age 43, Lamwo district 
 
Camp leaders used to have many cards and with those cards they used all of them to 
get items for themselves. Sometimes they retain your card, instead of bringing those 
cards to everyone, they keep some of those cards. If you would go to them, they’d tell 
you that your card is not there. But when you leave they use those to get items for 
themselves. 
Focus group, women, Lamwo district 
 
Since any form of discontent was to be channelled through the camp leadership only, this 
made it difficult for people to complain about the leadership itself. At higher levels the leaders 
tended to protect one another. Only lower level leaders could in some cases be held 
accountable, depending on how well-connected they were with higher-level camp leaders or 
with security actors. This would usually occur in public meetings. 
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There was a block leader who kept some of the things for himself, like a saucepan, 
after a Red Cross distribution. People called for a meeting and pointed out the bad 
things the block leader was doing. People decided that the block leader should be 
removed but he was not removed. 
Man, age 30, Chua district 
 
Spontaneous citizen mobilisation against abusive camp leaders could be a risk. The arbitrary 
use of power by the camp leadership undermined the will of citizens to openly resist or 
challenge camp authorities, because the possible consequences of losing food rations or one’s 
freedom were too great. The only options the Acholi were left with were in the informal, often 
‘hidden’ domain. Discontent found its outlet in ‘quietly complaining at home’, gossip and 
jokes. But the main strategy to deal with misconduct was to fill the gaps: the livelihood 
strategies people developed, finding loopholes in the systems to cheat, and engagement in 
LDUs. These strategies cannot be seen as active resistance, only as signs that the system was 
not adequately working for the displaced population.  
 
The geographical location of camps and the security hazards influenced people’s opportunities 
for voice and accountability strategies. The camp in Lamwo was on one of the ‘LRA corridors’ 
with high prevalence of rebel activity during the war. It meant that relief was delivered with 
longer intervals and the camp was thus less frequently visited by officials or aid workers, 
especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Possibilities for information and communication in 
this period were also limited. It meant that the camp population had limited access to Kitgum 
town and thus to higher levels of authority or the offices of the humanitarian agencies. Many 
respondents cited this as a major problem for raising complaints about relief itself or about the 
camp leaders in charge of distribution, although many also said that complaints could only be 
raised through the hierarchical system and it would be hard for ordinary camp residents to 
visit the offices anyway. Also, the population of this camp could make less use of social 
networks connecting them to town. It was only during the last phase of displacement that 
humanitarian actors started to open ‘complaints desks’ in the camps, where people could raise 
concerns, and at least they were informed about any misconduct. Whether this led them to 
hold leaders accountable from the top down was not clarified in this study. 
 
There have, however, been instances where open protest and mobilisation did occur. In two 
events at the Lamwo site the camp population revolted at points where misconduct by 
powerful actors had reached the limits of what people would bear. It resonates with Scott’s 
point (1990) about under which conditions hidden transcripts may cross into the public 
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domain. In these cases people’s top priorities, food and safety, were at risk and led them to 
cross the boundary of keeping up a docile appearance.  
 
The first instance occurred when the district authorities announced that new elections for 
camp commandants should be organised, in response to grave misconduct in most camps. This 
happened only in 2006. The sub-county chief in the Lamwo site then misinformed the camp 
population that the current camp commandant was ousted with immediate effect and that he 
would take over. In this particular camp, people disagreed with the behaviour of the camp 
leader who had cheated with relief, but their overall opinion was that he had done a good job 
in negotiations with the agencies and the military. The truth soon came out and a large crowd 
gathered in the centre, carrying sticks and stones to teach the parish chief a lesson. They 
believed he was incapable and an even a bigger liar and could pose a risk to the quantity of 
relief they received. He had to hide in a shop to prevent aggression from escalating. The camp 
commandant intervened and released him. 
 
A second event was a major failure of the UPDF to protect the camp against the LRA. The LRA 
had often launched attacks on the camp to loot relief, abducting people on the way out. Then 
once it happened that the rebels came in as deep as the centre of the camp, by the main street 
and the army barracks. They looted and destroyed shops along the main street, they burned 
huts and killed as well as abducted a number of camp residents. Anger and protest erupted 
among the camp residents. The next day, they marched to the army barracks to express their 
grievances in protest. The camp commandant said he had to intervene to ‘cool them down’.  
 
The people went up to the army barracks. They yelled: ‘Instead of coming out of your 
trenches around the barracks you are going in it!’ Some people were former soldiers. 
‘Give us your guns!’ they said, ‘you just sit down getting your allowance!’ I then called 
that meeting. People were very vocal in that meeting. They demanded the Resident 
District Commissioner22 to be there. He came a few times. Also the commander of the 
army, who is based in Gulu, came here. People were very serious: ‘You talk to your 
soldiers. They drink too much. They only sleep in the barracks and do nothing!’   
Camp Commandant, Lamwo district 
 
These events were confirmed in various interviews with other inhabitants of the sub-county. 
As a result of this protest the battalion of soldiers responsible was transferred and replaced – 
without further retributive action. Another effect was that the population stepped in to 
                                                          
22
 The Resident District Commissioner (RDC) is a Presidential appointee to the distict who oversees 
security and government programmes. 
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engage in protection activities. Together with the soldiers they dug a security road surrounding 
the camp where army vehicles could patrol. The event was an important incentive for youth 
and former soldiers to join the LDUs in the recruitment wave around 2002.  
 
6.5 Implications for the practice of citizenship 
 
What Harrell-Bond wrote in 1999 would still be a valid statement: ‘What is not known is how 
growing up or living out one’s old age as a camp refugee dependent on international aid for 
survival impacts on these different age groups; for example, on children, adolescents and the 
elderly’ (1999, p. 138). Knowledge has progressed on understanding the differential experience 
of the camp for youth and women. Still little is known about the lasting effects of the camp 
experience after return. Methodologically this is a challenging issue. After all, how can we be 
certain that current attitudes and behaviour are a result of living in displacement camps and 
not anything else? This section describes what the Acholi themselves said about this in relation 
to citizenship practice. I will also make some observations about the more intangible 
experiences.  
 
Regarding practices, most respondents described concrete skills they had learnt while in the 
camp, but a few also identified new habits that had emerged. People referred to ‘socialisation’ 
and practical skills as positive outcomes of the camp situation. The Acholi explanation of 
‘socialisation’ was understood as the various activities that brought people together, which 
especially younger generations considered important.  
 
I learnt staying together in groups. I joined a group of youth whereby we could advise 
ourselves, especially students on how to stay in congested places where prostitution 
is practised, alcoholism among the youth as well. So in the evenings we could come 
together for discussions of questions and advise fellow group members on how to 
stay for the well being of the camp. 
Man, age 26, Lamwo district  
 
As mentioned, a number of humanitarian actors initiated activities and groups, thus creating 
new social institutions in the form of beneficiary groups or sensitisation groups. Given the 
emphasis on social institutions for learning citizenship, these institutions could potentially be 
safe spaces for learning. Certain individuals, who had been ‘NGO focal persons’ and were 
therefore exposed to many activities, seemed to have gained experience with engagement 
(see Alfred’s story, Annex 4). Those respondents who had been ‘ordinary beneficiaries’ 
230 
 
acknowledged that certain skills had been interesting and helpful, but that their own social 
networks had been more relevant in surviving the camp. NGO activities were short-term, and 
groups were put together based on needs assessment and therefore members did not always 
know each other well enough for a group to be sustained for the project. Furthermore, the 
skills and knowledge gained in NGO-induced social institutions seemed thin and text-book 
style. For instance, several aid actors carried out training on human rights. When asked what 
people had learnt about rights literally everyone answered ‘women’s and children’s rights’:  
 
They used to teach that everyone has rights, also children. We came back with these 
skills and try to apply them. [...] We learnt children have rights, for you do not beat 
bad children. With your wife you sit down and discuss instead of beating her.  
Man, Chua district 
 
It was beyond the scope of this research to study the impact of rights training, but the manner 
in which people talked about rights in individual interviews gave some indications. For 
children’s rights, respondents were aware they should not be beaten, and that parents were 
obliged to send them to school and foresee in all aspects of care. In general, children’s rights 
were more appreciated than women’s rights, since women’s rights were often understood as 
‘handing over’ the authority from men to women. In a context where men already had the 
feeling that their manhood was threatened, as explained earlier, women’s rights were thus 
treated with suspicion by most male respondents. What was remembered is that one should 
not beat his wife, but ‘sit down and discuss with her’23 , yet the high prevalence of domestic 
violence demonstrated that this was not practised. Also shared responsibility over chores and 
child care remained a precarious issue. Thus, while many rights awareness training sessions 
provided knowledge, it was not enough to challenge male domination of institutions for 
decision-making or at home.  
 
Concrete skills and training were relatively easy to identify. Less obvious were certain practices 
that developed during the camp time and have become embedded in the way things are done. 
One of these practices was how community issues were discussed and resolved in meetings. 
The pre-existing practice of community meetings was ‘extended’ with the formation of sub-
committees with specific responsibilities, such as water management committees, and 
including women. Partly as the result of training, but also due to the many years these 
institutions had functioned, some of them continued after the camp. Saving groups had 
existed before, but adopted new mechanisms in the camp that continued to be used at home. 
                                                          
23
 This phrase was often used in individual interviews with the men. 
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Although these institutions built citizen capacities to cooperate among themselves I found no 
clear examples of groups starting to interact with local government.  
 
Another practice had to do with leadership styles and ways of communicating with the leaders. 
Whereas when at home the LC1 is practically the only leader they engage with, and sometimes 
the LC2 and a parish chief, in the camp they encountered many leaders at different levels of 
authority, each with their own style of leadership. Respondents expressed that it was very 
important for leaders to be honest and transparent, that they carefully explain everything that 
was going on to the wider community in public meetings, and not ‘favour’ or ‘segregate’24 
people. Some respondents said they had learnt that good leaders should first of all cooperate 
among themselves in order to do good for the community. Others emphasised they had learnt 
to work the multi-level system of governance to raise concerns: 
 
People learnt how to raise their voice: they should make follow-ups with the leaders if 
they want their voice to be represented. Also people learnt that if you want your 
issues to reach the district you can do it through LC 1, but you don’t go direct.  
Man, age 35, Lamwo district  
 
There was also a downside to this. People had learnt to work within a hierarchical system, 
which was imposed as the only way to channel concerns. Any engagement that by-passed the 
system was discouraged. The Acholi thus had little experience of what could be done if issues 
remained unresolved at the very local level.  
 
They know about their right to correct leaders. They do not do it in front of the 
community. But as executive they take LC1 aside and tell him. It is easy, because if he 
does something bad it will affect the whole community. Only to LC1. If you correct 
LC2, he might think you are minimising him. So you stop at LC1. 
Man, Chua district 
 
The effect of the population’s long-term subordinate position to the camp leadership and the 
military was one of the key intangible, yet salient, factors that emerged. This difficult position 
intersected with prevailing cultural norms about authority, as will be explained in Chapter 7. It 
thus deepened existing cultural barriers to ‘speaking truth to power’ by instigating the fear of 
reprisal.  
 
                                                          
24
 The words ‘favouring’ and ‘segregation’ are often used to refer to patronage along clan/ ethnic lines. 
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6.6 Implications for the Acholi sense of citizenship 
 
In Chapter 2 I indicated that displacement often has an emotional impact on the individual 
refugee (Kaiser, 2004; Malkki, 1996), due to feelings uprootedness and uncertainty. The 
literature on forced migration shows that the understanding of citizenship among refugees, as 
a political community in a particular territory, is shaped by humanitarian agencies, the host 
state, and refugee regimes. Nyer’s (2006) ‘humanitarian space’ and Fassin’s concept of 
‘humanitarian government’ (Fassin, 2007) in refugee camps hint at citizenship being recast. It 
is argued that humanitarian interventions shape, even make, subjects (Malkki, 1996). Feldman 
(2007) demonstrates that humanitarian practice on the ground, especially the creation of 
refugee categories, shapes the political vocabulary and expressions of community and 
citizenship. Authors highlight that refugees have little power to influence humanitarian actors 
or make claims (Harrell-Bond, 1999, 2002b; Malkki, 1996; Nyers, 2006). These issues have not 
been addressed in depth for the internally displaced, but it suggests that Acholi citizenship 
unfolds in a dialectic relationship to the actors that govern the camp.  
 
Here I argue that Acholi citizenship was recast to become ‘camp citizenship’, which 
undermined their sense of citizenship. I use ‘camp citizenship’ for two reasons: first of all, to 
highlight the notion of confinement that restricted the freedoms of Acholi citizens; secondly, 
humanitarian actors were indeed important for delivering services and fulfilling basic needs, 
but a number of other actors played a role in governing the camp. The camp leadership was 
not a state institution, and although invented by the humanitarian actors it was not made up 
of these actors. The military had to deliver security and was a key actor in camp governance. 
And also those state actors involved in taking decisions over the interventions during the LRA 
war shaped the lives of the camp population. Camp citizenship thus addresses the particularity 
of confinement, and the relationship between the camp population and the multiple actors 
that govern the camp. 
 
The fact that the Acholi had not ‘lost’ their nation-state clearly did not mean they did not 
experience the same ‘sense of loss’ as refugees do. If the meaning of citizenship comes with a 
set of entitlements and rights, in particular related to the state’s responsibility to protect and 
provide for basic needs, then clearly the situation of internal displacement meant that the 
Acholi lost full citizenship. Finnström (2003) therefore questions whether the distinction 
between IDP and refugee was useful at all in their case. Their case demonstrates that also the 
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existence of IDPs challenges the state-centred focus of citizenship and the state-nation-
territory triad (Nyers, 2006).  
 
I reflect on the implications of the camp experience for a sense of citizenship by looking at how 
it affected the dignity, security and equality of the Acholi. What happened to the Acholi sense 
of citizenship needs to be seen in close relationship to the constellation of powers that 
dominated the camp. Their primary relationship to authority was no longer to the state, but to 
the military and camp leadership, with implications for each of the three key aspects of Acholi 
citizenship. 
 
Regarding security, the creation of the camps goes back to a fundamental question: did it 
demonstrate state failure to prevent a situation from escalating, or an adequate response? 
The government itself claimed it initiated the camps as a protection measure. For the 
population of the Lamwo site, the move to the camp was their way to find protection after the 
LRA attacks of January 1997. Living in the camps, despite the harsh conditions, was seen as an 
improvement in their situation. A large number of respondents therefore said that the 
government had helped them by establishing the camps. Others were more critical and argued 
that if the government had done enough the camps would not have been necessary at all. The 
same can be argued for the LDUs. The security situation had deteriorated to such an extent 
that the organisation of armed civilians was seen as a resolution, while it proved governance 
failure.  
 
The camps affected Acholi dignity in several ways. As explained in Chapter 5, losing the (ties to) 
one’s land is harmful to Acholi dignity, as land is entangled related with one’s ancestors and 
livelihoods. The subsequent dependency on relief was considered a humiliation. Despite the 
many activities the Acholi developed to secure their livelihoods they were unable to cultivate 
their land, which was crucial for preserving a sense of dignity.  
 
Secondly, confinement and the political order that was in place were associated with feelings 
of subordination. This resonates with what others have written about ‘victimisation’ due to 
humanitarian operations and the tendency to conflate people with numbers in their activities 
and assessments (Müller, 2013). It shows that a sense of subordination did not occur just due 
to the humanitarian actors, but also due to the military and camp leadership, and due to the 
government which kept the camps in place. Many Acholi respondents stated they had felt like 
‘refugees in their own country’. Some even said they felt like slaves, because ‘when you wanted 
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to get out of the camp to relieve yourself you had to ask for permission’. These statements 
directly reflect how the Acholi qualified their citizenship. ‘Slaves’ and ‘refugees’ embody very 
different relationships to authority from ‘citizens’. In using these labels they referred to the 
government as a ‘slave owner’ or as a foreign government that treats the Acholi as strangers. 
This related closely to the equality aspect of citizenship. The Acholi felt strongly that it was 
their tribe that experienced the war, and the period of displacement was part of that.  
 
Displacement also affected Acholi ethnic citizenship. First, it affected the holders of authority 
in the Acholi political community at the local level. In terms of ethnic citizenship, the camp 
situation undermined the authority of customary leaders more seriously than insecurity had 
done prior to the camp. Removed from their context, this limited the abilities of customary 
leaders to perform their functions, and the camp leadership was involved in dispute resolution 
that would ordinarily be done by the elders. Their social status was seriously affected by 
alcoholism and absence of respect for their customary status in how the camp was run. 
Secondly, as explained, the dignity of the Acholi as an ethnic group was damaged. This 
subsequently weakened their sense of state citizenship, which shows how ethnic and state 
citizenship are linked. This proves Ndegwa’s point (1997) that experiences of ethnic citizenship 
can shape attitudes towards the state.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed how, with the encampment, the structures and processes that 
constituted the Acholi warscape were reconfigured. LRA activity and a militarised environment 
persisted in those camps that started in 1997, as well in the areas where people remained at 
home until they were eventually displaced in 2003. In relation to the second proposition, I 
showed how the power dynamics of a particular camp governance regime contributed to the 
securitisation of the public sphere and the narrowing of civic and political institutions.  
 
Certain political institutions changed quite radically when the camps started. The camp 
leadership and the humanitarian actors added to the complexity of parallel governing 
structures. Although introduced by external aid actors this was another change in the political 
institutions that shaped the lives of the Acholi, after the introduction of Resistance Councils 
from 1986 onwards. At the same time the challenges to Acholi customary leadership worsened 
and RCs/LCs were completely sidelined. The nature of the camp governance regime had 
implications for the public sphere in the camp: the fear of reprisals discouraged people from 
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critically engaging with the camp leadership and the military in the public sphere. This was 
reinforced by a discourse that represented camp residents as docile recipients of relief. 
 
In terms of transformations in social institutions, the period of displacement seemed to have 
had more negative impact on social relations than the earlier period of the war. Especially 
gender relations and the relationship between youth and elders suffered. New social 
institutions were introduced by humanitarian actors, mainly later in the war, from 2004, which 
were potential safe spaces for learning citizenship. People seemed to have picked up a number 
of practical skills (for farming and saving), but rather fragmented, text book-style knowledge of 
rights. The NGO activities did not seem to contribute to a strengthening of forms of citizen 
agency in the camps.  
 
In relation to proposition (III) the chapter demonstrated that the conditions in the camp 
narrowed down the opportunities for learning citizenship. The constellation of power in the 
camps offered limited spaces for citizen agency and discouraged Acholi citizens from engaging 
with structures of governance in a way that would overcome their subordinate position. The 
hierarchical governance regime, dependency and the ongoing insecurity produced a situation 
in which there was little space to exercise political agency. Even for the two main priorities, 
food and security, it was difficult to use existing channels for engagement. Instead, creative 
coping agency filled the gaps in food and security. Coping agency often occurred through 
cooperative relationships, while some people were forced to engage in crime and prostitution. 
But the camp experience was not uniform. To some individuals NGO activities meant exposure 
to leadership skills, as Alfred’s story illustrates (Annex 4). The Acholi built up skills and 
expressed agency in certain domains, mainly their own social institutions, while it was 
discouraged in public spaces. 
 
Concerning the sense of citizenship, the chapter has provided empirical evidence in relation to 
the first proposition: the camp situation further eroded crucial aspects of the Acholi sense of 
citizenship in terms of their sense of equality, dignity and security. Their sense of citizenship 
was ‘recast’ into what I referred to as ‘camp citizenship’, because of the relationships to the 
diverse set of actors that shaped the parameters of camp authority. The chapter also showed a 
connection between the sense of citizenship and the practice of engagement in the camps: the 
sustained experience of powerful, largely unaccountable camp authorities led to a sense of 
subordination, which the Acholi closely related to the loss of a sense of citizenship. This fills an 
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important gap in forced migration literature, which has not previously made the link between 
the status of being a displaced citizen and the practice of engagement.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses forms of citizen engagement in the present, in the Acholi and Lango sites. 
Through the comparison I will continue the discussion about how the experiences of the war 
and encampment affect citizenship practices today. As will become clear, the memories of 
camp citizenship continue to shape the practice of citizen engagement in the present, because 
it has also led to certain perceptions and expectations of the state.  
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Chapter 7 Acholi and Langi Practices of Citizenship Today 
Introduction   
 
How do Acholi and Langi people act as citizens of Uganda today, only a few years after stability 
returned to the region? This chapter compares the forms of citizen engagement in the Acholi 
and Lango case studies, with particular attention to the micropolitics of participation. It shows 
that, indeed, the forms of citizen engagement in Acholi are not as wide in scope and not as 
substantive as in Lango. The Langi use a wider range of tactics for citizen engagement, for both 
development and accountability purposes. I show how the experience of conflict and 
displacement in Acholi intersect with certain barriers to citizen participation. In addition, the 
past experience of conflict generates specific problems that are not observed in non-affected 
areas. 
 
In the previous chapters I explained how the Acholi sense of citizenship has been constructed 
over time and during the different episodes of the war. The findings confirmed that the 
experience of conflict and displacement had led to a lack of a sense of citizenship, a feeling 
that still persists today. In this chapter I do not present new evidence on the sense of 
citizenship, but I discuss the relationship between this lack of a sense of citizenship and citizen 
engagement in the post-conflict situation. 
 
In previous chapters I presented the evidence for propositions (II) and (III) about what 
happened to citizen engagement during the war. In this chapter I trace which aspects of the 
war have had lasting effects and how they have shaped Acholi citizenship. Here I present the 
evidence in relation to proposition (IV): certain ideas and practices that developed during the 
conflict persist, and result in a lack of citizen engagement in the post-conflict situation. In 
Acholi, fear of state reprisals and the perception that the public sphere is unsafe have been 
internalised. This limits citizen engagement, but it particularly undermines the interrogative 
voice. Furthermore, a lack of prior experience with citizen engagement now results in 
diminished forms of citizen engagement. Moreover, changes in social institutions mean that 
there is no strong social foundation for developing collective voice. Finally, because the Acholi 
customary leaders are struggling to regain legitimacy they cannot act as political brokers.  
 
I first present the findings about forms of engagement in Lango and Acholi, concentrating in 
section 7.1 on how the petitioning voice is exercised, and in section 7.2 on the interrogative 
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voice. The first two sections thus describe the differences observed between the two regions. 
For Acholi I then unpack what the ‘legacy of conflict’ entails in section 7.3.  
 
7.1 The petitioning voice: citizen engagement for ‘development’ 25 
 
This section concentrates on the social organisation of community life and how people 
exercise the petitioning voice for development purposes. I start with engagement in 
community institutions, followed by engagement with LCs and in the formal government 
system for development planning. A major contrast between Acholi and Lango is that the 
density of relations between the people, their leaders and local government institutions was 
‘thicker’ in Lango than in Acholi. Fox defined societal thickness as the ‘breadth and density of 
representative society organisations’ (1996, p. 1089) in the debate on social capital in the 
1990s. In the context of this research, thickness refers to the frequency of citizen-leadership 
relations. I observed that the density of relations between people and local leaders was higher 
in Lango. Concurrent with their higher level of awareness about the tasks of various leaders, 
the Langi also made more use of these institutions. Although the nature and the range of the 
community institutions were more or less the same, in the Acholi cases these institutions had 
fewer resources and did not perform as many functions as in Lango. This confirmed my 
expectation that the scope of interaction with authority is wider in Lango (Chapter 3). 
 
7.1.1 Day-to-day forms of community mobilisation 
 
‘Myero icak yito yat ki piny pe ki malo onyo jange’ 
(‘You must climb the tree from its roots, not from up or its branches’) 
 
This phrase, a famous Luo proverb, reflects a certain value in Acholi society. It is a 
reaffirmation of existing hierarchies, which is manifested and adhered to in various ways. In 
the context of this research the phrase is one of the most cited proverbs regarding the 
relationship between citizens, their voice, and higher levels of leadership.  
 
                                                          
25
 In this context respondents gave rather narrow definitions of ‘development’ in terms of income, 
agricultural production and the available basic services, rather than broader definitions that include e.g. 
equality and well-being. Local officials often referred to the development planning process. The local 
definition of development is adhered to here.  
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Community meetings 
 
Community meetings are the most common mechanism for resolving community issues and 
addressing development needs in the community. The word ‘voice’ has its equivalent in Luo 
language (dwong) and refers to the communication of needs and concerns. The first answer in 
both the Acholi and Langi cases usually is: ‘In case of any problem the community will sit down 
and discuss.’ Depending on the issue, it is decided who should take the issue forward, which in 
the case of any development issue is likely to be the LC1. Minutes of a meeting are written 
down and taken to the sub-county LC1 together with the attendance list and a letter stamped 
by the LC1. This is the default mechanism for informing the authorities. The second part of the 
answer would thus be: ‘The LC1 takes it [dwong] to LC2, who takes it to the LC3 and from there 
it goes to the district’ – which is the practical translation of the proverb above and so 
frequently cited that it seemed a text book phrase everyone had learnt by heart. The answer 
would usually end with ‘and then we wait.’ 
 
Meetings are ‘called’ and ‘mobilised’ by people in leading positions. The LC1 chairperson calls 
meetings when the issue concerns the entire village, the elders call them for issues to do with 
social harmony, and clan leaders can call their clan members together. Numerous factors 
determine the micropolitics of such spaces and their outcomes.  
 
As observed by Brock (2004) and Ahikire (2007), prevailing gender relations determine the 
extent to which women can exercise voice. In community meetings which I observed, it was 
the men that spoke most of the time and women engaged only in the end. The women had a 
short time slot to express their views and only a small number of them would take that 
opportunity. Women expressed the lack the confidence, feelings of powerlessness, and norms 
that dictate that men speak on their behalf. As one lady mentioned:  
 
Mostly men talk [in meetings], sometimes only two or three women give their 
opinion. The rest of the women fear, they feel the people’s eyes on them. That is the 
nature of women, they have public fear. At times perhaps the LC1 listens to women, it 
depends on how you speak.  
Acholi: woman, age 42, Chua district 
 
The women did not attend community meetings as often as the men in the first place. The 
prevailing norm that it was a ‘men’s affair’ made them reluctant to attend. Attending women 
thus felt like a minority voice, and as a result were less involved in decision-making. 
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An obvious difference between Acholi and Lango was that meetings were organised less 
frequently in Acholi. Though everyone in Acholi mentioned that community meetings were the 
most important occasions to raise a voice, respondents could often not recall when the last 
one had been held. Some declared the last one happened a year ago. The Acholi LCs 
themselves, on the other hand, complained that people ‘were not interested’ in meetings. 
People did not attend at all, or asked for a sitting allowance. In the case of Lango, the LCs faced 
similar challenges and therefore used other social gatherings to discuss issues, such as funerals 
and church services. Yet it is not surprising that community meetings were in principle 
important social spaces for engagement, since it was the most widely accepted form of 
community decision making. Finally, especially in Acholi I found that the remote households 
did not know when meetings took place. In Lango events were announced by pinning notes on 
the trees at junctions and near water points. 
  
Community forms of organisation  
 
Chapter 5 explained how groups for farming, saving and loans are important for social and 
economic life in Acholi and Lango, maintaining livelihoods and social relationships. In Lango 
the social drinking groups (Akiba) are also important. The groups are spaces for engagement 
where important skills such as group leadership, reciprocity and collective decision-making are 
nurtured. They are also used to share information, from all sorts of gossip to the latest news 
on local politics. The groups represent a form of organisation where people feel comfortable 
expressing voice. ‘Being social’ is considered a virtue everyone should possess. Not to be in any 
group could be interpreted as being anti-social. Pham and Vinck (2010) find that 59% of the 
Chua/Lamwo population are members of at least one group. I found that most men and 
women from the age of twenty are members of one or several groups. The groups bring 
together people from different clans and villages, and vary in size.  
 
Lango and Acholi groups share the same set of governance mechanisms for managing their 
internal affairs. Each group has a name, such as ‘Ribe aye teko’ (joining hands), a chairperson, 
treasurer and secretary, as well as a constitution, by-laws and a registration book. The by-laws 
usually stipulate the rules for membership, social behaviour, and punishment for failure to 
abide by the rules. In farming groups, clear regulations exist for when a group member may be 
unable to attend the group work: the member must either pay compensation in cash or catch 
up with the work individually. At the start of the ‘sitting’ members pay their contribution to the 
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treasurer: one share to pay for the brew and another share for the savings account, which is 
carefully written down by the secretary. 
 
What the regions had in common was the relevance of groups to local life. In institutional 
mapping exercises the various groups were well represented, while local government 
institutions in some cases did not even appear on the graph. One possible explanation for the 
limited engagement between the groups and the sub-county is that the sub-county has few 
resources to support groups26, does not function adequately27, and is consequently not very 
relevant to group functioning. When I asked group members about this it usually led to 
expressions of discontent with the local authorities, about how they were corrupt and not 
responsive.  
 
I also found differences between the Acholi and Langi groups. The groups in Lango were more 
established in terms of long-standing membership and diversity of functions. Lango groups 
were also more ‘monetized’ and operated with relatively greater cash flows, especially the 
Akiba groups. Langi were often members of more than one group, which showed they had 
more monetary assets to pay for membership.  
 
According to scholars in the civic republican tradition, particularly Putnam (2000), community 
groups can potentially function as a forum for mobilising political agency and reach out to 
state institutions on behalf of their members. To my surprise, neither in Lango nor in Acholi did 
I find many linkages, other than the formalities of registering at the sub-county, to increase the 
likelihood of accessing government-led development programmes such as NUSAF, or in the 
National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). The numerous groups operated on their own, 
managing themselves perfectly well, regardless of the work done by the sub-county. Nor have I 
seen them play an advocating role. Even groups participating in NAADS, which formally has a 
multi-layered structure for farmers’ representation and a ‘Farmers’ Forum’, did not report ever 
to have used internal NAADS mechanisms for channelling their concerns.  
 
In Lango, the non-conflict case, a citizen-initiated community association existed: the 
Electricity Committee, formed by a group of citizens from across the sub-county. They started 
a process to bring electricity to the sub-county, in order to provide the local Health Centre IV 
(at the sub-county centre) with electricity. All households were supposed to contribute 1,000 
                                                          
26
 Interview with Community Development Officer, Lamwo (24/08/10) 
27
 Interview with Parish Development Commitee member, Lango (01/11/10) 
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shillings each, and the task of collecting it was delegated to the LC1. At the time of research 
the collection process had just started. After the committee was formed and its constitution 
registered at the sub-county, the sub-county offered an office. Further negotiations led to a 
contribution of 2 million shillings and the sub-county requested more funds from the district. 
An interesting aspect of the association was that the committee purposely excluded the sub-
county from the process until 2 months after the January 2011 elections, afraid that 
candidates would appropriate the initiative for their campaigns. The chairperson explained: 
‘We wanted to stay away from politicians, because they create confusion’.  
 
When I re-visited the Lango sub-county in 2012, I heard that a new initiative had started, to 
open up a road from the parish to Lira town, where there was now only a footpath. The 
footpath was used by men and women who transported sacks of cassava on the back of their 
bicycles to the market in Lira. To have a proper road would save them a lot of time. Different 
farming groups had joined hands and had made a start with clearing the way. They hoped this 
would convince the district authorities that the population would play its part. Farmer leaders 
had, together with their LC1 chairpersons, contacted the sub-county chief and LC3 chairperson 
to make enquiries of the district. They had chosen a representative from among the farmer 
leaders and together they supervised the participation of group members in clearing the road.  
 
Both the Electricity Committee and the groups involved in opening the road initiative in a way 
replicated the mechanisms of a community group, but in more institutionalised form and on a 
larger scale. In the two Acholi case studies I have not encountered any similar form of 
organisation. In the Chua site (Acholi) I encountered one important instance of collective 
action that involved engagement with local state authorities, although it did not succeed. The 
military stationed in the barracks in Chua district had started to encroach on the land of some 
villagers by fencing it off. They thus deprived a number of families of their land for cultivation. 
A group of elders had joined together to discuss the issue with the sub-county. Since it was a 
land issue the elders were the most appropriate community members to represent the village. 
The LC3 had responded and together with the sub-county authorities the elders tried to follow 
it up at the district level. The sub-county seemed to support the elders and their LC5 councillor 
had once visited the site. However, since it involved the military the situation was complicated. 
The sub-county said this was not at their level of authority and therefore they could not take 
action. Sub-county officials told the elders the RDC needed to be involved and that the elders 
would need a lawyer. Particularly the issue of hiring a lawyer, which would cost an amount of 
money the village could never raise, seemed to have deterred the elders from taking further 
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action. This is where it seemed to end. It was the only instance in Acholi where citizens had 
organised themselves to talk to higher level authorities. Apart from this case, the Acholi 
referred to the LC system as the only channel to negotiate with local government.  
 
7.1.2 Formal mechanisms for engagement 
 
Engagement through the LCs 
 
An important finding from this study is that the Langi use more avenues for connecting to the 
sub-county than the Acholi. Langi are more aware of existing functions and respective 
responsibilities of various village-level leaders and sub-county leaders and officials. In Lango 
these forms of leadership are more actively involved in raising local development and public 
services than in Acholi. These findings are based on institutional diagrams carried out in focus 
groups, whereby participants were asked to map and prioritise the leaders and institutions 
that were important for the development of the village and linking to the sub-county. In 
addition, and for triangulation purposes, this issue was part of the semi-structured interview 
on the patterns of interaction with leaders. I now discuss these findings.  
 
In both Lango and Acholi it was the LC1 members, especially the chairpersons, who were most 
‘hands-on’ in handling community affairs. This is also shown in other studies (Pham & Vinck, 
2010; USAID, 2009). As they could be anyone’s neighbour or relative they are also the most 
socially embedded. Anything concerned with development or public services is considered the 
work of the LCs, since it required the link to formal government authorities: the LC 
chairpersons would ‘forward the issue’ to the higher levels. The LC1 chairperson is the most 
important channel to link the village population to the higher levels of governance: any 
information is passed via him/her. The LC1 chairpersons call community meetings for a broad 
range of issues under the rubrics ‘sensitisation’ and ‘development’: to discuss lack of or broken 
water points or classroom blocks; theft in the community; other government programmes, etc. 
On top of that the LCs play an important role in dispute resolution and holding local courts, 
although this task is also performed by elders and customary leaders. The LC1 chair also 
provides people with reference letters authorised with the LC1 stamp. Given the range of 
responsibilities of the LC chairpersons, it is not surprising that they were considered the most 
important community leaders in both Lango and Acholi: with no exception they were ranked 
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first in ranking exercises and institutional diagrams. Even when participants were critical of 
his/her performance, the LC1 was ranked number one.   
 
Of the 15 institutional diagrams that were made in Lango, all showed the LC3, sub-county chief 
and parish chief, and eight showed the CDO and NAADS coordinator. This did not mean people 
in Lango were satisfied with their performance. These officials were seen as important, yet 
could be much more relevant if they performed better. In Acholi only 5 out of the 33 
institutional diagrams showed any of the sub-county officials or LC3 councillors. All of them 
started with the LC1 as the most important institution. A commonality was that in both Lango 
and Acholi the LC3 chairperson was perceived to be a very formal office and hence more 
‘distant’.  
 
When asked who was in direct contact with the sub-county to raise community concerns at 
LC3 level, Langi respondents were able to name many more individuals, their positions and 
activities than the Acholi respondents. Findings are shown in Table 7.1. I discuss the most 
important differences in more detail below. 
 
Table 7.1   Institutions involved in brokering between village and sub-county  
   Figures represent the number of respondents who indicated a  
   particular leader interacted with the sub-county.  
 Conflict affected Acholi 
(N=40) 
Non-affected Lango 
(N= 40) 
LC1 40 40 
LC2 1 12 
Area councillor LC3 9 25 
Youth leader 5 - 
Village Health Team - 9 
Parish chief 2 9 
PDC - 6 
Area councillor LC5 - 2 
Elder 4 - 
Clan leader 3 3 
Farmer leader 9 5 
Former camp leader 2 - 
Important farmers  6 
Apart from LC1 nobody can 4  
 
LC3 councillors - Pham and Vinck (2010) show that 21% of the Acholi had interacted with LC3 
members (compared to 49% with the LC1 and 62% with religious leaders). The table shows 
that the LC3 councillors in Lango played a more prominent role than in Acholi. As an elected 
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office, these councillors were supposed to represent the parish at sub-county council 
meetings, and monitor the implementation of government programmes and sub-county 
expenditure. In Lango most respondents knew the names of their LC2 and LC3 councillors and 
people cited some of their achievements. One LC3 councillor in Lango was educated in 
Kampala. He was the Secretary of Finance to LC3 and also chaired the School Management 
Committee of the nearby primary school. He used church services, burial gatherings and school 
meetings to make public announcements, because if he called separate meetings people 
would demand an allowance or refreshments. Respondents gave examples of the issues he 
took up, mostly to do with boreholes and the schools. One comment about him shows that 
people expect a brokering role as well as social behaviour from their councillors:  
 
The AC3 of Bala parish is a development oriented person, very easy to approach and 
he listens to people’s problems. He always helps where need be. He is someone who 
sacrifices his time, like he does not fail to attend a meeting, and any kind of call by the 
community, and he does not miss a funeral. He is open, transparent and accountable 
to us, for instance when a project is supposed to come he always comes to the 
targeted people or group. 
Man, age 27, Kole district  
 
When interviewed, the LC3 councillor said he often received community members at home, 
who ask him to raise particular issues in LC3 meetings. He cited an example: 
 
The elders of a village came and see me here at home. It happened once from village 
[A]. There people had really a problem with water and the LC1 was reluctant to solve 
it. Elders came to my home. We sat and discussed. I went to see the water source and 
found it was very dirty. I went to the SC [sub-county] and brought the LC3 to see. The 
LC3 told the SC to give them a borehole, which they have now. 
Lango: LC3 councillor, Kole district 28 
 
The other LC3 councillor was a woman: the ‘women representative’. She came from one of the 
wealthier families in the sub-county, was better educated than most women (secondary 
school) and some of her in-laws had been quite involved in politics. An aunt had been an MP 
for Apac district and her father-in-law had been an LC5 councillor in Apac (before Kole split 
from Apac). This LC3 councillor was known for her involvement in women’s affairs. She had 
made efforts to link several women’s groups from the parish to the NAADS office at the sub-
county and several groups had received cassava cuttings and seeds for red chilli plants. She 
was also respected for ‘giving advice’ to the women, for example regarding testing for HIV and 
                                                          
28
 This story was confirmed in conversations with people from that village, who said that three of their 
elders had gone to see the LC3 councillor.  
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how to save money for school fees. She had raised the problem of poor roads from the parish 
to the sub-county, which was addressed by the sub-county.  
 
The activity of the LC3 councillors was a sharp contrast with the Acholi cases. Few Acholi 
participants knew the names of their area councillors at all, and claimed that ‘they only help 
themselves’ and not the community. In the Chua site, people only knew the name of the 
women representative, who was the fifth29 wife of an important clan leader. The six 
respondents who had mentioned her only said that she ‘could take issues’ to the LC3, but were 
unable to explain what those issues were and commented that she ‘never reported back to the 
village’. I interviewed a male LC3 councillor in Lamwo, who clearly made up a story of proper 
representation. He lived in the trading centre and claimed to visit all the ten villages in his 
parish at least once a month, riding out on his bicycle. The people from his parish, however, 
said they had only seen him there when he came to campaign in 2006. I observed his campaign 
meeting when he ran for internal party elections in 2010 as the LC3 chairperson candidate. The 
audience, from four villages, only applauded for his rival – an LC2 chairperson.  
 
Parish officials and LC2 – In Lango, the Parish Chief and members of the Parish Development 
committee were mentioned as active people. They were all residents of the parish and were 
active in collecting development priorities. Here, the Village Health Team (VHT) came up nine 
times, mostly in relation to malaria prevention and distribution of medication, but also for 
raising health concerns at the sub-county. The Parish Chief at the Chua site in Acholi was also 
from the parish, from the same family as the women representative to LC3. I did see him often 
at the sub-county head quarters, near his home, but the interviews showed the villagers were 
largely unaware of what he did. At the Lamwo site the Parish Chiefs were not originally from 
the area and nobody in the village knew them. Although VHTs did exist in both Acholi sites, 
nobody mentioned them. I discuss the PDCs and planning process separately, below. 
 
Other brokers – Table 7.2 shows that Acholi respondents reported that the Youth Leader and 
farmer leaders could go to the sub-county. Perhaps because LC1 were not perceived to be very 
active, and their actions often did not lead to results, the youth group and the farmer groups 
were trying to organise things themselves. For the youth leader, four respondents said he 
reported fights among the youth. One youth leader said he had once asked the sub-county for 
                                                          
29
 The fact that someone has five wives signifies the status and wealth of a family. In the Ugandan 
context, this can be an enabling factor for a councillor to function as a broker, but in this case most 
respondents that spoke about her made allegations that she was only helping her family.  
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funds to take the youth’s football team to another sub-county, which was refused. Farmer 
leaders were reported to ask the sub-county for seeds. Interestingly, these community leaders 
did not figure so strongly in Lango. In Lango, two particular farmer leaders were very active on 
a number of issues and had gained a lot of respect. They did not just convey issues of concern 
to the sub-county, they played a coordination role to follow up issues and mobilise the 
community, for instance when the sub-county and the villages had to work together to clear a 
main road. This shows a difference in the substantiveness of the engagement by the Acholi and 
Langi farmer leaders. 
 
In the Lango site, there were three farmers that were wealthier and had real farms, where a 
small number of villagers did seasonal work for a small wage. These farmers were said to have 
influence at the sub-county. Although this was often for their own interest, e.g. opening a road 
to their farm or, in one case, having a borehole on the compound, respondents felt this had 
benefitted the wider community. 
 
In Acholi I found two cases in which individuals had played a mediating role with the sub-
county, but were not LC chairpersons. In one case it was the vice chairperson of the NRM party 
at sub-county level. Since the LC3 chairperson was the chair of the NRM at that level, the vice 
chair used this link to get a borehole in her village - on her compound. The second person was 
a Secretary of Information to the LC1, so not outside the system himself, who followed up 
procedures with the district water office to bring a borehole to his village. This man was 
literate, bright, and had been in the LC1 since it was established in 1986. Using his title of 
Information Secretary he had taken LC letters himself to the LC2, LC3 and from there to the 
district.  
 
Individual interactions  
 
Table 7.2 shows the answers to the question ‘To which of the following leaders/persons have 
you ever taken an issue?’ – followed by a list of all state and non-state authorities at all levels.  
Respondents were then asked to explain what the issue had been, how it had been handled 
exactly, how they had felt during the process and whether they were satisfied with the 
outcome. Findings show that, on an individual basis, the Langi had more frequent, direct 
contact with leaders than the Acholi, and they interacted with more and different types of 
leaders. For the Acholi, LC1 was the most prominent leader for all kind of personal issues 
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(domestic problems, disagreements with other villagers), whereas the Langi actively contacted 
LC2 and LC3 level leaders for personal issues and community issues (water, education, roads).  
  
Table 7.2   Number of issues raised by individuals with their leaders 
   Figures represent the number of times an issue was raised with a  
   leader by respondents. 
 Conflict affected Acholi 
N=40 
Non-affected Lango 
N= 40 
LC1 17 22 
LC2  12 
LC3 2 4 
Area councillor LC3 1 6 
Village Health Team  8 
Parish chief   
PDC  1 
Area councillor LC5   
District office   
Elder  1 
Clan leader 7 6 
Farmer leader 7 6 
Family or friends  5 
NGO  2 
 
Individual interviews revealed that the Acholi primarily interacted with the three most local 
institutions: LC1, farmer leaders and clan leaders. They barely engaged with higher levels of 
authority, as others have found (USAID, 2009). Of the 40 Acholi respondents who were 
interviewed on everyday interactions, only three people had ever taken a personal issue 
directly to the sub-county. One man needed to resolve land issues as the result of a divorce, 
but they were not resolved. Another man in Chua had gone to the LC3 to ask about cassava 
seeds, for he had heard an NGO was distributing them. He declared the LC3 asked him for UGX 
30,000 (£8). He refused, because he had no money, and also thought the seeds should be free 
if it was an NGO programme.  
 
Acholi respondents commented that, in general, one could only report a divorce, birth or 
death, and land disputes after mediation at the lower levels had failed. Nobody reported a 
community issue to LC3 level personally. The major reasons for this were that a) this was 
considered an LC responsibility (citing the proverb), and b) people felt that such issues were 
not supposed to be raised individually, but would only be listened to if the whole community 
came together. Many Acholi respondents argued that individuals lacked ‘the authority’ to take 
problems to higher offices directly.  
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Also in Lango, individual interactions with leaders involved mainly personal issues: theft; 
arguments over land, borders and inheritance; loss or damage due to others. But here, 
interactions with LC2 and LC3 level leaders reflected what has been set out above: people had 
raised community issues such as bad roads or the need for boreholes. In one case, a shop 
owner had gone to the LC3 chairperson and the Sub-County chief about the bad road that 
made transporting his goods very expensive. He was dissatisfied with the way his LC3 
councillor’s response and decided to go to the sub-county himself. An instance like this, where 
a leader is bypassed, was not encountered in Acholi, apart from the mechanism for land 
disputes, which was more actively used.  
 
Customary leadership - Colebridge et al. (2005) stress the importance of political brokers for 
rural, poor communities. In the Ugandan context, customary leadership comprising the clan 
leaders (Rwodi Mo), elders (mio tam, atekere) and farmer leaders (Rwot Kweri) could in 
principle play such a role and mediate between their communities and government 
institutions. Though certain functions of LCs and customary leaders overlapped, many 
functions were considered to be ‘typical’ for LCs or clan leaders. Institutional mappings in both 
regions clearly showed their relevance to local life. I therefore studied in which ways citizens 
called upon them to advance community interests.  
 
A number of studies have demonstrated the importance of Acholi customary leaders in justice 
and reconciliation (Allen, 2006; Komakech & Sheff, 2009), and their function of guarding social 
harmony. In Lango, no ethnographic material about customary institutions has been 
documented since Tosh’s study in 1976. I interviewed 13 respondents and 5 elders and clan 
leaders about clan leadership and clan organisation. Based on these interviews I can say that 
the role of Langi clan leaders was the same: they played an important role in dispute 
resolution, especially over land, and advised the younger generations. Both Acholi and Langi 
customary leaders mediated in arguments and fights in the community, though once a fight 
resulted in bloodshed or injury it was the LC1 who was obliged to report it directly to the sub-
county and police. Elders and clan leaders could then still play a role in reconciling the fighting 
parties afterwards by performing rites and establishing how a victim should be compensated. 
The entire clan of the assaulter was responsible for paying compensation. Repairing social 
relations and compensation for a loss was valued over a punitive system that removed the 
perpetrator from society. In many instances matters were settled in customary law, but when 
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one of the parties was not satisfied with the outcome it could still be referred to the LC system 
and police.  
 
The role of Acholi customary leaders was, however, much smaller in community development. 
In Acholi I interviewed six elders, seven local clan leaders and one paramount chief at the sub-
county level. Almost all of them stated that ‘development is not our role’. Development and 
‘projects’ were considered beyond the responsibility of clan leaders. Their only engagement in 
developing the area was to advise the community and motivate the youth to work hard and 
complete their education. They did not actively link groups to sub-county authorities or 
mediate for development planning, which was considered to be the domain of LCs.  
 
In Lango I interviewed two elders and three clan leaders, of whom one was a clan leader at 
county level. Also in Lango, ‘development projects’ were considered a formal responsibility of 
local government. But here the clan leaders linked up with the LCs to further development in 
their area. Clan leaders actively advised area councillors to raise issues at LC3 level. 
Occasionally, clan leaders communicated directly with the sub-county on behalf of the clan. 
For instance, the clan leaders helped to mobilise the community when the local government 
wanted to implement a project for which community labour was needed. A clan leader at 
parish level cites an example: 
 
As a Jan Jago Ateke  [clan leader at parish level] I can speak to the sub-county. In 
courts I speak. I can go directly to the sub-county for development issues. I sit with my 
clan committee and write a letter, which the clan stamps. The LC1 stamp is not 
needed. We always get feedback from the sub-county. We requested a borehole and 
it was given five years ago. For this project the LC1 was also involved. The sub-county 
can ask for a community contribution, 2 million shillings for a borehole. Then per 
household 5,000 shilling. Both the Atekere [clan leaders] and the LC1 collected 
money. When it has been commissioned we have to take care of it. I am chairperson 
of the water management committee. When the land for the borehole is given by a 
clan, the committees of the clan and the LC sit together and the LC1 chairperson 
chairs, and we decide the location. The community provides sand and gravel, and 
feeds the people who drill the borehole. 
Clan leader, Kole district 
 
Langi clan leaders thus played a brokering role between communities and local government. 
However, clan leaders had to be cautious of having too much influence in government 
projects, knowing tension might emerge if a particular clan was seen as being ‘favoured’. The 
same clan leader  said: ‘We discuss plans from government in our meetings, like projects. It 
doesn’t come direct to us, government projects come for everybody and then it is up to the clan 
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to see what they can do.’ Clan leaders also had to be careful that different groupings within the 
clan benefitted equally from projects. The Rwot County explained:  
 
With projects from the sub-county I have never seen clan influence to appropriate 
them. For governments projects are universal to all community members in a village, 
where several clans live. So clan leaders... ah ah...no. Unless the clan comes up with 
its own plans to implement. But projects is government’s side. The government 
advises the clans to apply for projects, but that is difficult. There is fear within the 
people to apply as one clan: to sit as a separate group creates the fear that other clan 
members will accuse them of creating division and differences within the clan. For 
example, a part of our clan wanted a school in Akalo. Then other parts of the clan said 
it only benefitted one part of the clan. So small projects are a problem. The project 
needs to benefit the entire clan. 
Rwot County, Kole district 
 
 
Local Council meetings at LC3 level  
 
Another difference between Lango and Acholi was the functioning of the LC3 itself, which 
seemed to perform relatively better in Lango, despite certain flaws. In the case of Lango the 
council had met eight times over the last year (the number required per year) and the minutes 
showed that discussions had covered decision-making about the budget and services, and 
certain issues were forwarded to the district level. The Acholi cases showed the typical 
institutional deficits associated with post-conflict situations: lack of staff, resources and 
technical capacities (Jackson & Scott, 2008). In the first Acholi site the council met four times a 
year. In the meeting I observed the only item discussed was the complaint by the councillors 
that their allowances were paid late. In the second Acholi site the council had not met for an 
entire year for this reason. The sub-county authorities and LC3 chairperson stated they ‘had to 
work around it’ to get anything off the ground, which effectively meant they just went ahead 
with services without informing the council.   
 
Participatory Development Planning  
 
The Ugandan decentralised governance system was explained in Chapter 4. In Acholi the 
planning process had only been reintroduced since the camp phase out in 2007, when LCs took 
over from the camp leadership. Throughout the war the districts continued to be required to 
produce development plans, but of course of a very different nature. To what extent planning 
by the LC2 and the Parish Development Committees (PDCs) functioned in the camps was 
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vague, and not the same for every location. Most of the sub-county officials I spoke to 
confirmed that the PDCs did not do their work until 2009, though in some camps efforts were 
made to come up with development plans for the home areas. Here, the history of conflict 
appears to intersect with spaces for engagement and reinforce the weaknesses in participatory 
planning. 
 
At the time of research, the sub-county authorities in the Acholi cases wrote the development 
plans by themselves, without any community or PDC involvement. They claimed they lacked 
time and resources to move deep into the villages and mobilise the members. Sub-county 
officials expressed the difficulties: 
 
The challenges are that 1) the community doesn’t come in big numbers and also they 
demand for sitting allowances; 2) very few are literate. So they cannot meet the 
requirements of planning and the plan; 3) the items or issues that they feel are most 
needed, are not always most needed. It is very rare that we inform the community on 
what they [at the district] are not able to do [fund]. [...] Reasons for not reporting 
back are that the sub-county knows that it will be implemented at some point 
anyhow, as it is rolled over to the next Financial Year. Secondly, the workload is too 
much, there is no time. Thirdly, there are no resources, for instance no fuel to go 
back. 
LC3 chairman, Chua district 
 
Among the population the PDCs were virtually unknown: a result of not functioning for years 
during encampment. Hardly anyone could say what a PDC was. I interviewed various PDC 
members in the Acholi cases, who themselves could not explain their roles and responsibilities. 
In the Lamwo case, the former camp commandant was among the PDC members. As a teacher 
and LC2 member he was very well able to explain the role of the PDC. After the camp finished 
he twice attended training in Kitgum town about planning. Apart from that he had not met 
with his fellow PDC members or carried out the actual planning work.  
 
In the case of Lango there was more awareness about the PDCs; many respondents (though 
more men than women) were able to explain that it was a parish-level body that talked about 
needs and development. The PDC members interviewed listed a number of responsibilities and 
gave examples of ‘data collection’ activities they had carried out to provide the sub-county 
with information about development needs. The PDCs clearly had more experience in Lango. 
Yet they suffered many weaknesses that were identified by scholars studying Uganda’s local 
government system. As the LC3 chairperson complained: 
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The problem for their functioning is the lack of resources. There are limited resources 
remitted to lower Local Governments. The conditional grants and the local revenues 
for co-funding. But the graduated tax was abolished and that was out main source of 
income. The little revenue we get is from the shops and businesses that have to pay 
license, some from the market and some checkpoints for revenue from produce. The 
Sub-County does not release funds to the PDCs. They are supposed to be funded from 
local revenue but mostly we don’t [generate enough].  
Lango: LC3 chairperson, Kole district 
 
The PDC members felt that their work was insufficiently supported by the sub-county, and that 
their time and energy should be adequately compensated. On a positive note, they did feel 
that the sub-county was responding to the priorities they came up with and felt that as PDCs 
they played an important role in monitoring whether each parish was addressed in turn.  
 
Thus in the Acholi cases the PDCs barely functioned, which eliminated at least one potential 
avenue for raising citizens’ demands. The PDCs in Lango functioned mostly as a mechanism for 
data collection, but compared to the situation in Acholi that was relatively better. As a forum it 
had little negotiating capacity to influence or challenge budget allocation. This was also due to 
the place of the PDC within the planning system. PDC members are elected, but they fall within 
the technical arm of local government. Whether they should fulfil a negotiating role was thus 
questionable. 
 
7.1.3  Challenges in exercising the petitioning voice 
 
In both Lango and Acholi many challenges were observed in using the formal mechanisms for 
the purpose of enhancing local development and services. However, the problems were 
considerably worse in Acholi. In this section I discuss two important challenges that were 
observed. Findings are based on focus group discussions in each village in the three research 
sites. In the focus groups, participants identified the most serious ‘development issue’ in the 
community. The discussion then focussed on an analysis of the issue and how the community 
had mobilised for it. In addition, interview questions addressed which were the most 
important challenges to voice (dwong).  
 
One of the most widely cited problems in Acholi (in interview) was lack of knowledge, 
indicated by twenty of the forty interviewees. I also observed this during the focus group 
discussions: participants did not know how to make use of the various openings for citizen 
engagement, including through representatives. This is part of the reason why in Acholi people 
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did not use all available avenues to channel their concerns to sub-county level. They solely 
relied on the LC1 to connect them. This was reinforced by certain socio-cultural factors, like 
the strong adherence to ‘You must climb the tree from its roots, not from its branches’. If an 
issue was not taken up by the LC1 chairperson the Acholi were extremely reluctant to bypass 
that LC1 and take the issue directly to the sub-county. Respondents literally said there was no 
other way to have voice than by sending letters through the LC1, and then ‘all we can do is 
wait’. If an LC1 was inactive, and most of them were, the process got stuck at this level straight 
away. Even when confronted with this dilemma, respondents acknowledged it and simply said 
it was ‘very hard’. When asked if someone else could follow an issue up they would reply with 
the tree proverb. Officials at the sub-county at both Acholi sites said that the LC1 chairpersons 
were ‘hardly seen’ at the sub-county offices30, suggesting that LC1 chairpersons were indeed 
not very active. They said that they saw the LC2 more often, but usually only after the sub-
county had sent for them to share information.  
 
In Lango, on the other hand, less than half of the interviewees highlighted this as a problem. 
From discussions and observations it was clear that communities did try other options, both 
formally and informally. Here the local population had better access to information and better 
relationships with various leaders, which helped to channel their interests to the sub-county 
and even the district. Citizens talked to their LC3 Councillors or went to the sub-county directly 
to look at the notice boards. Some, though few, attended council meetings.  
 
A second challenge that was cited more frequently in Acholi than in Lango was that sub-county 
officials tended to discourage direct engagement. The few respondents that knew about 
someone going to the sub-county offices declared that officials would ask people ‘Who are 
you?’ implying ‘Who do you think you are?’. If the respondent was not an LC they were sent 
back to the village and told to get the LC1 to take the issue for them. This reinforced the 
weight of the proverb that one should not come directly to the higher offices. Citizens also felt 
intimidated by the knowledge of officials and leaders, which they felt was used to keep citizens 
at a safe distance:  
 
People have to come as a ward in order to have a voice. They cannot have a voice 
individually. Because nothing will be done for you. Some of the leaders are rarely in 
the office, like LC3, and even if he is, people fear going to him because he hides 
himself behind laws, saying that ‘the law says this and that’. 
Acholi: man, age 41, Chua district 
                                                          
30
 Interview, Sub-County Chief in Chua (18/02/10); Parish Chief in Lamwo (25/08/10) 
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One of the Parish Chiefs in Chua called the people of the parish ‘primitive’ and ‘stubborn’, so 
assumptions made about his attitude were not ungrounded. The assumptions about the 
behaviour of officials greatly informed the interface between citizens and local state 
institutions. Afraid to encounter such a reaction, people refrained from going to the 
authorities with requests. 
 
Despite the thickness of relations in Lango the situation should not be misinterpreted as a 
‘good case’ in all aspects. Ordinary governance challenges existed, like elite bias and 
corruption through social networks, such as the clan or along party lines. At LC1 level, 
chairpersons would misuse their powers when a relative was involved, like ‘resolving’ a dispute 
to the advantage of their relatives or including relatives on NGO beneficiary lists. A common 
complaint about the LC3 councillors was that they used their influence to direct funds to their 
villages or clans. For higher levels of governance, respondents recognised that if they elected 
representatives from opposition parties they were likely to miss out on resources if the 
majority of the LC3 or LC5 council and bureaucrats were NRM supporters.  
 
To conclude, there are qualitative differences between Lango and Acholi in the patterns of 
interaction between the village population and the sub-county. The differences are 
summarised in Table 7.3   
 
Table 7.3  Qualitative differences between Lango and Acholi functioning of LCs 
Conflict affected Acholi Non-affected Lango 
Dependent on LC1 chairperson Used various LC leaders to channel interests 
Little knowledge of responsibilities of sub-county 
officials 
Some knowledge about responsibilities of sub-
county officials 
No knowledge of formal mechanisms to hold LCs 
accountable 
Knowledge of formal mechanisms to hold LCs 
accountable and had used in some instances 
Hardly any direct contact between citizens and 
sub-county 
Regular contact between citizens and sub-county 
Area councillors had not mediated issues 
between villages and sub-county 
Area councillor informed population at church 
services 
LC3 had not held the minimum number of four 
council meetings for over a year 
LC3 had convened the maximum of 8 council 
meetings in one year, which were minuted and 
filed by sub-county. 
 
In Acholi the LC1 chairperson was often was the only leader mediating between the village and 
higher levels of government, while in Lango other leaders also figured. In Acholi this narrowed 
down the opportunities for raising concerns at higher LC levels. Furthermore, although the 
Acholi did express their development needs to me, this was not directly linked to government 
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responsibilities or translated into ‘claims’. I offer an explanation for this in section 7.3. The 
Langi seemed more aware of what a government ought to do and subsequently asked for that 
to happen, even though there were many instances of ‘participation fatigue’ after engagement 
had failed to produce results. In Lango the village population was inclined to use councillors as 
representatives: asking him/her to take issues to council meetings. Again, the situation in 
Lango was far from ideal and huge flaws in the representative functions of LCs remained. In 
this region, however, some seeds of local democratic governance were visible. 
 
7.2  The interrogative voice: engagement for accountability 
 
Using voice to present your leader with a ‘development wish-list’ is quite different from telling 
that person whether he or she did a good job or not. To be able to use an interrogative voice is 
closely linked to prevailing norms about citizen-leader relations, power and self-confidence. In 
the Ugandan context, as in many African countries, citizens faced challenges in exercising voice 
for claiming accountability. Many challenges were similar to those described in previous 
sections, but additional factors appeared. This section presents the issues that raised 
discontent about local government performance among the village populations. I also describe 
the differences between Acholi and Lango in how they acted upon their concerns and held 
local government accountable. 
  
7.2.1 Governance problems from a citizen perspective 
 
In both Lango and Acholi, the many development problems people encountered were largely 
ascribed to two problems: ‘segregation’ and corruption. Segregation31 was one of the most 
heated topics when speaking about local governance problems. Leaders at each level favoured 
their own village, clan or party members in the distribution of resources. ‘Everything stops at 
the sub-county’ was a common phrase among villagers when talking about development 
programmes. Since the officials and LC3 worked ‘inside their offices’ and their work was not 
completely disclosed, they were the first to be suspected of ‘eating the money’ (cam cana: 
corruption). People also suspected corrupt behaviour at LC1 level, because LC1 members were 
                                                          
31
 Also described as favouritism, though in English these are two different issues. It generally refers to 
patronage along ethnic/clan lines. 
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involved in the registration process of project beneficiaries and in communication with the 
sub-county.   
 
In the Acholi cases it was a particularly tense issue, because most aid agencies channelled their 
aid programmes or distributions using the LC system. Resources and ‘projects’ were in demand 
and the LCs were often involved in decision-making about beneficiaries, thus making them 
important gatekeepers. In Acholi many NGOs targeted people with special needs, such as 
widows, the disabled, orphans and people living with HIV/Aids. Out of the ten Acholi villages 
where fieldwork took place, seven LC1 chairpersons were accused of registering their relatives 
as beneficiaries. This corresponds with what has been written about elite capture in CDD 
interventions (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). In each village several respondents would make such 
accusations, but it was impossible to find out whether corruption had actually occurred. Some 
LC members would have gone as far as registering their children and cousins on the list of 
orphans, while leaving out the genuine orphans. Few NGOs go down to the villages themselves 
to carry out verification exercises, since this comes with high transaction costs.   
 
In both regions the perceived non-responsiveness of officials, and their inability and lack of will 
to take action, were considered major problems. In a context with limited resources it was 
quite understandable that officials could not address all the problems. Citizens quite likely 
reported problems for which officials had no direct responsibility, not knowing their exact 
mandates, which led to discontent even though the official was not actually responsible. 
Nonetheless, the outcome was that many citizens saw the work of officials as irrelevant. 
 
The biggest difficulty is negligence by the authorities. You take an issue to LC1 but he 
does not forward the issue, only tells you that he took it to the sub-county and you 
can wait for the feedback for long and give up. 
Acholi: Woman, age 34, Lamwo district,  
 
The Acholi and the Langi did experience corruption and unresponsiveness as a disadvantage, 
behaviour that they were forced to live with, and which limited their livelihood options. In 
which ways, then, did they try to seek accountability for such failures?  
7.2.2 ‘We want to remove the LC’ 
 
There are few formal accountability mechanisms at people’s disposal in Uganda. At the very 
local level of LC1 and LC2, citizens need to collect signatures and organise a ‘vote of no 
confidence’ to push an elected leader out of office, after which a by-election can be held. The 
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higher up the ladder, the more difficult it becomes to hold leaders accountable. Though the 
LC1 level is relevant in people’s lives, it has far less power than the LC3 level where important 
decisions are taken and budgets are allocated. At this level the procedures and information 
flows become much more complicated. Interactions between the sub-county and district levels 
are even more difficult for local villagers to assess.  
 
A clear difference between Lango and Acholi was that in Lango the formal mechanism was 
known to the population and actually used. The majority of Langi respondents – though more 
men than women – were able to explain the procedure in individual interviews. In the parish 
where I did the research, three LC1 chairpersons had been expelled from office in the last five 
years. After holding a village meeting, people had sent a letter to the LC2 chairperson with 
their complaints and the required number of signatures, after which the LC2 chairperson and 
the Parish Chief called a village meeting. In the meeting the LC1 was questioned. Then the 
stamp was taken away from him and a by-election was held immediately. Reasons for 
removing LC1s from office included favouring their own clan, bad morals such as frequent 
‘over drinking’ (setting the wrong example), stealing or any other crime, and making decisions 
on his/her own without involving the committee or the wider community. 
 
It showed the Langi population’s ability to use the law and confront the LC1 with his 
misbehaviour. Yet focus group participants also gave reasons why such steps were not taken, 
even in cases where an LC1 was not performing well. Most people were afraid to create social 
tension; when some community members complained about an LC they risked creating friction 
with the clan of that LC. Social unity was an important value, which should be respected. 
 
In Acholi, while practically every village complained about their LCs, I encountered only one 
example where an LC1 was removed. Otherwise, there was little awareness about this formal 
procedure. It was striking how frequently respondents answered that they could only ‘wait for 
elections’ as the only way to hold their leaders accountable. Even after the 2011 local elections 
had just taken place, respondents commented ‘If this one [LC] is not working well, then we just 
remove him next time’, which in practice meant allowing the LC to misuse the office for the 
next five years.  
 
In Acholi I encountered several examples where the sub-county had actively discouraged any 
action to remove LCs from office. They simply stated that ousting an LC was ‘not an option’ 
and the population had to wait for national elections. In one village people were particularly 
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unhappy with their LC chairperson, who had been accused of diverting NGO resources several 
times. Some of the elders had gone to the sub-county and complained to the LC3 about it, 
saying they wanted a new LC1. The LC3 answered that ‘Only the President can remove an LC1’. 
There were other examples that show that a lack of knowledge about procedures was 
reinforced by more knowledgeable officials, who used this gap to the disadvantage of the 
communities 
 
About the LC1 here, other committee members complain he only works with the 
[Secretary for] Defence, not the others. The members did not come out clearly, they 
only complain from down [among themselves locally], they do not take it to the LC2 
to help them. I cannot tell why, maybe they think that since the committee has no 
money it is useless, or they are disorganized and do not come out. People have tried 
to correct LC1 and sent complaints to LC3 about segregation. [...] People took their 
views to LC3 at sub-county, and he said there cannot be a by-election, or he has no 
power to carry out a by-election.  
Acholi: Man, age 40, LC2 member, Chua district 
 
In both Lango and Acholi people felt that corruption at higher levels was worse, but it was 
something they had to live with as they would never be able to challenge it. While officially it 
should be the council that provide the checks and balances to the sub-county officials, in many 
cases the council simply rubber-stamps sub-county decisions.  
 
Those at SC are together as a team in corruption. The Area Councillors we sent [voted 
for] are not helping us. In elections we will change them [oust them]. The way we are 
being handled is not proper. We wait for the elections. (...) The civil servants: the only 
way we can work on them is through the strong councillors that we have to elect. We 
always fear to go ourselves, we can easily be arrested. When we vote the leaders into 
power we respect them. But when he does not represent us well we have to wait for 
elections. (...) The LC3 comes from up! For the government goes from LC1 to LC5 so 
we cannot do much. 
Lango: Focus group with 7 men, Kole district 
 
Citizens themselves cannot do much more than read information displayed on notice boards 
and attend the council meetings, but there are no mechanisms at their disposal to enforce 
sanctions. Most respondents therefore stated that central government was responsible for 
supervising LC3 and LC5 officials and controlling the flow of funds. This was congruent with the 
adherence to existing hierarchies. At the same time, central government was perceived to be 
even more corrupt and it was assumed that it would probably protect local governments. 
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7.2.3 Informal accountability mechanisms 
 
In the relationship between citizens and more powerful actors, citizens may not have formal 
mechanisms to challenge the powerful, and may even consider it inappropriate to express any 
form of critique. Scott has written extensively on how power operates to oppress the less 
powerful actors in unequal relationships (Scott, 1985, 1990). Compliance is not only a reaction 
to repression; it is in many cases a strategy to ‘stay safe’ or to repress anger about humiliation. 
Yet in these circumstances, forms of dissent can nonetheless exist. These ‘hidden transcripts’ 
are often expressed within the inner circle of the poor, invisible to the powerful, but under 
certain conditions may cross the line to the public arena (Scott, 1990). Even the powerful may 
be susceptible to such signals. Informally, these local expressions may have sanctioning powers 
and forge improvement. In some cases quite impolite or rude forms of accountability are 
developed, such as the use of violence (Hossain, 2010).  
 
The sense of community in both the Acholi and the Langi was characterised by values such as 
‘unity’ and ‘togetherness’ that all people respected. There were therefore many social 
conventions which prevented frictions being created in the community, either between the 
leaders and the population or between clans. Misbehaving LC members could thus not simply 
be reprimanded using formal methods. Involving the sub-county might lead to fines or arrests. 
Fines were paid to the sub-county and would not benefit the villages. An arrest would take a 
community member away from the village and his/her family, which was generally perceived 
as negative. In principle, to oust an LC from office was a last resort, hence people preferred to 
resolve problems with the LC1 among themselves. 
 
The typical informal strategy was to advise, not to criticise or challenge, a leader. This was a 
visible but discreet measure often adopted by other LC members and customary leaders. 
Elders narrated examples from the past or told parables that sent out messages to the culprit 
about his/her faults and the solutions, often in community meetings. They can also ‘sit down’ 
with the LC to counsel him. However, especially in the Acholi region, the elders were said to 
have lost the ‘advising influence’. In the first place many elders had passed away in the war, 
and there were not many to fill that role. Also, they were not perceived as legitimate voices to 
speak about ‘politics’ and were expected to engage in cultural affairs only.  
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Given that the Acholi could not make use of formal mechanisms, I paid all the more attention 
to informal strategies. Informal, more hidden, pressures in the context of Acholi would not 
take rude forms, in fact rather the opposite. One informal strategy was non-participation; 
people refused to show up when a leader called meetings or for community actions, which 
sends a clear message to the leader. This was also used for other authoritative bodies, as in the 
case of an NGO that wanted to a hold meeting with a group of beneficiaries for an agricultural 
project, but the group members did not show up since they disagreed with the type of project.  
 
A second strategy was to use mockery or satire by naming places or objects to ridicule 
particular leaders, which clearly worked to discredit them, undermining their reputation and 
status. A place in the road was named after a man who was so drunk that he wet his pants, as 
a story to ‘teach people’ to avoid drinking. In Gulu district a particular bean variety was named 
after a politician who stole many sacks for own consumption. Also, women composed songs 
with hidden messages to leaders. A third strategy was to reclaim an ‘invited space’: to wait for 
any kind of meeting to be called and raise issues at the end, when the floor is open for 
comments. A meeting called to inform people about a vaccination programme could then 
result in discussing a leader’s actions, which was enough reason for some leaders not to call 
any meetings. 
 
In recent years, community radio has become a powerful medium: a strategy for letting off 
steam. People call in to radio programmes and talk shows where criticism is very openly and 
directly aired, though with the security of being an anonymous caller if preferred. Since it can 
reach a larger audience, it may have more effect (Blair, 2000; Devas & Grant, 2003). Politicians 
and LC5 district chairpersons often participated in radio talk shows to explain their decisions. 
People would call in with questions to which they would respond, and over the next few days 
one would hear people debating what had been said. However, one civil society representative 
commented: ‘While it [the radio programme] is important as an arena to air our grievances, it 
makes our people divert their attention and it weakens the capacity to work on your leader 
directly’. 
 
The question is how effective such acts of citizenship are for holding leaders accountable. 
Hossain (2010) demonstrated that the effects of such acts are short-term and reversible, and 
they did not feed into or strengthen formal accountability mechanisms. These acts are very 
local and unable to challenge the often bigger failures at higher levels. This also seemed to be 
the case in Acholi. The naming and shaming strategies were potentially effective at the very 
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local level of LC1 and LC2; they became more difficult at LC3 level, and were unlikely to have 
any effect beyond that.  
 
Whether officials and politicians respond to the expression of discontent and attacks on their 
status depends on many factors combined, as highlighted in accountability literature. In rural 
areas like these there was little presence of organised actors with whom citizens could liaise to 
demand accountability, with the exception of calling in to radio programmes. In Acholi all 
NGOs in the area were implementing livelihood and social service programmes, with little 
attention to the governance dimension of each of their activities. Add to this the lack of a legal 
framework to enforce accountability claims, adequate information, and functioning 
representatives. The subtle accountability strategies could not reinforce or be reinforced by 
other accountability strategies.  
 
7.2.4  Cultural limitations to making accountability claims 
 
The interrogative voice requires certain capabilities (Goetz & Jenkins, 2004; McGee & Gaventa, 
2011), mechanisms through which voice can be exercised (Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007), 
and support and enforcement from higher-level government actors (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 
2006). A number of capabilities came out above. In this section I focus on citizens’ internalised 
ideas about power and authority, which inform how they perceive their agency in 
accountability relations. These include the cultural norm of respecting authority and the 
hierarchy of social relations in society, reinforced by lack of education and self-confidence. As I 
explained in Chapter 3, and as it emerged throughout the subsequent chapters, was that the 
practice of citizen engagement requires a sense of citizenship and agency, on top of knowledge 
of procedures.  
 
The social distance between citizens and Ugandan state officials is large, even at the very local 
level. This distance can appear abruptly after elections, when candidates become ‘bosses’ 
overnight. Cultural norms prescribe a kind of respect for persons in leadership positions that 
forbids criticism and challenges by individual citizens, even if the leader abuses his office. In 
the Ugandan cultural set-up, demanding accountability by direct confrontation is therefore 
nearly unacceptable. The informal accountability strategies discussed above all avoided direct 
confrontation, calling in to a radio programme being slightly different, because mediated by 
anonymity.  
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In both Lango and Acholi, respondents expressed various fears that held them back from 
seeing local leaders or officials, which resonates with how Corbridge et al. (2005) describe the 
barriers between citizens and the Indian state. ‘Not knowing how to speak’, lacking the 
confidence because the official will be more ‘educated’, feeling that the official is simply 
‘higher than you’ and will be ‘rude’ were most the frequently cited fears.  
 
Yes, some people fear talking to leaders because sometimes they [people] can raise 
certain issues, and the leaders and other people end up abusing them [using offensive 
language]. This kind of behaviour makes people feel inferior in the community. Others 
fear because of lack of money and think, if I go to a leader then what will I give him? 
Lango: Man, age 49, Kole district 
 
Some people are scared of harsh leaders, because if they are assuming positions they 
decide whether to listen to your case or not. Leaders in positions think they have 
authority. I know most leaders are really harsh. 
Lango: Woman, age 45, Kole district  
 
A direct consequence of their perceived inferiority was that people adopted a certain attitude 
when they did see someone in a position of authority. The ‘significance of politeness’, a phrase 
coined by Hossain as a structuring feature of Bangladeshi society (2010, p. 914), was what the 
respondents in my study referred to as the obligation to be ‘humble’ and ‘to speak with low 
voice’: 
 
You need to humble yourself if you are going to raise a problem, so that he/she can 
be of good help by solving it in a humble way. If you speak at the top of your voice 
then leaders will not help or listen to your problem, since you never used a good 
approach.  
Lango: Man, age 43, Kole district 
 
The image of political leaders as ‘bosses’ or ‘Big Men’ that prevails in many African societies 
has been widely discussed in the literature on ethnicity and politics (Bayart, 1993; Berman, 
1998; Chabal, 1992). Local big men maintain power through the system of ‘decentralised 
despotism’ that was created by post-colonial regimes (Mamdani, 1996). Their ethnic kin have 
expectations once leaders are elected. They are not just part of an understanding of how 
politics is ‘done’; the hierarchical relations of power that exist and the social distance between 
leaders and citizens that is adhered to seems culturally embedded. Once in office the boss can 
act and do as he pleases without impunity. What I encountered in Acholi and Lango was that 
the election process did not seem to offer a sense of control over their elected leaders. Rather, 
people acted as if they had given away that power, a view that was only strengthened by 
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rampant vote-buying practices during the campaigns. Power holders themselves used this 
notion of control. Sub-county leaders claimed power over the constituency by emphasising 
obedience, thus reinforcing the boss image: 
 
If the LC1 comes with an idea with which the people disagree, then we have to settle 
it there and then. But if the Sub-County comes with an idea, we just have to follow it. 
Maybe it is an idea [directive/policy] for all wards. We need not react against it. (...) 
Those are ideas you cannot run away from, you have to abide by them. With the LC1 
we sit and settle. If he refuses, we leave him alone or we vote and we then go with 
the majority [decision]. We cannot react against the Sub-county out of fear. If you 
don’t obey they can take you to prison or take your properties. They always say ‘This 
idea comes from the very people whom you have elected in the district [council], so 
you have to obey.’  
Acholi: Man, age 59, Chua district 
 
Although these problems existed in both regions, the situation in Lango looked better – though 
not ideal – than in Acholi. The findings of previous sections are summarised in Table 7.2 and 
demonstrate the differences in practices of engagement between Lango and Acholi, and in the 
functioning of local state and customary leaders. In the last section I will explain the difference 
by linking the situation in Acholi back to the previous chapters about the conflict. 
 
Table 7.4 Differences between Acholi and Lango for Citizenship Practices in the present 
 
 Conflict affected Acholi Non-conflict affected Lango 
Community-based 
institutions  
Numerous, active and relevant, but 
in the process of consolidating; 
infrequent activities. Not used as 
springboard for the use of the 
petitioning/ interrogative voice. 
High in density, high intensity of 
activities, consolidated. Small 
groups usually not used as 
springboard for the use of the 
petitioning/ interrogative voice 
regarding formal authorities, but 
for learning citizenship and 
leadership skills. However, the 
Electricity Committee did interact 
with sub-county and district 
government. 
Engagement for material 
aspects of development: 
the petitioning voice 
Few channels for engagement used, 
often only the LC1. 
More diverse, various local 
leaders used to raise community 
issues. 
Formal development 
planning 
Virtually non-existent below LC3 
level. PDC unknown by citizens and 
members unaware of their roles 
Functioning, though with 
institutional challenges. PDCs 
function to collect household 
data, but not as a platform to 
negotiate projects. 
Formal mechanisms for 
accountability and use of 
the interrogative voice 
Not used; thought of as impossible Used in various instances of 
(perceived) corruption or 
misconduct of lowest level 
leaders, but harder to do at higher 
levels. 
Informal mechanisms for Non-confrontational mechanisms Non-confrontational mechanisms 
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accountability and use of 
the interrogative voice 
sometimes used for the very local 
level, e.g. advice by elders, songs. 
But fear of negative consequences.   
used for the very local level, very 
confidently for clan leaders and 
more carefully for formal leaders 
as LCs. 
 
7.2.5  Reflection on the two Acholi sites 
 
In terms of the scope and level of citizen engagement I did not observe any significant 
differences between the two Acholi sites. The populations of Chua and Lamwo faced similar 
challenges in exercising the petitioning and the interrogative voice, and expressed similar 
framings of their sense of citizenship. As explained in Chapter 3, the main difference between 
the Chua and Lamwo research sites was the duration of the camp experience - in Chua for five 
years and in Lamwo for over ten years. The objective of also doing research in Lamwo was to 
enhance my understanding about camp life, not to explain the impact of a variation in the 
duration of encampment. In Lamwo I dedicated much of my time to a reconstruction of camp 
life based on people’s memories and narratives. As a consequence, in Lamwo I did not do as 
many interviews about present-day citizen engagement as would enable a neat comparison 
between the two sites. I do, however, have a tentative proposition about the similar nature of 
citizen engagement.  
 
Although the length of displacement was shorter in Chua, the Chua population nonetheless 
experienced all the conflict mechanisms. Before the camp started in 2002/3, the Chua 
population experienced similar levels of insecurity and militarisation of their environment to 
the Lamwo site. Insecurity and militarised control curtailed spaces for socialisation and citizen 
engagement, and the population in Chua emphasised coping agency as much as in Lamwo. The 
Chua population experienced the same changes in social, cultural and political institutions. The 
important difference is that they experienced the camp leadership and disciplined forms of 
engagement for five years less. But the Chua population did not have the opportunity to build 
experience of citizen engagement prior to the camp. Regarding the sense of citizenship, the 
very fact that one had to leave one’s home and resettle in the camp was damaging to Acholi 
dignity. Whether it was for five or ten years made no difference: the home was lost. Nor did 
the length of displacement matter for how the role of the state was perceived. Finally, since 
the major influx of humanitarian agencies started after 2003, the populationS in both Chua and 
Lamwo were exposed to their interventions for a similar period of time.  
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Thus, the Chua population had no more opportunities to learn and experience active, 
democratic citizenship. They too lived with the same military repression and threat of LRA 
attacks. This may explain why their forms of citizen engagement did not seem to differ from 
the Lamwo site, but I may have missed nuanced details in how camp duration affected 
substantive citizenship. 
 
7.3 Acholi citizenship explained 
 
The previous sections demonstrated that, indeed, the scope of citizen engagement in Acholi, in 
terms of the tactics used and the issues raised, is not as broad as in Lango. The task that 
remains is to explore whether this difference in citizen engagement was caused by the LRA 
conflict.32 In this final section I address proposition (IV): certain practices and ideas that 
emerged during the conflict persist in the post-conflict situation. I do this by referring back to 
parts of the diagram presented in Chapter 3. Section 7.3.1 first reflects on the validity of the 
findings, because of the methodological challenges I encountered (discussed in Chapter 3). 
Section 7.3.2 explains how a lack of a sense of citizenship and persisting fear shape 
engagement (Figure 3.1, G). I then discuss perceptions of the public sphere and the persistent 
practice of withdrawal, in section 7.3.3 (Figure 3.1, F), followed by perceptions of state 
responsibilities in 7.3.4 (Figure 3.1, F). I then discuss an effect of changes in social institutions 
that was not anticipated prior to the fieldwork, which is added to the diagram. This concerns 
the lack of a social foundation for exercising collective voice, which I discuss in section 7.3.5. I 
also discuss the effects of changes in customary institutions and how these affect engagement 
in section 7.3.6, and explore the differentiated effects of the conflict for ethnic and national 
citizenship. Finally, the lack of prior experience with citizen agency is discussed in section 7.3.7 
(Figure 3.1, E). 
 
This discussion helps confirm or refute the overall proposition of this study. Linking past 
experiences to present-day behaviours was the most interesting and the most important 
aspect of the research, and indeed the most challenging. Time and again I asked myself about 
attribution: was the conflict, with all its different features, indeed the cause of the observed 
differences in citizenship? It clearly was responsible for the difference in the sense of 
                                                          
32
 In Chapter 3 I argued that the difference between the Langi and the Acholi could not be explained due 
to differences in cultural characteristics between the two tribes. 
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citizenship, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, but was it also responsible for differences in 
the practice of citizenship?  
 
7.3.1 Reflections on the findings 
 
I encountered several challenges when interrogating the fourth proposition. Based on the 
findings that I present here I do, in fact, believe I have enough evidence to confirm this 
proposition. A major challenge was that I encountered silences when I tried to ask about the 
effects of fear and past experiences, just like many researchers who study the effects of war 
(Green, 1995; Hume, 2010). I also noticed that many of the Acholi in the research sites were 
not in a position to reflect upon their own practice of engagement. Many had not seen how 
communities in other tribes practised their citizenship, as I had seen in Lango. But mainly it 
was not something people reflected on in ordinary life: how socialisation in a particular 
context shapes present-day practice. As I will show below, it only happened when adults spoke 
about the youth and the ‘bad behaviour’ they had picked up in the camp. But this was not an 
example of citizen engagement. It proved easier to discuss this issue with my three research 
assistants and Acholi intellectuals in town, which I did at length to validate my conclusions.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, I pursued alternative explanations for the observed differences. The 
most important was culture: do differences in cultural norms that govern the interaction with 
authorities explain why the Acholi seemed to be less pro-active and confrontational than the 
Langi? I do think culture plays a major role in citizen engagement, but I did not find many 
differences between the Langi and the Acholi in terms of cultural beliefs or ideas that govern 
citizen engagement. I acknowledge this could be a weakness in this study. But I conclude that it 
was the experience of conflict and displacement in Acholi that caused the difference in their 
engagement. Therefore I validate my overall proposition, and in this section I present the 
evidence to support this.  
 
The findings also showed that certain features of the conflict did not matter as much as 
anticipated - or rather, they did not have a significant impact on citizen engagement. The LRA 
atrocities first of all caused death, injuries, broken families, and destruction. These atrocities 
had a huge impact on the well-being of families, as well as a psychological impact on the wider 
community. This mattered for citizen engagement because of the fear, which then led to 
withdrawal from the public sphere. But the perceptions of the state and the public sphere, 
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displacement into camps, and the presence of violent armed actors all seemed to have a more 
profound impact on citizen engagement than the actual LRA violence.  
 
7.3.2 The effects of fear and a lack of a sense of citizenship 
 
There was substantive evidence that fear and suspicion of the public sphere persisted in the 
post-conflict situation, which led to a reduced level of citizen engagement and a narrower 
range of forms of engagement. (See Joseph’s story in Annex 5). The fear in the past was 
strongly voiced by this man: 
 
The war has affected the psychology of people whereby people only think what to eat 
and how to protect themselves from the rebels. It also brought enmity among people 
as people don’t have the same voice to present their issues or opinions, because 
some people benefited alone or pursued individual interests for personal benefits, 
[and] since they left people ignorant they [indirectly] killed many people. (...) Also the 
war created fear in people to have voice, because if you present a strong issue, you 
will be followed up seriously by the government. That is: if you go against the 
government and also against the rebels. This happened because they stayed among 
the people and they kill you, but nobody can know who killed you.  
Acholi: Man, age 30, Chua district 
 
In Chapter 2 I elaborated the prominence of ‘silence’ in (post)conflict settings (Hume, 2010; 
Uvin, 2009). In the context of war it often stems from a ‘culture of fear’ (Wood, 2003) that 
emerges in the face of violent repression. In Acholi I encountered silences, while very few such 
silences were observed in Lango. It is difficult to interpret silences as an outsider, because 
there may not be many respondents who can validate one’s interpretations. Though 
respondents came up with valuable reflections about why fear continued to operate, other 
reasons for silence may exist simultaneously.  
 
Silence operated subtly for specific aspects of the relationship between the Acholi and the 
regime. The silence was there to prevent any harm which might come from speaking 
negatively about the government. In the early stage of the field research I noticed that women 
especially would talk quite readily about their history and their lives during the war. However, 
when questions were moving into the direction of government’s roles, the women would fall 
silent and shy, or would start to turn away from me. I started writing down at which moment 
in the interview silences occurred, which enabled me to identify the sensitive issues. Also men 
would fall silent, although several men would resume speaking after some hesitation, and 
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spoke quite critically of government. I felt people had created invisible, almost unconscious, 
boundaries in their minds about what could be spoken about and what could not. When the 
community got to know me better they dared to reveal more. These elders described their 
fears and assumptions about breaking the silence: 
 
People still have the trauma of the past experience of war, that if you want to say 
something on the government you first reflect on what happened during the insurgency, 
then you stop talking.  
Elder 2, Lamwo  
 
People fear, because when you as an ordinary village person speak about the 
government or speak about what it is doing, the government has the security bodies and 
they can send those like the police to come and arrest you. They’ll say you are spoiling 
the reputation of the government. This keeps you from criticising the government. 
Elder 1, Lamwo  
 
We take the government as our father and we are the children of the government. So it 
is [for] the government itself to come out and explain about how it operates and 
handles issues. So that when you have anything to speak about, about the government, 
you can feel confident that nothing will happen to you. But since it doesn’t do that, 
there is that fear and suspicion. Because there is still that law that whoever speaks 
anything that spoils the government programmes or shows a bad image of government 
you will still get arrested and sentenced in court.  
Elder 2, Lamwo  
 
In focus groups with youth similar concerns were expressed. They emphasised that youth 
risked being labelled rebels, which in the past led had to arrests by the military. This had made 
them very careful about what they said and what they did not. Although the military is no 
longer present in the area, they felt that one can never know what will happen in the future.   
 
The governance regime in the displacement camps had compounded the perception of the 
public sphere as unsafe. In interviews I asked both men and women about the differences they 
felt in having voice, comparing the situations in the camp and now at home. Since many 
people had expressed the difficulties in having voice while in the camp, I hoped to find out 
whether people still carried a sense of having to be silent about certain issues. People 
acknowledged that interaction with leaders had become easier now that they were no longer 
dependent on relief. On the other hand, many NGO programmes were channelled through the 
LCs. Because of the many development programmes in Acholi, this created a different power 
dynamic between the population and LCs from that in Lango. The authority of LCs to identify 
beneficiaries thus undermined the power of the population to voice dissent. Female 
respondents in particular argued that it was therefore better to maintain a good relationship 
270 
 
with them, despite their corruption. Women feared that a leader would become ‘an enemy’ if 
criticised. One then risked being excluded from ‘projects’. This idea that one had to subject 
oneself to leadership was a notion that strongly intersected with women’s position in society 
generally, and reinforced it.  
 
Finally, a lack of a sense of citizenship, demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, undermined citizen 
engagement. The lack of a sense of citizenship made people feel that the state would never 
listen when the Acholi voice was raised. Some stated that they felt they were not seen as 
citizens, but as ‘Kony’:  
 
People have fear in coming out with the voice on government because they think 
government will say that they support Kony and people still have fear that Kony might 
come back. Those days even when the war was still intense, people had no voice 
because most of the time, they were thinking of how to hide and where to hide like 
baby rats. 
Acholi: Man, age 40, Lamwo  
 
How this undermines citizen agency is explained by this man with the following proverb: 
‘Dyang ka dong kikolo oko woto dok ikin wadi?’, which means ‘If the bull is castrated, does it 
still move with the rest? It does not because it now has no ability to fertilize the cow’. This 
reflects the embodied experience of how the Acholi feel weak compared to other tribes.  
 
7.3.3 Internalised perceptions of the public sphere 
  
At the time of research, the Acholi were still suspicious of openly engaging in the public sphere 
on various issues. In Chapter 2 it was argued that perceptions of available space inform current 
willingness to engage as citizens, and that perceptions are coloured by people’s past 
experiences with the state (Thomson, 2011). In subsequent chapters I demonstrated that the 
Acholi felt the state was an actor that could not be trusted and, somewhere below the surface, 
was against the Acholi tribe altogether. They had also experienced the repressive actions of 
the military and a securitisation of the public sphere. In line with Thomson’s findings on 
Rwanda, my findings suggest that the Acholi continue to perceive the public space as unsafe.  
 
People have fear in coming out with their voices because for the last twenty years 
people have been living fearfully and up to now there is no big change.  
Acholi: Man, age 36, Chua  
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Internalised perceptions about the public sphere and state behaviour, which originated from 
the war, undermined the confidence of citizens to speak to government officials and police, 
and engage with local government institutions. Not every topic concerning the regime was 
taboo, but it was more a matter of how one spoke about it while ensuring the ‘government’s 
reputation’ was not damaged. Therefore, negative opinions about government performance 
were not readily shared outside an inner circle of family and neighbours. Thinking of the public 
sphere as an arena for deliberation (Fraser, 1990), a conclusion is that the Acholi lacked the 
capability to use this arena.  
 
Factually, formal opportunities opened up now that the planning process resumed and 
recovery programmes started. The possibility to exercise the petitioning voice thus opened up, 
but it was treated with suspicion. The needs were great and this did motivate the Acholi to 
engage with certain programmes, including government programmes such as NAADS and 
NUSAF. It was, however, a challenge to express discontent with the way such programmes 
were implemented. When the quality of seeds and cuttings distributed under NAADS was 
poor, for instance, one was reluctant to say this openly. Rather, farmers refused to pick up the 
sacks. The life story of the man, at the beginning of this chapter, showed a similar reaction 
when the goats in a project had died. More generally, holding the local state accountable for 
weak performance was a huge challenge. The discourse in the public sphere was neither 
critical nor constructive. 
 
These factors reinforced another barrier to engagement: the cultural respect for authority. As 
shown in section 7.2, respect for anyone in a higher official position (from sub-county level 
upwards) was an impediment to engagement with state actors in both Lango and Acholi. But in 
Acholi the respect one ought to have intersected with the fear and suspicion one has based on 
past experiences.  
 
7.3.4 Perceptions of state responsibilities  
 
Another idea that emerged in the post-conflict situation and informed citizen engagement in 
the present was a particular expectation of the state. Again, this was not something the Acholi 
in the research sites expressed verbally. This conclusion is based on the comparison between 
the expectations expressed in both Acholi and Lango and on observations of how people acted 
according to their expectations.  
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To a great extent, low expectations of the state had been caused by the securitisation of the 
public sphere. This first came up in Chapter 5, when I explained that ordinary service provision 
was less of a priority during the war. It came out strongly in Chapter 6, where I showed how 
some people supported government measures to establish the camps and the creation of 
LDUs, although some researchers encountered critical objections in other parts of the region 
(Dolan, 2009). I argued that this is the result of an untenable situation of insecurity in which 
people support measures that enhance their protection even if these outcomes are proof of a 
failing state.  
 
This had direct implications for people’s expectations of the state in the present. For so many 
years people had asked for security, and now that the situation was stable many did not seem 
to demand more, despite their expressed needs for education, health care and livelihood 
inputs. The population had seen little of a developmental state and knew little of development 
elsewhere in Uganda, including development of the markets, enterprises and infrastructure, 
and how these differed from previous regimes. As a result, the current breadth and depth of 
Acholi demands were at a lower level than in non-affected Lango. Pham and Vinck show that 
79% of the Acholi are satisfied with how the government is maintaining the peace, but only 
32% are satisfied with how it handles services, employment, corruption and involving the 
community in decision-making. Dissatisfaction, I argue, does not translate into making 
demands. 
 
Despite all the weaknesses in Uganda’s development policies and implementation, the Langi 
had seen some development being brought to their region in the form of gradual 
improvement to their sub-county Health Centre and the construction of several schools in 
their sub-county. Now that the situation had returned to stability, Acholi seemed first and 
foremost glad that peace had returned and would not ask for more. It even seemed they 
expected less from the government than Langi.  
 
7.3.5 Effects of the fragmentation of social institutions 
 
The disruption of social institutions had more effects than anticipated in the initial framework 
presented in Chapter 3. Initially I related the weakening of social institutions strictly to learning 
citizenship. Based on the findings I need to add that the changes in certain social institutions 
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also had other effects. First, social institutions are indeed still fragmented and therefore they 
do not offer solid platforms for citizenship learning. Secondly, the foundation for collective 
forms of citizen engagement is not as strong as in Lango. Thirdly, changes in social relations 
specifically undermined the role of customary leaders as political brokers. However, there 
were signs that certain social institutions were starting to recover.  
 
In my discussion of the effect of the LRA conflict on social institutions I distinguished social 
relations from forms of social organisation. In this section I discuss the functioning of 
community groups and the quality of social relations within the community. In the next section 
I discuss customary institutions and the relationship between the elders and the village 
population.  
 
As mentioned above, the community groups in Acholi were not as well established as in Lango. 
Research participants themselves did not relate the way Acholi groups were functioning 
directly to the war. I did attribute the difference between Acholi and Lango groups to the 
conflict, because many respondents said that problems in group work were caused by the fact 
that groups were ‘still young’ or new.33 Numerous groups were initiated in the camps, often 
induced by NGO programmes, but many dissolved when people moved home, because NGOs 
had included beneficiaries from various villages in such groups, who were unable to meet after 
everyone had gone back to their home village. In many places new groups had to be formed.  
 
Why is the ‘newness’ of Acholi groups relevant? I argue that when such institutions and social 
practices have been stable and established for a long time they can offer a springboard for 
larger-scale initiatives, as the Electricity Committee in Kole (Lango) illustrated. This Committee 
was an instance of a community group that had ‘scaled up’: using the same mechanisms for 
organisation as the community groups do, this committee represented all citizens of the sub-
county to higher levels of governance and to a national company. This committee had thus 
reached out to state actors (an example of Putnam’s linking social capital), while community 
groups usually would not. The reason why Acholi groups tend to be newer is directly because 
of the conflict and social and organisational disruption. 
 
This study showed that the LRA war directly and indirectly affected the social relations of 
Acholi communities. Like Pham and Vinck (2010) I found that the Acholi referred positively to 
                                                          
33
 Twenty respondents mentioned this in individual interviews and it came up in several focus group 
discussions. 
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their neighbours and communities as ‘good people’. At the same time they spoke of a ‘lack of 
unity’ since the war. The following quotation indicates various reasons for the lack of harmony: 
 
The war has led to disunity: every elder now only knows their own side [clan]. The 
issue of drinking alcohol has spoiled the elders. Even if there is a case to be settled, 
the elders will first want to drink. Most of the elders do not know the history of 
Acholi, even if you ask them they cannot tell you. There is much corruption with the 
elders. If you bring a case they ask for money. There is a lot of segregation and 
tension among people, for example land disputes or arguments over NUSAF. People 
in the ward do not want to associate with those who benefited from NUSAF. People 
do not like the LC1 because he registered only his relatives for NUSAF. He alone had 
two groups on his own that received agricultural inputs from NUSAF. 
Acholi: Woman, age 30, Chua district 
 
Most respondents speak about the displacement into camps as the main cause for discord and 
social conflicts; too many people confined together and alcoholism had eroded important 
Acholi norms that had guarded their harmony in the past. The increase in land disputes can be 
considered an indirect effect of the war. 34 Boundaries had been forgotten while people lived 
in the camps and many of the elders who were the holders of such knowledge had passed 
away, or were not taken seriously. I came across several boundary disputes in both research 
sites, of which two were so serious that the parties involved refused to speak with one 
another. One of these cases became entangled with local politics, because one of the involved 
community members was the sub-county chairperson of the NRM party.  
 
Also a new source of disharmony was cited, which was said to have started in the camps: 
tensions between NRM supporters and members of opposition parties. This started after the 
change to multi-party politics in 2006. This quotation shows how this intersects with on-going 
land disputes: 
 
The unity among people nowadays is threatened because most of the party 
supporters are trying to spoil groups. In groups like NUSAF 2, people from different 
political parties are joining together. Then some will chat and make fun of others, 
they praise their parties so that the person who belongs to another party would leave 
the group and join together with his party members. Other group members give 
examples of how leaders are staying well together, because they don’t fight amongst 
                                                          
34
 A World Bank (2009) survey in 2008 showed that 25% of the respondents (N=1200) reported being 
involved in a land dispute over boundaries. This figure was expected to rise as the phase out process of 
the camps was on-going. In 65% of the reported cases the dispute concerned the areas that were left 
behind upon displacement. Other disputes concerned the land on which the camp was located and the 
land belonging to host communities. The report also mentions that the population has very little 
knowledge of the Land Act and that the majority perceived land title registration as a government 
attempt to grab their land. Pham and Vinck (2010) report that 35% of the respondents were involved in 
land conflict. 
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themselves. Like Museveni and Besigye have never fought and quarrelled so why 
should we the supporters fight and hate each other. The tension came because the 
NRM was rigging elections and because of tension among people because of the land 
wrangles. Among the people who are returning home. It becomes political, because 
tension is between opposition and NRM supporters. Then the NRM officials tend to 
back up their supporters and take away the land from opposition supporters, which 
brings tension among the people. 
Acholi: Man, age 35, Lamwo district 
 
An example of how the conflict directly impacted on social relations was when families had 
been victims of an LRA attack in which someone from the same community had been involved. 
It had been an LRA tactic to force abductees to attack their home areas. One example of such 
stories: 
 
Now there is lack of cooperation among the people. For example, my sister was taken 
by the LRA and she came back with other LRA rebels near our home. And they 
stabbed two people, a man and a young girl of 12 years old. They were killed for 
trying to escape. The girl is the daughter of the brother of LC1. so conflict started 
seriously between the two families; the family of the girl who was killed, and mine as 
the family of the abductees. So the family of the dead girl hired four soldiers from 
UPDF to kill me, as the sister of the abductee. The UPDF pierced my chest with the 
bayonet. So the father of my sister reported to the police and the police carried out 
investigation to find out the truth. Now, we still don’t talk to that family, there is still 
that anger. And it was difficult to go to that LC1, who passed away. 
Acholi: Woman, age 28, Lamwo  
 
Many respondents referred to examples like this as a possible reason for the lack of unity in 
the community, but I encountered only two instances in which this had happened and caused 
a breakdown in the relationship between two families. In the absence of a reconciliation 
process the families were unable to collaborate in, for instance, group work.  
 
A lack of unity had implications for the community’s collective capacities for citizen 
engagement, like some authors have argued (Fox, 2007; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006). When I 
asked respondents why the community did not act upon various governance problems they 
had mentioned the lack of unity was frequently cited. For an issue to be taken to a higher 
authority ‘the community has to come up as one’, notably in a community meeting. Therefore, 
where unity was lacking certain issues remained unsolved. In two cases the engagement of 
individual families was seriously hampered. One family told me they had difficulties accessing 
the LC chairperson, because the LC’s family had been victim of an LRA attack in which a 
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member of the other family had participated. Another family explained they feared to speak to 
the LC out of guilt that one of their children was in the LRA.35  
 
The war also directly undermined the mechanisms for repairing social relationships and 
restoring unity in the communities. People lacked the assets to go through full reconciliation 
processes, or to pay fees to customary courts. Many of the elders and customary leaders who 
had facilitated the process and performed the rituals had passed away. As long as a 
reconciliation process between families and clans was not completed, the clans and families 
involved could sometimes literally not ‘talk’ to one another or engage in other social activities 
such as group work. But then I also heard of families that had been forgiving of LRA abductees, 
knowing they acted against their will. The effect of such past events is thus not uniform. 
 
7.3.6 Customary leadership challenged  
 
Previous chapters showed that the legitimacy of customary leaders and elders was challenged 
during the war. Other scholars spoke about their ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Branch, 2010) and the 
problems this created for their role in justice and reconciliation mechanisms (Allen, 2006). In 
the early phases of the war the legitimacy of the Acholi elders and customary leaders had been 
seriously challenged by their inability to resettle former UNLA soldiers. The Acholi clan system 
was subsequently almost dismembered in the camps, when clan authority was undermined in 
various ways. First of all they were no longer able to perform important rituals. Secondly, their 
social status was eroded because the humanitarian actors made them ‘ordinary people’ and 
because many of them failed to show respectable behaviour because of alcoholism.  
 
In my study I found that everyone, but particularly the youth, felt that the elders had lost a 
certain status and respect. Also, the youth felt that not all the elders’ advice was applicable to 
present-day problems, or felt they were incompetent. The challenge to the status of the elders 
is illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
The elders are bribed by the government. So when it comes to giving advice, the 
elders advise people to support the government. But the youth do not support that. 
Most of the LCs are also bribed by the government and they call the president 
‘father’. But before the camp there was nothing like bribe.  
 
                                                          
35
 Because of the issue being so sensitive it was too difficult to find out the exact number of similar 
cases.  
277 
 
The role of elders drastically changed. The type of life in the camp was different from 
at home. By then, the elders had so many responsibilities. I don’t know why it 
changed. Our life entered a different form in there,... drinking, drug abuse. The 
government brought in the LCs. The LC is also in the village, just like the rwot kweri, 
the clan leader. Now which one to listen to? In the government system there is 
sometimes support for linking to higher level officials. The elders shied away, they 
also saw the LCs as somehow superior, the elders don’t act as their fathers any more. 
They call even the LCs ‘ladit’, which means honourable! That removes the respect 
from the elder. In many cases the elders kept quiet. Their advice is not followed.  
Man, age 62, Lamwo 
 
An implication of this legitimacy crisis is that, in the post-conflict situation, the elders are 
barely able to function as political brokers between the communities and the state (Corbridge, 
Williams, Srivastava, & Véron, 2005). I observed public meetings in which they were not always 
taken seriously by the population. In two village meetings in which LC1 chairpersons made 
public announcements I observed a few instances where the attendees laughed when one of 
the elders had stood up and addressed LC members. When I asked afterwards what had 
happened I was told the elder had said something irrelevant and was ‘stubborn’ or ‘drunk’. Not 
only was their knowledge not always considered relevant, it seemed they lacked the status and 
authority to advise the LCs. However, when I observed a customary court meeting about a 
family issue the audience was listening carefully. Also in the case of the land encroached upon 
by the military, mentioned above, the village population referred to the elders as their 
legitimate representatives. Thus, for issues that clearly belonged to the customary sphere the 
elders seemed to carry out their roles appropriately, but they were still unable to play a 
meaningful role vis-à-vis local state actors on other occasions.  
 
The findings from Lango show there is a tension between the LC system and the customary 
norms that allow elders to have a voice on public affairs: the ‘public’ LC system (state 
citizenship) is not the customary ‘public’ (ethnic citizenship). In both regions there is 
interaction between the two systems, in particular when it comes to justice mechanisms and 
resolving land disputes. In Lango, the LCs are therefore generally considered the appropriate 
channel for dealing with higher-level government issues rather than customary leaders. But, 
from observations of meetings in Lango, it seemed advice from customary leaders is more 
often acknowledged. Also, on a number of occasions elders raised issues with the sub-county 
on behalf of their communities, particularly around land, or instructed the LCs and opinion 
leaders in the community to do so.  
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My findings for the present-day situation suggest that there may be reason for optimism and 
that the crisis in legitimacy as described by Allen (2006, 2010), Branch (2010) and Finnström 
(2003) will not be permanent. In the post-conflict situation, elders and clan leaders - holders of 
authority in the Acholi ethnic community - were needed for resolving land disputes and 
organising clan affairs. Now at home, they no longer had difficulty accessing their shrines or 
performing rituals. The customary leaders seemed to be re-establishing some of their 
legitimacy in their own customary sphere. Now able to perform crucial functions regarding 
land distribution and settling border disputes, and where possible also for the reconciliation 
between clans, their powers were gradually being restored. As a result, customary leaders are 
regaining some respect.  
 
Thus, an implication of the effects of the war on the Acholi customary leaders is that Acholi 
communities lack political brokers. For the practice of citizenship this means a lack of 
leadership figures that can engage in or mobilise citizen engagement in relation to the local 
state. However, within the sphere of the ethnic community there are signs that customary 
authority – and with it an important aspect of ethnic citizenship - is being reconstituted to 
some extent. 
 
7.3.7 Lack of prior experience with citizen agency  
 
This sub-section addresses the second part of proposition (IV): that the Acholi citizens have 
little prior experience with forms of citizen engagement, which leads to limited levels of 
engagement in the post-conflict situation. Perhaps the phrase ‘we just wait’ – a frequent 
answer to my question about whether and how people follow up on issues raised to the sub-
county - illustrates best that people were unaware of procedures. I want to argue that a lack of 
experience is part of the explanation for less engagement in Acholi compared to Lango. This is 
not something that many people explained to me in so many words, since in general people do 
not speak in a way that reflects on complicated processes such as experiential learning. This 
finding is thus based on observations of the knowledge people displayed in using formal 
channels for engagement, like for raising concerns about a public service or for raising a 
complaint about the performance of an LC.  
 
As explained in section 7.1 and 7.2, the Acholi were unaware of most of the formal procedures 
in place for using the petitioning and interrogative voice. The majority of the people did not 
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know the responsibilities of the sub-county. Also local leaders themselves, such as the LC1 and 
LC2 and members of the Parish Development Committee, were not aware of all its functions. 
Apart from such knowledge, people had little practical experience in interacting with state 
authorities. I deliberately use the word ‘experience’ to underline that this goes beyond a gap in 
knowledge about laws and procedures (although these are of course a component of it) and 
includes the lack of skills and awareness that people would have built up over time through 
exposure and learning through practice. 
    
My reasoning is that the Acholi have not had the same opportunities to gain experience with 
the functions and channels of the LC system as the Langi. Before the RCs/LCs were introduced 
in 1986, there was no system in place in either Lango or Acholi that ensured bottom-up 
participation and representation. During the war the RCs/LCs in Acholi were used for security 
purposes, not to channel citizen demands or for the planning process as in Lango. As 
mentioned before, social and cultural institutions where such practices could be learnt did not 
function either. In the post-conflict phase, having lost out on several years of the development 
of the LC system that had been advancing elsewhere, citizens thus had little experience to fall 
back on in mobilising the LCs system for the recovery. Everyone knew that ‘development 
comes through the LCs’, but there was a tendency to wait for it rather than organising for it, 
with the exception of a few active LC members.  
 
The functioning of the LCs showed a number of shortcomings which were caused by the war: 
PDCs were not functioning, LC3 representatives were barely active, and the sub-county lacked 
staff, technical capacities and resources. LC21 and LC2 members lacked knowledge of systems 
and procedures, and lacked experience in using the channels of engagement at higher levels. 
We should not forget that most of the local leaders were themselves as much affected by the 
conflict as anyone else. The LCs had functioned in a very particular way during the war, and 
had barely performed their representative functions. They had had few opportunities to 
perform ordinary leadership roles in terms of development and mediating with higher level 
authorities. Both the population and the lower level LCs thus lack years of experience in raising 
issues and following them up. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter presented the difference in citizen engagement between Lango and Acholi. It 
showed that the Langi used a wider range of tactics for engagement: they used various formal 
and informal avenues to exercise the petitioning voice as well as the interrogative voice. They 
engaged with sub-county and district-level authorities. They had active community-based 
forms of organisation, both within the clan and comprising members of various clans. 
Modelled after the local groups, one initiative had developed into an association at sub-county 
level. The issues on which they engage ranged from the welfare of the clans, to government 
services, to the accountability of lower level leaders.  
 
In Acholi, citizen engagement was neither as wide in scope nor as substantive as in Lango. 
Where instances of citizen engagement occurred this was mainly to use the petitioning voice in 
an attempt to obtain much-needed services. The LC1 chairperson was the most important 
avenue through which this was pursued, and often the only one. Apart from that people 
tended to rely on their own efforts to improve their living conditions. The Acholi barely used 
the interrogative voice for accountability purposes. Discontent about a local leader, often the 
LC1, was expressed through hidden transcripts in the form of gossip and ‘talking quietly at 
home’ and various passive resistance tactics.  
 
I then described how ideas and practices that emerged during the conflict continued to shape 
current practices. Based on the findings presented in section 7.3 it can be argued that there 
was not simply ‘less’ or ‘a lack of’ engagement. In Acholi, the practice of citizenship was 
characterised by a persistent fear of the state and suspicion of the public sphere that had been 
internalised by Acholi citizens. As a matter of routine people were careful in their interactions 
with the state. On sensitive issues, disengagement was the more likely strategy. In addition, a 
fragmented social base for collective action and the lack of political brokers compounded the 
challenges to a collective voice.  
 
The findings presented in the last section suggest a differentiated effect of the conflict on 
ethnic citizenship and citizenship of the Ugandan state. Although the security aspect of a sense 
of citizenship had much improved, the dignity and equality of the Acholi tribe had not been 
restored. A sense of inferiority, fear and suspicion continued to characterise the practice of 
citizenship in relation to the state. For the ethnic community, on the other hand, the chapter 
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showed that important institutions like the community groups, practices like wang oo, and the 
involvement of elders in clan affairs were being revived. 
 
In the final chapter I go back to the propositions of this study and present my conclusions. I 
explain my contributions to the literature and I discuss the implications for policy. If the 
problem of citizen engagement in Acholi is not simply the lack of engagement, then 
interventions should not be oriented simply to increasing the frequency of state – citizen 
interactions.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
Introduction  
 
This final chapter presents the main arguments and conclusions about how protracted conflict 
and displacement affect the ways in which citizenship is sensed and practised. I return to my 
initial propositions and then explain how my study has contributed to existing knowledge in 
this field. This includes a critical engagement with other research done. I discuss policy 
implications, in particular for community-driven approaches in (post)conflict settings. 
 
The overall proposition is that the experience of protracted conflict and displacement leads to 
a lack of a sense of citizenship and to diminished forms of citizen engagement, due to the 
limited opportunity for learning and experiencing the practice of citizenship. What has been 
learnt in this study is that in order to understand citizenship in a post-conflict situation, both 
the sense and the practice of citizenship need to be studied. This requires a historical analysis 
of how they are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed over time. Regarding the 
period of conflict itself, one needs to unpack the features of the conflict and follow the 
mechanisms through which the conflict may have affected citizenship practice. In Acholi, a 
combination of mechanisms diminished a sense of citizenship and forms of citizen 
engagement, as was observed at the time of research in 2010.  
 
The proposition (II) for what happens during the conflict is that certain social and political 
institutions narrow down and that the public sphere is securitised. The consequence of these 
changes, stated in proposition (III), is that there is a lack of opportunities to learn and 
experience active, democratic citizenship. In Acholi, political institutions and the public sphere 
were securitised due to military presence and threats of LRA attacks. Social and cultural 
institutions were disrupted, customary institutions lost authority and local state actors were 
preoccupied with security issues. It was demonstrated that the focus of the Acholi during the 
insurgency was on forms of coping agency for short-term needs. Younger generations did not 
gain experience with forms of citizen engagement like their elders had. The study also 
demonstrated how the conflict led to a lack of a sense of citizenship in terms of a lack of 
dignity, security and equality. The last proposition (IV) states that certain practices and ideas 
developed during the conflict persist in the post-conflict situation. The study shows how the 
practice of citizen engagement in Acholi is characterised by fear and suspicion and weakened 
by a lack of prior experience with citizen engagement.  
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My main conclusion is that protracted conflict diminishes a sense of citizenship and radically 
changes the social environment in which active citizenship is learnt, through the narrowing and 
securitisation of institutions and the public sphere. Especially if the state is considered hostile 
to its citizens, this compounds suspicion and fear of engaging with state actors, or in the public 
sphere more generally. In addition to what scholars have highlighted about the importance of 
a consciousness of one’s citizen identity and agency, one’s dignity, and one’s previous 
experience with forms of citizenship practice, I draw attention to the sense of citizenship as 
something that is a prerequisite for active citizenship. Since conflict breaches a guarantee of 
security, dignity and equality, a sense of citizenship fails to develop, or diminishes.  
 
In section 8.1 I summarise what citizenship looks like in the Acholi and Lango case studies and 
highlight the main differences between them. In section 8.2 I return to the propositions and 
diagram presented in Chapter 3 to discuss the causal relationships between features of the 
conflict and present-day citizen engagement. In section 8.3 I explain how my study contributes 
to existing knowledge. I reflect on my approach that focuses on everyday forms of engagement 
and the spectrum of forms of engagement, followed by a discussion of the intersection 
between citizenship and conflict. The section finishes with a discussion of how my findings 
compare with the work of other scholars. I then discuss the implications of my findings for 
Community-Driven Recovery interventions in section 8.4. Finally, I suggest topics for further 
research.  
 
8.1 Acholi and Lango compared  
 
I compared two LRA-affected areas in the Acholi region with one non-affected area in Lango. 
They were compared in terms of how people in these areas perceived themselves as citizens in 
relation to other tribes and in relation to the state. From their narratives, key aspects emerged 
that I took to be their understanding of a sense of citizenship; a) Equality: their perceptions of 
whether the state treats all tribes equally in terms of distribution of resources and political 
power, and equality among tribes, b) Dignity: their perceptions of whether the state treats all 
tribes with respect and leaves them their dignity, and whether other tribes do the same, and c) 
Security: their perceptions of how the state responds to insecurity.  
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In terms of active citizenship, or citizenship as practice, I formulated proxies that applied to the 
right-hand part of the spectrum (Figure 2.1), which corresponds to the focus of this research 
on everyday forms of enagement: a) involvement in different forms of community 
organisation, b) interactions with formal and customary forms of authority, c) engagement 
with development and in formal development planning (the petitioning voice), d) engagement 
in accountability mechanisms (the interrogative voice). Table 8.1 summarises the differences 
between Acholi and Lango, at the bottom of this section. Here I will summarise the findings for 
people’s sense and practices of citizenship for both regions separately.  
 
Acholi region 
 
The findings showed that the Acholi lack a sense of citizenship, in each of the three aspects: 
equality, security and dignity. Section 8.2 explains how this can be attributed to past 
experience of conflict and the role of the NRA regime in particular. The predominant 
impression among the Acholi is that the NRA/M regime is not a regime for all tribes and is, in 
fact, ‘against the Acholi’. Their understanding is that to be Acholi in Uganda is to be a second-
class citizen, unworthy of development and dignity. Certain phrases used to describe 
themselves as Acholi illustrate their narrative as citizens of Uganda, such as the expression 
‘being on the slope of the hill, while others are on the higher parts’. The statement of one 
woman that ‘We are like slaves being brought into Uganda’ reflects the alienation of the Acholi 
people. Even among the youth that pursued higher education in the southern regions, and 
thus have better prospects, these perceptions exist. They feel that other tribes replicate the 
stigmatisation of their tribe as ‘warriors’, a representation used by the NRA regime during the 
war.  
 
Regarding citizenship practices, the Acholi are not in a state where they could look beyond 
day-to-day needs. They are preoccupied with rebuilding the basics of their home. Chapter 7 
demonstrated that the scope of citizen engagement in Acholi is limited mainly to the use of the 
petitioning voice, both informally and through formal institutional channels. The LC1 is the 
primary channel for engagement. Although it is not hard for people to identify needs, using 
their petitioning voice to channel their issues and follow them up proves to be challenging. 
They lack the knowledge of the planning process and the functions of LCs, the meaning of 
representation of interests, and a notion of development as entitlement. Certain norms, such 
as respect for leaders - especially if they are in formal offices - limit direct engagement 
particularly at higher levels of governance. People therefore tend to rely on their own 
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institutions and do not use other avenues to link up with higher levels of state authority. The 
depth of engagement is limited to reporting an issue to LC1 and when this does not lead to 
results they would just ‘wait’ and not follow up further.  
 
Chapter 7 furthermore showed that exercising the interrogative voice and engaging for 
accountability is even more challenging. Despite the many complaints about local state 
authorities, holding them accountable is usually not within the scope of engagement. Instead, 
everyday forms of resistance are used to air discontent; not showing up for meetings is a tactic 
of passive resistance. The Acholi are reluctant to use the interrogative voice to check up on a 
leader, whereas Langi citizens are more willing and likely to do so. It is particularly in this 
domain where internalised ideas about power, some of which are the result of the war, 
intersect with ‘ordinary’ challenges inherent in holding leaders to account, such as lack of 
awareness about suitable mechanisms (this will be further explained below). People’s 
reluctance stems from fear of negative consequences: either one risks being excluded from 
recovery programmes, or the state might punish you for spoiling its reputation. Findings 
showed that the Acholi are less demanding than the Langi, and less familiar with state 
responsibilities. Expecting less from the state, and relieved as they were that the situation is at 
least stable, they would not confront the authorities with their concerns about the slow 
recovery process.   
 
Important for maintaining social relations and livelihoods are community-based institutions 
like the groups. These had resumed in the satellite camps and home areas. Many groups are 
recently formed and experience various vicissitudes. Community groups for farming and saving 
are running, though often irregularly. Cultural institutions such as clan leadership functions 
and teaching the youth around the evening fire (wang oo) have resumed, but the adults feel 
they have weakened. Many elders are struggling to generate respect, and feel that young 
people are not listening and are drinking too much. Nonetheless, people are glad cultural 
institutions are in place, and they play an important role in responding to daily needs.  
 
People are more active in their own groups than for community issues beyond immediate 
household subsistence, such as general health care, water and sanitation. These are identified 
as important needs, but primarily a responsibility of government. Community meetings rarely 
take place. The limited interaction between Acholi citizens and various leaders for 
development purposes and to access formal authorities is what I have called a lower ‘density 
of relations’. People think that the only way to channel their needs to local government is 
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through the LC1, and thence upwards through the LC system. Other mechanisms, such as 
going through elected LC3 councillors or elders, are not used. The formal planning process and 
the functioning of PDCs are virtually non-existent below LC3 level, and the sub-county itself is 
hampered by institutional deficits. This level of local government is only remotely present in 
people’s lives.  
 
Finally, within the Acholi ethnic community the customary leaders are unable to function as 
political brokers, or ‘fixers’, or to mediate with the local state. They have re-established their 
legitimacy within their cultural domain to a certain extent. Capable of performing much 
needed cultural practices like dispute resolution and educating the youth, they are starting to 
regain respect. However, they are not credible as actors to liaise with the LCs about 
government services and they have lost the power to monitor the behaviour of LCs.   
 
 
Lango region  
 
In Lango region citizenship looks very different. The Langi have a stronger sense of citizenship 
and demonstrate forms of citizen engagement that are broader and deeper than in Acholi. 
There are gaps in both the sense and the practice, but overall the situation in Lango is better. 
This is attributed to their having lived in a more stable political environment since the late 
1980s, so that experience with citizenship practice could develop. After a brief period of 
turmoil due to Tito Okello’s coup, this potential oppressor was stopped by the NRA. Initially, 
the Langi were afraid the NRA would be a military dictatorship as under Idi Amin, but from 
1988 the area became stable.  
 
In terms of how the Langi perceive themselves as citizens of Uganda, the north-south divide is 
experienced due to the notion that the NRM favours the south in terms of development, but it 
is not as sharply felt as in Acholi. Three factors were particularly significant in building the 
relationship to the state. First of all, the restitution of cultural leadership by the NRA affirmed 
their identity as a cultural group and acknowledged them as a collective political subject. 
Secondly, the appointment of several Langi to important bodies and levels of government 
offered a form of representation. Lastly, people are aware that the region did experience some 
development under the NRA/M, despite its southern bias. Lango remains a stronghold of 
Obote’s party UPC, now under new leadership, but its support for the NRM has increased. 
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However, this increase can be interpreted as people’s buying into the patronage system of the 
NRM, which channels resources to its support areas.  
 
In Lango there is a higher density of relations between citizens and local leaders. People know 
their local representatives and communicate various concerns to them to be taken up at 
higher levels. Generally, people are aware of the different types of leadership functions and 
how to use them, even though responsiveness from higher levels remains inadequate. They 
use formal and informal accountability mechanisms to hold local clan leaders and LCs to 
account, although this is clearly harder at higher levels of governance. The LC system itself is 
functioning relatively better, though generally under-resourced and facing capacity gaps. PDCs 
primarily play a role in data collection for the sub-county about existing needs and do not 
attempt to negotiate about the allocation of resources. Some of the LC3 councillors are 
actively following up sub-county budgets, which is not at all the case in Acholi.  
 
Generally, mediation with the sub-county about public services is seen to be a task of the LCs. 
Elders and clan leaders sometimes function as political brokers to raise concerns with the sub-
county. But Lango is characterised by vibrant community-based institutions, which sometimes 
serve as collectivities that reach out to formal state institutions. Active clan committees and 
community groups are wide spread. They function as spaces for learning citizen engagement 
and leadership. The example of the Electricity Committee shows that a form of citizen 
engagement organised at sub-county level is very able to negotiate with the sub-county and 
even the district. This committee had adopted and aggregated the same mechanisms for 
cooperation as exist in the local groups. It is an instance of citizen engagement that has spilled 
over into an organised collective at a higher level. This was not encountered in Acholi. 
 
An entertaining debate, with no clear outcome, is which of the institutions is more important 
to community development: state-led or community-led initiatives. Perceived 
misappropriation of funds by local authorities makes people feel their own initiatives are more 
reliable and relevant, but they are aware that the state is indispensable for schools and health 
centres. These discussions thus reflect some of the problems experienced with the state, but 
also Langi expectations about state responsibilities, and their standards of state performance. 
In Acholi the same discussion reflects their more substantial needs, which they expect to have 
to deal with themselves, and although they acknowledge the state’s responsibility for service 
delivery they expect very little. 
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The situation in Lango remains far from ideal and is characterised by all ‘ordinary’ problems 
associated with local governance and participation. Citizen engagement in decision-making is 
rife with the micropolitics of participation such as elite capture and bias, local leaders who 
know how to abuse the lack of education of citizens, and instances of corruption or suspicious 
funding/project allocations through clan or party networks. Citizen voice is hampered by a lack 
of knowledge as much as by cultural constructions of authority and respect, in which even 
elected leaders are seen as ‘bosses’. Also a lack of trust in local state institutions and certain 
leaders, and the limited outcomes of engagement discourage citizen participation. Common 
factors limiting gender equality prevent women from active engagement in decision-making. 
Despite these problems, the Langi are better equipped than the Acholi for citizen engagement, 
partly learnt through community-based institutions and through growing up within stable clan 
governance structures, and partly through having more experience with stable state 
institutions. 
 
All these ‘ordinary’ factors are observed in Acholi too. In the case of LC corruption of recovery 
funds and projects, it must be noted that one contributing factor to this problem is not so 
much the conflict itself as the higher level of resources made available through the influx of aid 
agencies. Projects and distributions are mainly channelled through the LC system with little 
control from outside, which affects people directly if they are excluded from the list of 
beneficiaries.  Many ‘ordinary’ challenges are, however, deeper than observed in Lango. I 
argue the problems are deeper due to the conflict. The war has also generated conflict-specific 
problems that limit citizen engagement. These problems exist at the deeper levels of how 
agency and voice are informed, and therefore intangible. Table 8.2 summarises the differences 
between Lango and Acholi. 
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Table 8.1 Differences between Acholi and Lango Citizenship 
Proxies  Acholi (conflict-affected) Lango (non-affected) 
Perception of the state Potential threat, discriminating 
against Acholi, war reinforced north-
south divide 
Favours other regions, but some 
development came under the NRA 
Perception of the self as 
citizen 
Second-class, the lower tribe. Relatively inferior in terms of 
equality and development 
compared to southern tribes.  
Expectations about role of 
government  
Very low. Expectations related to 
immediate subsistence. 
Strong feelings about the state’s 
responsibility to protect, the need 
for comprehensive reconciliation 
process, and cessation of threat and 
discrimination. 
Higher than in Acholi. Longer-term 
expectations, which addressed 
the broader service delivery 
issues. 
Sense of ethnic citizenship Strong. Proud of being Acholi. 
Definition of Acholi identity includes 
references to the war experiences, 
marginalisation of the region 
Strong. Proud of being Langi. 
Definition of Langi identity 
includes references to lack of 
development due to being an 
opposition area. 
Perceptions of customary 
authority 
Affected during the war, less 
respect. 
A respected authority in the clan 
and in relation to issues that are 
formally part of the domain of the 
LCs. 
Engagement in customary 
institutions 
Active engagement in principle, but 
activities were irregular. Only 
funeral activities were moments of 
high-level clan activity. 
Active engagement, high level of 
organisation and activities outside 
funeral gatherings. 
Community-based 
institutions  
Numerous, active and relevant, but 
in process of consolidating, 
infrequent activities. Not used as 
springboard for the use of the 
petitioning/ interrogative voice. 
High in density, high intensity of 
activities, consolidated. Not used 
as springboard for the use of the 
petitioning/ interrogative voice 
regarding formal authorities, but 
for learning citizenship and 
leadership skills. 
Engagement for material 
aspects of development: 
the petitioning voice 
Few channels for engagement used, 
often only the LC1. 
More diverse, various local 
leaders used to raise community 
issues. 
Formal development 
planning 
Virtually non-existent below LC3 
level. PDC unknown by citizens and 
members don’t know their roles 
Functioning, though with 
institutional challenges. PDCs 
function to collect household 
data, but not as a platform to 
negotiate projects. 
Formal mechanisms for 
accountability and use of 
the interrogative voice 
Not used, thought of as impossible Used in various instances of 
(perceived) corruption or 
misconduct of lowest level 
leaders, but harder to do at higher 
levels. 
Informal mechanisms for 
accountability and use of 
the interrogative voice 
Non-confrontational mechanisms 
sometimes used for the very local 
level, e.g. advice from elders, songs. 
But fear of negative consequences.   
Non-confrontational mechanisms 
used for the very local level, very 
confidently for clan leaders and 
more carefully for formal leaders 
such as LCs. 
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8.2 Mechanisms of conflict and their effects 
 
The previous section established the differences between the two regions. In this section I go 
back to the propositions formulated in Chapter 3 to explain the observed differences and to 
show how conflict affected the sense and practice of citizenship in Acholi. In Chapter 3 I 
explained that conflict was understood as a warscape (Nordstrom, 1997): a dynamic, 
fluctuating social and political environment (Vigh, 2006). The study distinguished four key 
features of the conflict (Figure 3.1), which were detailed in Chapters 5 and 6:  
 
Displacement: The displacement camps that were scattered across the region became a 
structural feature of the war. They affected the mobility and livelihoods of people, the 
strategies of the LRA and the military, and humanitarian operations. To citizens the camp was 
a confined space with its particular governance regime in an insecure environment. Life in the 
camp was no guarantee of either physical or food security, since the military often failed to 
protect the residents and relief was not reliable. The Acholi were highly dependent (a) on the 
state for its willingness to resolve the conflict, (b) locally on the camp leadership, (c) on 
humanitarian actors for food, and (d) on the military for safety. 
 
LRA atrocities and insecurity: Although I argue for a broader understanding of conflict than the 
acts of violence committed during warfare, the LRA activities do need to be mentioned 
separately. The direct experience of violent atrocities created a sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability, and the sense that the state refused to protect the population. 
 
The role of the state: In any type of conflict the state is an actor. Even if it is not among the 
fighting factions, or chooses not to intervene, refraining from taking action is also the result of 
a decision. The role played by the NRA regime profoundly shaped the Acholi sense and practice 
of citizenship. This compounded negative perceptions of the state when the NRA established 
its control in the region in 1986. 
 
Presence of armed actors: The presence of a powerful military, which used its powers to 
control the population and left gaps in the protection, influenced the nature of the public 
space. Also the LRA itself: not only their actual atrocities but also their mere presence and the 
continued threat of violence caused the public space to be unsafe.  
 
291 
 
The study shows that a warscape as a social and political environment generates structures 
and processes, and changes local institutions that shape people’s lives. This demonstrates that, 
if we are to understand the effects of conflict, the experience of the LRA conflict cannot be 
narrowed down to the atrocities that were committed by the rebels. In unpacking the concept 
of violent conflict I seek to avoid making grand statements and assuming problematic linear 
relationships about the effects of conflict on citizenship, which are both highly complex 
concepts. 
 
8.2.1 Reflections on the propositions  
 
The features of the conflict created the new social order that reconfigured local life and set in 
motion other changes that affected citizenship. The overall proposition (I) of this study is that 
the experience of protracted conflict and displacement lead to a lack of a sense of citizenship 
and to diminished forms of citizen engagement, due to limited opportunities for learning and 
experiencing the practice of citizenship. In turn, this is linked to three further propositions:  
 
II. The LRA conflict led to a securitisation of the public sphere and to narrowing, 
securitised civic and political institutions.   
III. The lack of safe space and the narrowing of local institutions limited the 
opportunities for learning the practice of citizenship during the conflict. 
IV. In the post-conflict situation, certain ideas and practices that emerged during the 
conflict persist and result in a lack of citizen engagement.  
 
In this section I summarise the evidence in relation to the first part of the overall proposition: 
there is a lack of a sense of citizenship in Acholi. Subsequent sections summarise the evidence 
in relation to the three specific propositions that were formulated for how the practice of 
citizenship evolved during and after the conflict 
 
The four conflict features above, separately and in combination, directly affected the sense of 
citizenship (Figure 3.1 – X). These factors implied a failure to protect the lives and properties of 
Acholi citizens. As explained throughout the empirical chapters, this eroded a sense of security, 
dignity and equality. Having to experience violence created a vulnerability that deeply 
penetrated people’s sense of being. The loss of their collective dignity was expressed in stories 
about the Karamojong raids (Chapter 5). But also the loss of ties to the land and the 
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dependency on relief meant an erosion of the Acholi sense of citizenship. This started right 
from the beginning of the war when farming was disrupted due to LRA activities, but was 
significantly worsened when the displacement camps started. Displacement led to citizenship 
being recast as ‘camp citizenship’: the life of camp community was largely defined by the 
military and the camp leadership. Individual loss of dignity came out strongly in the camp 
situation. No longer providing for one’s family and being confined in the camp was 
experienced as losing Acholi pride. 
 
The role played by the Ugandan state has direct implications for the Acholi’s perceptions of the 
state and their sense of citizenship. The socio-economic inequality that was the result of the 
historical north-south divide was severely worsened by the war. The Acholi feel the state has 
had a major role in letting this happen. The state further alienated the region from Uganda. 
This it did by discriminating against Acholi by failing in protection, by using a political discourse 
that furthered stigmatisation of the Acholi as an ethnic group and by unequal resource 
allocation. This undermined the trust in the state, which is nearly conflated with the NRA/M.  
 
The negative perception of the NRA/M was only strengthened by how politics operated in 
Uganda. In present day Uganda, the NRM regime has been quite successful in establishing the 
notion that development is only ‘given’ in return for support to the NRM.  
 
This study shows the importance of understanding the historical dimension of the Acholi 
construction of citizenship. Though I had planned to look at historical developments from the 
outset, their importance came out more strongly than I had initially anticipated. This first 
struck me when the Acholi included the Karamojong cattle raids in their historical narratives. I 
had expected people to start the narrative with the arrival of the LRA, yet they chose an event 
that predated the insurgency. It then re-emerged in how they compared the current regime to 
previous regimes and framed their sense of citizenship in terms of the inequality between the 
north and the south. These narratives reflected the north-south divide, which can only be 
understood when taking into account the colonial history, and the way different regimes 
developed different relationships with each region. Thus, the current experiences of 
citizenship in Acholi cannot be understood separately from the political history of Uganda.   
 
The sense of citizenship incorporates feelings of belonging to the ethnic community, being 
Acholi, as well as to the political community of the state, being a Ugandan citizen. The findings 
show a relationship between the two. Among the Acholi there is a strong sense that they were, 
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as an ethnic group, affected by the war and abandoned by the state. This resonates with 
Ndegwa’s (1997) thinking that membership of the ethnic community affects the attitudes 
towards the political community of the state. Concerning the practice of citizenship, however, 
the conflict impacted differently on engagement with the state compared to engagement in 
the Acholi ethnic political community. This will be discussed in later sections.  
 
8.2.2 Securitisation of the public sphere and institutions 
 
Proposition (II) states that local political and social institutions narrow down and that the 
public sphere becomes securitised during conflict. I first discuss the changes in local 
institutions during the LRA war, followed by nature of the public sphere (Figure 3.1 – Y). The 
study highlighted changes in social, political and cultural institutions during both phases of the 
war: before and during displacement. Other Uganda scholars have presented detailed analyses 
of changes in the customary institutions (Allen, 2006, 2010) and how the Acholi created 
culture to make sense of the LRA conflict (Finnstrom, 2003). The creation of culture, 
accompanied by new social institutions to maintain social relationships during war, has been 
acknowledged as an important coping strategy (Nordstrom, 1997).  
 
My study contributes to empirical knowledge about Acholi by looking at interactions between 
political institutions and citizens during the conflict, which has not been discussed in the 
literature. In Chapter 5 I showed how the Resistance Councils (RCs) in Acholi were resisted 
when the NRA took power, but that they fulfilled a particular security role during the first few 
years of the LRA conflict. As a consequence, the RCs did not develop experience in their 
‘ordinary’ representative functions and in mediating between the community and higher levels 
of government about services. In Lango, however, the RCs did start gaining experience with 
this type of work, especially from 1995 onwards when they had become the Local Councils 
(LCs) and after the Local Government Act in 1997 was adopted. In the Acholi camps, the LCs 
were sidelined by the new political institution of the camp leadership. This often caused 
friction between the two forms of authority. At the time of research the Acholi LCs were only 
just growing into their roles.  
 
The conflict affected citizen engagement through changing certain political institutions and 
social relationships at the local level in a way that was not anticipated prior to the fieldwork. 
The changes had fragmented the social base in communities which is conducive to the 
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collective voice (Figure 3.1, G). The political authority of the customary institutions, clan 
leaders and elders was undermined from the outset of the war, first of all because they were 
unable to reintegrate former UNLA soldiers after 1986; secondly, because their basis of 
legitimacy had dissolved when they could not perform crucial cultural functions; and finally, 
because in the camps their social status was not acknowledged by the camp systems and 
regulations. The frequent remarks that the clan leaders had become ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘drunkards’ showed that their position was undermined. Their function as role models and 
teachers of the younger generations was thus discredited. Apart from the customary 
leadership itself certain cultural institutions could not function either. Of these, the ‘wang oo’ 
and local community groups were important places where the youth were ‘taught’ about 
norms and respectful adult behaviour, including issues to do with leadership. These findings 
corroborated the conclusions of other scholars (Allen, 2006, 2010; Dolan, 2009; Finnström, 
2003), but because my study was carried out later I was able to show that there are signs of 
customary leadership recovering.  
 
Regarding social relations, I explained in Chapter 2 that conflict causes social relationships and 
trust to deteriorate (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Justino, 2013; Steenkamp, 2009). Interestingly, 
survey research in post-conflict Acholi shows that social bonds there are generally strong: 76% 
report that they trust the people in their village and 91% say they have good relationships with 
their community (Pham and Vinck, 2010). Ex-combatants continue to have difficulties in the 
community. Though 70% of the people stated they had no problems living together with 
former LRA soldiers, attitudes had not improved since an earlier survey in 2007.  
 
My study shows that community members generally comment positively about the Acholi 
communities as ‘good people’, but that specific relationships were challenged. I looked at the 
relationship between younger generations and customary authority. Social relations were 
affected before the camps, but it seemed that the confinement and the hardships of camp life 
had even more detrimental effects on social relations. Younger generations lost respect for the 
elders and clan leaders. In addition, while doing fieldwork I came across a small number of 
cases whereby tensions existed between those specific families that were victim of an LRA 
attack and the family of an LRA combatant who was known to have taken part in the attack36.  
 
                                                          
36
 I have however not been able to find out at what scale such frictions occurred. 
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I also looked at forms of cooperation in community institutions, which previously had been 
‘safe spaces’ for learning about leadership and decision-making. In the Acholi context these 
were primarily the farming groups and savings groups, and community gatherings. Existing 
literature that discusses citizenship in violent and conflict-prone settings has demonstrated 
that the spaces for engagement alter dramatically, in particular due to the presence of 
multiple (armed) authorities and the narrowing boundaries of safe spaces (Pearce et al., 2011). 
The groups could barely function before the camps and stopped completely when the camps 
started and people could no longer cultivate their gardens. Later on during the camp phase, 
plots of land surrounding the camps were used by a small number of groups. In the last stages 
of the war more NGOs were active in the region and they started group activities. These 
groups were often functioning only temporarily.  
 
In Chapter 2 I distinguish ‘safe spaces’ for citizen engagement (Gaventa 2006, Pearce, 2007), 
from the more general public sphere as the domain for deliberation (Fraser, 1990). My findings 
show that in particular military repression and the threat of LRA attacks made the public 
sphere unsafe. The military was constantly present and especially in the camps it closely 
monitored the population. As an armed actor the military was far more powerful than civilians, 
able to control their lives and movements. Furthermore, securitisation of the public domain 
led to a focus on security by all actors: the military, Resistance Councils, customary leaders and 
the population. This is similar to what Ben-Porath (2006) found for Israel. The scope for 
engagement on other issues was thus limited.   
 
In response to the militarised environment, self-censorship and silence became important 
strategies for social navigation in order to survive. Political agency was repressed by these 
powerful actors, but also by the population itself as a form of reflexivity in this warscape. 
Withdrawal from the public sphere, as documented in other contexts (Thomson, 2011; 
Wheeler, 2011) also happened in Acholi. In particular, discontent with powerful actors and the 
use of the interrogative voice were risky. In the camps, the governance regime constituted a 
disciplining mechanism in which one learnt to behave and speak according to what was 
appropriate.  
 
The next sub-section describes the implications of the transformation of local institutions and 
changes in the nature of the public sphere for citizen engagement during the conflict. 
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8.2.3 Limited opportunities for learning citizenship during the war 
 
Proposition (III) posited that, as a consequence of the changes described above, Acholi citizens 
had limited opportunities for learning the practice of citizenship during the conflict (Figure 3.1 
- B). The findings confirmed this proposition by showing that the Acholi emphasised forms of 
coping agency over citizen agency as security issues dominated the public domain, and that 
ordinary citizens refrained from engagements with authority and public gatherings out of 
concern for their safety.  
  
The study showed there was a shortage of ordinary socialisation spaces for both citizens and 
local leaders. While still living at home, the insecurity caused by the LRA, compounded by a 
militarised environment, meant that families were more on their own and had few 
opportunities for social interactions and cooperation. Community activities and social 
gatherings were a risk to their security. This included public events such as local courts and 
community meetings to discuss development. An implication of this was that community 
discussions for decision-making were rarely organised. When these did take place, few people 
attended and the main issue discussed was security situation. While the RCs/LCs linked up with 
the sub-county about security matters, ordinary people hardly engaged with higher levels of 
authority. In the camps the securitised environment persisted. One could arguably say the 
social context became even more securitised, because the military presence was now 
permanently close to the people and the camp leadership was in place.  
 
The securitised environment had implications for agency and engagement in the public sphere. 
The perception of the public sphere as unsafe discouraged engagement, particularly with the 
state and military. People refrained from citizen agency even when it concerned their security, 
one of their main priorities. The military deterred the interrogative voice and silence offered 
the people more protection than confronting army misconduct. This is a clear example of how 
‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970) develops in response to context. The securitisation was compounded 
with the lack of experience of discussing long-term governance and development issues.  
 
In the camps, people developed a range of coping mechanisms and demonstrated their agency 
through participation in the LDUs and by their engagement in new livelihood activities. Agency 
was also expressed in a range of informal activities that challenged the systems: stealing, 
cheating with the rations, deals with camp leaders and soldiers, ‘gossip at home’, but also 
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more risk-prone actions such a secretly leaving the camp to look for fire wood and crops that 
could be sold. However, it was much harder to interrogate the existence of the camps, the 
nature of camp governance, the failure of the military and the state, and the gaps in 
humanitarian interventions. Not only was it more difficult, it would also be a risk to their 
security to challenge powerful actors with the means to ‘punish’ dissent by e.g. labelling 
someone a rebel, making arrests, or withholding food rations. Citizens were thus rendered 
beneficiaries that were supposed to receive thankfully rather than citizens whose lives and 
livelihoods were protected by rights, and who could actively claim those rights. Forms of 
collective organisation were ‘dictated’, having to follow the camp hierarchy and systems with 
less space for spontaneous actions. The camp leadership was actively used as a channel to ask 
for protection and relief. It is, however, not surprising that a more demanding or even 
confrontational approach was considered unsuitable and that people chose to fill the gaps in 
protection and food security themselves.  
 
In sum, as a result of institutions and the public sphere being securitised, Acholi citizens had 
less exposure to learning citizenship practices. The next section explains how this affects 
citizen engagement in the post-conflict situation. 
 
8.2.4 The post-conflict situation 
 
The proposition (IV) for the post-conflict situation states that feelings, perceptions and 
practices which were developed during the conflict persist in the post-conflict situation. Even 
when violence subsides and the warscape is no longer manifested, people carry past 
experiences into the present and this affects their behaviour. In Chapter 3 I predicted a lack of 
a sense of citizenship and that the practice of citizen engagement would not be as wide as in 
scope and as substantive as in non-affected areas. The study has generated more details about 
the practice of citizenship than anticipated: it is characterised by low expectations of state 
performance, fear and suspicion of the state and the public sphere, an emphasis on coping 
agency, and a fragmented social foundation for collective voice (explained below). These 
perceptions and practices clearly originate from the conflict period and therefore the findings 
confirm proposition (IV). I recognise that my study proves this proposition least firmly of the 
four, because of the challenges discussed in Chapter 7. Further research would be welcome.  
 
298 
 
Expectations of the state. An indirect implication of the role played by the state was that it 
affected people’s perception of state responsibilities. While the Acholi are critical of the way 
the regime had handled the conflict they also express support for certain measures like the 
mobilisation of LDUs. Some even agree with the creation of camps, although others are critical 
of it, feeling these were reflections of state failure. This informs current expectations of the 
state concerning service delivery. The predominant view is that the state does not do much. 
Most people therefore do not bother to engage. Some of the Acholi see the little that is done 
as ‘generous’ and do not demand more. This reflects the internalised powerlessness of the 
marginalised (Gaventa, 1982): as a response to living without power, the poor adjust their 
expectations about what is possible.  
 
Internalised fear and suspicion lead to silence. The findings for citizen practices in the post-
conflict situation show that silence continues to be a strategy for many people. This is similar 
to what other studies have shown (Green, 1995; Hume, 2010). Uvin (2009) found that people 
in Burundi would talk about violent events in the past, giving him factual information about 
what happened. But there was an unspoken boundary to what could be said. To discuss the 
causes of the war was impossible, since that would ultimately lead to discussing differences 
between Hutu and Tutsi and where to put the blame. My study generated similar findings but 
also shows something new: silence is observed for particular issues or domains of 
engagement. People continue to adhere to self-censorship about politically sensitive issues 
where the state is involved. Chapter 7 showed how this particularly undermines their 
capacities to engage in accountability processes. It exacerbates the effects of cultural norms of 
respecting leaders as ‘bosses’, which weakens the interrogative voice. Women seem to have 
internalised this kind of silence even more than men. This makes the barriers to their 
participation in community politics even greater, because they face both the cultural norms of 
respect for authority and the convention that politics generally is the domain of men. The 
absence of a strong interrogative voice is what surprised me initially. If community members 
are convinced that LCs and officials corrupt the funds and goods they need so desperately, 
then why do they not take action? Gradually in the course of my fieldwork I came to 
understand how much it actually takes to stand up to authority in this context, and how fear of 
being excluded from any project prevails. 
 
Coping agency persists. What was not anticipated prior to the fieldwork was that the Acholi 
citizens are still focusing on day to day survival, because of the recovery challenges in the 
return areas. As explained in Chapter 7, people continue to dedicate their time and efforts to 
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food and security, but now also to the basic securities of having a home, access to water, and 
livelihoods. At the time of research in 2010, everyone recognised the need for health facilities 
and schools, but people were too busy to mobilise for long-term goals. They did, however, 
participate when teachers’ huts needed to be constructed near the school block.  
 
Fragmented social foundation for collective voice. Changes in social institutions undermine the 
collective voice. First of all, customary leaders are still struggling to regain legitimacy when it 
comes to their role as political brokers. As Lubkemann (2008) argues, social struggles (in 
gender or intergenerational relationships) exist in peacetime and continue during war. The 
study shows that the conflict itself shapes the struggle, as youth disapproved of the behaviour 
of elders. Secondly, ‘disunity’ in the community affects the ability of a village population to 
develop a collective voice; it is difficult, however, to say exactly to what extent this hampers 
collective engagement compared to other challenges that have been identified. This confirms 
the findings of other authors who point out that for voice to carry weight and to be a potential 
threat to the interests of power holders it needs to be a collective voice (Fox, 2007; Peruzzotti 
& Smulovitz, 2006).  
 
Lack of experience. This includes knowledge about procedures and legislation, but also 
practical experience with engagement in formal institutions, representative leadership, 
negotiation and decision-making, and mobilising for collective voice. It poses a challenge to 
mobilisation for services and for accountability claims. This resonates with other studies that 
identified prior experience as conducive to engagement (Kabeer, 2005; McGee & Gaventa, 
2011) 
 
These factors inform citizen engagement in the post-conflict situation. Also the lack of a sense 
of citizenship results in diminished forms of engagement, illustrated by the proverb that a 
castrated bull will not move with the rest of the cattle. This resonates with Gaventa’s (1982) 
conceptualisation of acquiescence of the marginalised. Together, these factors intersect with 
other factors in society that limit or are conducive to citizen engagement. Chapter 7 showed 
that the experience of conflict deepens the effects of certain social-cultural norms, like the 
adherence to respect for authority. It reinforces existing barriers to women engaging in 
community-level decision-making.  
 
The lasting effects on active citizenship of living in insecurity and fear are hard to predict, and 
depend on many factors in the post-conflict situation. The immediate effects, first manifest 
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during the war and still observable at the time of research, are silence and withdrawal from 
the public sphere where issues to do with the state are discussed. Forms of citizen agency are 
not necessarily, and definitely not immediately, built or strengthened in the aftermath of the 
LRA conflict. Nor would people’s priorities immediately extend from coping to citizen agency.  
 
The findings in relation to propositions (II) to (IV) help to confirm the overall proposition (I) of 
this thesis: indeed the conflict had led to a lack of a sense of citizenship and to diminished 
forms of citizen engagement. However, only to say that citizen engagement in Acholi is not as 
wide in scope and not as substantive as in non-affected areas would not be a fair 
representation of reality. Indeed, as a result of the war the Acholi lack certain knowledge and 
experiences for engagement, including technical knowledge of procedures and state 
responsibilities. But this intersects with the other factors discussed in this section which have 
become characteristic of the practice of citizenship in Acholi. At present, citizens are less 
comfortable about actively engaging when state institutions are also involved. To a certain 
extent this is a reflection of past experience and on-going mistrust of state institutions.  
 
8.3 Contributions to previous literature  
 
In this section I reflect deeper on the contributions of my thesis to the existing literature. 
Various bodies of literature were outlined in Chapter 2: active citizenship, a spectrum of citizen 
engagement and state-society relations, micro-analysis of conflict, and forced migration. I 
found the concept of agency to be particularly relevant to all of them, if properly defined for 
the various forms it may take and purposes it may be put to. I start with a reflection on my 
approach to everyday forms of engagement, which relates back to the spectrum outlined in 
Chapter 2. I then discuss the implications of my findings for the bodies of theory on conflict, 
displacement and citizenship. I finish with a discussion about how my study compares to the 
studies that suggest a positive effect of conflict on citizen participation. 
 
8.3.1 My approach to the everyday 
 
In Chapter 3 I explained my focus on everyday forms of engagement, emphasising the ‘critical 
and constructive’ engagement end of the spectrum. My definition of ‘the everyday’ is people’s 
real-life experiences, interactions with, and perceptions of the state. This is informed by 
Corbridge et al. (2005) who argue that state-society relations can be understood by looking at 
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real-life moments where people ‘see the state’ and that perceptions of the state are mediated, 
for instance through ideas and political brokers. The overall advantage of this approach, as 
demonstrated in this study, is that it brings out the numerous ways in which people seek to 
improve their lives with or without the state and that, where they face challenges, these tell us 
about the fractures or weaknesses in state-society relations.  
 
The spectrum of forms of citizen engagement outlined in Chapter 2 shows that many scholars 
focus on the left-end side of the spectrum (Figure 2.1) and study overt, large-scale and often 
violent forms of collective action as in revolutions and contentious politics (Tilly & Tarrow, 
2007). I would not have ignored such instances had I encountered them in the field. But in the 
Ugandan context where confrontational tactics are usually not part of the repertoire of citizen 
engagement when making claims (either on the state or customary authority), a focus on 
small-scale and everyday forms of engagement seemed relevant for the post-conflict situation.  
 
Using this approach my study shows: 1) a spectrum of formal and informal tactics for 
engagement is used at local level, but a less broad one in Acholi than in Lango; 2) people have 
normative ideas about government responsibilities and its performance; 3) in post-conflict 
situations engagement is shaped by ideas, emotions and experiences from the past, of which 
fear is a strong emotion. I elaborate each of these points. 
 
First, this study showed that in the current context of northern Uganda, forms of engagement 
are mainly situated at the right-hand side of the spectrum. Citizens organise themselves to 
improve their living conditions and livelihoods, with and without the state. In the case of 
Lango, everyday interactions between village communities and local officials and elected 
leaders did in a few instances lead to better services. The planning process is one avenue for 
getting better services, but many informal interactions between citizens and leaders occur on 
the side. Failure on the authorities’ part leads to gossip, shunning, informal ‘advice’ and 
sometimes more formal efforts to ‘correct’ the authority. In daily life, citizens thus use both 
constructive and critical engagement and, where state behaviour is disapproved of, both 
passive resistance and (modest) forms of contestation are employed. All of these tactics, used 
in this local web of relations, very slowly help the Langi community move forward. Of course, 
their situation is still far from ideal. But it makes a case for the development of an active 
citizenry and more responsive authorities. In the Acholi case, the local state and village 
populations operated more separately. Few instances of constructive engagement occurred 
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and contestation is never public, always hidden. Thus, in post-conflict Acholi engagement is 
limited to a small part of the spectrum. 
 
During the period of field research in 2010, there was no instance of contentious politics like a 
riot or protest. Respondents indicated that there had not been any such instances in the past. 
Only in the Lamwo research site two instances of large-scale protest by the camp residents had 
occurred (Chapter 6): after the UPDF had failed to fend off an LRA attack and after a sub-
county official had attempted to replace the Camp Commandant. In both cases an angry crowd 
had marched to the centre of the camp to protest. These incidents showed ruptures in the 
day-to-day patterns of interaction with authority, which were channelled through camp 
leadership and docile. The ‘hidden transcripts’, which had centred around dissatisfaction with 
the army, crossed into the public domain and discontent was aired. Such ruptures, I argue, 
have meaning and are reflections of how citizens feel in relation to the state.  
 
Secondly, a focus on everyday forms of engagement reveals people’s normative ideas about 
the state. Even in Acholi, where engagement is weak, people have ideas about what the state 
ought to do for the people. Thus, one need not focus solely on riots and protests to find out 
what ‘the public’ wants. A focus on the everyday is able to show this. Moreover, this approach 
is able to unpack social diversity within ‘the public’ or its ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970).  
 
Thirdly, looking at the everyday challenges for engagement shows a relationship between 
ideas, emotions and engagement. This resonates with the work of Wood (2003) and Petersen 
(2001), who emphasise the importance of emotions for an explanation of action. Wood 
emphasises a sense of dignity. Petersen speaks about feelings of resentment stemming from 
perceived unjust social hierarchies. In this study a reluctance to engage with the state on the 
part of the Acholi is partly explained by emotions, in two ways. The analysis of the sense of 
citizenship reveals the emotional aspect of how the war had undermined the dignity of the 
Acholi. A sense of dignity feeds into an emotional understanding of the self. In the Acholi case, 
lacking a sense of entitlement then causes a reluctance to use the petitioning voice.  
 
Other studies have shown how certain ideas, perceptions and practices that develop during 
conflict persist in the post-conflict situation. The nature of the ideas and practices varies across 
the countries and type of conflict. Jones’ (2009) interpretation of customary court rulings in 
the Teso region of Uganda is that elders seek to reclaim authority and ‘discipline’ young men 
to prevent insurgent actions. Rebellious young men were considered a major cause of the Teso 
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insurgency, 1986-1993. My findings resonate with the findings of Christensen and Utas (2008), 
who show that forms of social navigation persist in post-conflict Sierra Leone, based on past 
experiences related to the conflict. A comparison must be carefully made, however, for their 
findings relate to ex-combatants in response to uncertainty during the election period, not to 
ordinary citizens. For Rwanda, authors show that the public sphere is perceived as unsafe and 
that ‘passive resistance tactics’ are used in response (Beswick, 2010; Thomson, 2011). Despite 
the variation, these studies show that certain perceptions of risk, the ways in which people 
analyse their context, and behaviours that were ‘learnt’ during the conflict shape forms of 
engagement in the public sphere. This is consistent with the findings in this thesis.  
 
In Acholi, fear of state repression persists, among some, in the post-conflict situation. The fear 
of reprisal affects adults and older generations, who have directly experienced state violence. 
The younger generations have learnt about this from their parents and this makes them 
careful not to be labelled as rebels. Although they do not lack awareness about their own 
situation and roles of the state, so ‘acquiescence’ is not entirely the appropriate word to use, 
the young adults definitely feel that engagement with state actors is not useful. In Chapter 3 I 
spoke about the reasons for ‘silence’. Scott (1985, 1990) points to hidden transcripts and 
passive resistance behind the silence, whereas Gaventa (1984) emphasises the quiescence of 
being in a position of powerlessness. This study shows how the emotion of fear is embedded in 
people’s scripts. Some voice it openly, while others have internalised it, and it quietly, 
unconsciously limits their scope and tactics for engagement. It especially discourages the use 
of the interrogative voice.    
 
Does this discussion indicate that there is a segment on the spectrum of approaches to citizen 
engagement that has been overlooked so far? With the exception of Scott (1985, 1990) the 
approaches described in Chapter 2, all focus on visible forms of engagement. Scott’s work on 
hidden transcripts and passive resistance brings out how citizens can quietly reject the state. In 
my view, his work has not touched very clearly on fear and suspicion, which leads to 
disengagement in the case of Acholi. Thus, near Scott’s segment on the spectrum, between 
‘Resistance’ and ‘Contention’, I would add disengagement. In Scott’s work the observed 
disengagement is a form of rejection or tacit resistance. In my study it is not active rejection; it 
is a form of apathy and a lack of a sense of agency. 
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8.3.2 Citizen engagement in post-conflict settings 
 
In this section I elaborate three contributions of the thesis in conversation with the literature 
discussed in Chapter 2 and and I finish the section with the overall conclusions of the thesis. 
First of all, understanding citizen engagement requires an analysis of both the sense and the 
practice of citizenship, and the relationship between the two. My thesis has shown how a lack 
of a sense of citizenship is part of the explanation for diminished forms of citizen engagement. 
This contributes to existing literature on the prerequisites for citizen agency. Underlying active 
citizenship is a sense of agency, and political agency in particular (R. Lister, 2003; Martin, 
2003). This is an awareness of the self as a citizen as someone who has rights, and awareness 
of one’s agency in relation to the wider political community. Lister (2003) furthermore 
highlights dignity as an important prerequisite for citizen agency. Dignity and the closely 
related attribute of self-confidence strengthen the sense of a citizen identity and may 
encourage someone to act according to the rights and entitlements that (ought to be) 
associated with that citizen identity. Self-confidence is an individual attribute, though nurtured 
by collective engagements. 
 
The Acholi sense of citizenship is multifaceted: constituted by a notion of security, equality and 
dignity. All three aspects were damaged by the war. Thus, similarly to Lister (2003), I arrive at 
dignity as important for agency, and where Acholi dignity was eroded due to conflict this 
undermined agency. But a sense of security and equality are important too. In other contexts 
the awareness of existing inequalities leads to citizen action (Dagnino, 2007), and the sense 
that dignity has to be regained leads to violent insurgency (Wood, 2003; Petersen, 2001). My 
thesis suggests that, when crucial aspects of citizenship have been severely affected, a lack of a 
sense of citizenship leads to less political self-awareness: less confidence that one could act. 
This is reinforced by persistent fear and suspicion of the state and the public sphere. Citizen 
engagement is thus hampered by a combination of ‘the culture of fear’ (Wood, 2003) and 
quiescence (Gaventa, 1982), and the lack of a sense of citizenship. The study also 
demonstrates the connection between ethnic citizenship and national citizenship, confirming 
Ndegwa’s (1996) argument that attitudes towards the state can be mediated by membership 
of the ethnic community. Both the Acholi and the Langi evaluate their individual relationship 
to the state by reflecting on the relationship between their tribes and the state. Where they 
feel the state has done harm to their tribe this diminishes the sense of citizenship, for them as 
individuals as well as the collective ethnic community. 
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My second contribution is the analysis of citizen agency. In Chapter 2 I showed that the 
literatures on both conflict and forced displacement have demonstrated that people have 
agency during conflict and displacement, but an ambiguity remains as to how citizen agency 
evolves. To explain the relationship between conflict and citizen engagement I distinguish 
coping agency from citizen agency. This is informed by Lister (2003, p.39), who cites Doyal and 
Gough (1991, p. 68) who refer to citizen agency as: ‘the higher degrees of political autonomy 
which are entailed by democratic participation in the political process at whichever level’. I am 
thus interested in a more political form of agency, which is required to engage with broader 
processes of governance involving state institutions, and with community (development) 
issues that go beyond meeting the needs for immediate survival, thus having a longer-term 
perspective (Cornwall, 2002a). Political agency is exercised with a focus on those powerful 
actors, often the state, that have the authority to take decisions, with the purpose of 
influencing their decisions and shifting the powers that operate in the spaces where decision-
making takes place (Williams, 2004).  
 
Conflict studies literature has described forms of coping agency in great detail, whereas citizen 
agency has been less documented. To make this distinction enabled me to analyse people’s 
agency more accurately. It showed that the Acholi developed a survival mindset that focused 
on short-term needs of food and security, rather than on long-term development goals. This 
coping agency serves subsistence and basic levels of survival and contributes to people’s 
resilience. Citizen agency was discouraged, even deterred, or limited due to the lack of safe 
spaces. My findings thus support the work of other authors, e.g. Barter (2012) and Moser and 
Horn (2011) who argue that different forms and levels of agency need to be distinguished in 
order to know what is going on in conflict settings. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to existing work on the transformation of institutions during 
conflict (Justino, 2012, 2013 - add). I agree with those who have emphasised shifting patterns 
of authority (Vlassenroot & Raymaekers, 2004, 2005, 2008; Lubkemann, 2006), and with those 
who emphasise the continuation of participation in social relations and economic networks 
(Cramer, 2006a; Lubkemann, 2008; Nordstrom, 1997, 2004) – though in different forms. But as 
I argued in Chapter 2, this work has not investigated how changes in institutions affect 
citizenship. The Acholi warscape was a clear example of a ‘war complex’ (Vlassenroot & 
Raeymaekers, 2004), but more than Vlassenroot and Raymaekers I focused on how citizens 
engage with shifting patterns of authority, and extended the analysis into the post-conflict 
situation. My conclusion that certain changes in social and political institutions affect 
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socialisation processes and opportunities for learning citizenship is an important contribution 
in this field. It has been acknowledged that changes in social and political institutions during 
conflict affect the distribution of power, which will have implications for the functioning of an 
institutional democracy in the post-conflict situation (Justino, 2013). I draw attention to how 
these changes affect citizens, which has implications for how they are able to participate in an 
institutional democracy. Where new institutions emerge it is important to investigate what 
kind of socialisation and learning they offer. Do they offer similar opportunities for learning 
citizenship or very different skills? Which norms are transmitted?  
 
In addition to studying institutions, I argue that for the study of citizenship in conflict settings it 
is important to understand changes in the nature of the public sphere. This requires an 
analysis of the perceptions of the public sphere and the perceptions of the actors that 
dominate it. Such an analysis is needed to demonstrate to what extent ordinary citizens have 
been exposed to discussing and negotiating public issues, and how they learnt to engage with 
powerful actors. This study shows that such perceptions and practices continue in the post-
conflict situation to some extent. As other studies have shown (Green, 1995; Thomson, 2011), 
this research demonstrates that persisting fear and suspicion of the state, a dominant actor in 
the public sphere, continue to discourage citizen engagement. This underlines the emotional 
aspect of engagement, but in this case it deters and does not encourage engagement (Wood, 
2003; Petersen 2001).  
 
This discussion leads to the main conclusion for this study. Violent conflict directly impacts on 
the sense of citizenship and affects the practice of citizenship by radically altering the exposure 
to learning citizenship in institutions, through socialisation and in the public sphere. This 
undermines citizen agency. What citizens are exposed to depends on the nature of the 
warscape and how state and non-state actors shape the public sphere. The sense and practice 
that exist in the post-conflict situation will therefore be characterised by certain ideas, 
perceptions, emotions and behaviours that were developed during the conflict.  
 
8.4 Comparison with studies that suggest a positive impact of conflict 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed studies that suggest that violent conflict can have a positive impact on 
civic and political participation. My thesis demonstrates that conflict diminishes citizen 
engagement. In this section I explain that this difference in findings is likely to be explained by 
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different understandings of violent conflict and of participation, and the interplay between the 
two.  
 
De Luca and Verpoorte (2011) refer to post-traumatic growth theory for an explanation of 
increased social capital after conflict. In my study I emphasised the interplay between agency 
and the context of a warscape. This may explain the differences between my study and their 
findings. I have shown that the warscape did not allow people to carry out associational 
activities, which corresponds to their findings about low levels of social capital. It was thanks 
to the stability that groups were gradually formed in the home areas. Thus, looking at these 
changes in the structural context offers an alternative explanation to the personal growth 
theory, and situates participation in its context. Furthermore, I showed that the Acholi groups 
do not function as well as the ones in Lango. To observe an increase in the numbers of groups 
is important, but it is also important to look at what actually takes place in these groups to 
understand the recovery process.  
 
The findings of Blattman (2009) about higher levels of social and political participation among 
ex-combatants are not necessarily inconsistent with my own findings. The estimated number 
of abductees is 30,000 (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999) and figures about ex-combatants have 
been debated, but clearly ex-combatants form a minority group among the Acholi. It may be 
that among the Acholi, for whom average levels of engagement are low, it is the ex-
combatants that are the most engaged. Blattman’s study, impressive as it is, does not tell us 
how the levels of engagement of Acholi ex-combatants compare to ordinary citizens from 
other ethnic groups. My own findings show that levels of engagement of Acholi citizens are 
lower than those of Langi citizens, but since I did not single out ex-combatants as a separate 
social category it is possible they were among the more engaged citizens in the community.  
 
Finally, based on the theories of participation, I have reservations regarding the indicators for 
participation that were chosen by Bellows and Miguel (2009), who argue that the war 
experience in Sierra Leone led to more social and political participation. In their study 
‘participation’ was used without any attention to the debates around power and substantive 
participation. Studies into the micropolitics of participation have shown that ‘attending 
community meetings’ and group membership do not necessarily mean that people exercise 
real power in those institutions. Furthermore, these studies assume that the level and quality 
of participation is universal, regardless of clan, gender, and age and thus fail to unpack the 
‘myth of community’ (Guijt & Shah, 1998).  
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These studies emphasised the experience of violent acts related to the war. In my study I 
emphasised violent conflict as a warscape (Nordstrom, 1997) and as a situation in which other 
social and political changes occur, which sometimes have more impact on local lives than the 
acts of violence themselves (Lubkemann, 2008). I related forms of engagement to this context, 
taking a historical approach, which brought out the scope and depth of engagement. Though 
the findings of the three studies described here are very interesting, they may not show the 
whole story of how participation is experienced. 
 
8.5 Policy implications  
 
The findings of this study have implications for how active citizenship is understood and 
approached in post-conflict interventions. Given the complexity and the long time frame 
required for the (re)construction of citizenship and gaining experience with citizen 
engagement, recovery processes need deliberate measures to address citizenship. It is 
questionable whether citizen participation and state-society relations are strengthened as a 
‘by-product’ of other interventions. The study also points out that conflict affects different 
social identities differently, for instance, men, women and youth. They therefore experience 
different obstacles to citizen engagement, which calls for specific measures for each of them.  
 
Community-Driven Recovery (CDR) is an example of an approach that assumes that 
participation, community cohesion and (local) state-society relations improve after joint 
collaboration on a project. The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), based on CDR 
principles, has these objectives for Northern Uganda. I use NUSAF to discuss the implications 
of my study. Based on the findings I reflect on the sense of citizenship and on the 
circumstances that are conducive to learning citizenship. 
 
If the sense of citizenship is important for engagement, how does a programme like NUSAF 
address equality, security and dignity? It could be argued that NUSAF aims to contribute to 
physical security and equality by addressing poverty locally, but it has been critiqued for not 
addressing the deeper causes of poverty (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007a). It cannot address the 
forms of physical and domestic violence that occur. NUSAF does not address the lack of a 
sense of citizenship on the part of the Acholi in terms of their dignity. Others state that to 
restore the dignity of the Acholi a comprehensive process of national reconciliation is needed – 
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including reparation for the losses of lives and cattle – that addresses the LRA conflict and also 
conflicts in other parts of the country longer ago (ICTJ, 2012). Such measures explicitly address 
the historical reasons for the North-South divide. They go beyond the scope of NUSAF and 
underline the need for comprehensive approaches that address deeper causes of 
marginalisation. 
 
Regarding the practice of citizenship, the study identifies the need for ‘safe spaces’ to build 
experience with engagement, a public sphere where one feels safe to express ideas, 
perceptions of the state as a genuine actor, and attention to social differentiation and 
inequalities within communities. In this regard NUSAF misses an important step: it opens up 
spaces for engagement without addressing the past experience of Acholi citizens and how 
conflict has affected these factors. The programme assumes that a partnership between 
communities and local government is established once communities start engaging in the 
programme. It also assumes that citizens already possess sufficient knowledge of how to 
engage and that everyone will participate equally.  
 
However, this study shows that in Acholi there is no foundation for ‘a partnership’ to function. 
Citizens mistrust the state and do not consider the public sphere safe. They lack the experience 
with engagement needed to play their part in the partnership. Therefore they do not use the 
spaces in the ways anticipated by the programme. As explained in Chapter 7, citizen agency 
mainly occurs in exercising the petitioning voice (introduced in Chapter 3). Indeed, I witnessed 
groups in the Lamwo site filling in forms with ideas for NUSAF2. NUSAF offers people the 
opportunity to ‘ask’ for small-scale projects, but it does not offer them a real, influential voice 
in the follow-up or during the implementation of projects. To engage for accountability 
purposes is a challenge. Not only are people tired of being rebuked by officials, as Golooba-
Mutebi and Hickey have shown, they refrain from challenging them out of mistrust. Many 
people who were unhappy about perceived corruption in NUSAF1 did not participate in 
NUSAF2: an act of passive resistance instead of openly expressing voice. The study thus 
complements the analysis of Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) about the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund (NUSAF) by giving a detailed analysis of what happens at the interface 
between the state and its citizens at local level. 
 
Furthermore, the study points out the lack of experience, especially when it comes to 
negotiating with state actors about ‘ordinary’ services. Secondly, women and youth face 
challenges when community projects are decided on in public meetings, in which men and 
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elders dominate. Where CDR requires groups for smaller projects to be mixed in terms of 
gender, women face the same challenge. As mentioned in Chapter 7, women find it hard to 
question LCs.  
 
NUSAF is not designed as a programme for citizens to learn the practice of citizenship. NUSAF 
does not seek to empower the Acholi as political agents or, indeed, citizens in a way that 
enables them to negotiate with the state. It uncritically assumes they will. If desirable, what 
can be done to strengthen a ‘citizenship building’ component? How can this be done for 
different social identities? First of all, approaches to reconstructing citizenship need to be 
longitudinal interventions that focus on both developing a sense of citizenship and finding or 
creating ‘safe spaces’ where the practice of citizenship may be experienced. The training 
components in CDR focus too much on providing information about, for instance, planning 
processes and local government systems. This is not sufficient to empower citizens to actively 
engage in governance and politics. Where citizens are new to engagement, they need 
mentoring.  
 
The interaction process between citizens and state institutions requires facilitation, as the 
negotiation is one between unequal partners. There are social and cultural barriers to 
overcome in how citizens and leaders view each other. Moreover, building citizenship may not 
lead to the desired outcomes if state responsiveness is not addressed simultaneously (Gaventa 
& Barrett, 2010). The importance of facilitation is highlighted by several authors (Manor, 2007, 
p.9; Mansuri & Rao, 2004), as is the active role of local governments (Manor, 2007). Consider, 
for instance, this example of a ‘community contract’ in a project in Uganda (not a CDR 
intervention) to support community-led monitoring of the performance of local health units 
(Bjorkman & Svensson, 2009). Here the creation of the partnership itself was planned and 
heavily facilitated by a Community Based Organisation, and negotiated by local government 
and the communities involved, in an effort to mitigate the hierarchy between communities 
and local governments. Findings from this study show that people referred to this contract 
when monitoring health staff. It thus contributed to substantive citizen engagement.  
 
It was noted that facilitation in NUSAF 1 was too light (Robinson, 2007). In NUSAF 2 it is 
intensified, but only regarding the communities. Facilitators explain the procedures, help 
groups write proposals and submit the forms to the sub-county. In a way, they are the brokers 
between the communities and the government. Although local authorities now have a role in 
NUSAF2, there is still limited interaction between them and the communities over NUSAF. The 
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programme would benefit from facilitated interactions between citizens and local government, 
giving the communities the opportunity to gain experience with engaging with state actors.  
 
Secondly, women and youth need approaches to learning citizenship that respond to their 
specific obstacles to engagement. The issue of social inequalities and power dynamics that 
affect interventions is known in CDR literature (Brick, 2009; McCarthy, 2011). The requirement 
to have quotas for women and youth in groups and committees may simply reproduce these 
challenges and make women and youth feel vulnerable and powerless.  
 
As for the prospects of citizenship and democracy, there could be scope for thinking about 
how recovery interventions that target the subsistence and safety of citizens (not just CDR) 
could be designed to offer opportunities for learning citizenship and political agency. If food 
and safety are people’s priority, how can this serve as an entry point to work on citizenship? 
For example, at the time of the research, Oxfam supported water management committees 
(for wells and boreholes) at village level in running their own groups democratically, facilitated 
interaction with the CDO at the sub-county offices, and trained them how to communicate 
with the District Water Office.  
 
A similar argument can be made for humanitarian interventions in displacement camps, 
especially concerning the camp governance structures. If, as Feldman  (2007) argues, 
humanitarian practice affects a sense of citizenship among the displaced, their discourses and 
actions, how can humanitarian aid to displaced populations enable forms of citizen agency?   
‘Citizen participation’ in the Acholi camps implied little more than helping the agencies to run 
the basic services in camps. Groups created by NGOs often had no influence over how relief 
and security are organised and do not learn how to critically engage with the powerful 
structures of the camp governance regime. Camp governance mechanisms need to be 
revisited to provide residents with meaningful avenues for engagement with camp leadership, 
including for holding them accountable.  
 
Consider this example from South Africa, where humanitarian aid encouraged citizen agency 
among displaced persons. In 2008, undocumented migrants were displaced into camps 
following the outburst of xenophobic violence. Activist organisations that had been active in 
mobilising for the rights  of HIV/AIDS patients became involved in the humanitarian assistance 
to the displaced (Robins, 2009). Using a rights-based discourse, building on years of experience 
with activism and advocacy work, these organisations promoted their rights of and helped 
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them articulate their claims on the state. Robin’s study is part of on-going debate that seeks to 
improve humanitarian practice in a way that it does not just ‘save lives’ but ensures human 
dignity and enables the political agency of displaced people (Müller, 2013; Redfield, 2005).  
 
8.5 Implications for further study 
 
I suggest two areas for further study, which would enable more nuanced understandings of 
the effects of protracted conflict on citizenship. The first is to study various types of conflict 
and the second is to compare different forms of displacement. The Acholi context has certain 
characteristics: an ethnic homogeneous population, a rebel group largely formed by members 
of the same ethnic group, displacement within the region, the role of the military and the 
North-South history. It would be relevant to apply the framework used in this study in settings 
with different conflict dynamics, to enhance our understanding of the relationship between 
various conflict attributes and forms of citizen agency. For example, in contexts where the 
conflict involves different ethnic groups and various armed actors, social and political 
institutions may be affected in very different ways. In an authoritarian regime context the 
public sphere is controlled by political violence and intimidation, with specific implications for 
public discourses.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, this study did not explicitly interrogate the variation in the length 
of displacement and its effects. For a more nuanced understanding of the difference between 
short and long-term displacement this is an area that requires further research. It would also 
be interesting to research displacement to different locations (camps, urban areas, abroad) 
where they experience different institutions and public spheres.  
 
Given the conclusion of this study about how conflict affects the exposure of citizens to 
learning citizenship, it can be expected that this exposure looks different in contexts with 
different conflict dynamics. This may affect how people see the state, and themselves as 
citizens, what they learn in terms of citizen engagement, and how this informs how they 
practise citizenship. Studying this may deepen an understanding of how different conflict 
dynamics affect citizen agency and help to find opportunities to strengthen active citizenship. 
As this study demonstrates, in any context it will be important to take a historical approach to 
see how citizenship is constructed, in which spaces and institutions, and to interrogate both 
the sense and the practice of citizenship, for different social identities.    
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Annex 1 Overview of interviews and focus groups 
 
 
Table A0.  Final sample size per research site 
 Acholi – Chua Acholi – Lamwo Lango – Kole 
Number of focus 
groups* 
67 42 47 
Number of 
respondents with 
whom I carried out 
individual interviews** 
148 62 157 
*The number of focus group participants varied between four and ten 
** Includes interviews with ordinary citizens, LC members at LC1, LC2 and LC3 level, customary leaders 
and sub-county officials. District and national level officials are included in Table A4 below.  
 
 
Tables A1, A2 and A3 present the details for how many of each type of focus group and interview have 
been carried out, per site.   
 
Table A1.  Overview of semi-structured interview used in the villages 
Title Issues  Number of respondents in  each 
research location 
  Chua 
(Acholi) 
Lamwo 
(Acholi) 
Kole 
(Lango) 
Biographic 
interviews 
Life trajectory 
Social roles and leadership roles in the 
community 
Life before the camp 
Life and role in the camp 
- 3 - 
Camp life Daily activities and challenges + forms 
of agency. 
Citizen agency for food and security. 
Social relations, cooperation, 
problems. 
Strategies and challenges for 
petitioning and interrogative ‘voice’. 
Camp leadership and other authorities. 
Example of issue taken up with camp 
leadership. 
Compare ‘voice’ before, during and 
after the camp. 
Compare camp leadership and LCs. 
Identify what was learnt in the camp. 
9 20 - 
Citizen engagement 
in community 
institutions and 
local leadership. 
Group membership. 
NGO activity. 
 
Detailed narrative(s) of any issue taken 
up with local leadership. 
Community meetings and other forms 
of collective action. 
Interactions between village and sub-
county authorities.  
Collaboration between village and sub-
county authorities. 
Strategies and challenges for 
35 5 60 
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petitioning voice. 
Strategies and challenges for 
interrogative voice. 
Examples of NUSAF/NAADS/any 
project. 
 
Meaning of citizen, community 
member, state, government, and roles 
and responsibilities. 
Clan and tribe Functions of clan leaders.  
Clan activities and organisation. 
Intra- and inter-clan relations. 
Characteristics of one’s tribe. 
Compare tribes in Uganda.   
Compare tribes and their relation to 
the state. 
19 - 8 
Comparing clan 
leaders and LCs 
Compare LCs and clan leaders for:  
-  election process. 
-  how they are valued. 
- approachable.  
- advisable or criticisable.  
- accountable. 
- required skills, attributes. 
- tasks/ roles. 
- role for social organisation. 
 
Interaction between clan leaders and 
local government.  
  
 
- - 10 
Guide for customary 
leaders 
Role of customary leaders. 
Role regarding social organisation in 
the clan. 
Interaction between clan leaders and 
local government.  
Changes in role over time. 
 
5 5 6 
Guide for LC 
members and sub-
county officials 
Tasks of individual. 
Linking between levels of governance. 
Which issues are raised with them by 
citizens and how. 
How they reach out to citizens. 
Perceptions of the villagers and their 
problems. 
Acholi only: roles during the war and 
camp. Post-conflict challenges. 
23 9 12 
Life history Narratives of all important events/ 
episodes in one’s life. 
Role of other community members in 
selected events. 
Expectations and actions of state 
institutions.  
Forms of collective organisation in the 
past + changes over time. 
Forms of agency for security and 
development over time. 
Changes in forms of authority over 
21 5 20 
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time. 
Political history What happened in research area under 
previous regimes. 
Local life under previous regimes. 
Local government and ways of 
engaging under previous regimes. 
Regime change to NRA. 
Compare regimes and one’s feeling of 
belonging, relationship with each 
regime. 
26 7 8 
Voice & 
participation 
Strategies and challenges for 
petitioning voice. 
Strategies and challenges for 
interrogative voice. 
Strategies to influence sub-county and 
district authorities. 
Roles played by local leaders as 
intermediaries/representatives. 
National level: compare the voice of 
one’s tribe with other tribes. 
Acholi only: voice and the war. 
10 10 33 
 
A2.  Overview of focus group discussions in the villages 
Title Issues   Number of groups per site 
  Chua 
(Acholi) 
Lamwo 
(Acholi) 
Kole 
(Lango) 
Group work  History of the group and how it 
formed, by whom. 
Group activities. 
Group governance mechanisms and 
problem solving.  
LC members in the group and their 
roles. 
Interaction with local government. 
5 5 5 
Collective 
organisation for a 
development 
problem 
Identify a ‘community problem’ 
Any form of collective action around 
the issue. 
Roles of particular individual(s) in 
taking issue forward. 
Interaction with local government 
around the issue. 
Any involvement by NGOs. 
9 4 5 
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A3. Participatory Research Methods used in focus groups in the villages 
 
Title Issues   Number of groups per site 
  Chua 
(Acholi) 
Lamwo 
(Acholi) 
Kole 
(Lango) 
Causal flow diagram Effects of living in the conflict. 
Effects living in the camp. 
5 3 - 
Institutional 
mapping of leaders 
Mapping and ranking of any type of 
leader identified in the community. 
Ways of accessing them. 
15 8 10 
Institutional 
mapping of social 
institutions 
Mapping and ranking of social 
institutions. 
4 6 5 
Leadership skills 
ranking 
Ranking of the different skills and 
attributes people find important for 
different types of leaders. 
5 5 5 
Time line History of events/episodes of 
research site.  
Local life during these events/ 
episodes. 
12 4 8 
Well-being ranking Changes in quality of life over time. 
I.e. for different regimes; before/after 
camp.  
4 2 3 
Village map Mapping of the village, infrastructure 
and resources, clans and their 
territory, land disputes. 
8 5 6 
 
A4. Interviews with government officials at district and national level 
 
Interviewee  Location Date 
LC5 Chair person Kitgum 05/05/2010 
LC5 Chair person Kitgum 18/08/2010 
LC5 Chair person Kole  
District CAO Kitgum  
District assistant CAO  Kitgum 18/08/2010 
District CDO Kole  
District Planner Kitgum 06/05/2010 
LC 5 Vice Chair man Kitgum 06/05/2010 
Ministry of Local Government Kampala 03/03/2010 
Ministry of Local Government, 
LGSIP 
Kampala 01/03/2010 
Office of the Prime Minister Kampala 11/05/2010 
Office of the Prime Minister - 
PRDP 
Kampala 08/2010 
RDC  Kitgum 06/05/2010 
RDC  Kitgum 18/08/2010 
RDC Kole and Apac 21/10/2010 
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A5. Interviews with international and domestic Civil Society Organisations  
 
Interviewee  Location Date 
ACDA – Agoro Community Development 
Association 
Kitgum 12/02/2010 
ACET Kitgum 25/02/2010 
ACODE Kampala 02/02/2010 
ACORD Gulu 09/02/2010 
ACORD Kitgum 10/02/2010 
ARC Kampala 01/02/2010 
AVSI Kitgum 11/02/2010 
AVSI Kitgum 12/02/2010 
AVSI Gulu 14/02/2010 
AVSI Kitgum 01/08/2010 
Caritas Kitgum 04/05/2010 
CARE – Governance Programme Gulu 05/02/2010 
COPA Gulu 02/02/2010 
CPA Kitgum 16/02/2010 
DENIVA Kampala 03/03/2010 
FAPAD Lira 15/11/2010 
FAPAD Lira 02/12/2010 
Gulu NGO Forum Gulu 03/02/2010 
Gulu NGO Forum Gulu 08/02/2010 
Gulu NGO Forum Gulu 05/03/2010 
Gulu NGO Forum (former staff) Kampala 12/05/2010 
Gulu NGO Forum Gulu 24/09/2010 
HURIFO Gulu 06/02/2010 
HURIFO Gulu 08/02/2010 
IRC Kitgum 12/02/2010 
JRS – youth programme Kitgum 23/04/2010 
JRS – peace maker programme Kitgum 23/04/2010 
JRS – head of office Kitgum 24/04/2010 
Kitgum NGO Forum Kitgum 17/02/2010 
Kitgum NGO Forum Kitgum 16/08/2010 
Lango Cultural Foundation Apac 21/10/2010 
LWF Kitgum 08/2010 
Oxfam GB Kitgum 14/02/2010 
Oxfam GB Kitgum 28/04/2010 
Oxfam GB Kitgum 18/08/2010 
Oxfam GB (staff in Kitgum during 1997-1999) Kampala 11/08/2010 
NGO Link Forum Apac 06/11/2010 
NRC – Camp Management and Protection Gulu 04/02/2010 
NRC – Livelihoods Programme Kitgum 14/02/2010 
NRC – ICLA programme Kitgum 17/02/2010 
TAACC Apac 09/2010 
ULGA - Uganda Local Government Association Kampala 01/03/2012 
War Child Holland Kitgum 08/2010 
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A6. Interviews with Bi- and Multilateral Donor Agencies 
 
Interviewee  Location Date 
BTC Kampala 27/02/2010 
BTC Kampala 01/03/2010 
BTC Kampala 08/2010 
Danida Kampala 25/01/2010 
DFID Kampala 14/05/2010 
European Commission – SDP Kampala 03/03/2010 
EU – NUREP Gulu 04/02/2010 
GTZ Kampala 08/2010 
NORAD Kampala 08/2010 
Royal Netherlands Embassy Kampala 20/01/2010 
Royal Netherlands Embassy Kampala 01/03/2010 
SIDA Kampala 08/2010 
UN Cluster Meeting Gulu  26/11/2010 
UNDP Gulu 04/02/2010 
UNDP Kampala 03/03/2010 
UNDP Kampala 04/03/2010 
UNDP Kitgum 19/02/2010 
UNDP- head of office Gulu 24/09/2010 
UNDP – governance Gulu 24/09/2010 
UNHCR Gulu 09/02/2010 
UNOCHA Gulu 04/02/2010 
USAID Gulu 08/02/2010 
World Bank - LGMSDP Kampala 08/10 
 
A7.  Interviews with Academia 
 
Interviewee  Location Date 
Makerere University, Refugee Law Project Kampala 20/01/2010 
Makerere University, Refugee Law Project Gulu 03/02/2010 
Makerere University, Refugee Law Project Kampala 11/05/2010 
Makerere University, Refugee Law Project Kampala 10/08/2010 
Makerere University, Refugee Law Project Kampala 11/08/2010 
Makerere University, Faculty of Social 
Science, Department of Women and Gender 
Studies 
Kampala 02/2010 
Makerere University, Institute of Social 
Research 
Kampala 26/01/2010 
Makerere University, Department of Political 
Science and Public Administration 
Kampala 10/008/2010 
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Annex 2 Analysis in NVivo  
A.2.1 Example of tree and child nodes for ‘camp life’ 
 
Table A.2.1 shows part of the tree ‘Acholi Camp Life’ (A). It shows main themes coded from the 
interviews: daily problems, coping, camp leaders, and voice (node, B). Some of these nodes 
were further coded (child nodes, D).  
 
Table A.2.1  Part of the NVivo ‘tree’ – Camp life* 
A B C D 
Camp life Daily problems Food  
Security  
Health 
Social relations 
 
 Coping Getting food 
Getting cash 
Protection 
 
 Camp leaders 
 
Opinion on leaders Positive 
Negative 
  Roles leaders in camp Camp Commandant 
Committee 
Block leader 
Village leader 
 Voice in camp For accountability Strategies 
Examples  
  Petitioning voice Strategies  
Examples  
  Voice mechanism Through meetings 
Individual complaints 
*Please note this is only a small section of the tree 
 
A.2.2 Analysis for the sense of citizenship 
 
Here I summarise the process for analysing the data in relation to the two core concepts of this 
thesis: the sense and the practice of citizenship. To study the sense of citizenship, interviews 
concentrated on perceptions of the self as Acholi or Langi, perceptions of the citizen identity, 
and perceptions of the state. The NVivo tree was labelled ‘Acholi identity’ level (A). The tree 
for Lango was constructed separately. Interview questions addressed features of the Acholi 
identity, the differences between Acholi and other tribes, and differences in the relationship 
between the tribes and the state. These aspects constituted level B of the nodes. While coding, 
most descriptions of Acholi identity fitted into three child nodes (level C): narratives about 
Acholi culture and tradition, about insecurity aspects, and about poverty. When asked about 
the differences with other tribes (B2), socio-economic inequalities and the experience of war 
were highlighted. When discussing the relationship between the Acholi and the state (B3), the 
role of the state in war and in the unequal distribution of resources figured prominently. Many 
respondents added that the discourse of state officials about their tribe had harmed their 
dignity, constituting the third child node.  
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Table A2.2 Part of the NVivo tree - Acholi identity* 
A Acholi identity     
B B1 Acholi identity 
features 
B2 Differences 
with other tribes 
B3 Relationship 
Acholi tribe – 
state 
B4 Relationship 
other tribes – 
state 
B5 meaning of 
citizen 
C  Cultural 
characteristics 
Inequality Inequality Allocated more 
resources 
Descriptions 
C Experience of war Experience of 
war 
No dignity Are given more 
security 
Crucial 
moments of 
feeling ‘more’ 
or ‘less’ like a 
citizen 
C Poverty and 
inequality 
 No security   
*Please note this is only a small section of the tree 
 
Although a small number of Acholi respondents mentioned other factors, the majority framed 
their answers around the concepts inequality, security and dignity and in my analysis I 
therefore took these three concepts as key aspects of an Acholi sense of citizenship. By using 
NVivo it was possible to check this analysis by carrying out a search on this selection of 
interviews, to look for other factors that could be important for the Acholi’s relationship to the 
state. For example, I looked for ‘elections’ and ‘party support’ in these interviews to check 
whether that may have defined their relationship. But even after carrying out these checks I 
remained convinced that security, identity and equality, or the lack of it, were crucial aspects 
of Acholi citizenship.  
 
I then synthesised the data around these concepts to write thick descriptions of a sense of 
citizenship, answering the research question. I was able to use the same concepts for the 
analysis of the sense of citizenship during the period of displacement. The negative effects of 
conflict and life in the camps figured clearly in Acholi narratives. In their own words they 
explained how they felt abandoned and treated as slaves by the state. This confirmed the 
hypothesis that Acholi citizenship had been eroded.  
A.2.3 Analysis for the practice of citizenship 
 
Following the conceptual framework, I used those sections in NVivo where people spoke about 
their engagement in community groups, their interactions with authorities, voice for 
development purposes, and voice for accountability purposes. These were all tree level (A) 
themes, under which I distinguished nodes and child nodes, as shown in Table A2.3.  
 
Table A2.3 Part of NVivo tree on ‘engagement’ 
A B C  
Community groups B1 type of group 
B2 group leadership 
B3 group governance 
B4 link to local state  
  
Voice for development B1 how/ strategies 
B2 challenges 
Formal/LCs 
Formal/ PDC 
Informal 
 
Voice for accountability B1 how/ strategies 
B2 challenges 
Formal 
Informal 
Rude/offensive 
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Within the trees that coded data for distinct periods in history (i.e. under Obote, Amin, and the 
NRA) forms of citizen engagement were also coded, including interactions with authorities and 
participation in community institutions. While doing research it was not very difficult to find 
out about the practice of citizenship for these different historical periods. Through time line 
exercises and interviews I established a ‘baseline’ of forms of citizen engagement during the 
1980s, prior to the start of the NRA regime, which showed similar forms of engagement among 
Acholi and Langi in community institutions and ‘muyumba kumi’. For both Lango and Acholi I 
could thus systematically analyse how patterns of interaction had developed over time. This 
showed the limited safe space for citizen agency during the LRA conflict in Acholi, when forms 
of coping agency were prevailing. In Lango, the space for citizen agency was reduced during 
the Amin era, after which it increased again under Obote (II).  
 
As shown in the table, current forms of citizen engagement were coded in separate trees. It 
was a challenge to demonstrate the legacy of the conflict, with all its features, for citizen 
engagement in the present. The lower levels of engagement and the lower density of 
relationships between citizens and various leaders could be demonstrated: as explained above, 
the coding showed fewer records for the Acholi on this theme. They were especially reluctant 
to engage to hold state actors to account. I then compared the factors that limited citizen 
engagement for Lango and Acholi. These were similar to a great extent, but were aggravated in 
Acholi. There were also factors that appeared only in the Acholi sites, for which I identified 
relationship to the conflict. 
 
The challenge was thus to demonstrate that lower levels of engagement were not just 
‘ordinary’ problems as they appear in stable settings, but the result of the experiences of 
conflict and displacement. I pursued the question of how fear operated in people’s minds: how 
this is a legacy of the conflict, limiting engagement, in particular for accountability purposes 
(interrogative voice). A small number of respondents were able to put this in words and were 
able to reflect on their behaviour and that of others. Some excerpts from their statements are 
included in the thesis. But many people did not have the vocabulary and were unable to give a 
more abstract reflection on their behaviour. They could explain what they did and did not do in 
terms of engagement, but it could be a challenge to get them to explain underlying motives, 
reasons and emotions. In life history interviews respondents gave detailed accounts of 
interactions with different types of leaders throughout their lives, and, for instance, fear of 
military actors came up frequently. But for the present, when asked about the difficulties of 
interacting with leaders, many fell silent. In terms of the data set this is a weakness. Although 
nobody denied the role of fear, I relied on a smaller number of people who actually spoke 
about it. Nonetheless, those few who dared to speak gave powerful accounts of persisting 
fears. This was confirmed in interviews with academia and CSOs at district and national level. I 
therefore felt confident in concluding that fear of state and military actors continues to shape 
citizen engagement with state institutions. 
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Annex 3 Mariana’s story 
 
Mariana narrates her life during the early phases of the conflict (Chapter 5). She expresses her 
fear of the state and the public sphere and how this disrupted her daily activities. She then 
explains the challenges she experienced in the camp, which shows how the conflict impacted 
on gender relations. She relates this to a lack of legitimacy on the part of the customary 
leaders, who were unable to maintain a level of social cohesion in the community.  
 
My life had challenges. It started with the Karamojong and then Kony. My first child, I had 
when the Karamojong came to raid our cattle. They took all the cattle from my husband and 
my family-in-law. My second child was born when there was the NRA commander stationed in 
the trading centre here. His name was Abiriga. He was bad! There were firing squads – taga 
taga tage tage [onomatopoeic]! We would not come to the centre any longer. The soldiers 
were not good. I had my third child when the LRA was now around. They were in Sudan, then 
came to Uganda, then again in Sudan, then came to Uganda. When we heard they come we 
ran and hide in the valley or the hills. When they left we came back. At times we took food and 
ran with it. We cooked there. Sometimes we stayed for two days, sometimes a week or more 
without coming out.  
 
It made my work in the garden difficult. We used to have a group and rotate. It gave you a 
moral boost to work together even if you feel weak. When rebels came and find you in a group 
they’d kill all of you. So it was better to work alone in the garden. This took many years, up to 
now.  
 
Then my fourth child, I had when we were going to the camp. One day the LRA came to our 
compound. They killed two brothers of my husband and threatened to kill my baby. That is 
when we decided to go to the camp, in the trading centre. 
 
We used to have many things like food. We had everything. Life was good. Children were 
respecting others. Now they are disobeying the parents. There were no rampant disease 
outbreaks like nowadays. There was cooperation. The desire to be with your relatives was high. 
Not today, people do not know their relatives and don’t have heart for others. There used to be 
no cases of theft, rape, or greed as there is now. 
 
In the camp it was not all that good. But at least there was food relief. Before the camp there 
was sharing of the fire place, wang oo, and sharing of food. Teaching of children was a 
communal thing. Your neighbour can teach and take care of your children, even if you are not 
there. There was good relationship among the community, for example your closest neighbour 
can marry your daughter which is a great offer. Problems between man and wife were solved 
by clan members. During the camp there was no sharing of food and fire place. 
 
My difficulties in the camp were domestic issues. There was a serious domestic violence which 
made me go back to my parents since the camp time up to some two months ago. That I have 
come back there was a quarrel between me and my husband there after he chased me away. 
My husband was not responsible in taking his duty as a man because could get thing like food 
in the house but my husband could sell off and drink the money without doing something 
productive. My husband was beating me time and again. My husband could sell the food we 
get from UN and the little we cultivate. Chasing me from his home was another issue which 
made me very upset until when I came back. Quarrelling was another daily problem that I had 
with my husband when he was drunk.  
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Young girls started having a household when they were only 13 years old. Young boys started 
to bring in women. The war spoiled the relation between men and women. They were young 
and not mature. The life of elders changed, there was no more wang oo to give good ideas to 
youth. They slept in the same hut as youth, which is against our culture. In the camp they were 
drinking, but before they were really hard working. Now, clan leaders again advise the youth 
who wish to marry, so they know which other clans are relatives. 
 
Elders should solve problems facing a clan. Find out the root cause of something. For example 
the outbreak of a certain disease like smallpox. This can be solved by ritual sacrifices to 
eliminate or drive such diseases out of the community, or the patient to be taken to the bush to 
avoid the spread of the disease. The house has to be fenced in order to avoid the spread. 
During camp elders changed - for example: they don’t concentrate on teaching the children at 
wang oo in the evening. They lost respect compared to before the war. 
 
Mariana had her fifth child in the satellite camp in 2009, which was nearer to her home area 
than the main camp. She sent her two older children to her mother in Gulu district, to go to 
school.  Mariana and her husband were constructing huts in the home area and moved there 
in 2011. 
340 
 
Annex 4  Alfred’s story 
 
This is the story of a young man who was a youth leader during the last four years that he 
stayed in the camp (2005-2008). Now aged thirty-five, he was in his late twenties at the time. 
As a youth leader and War Child protégée he had worked closely with some of the camp 
leaders. During the time of the conflict the local government started gradually to become 
more involved in running the camps. I asked him about his past and what he had learnt from 
the time he lived in the camp. The story shows how this young man had been more exposed to 
forms of engagement, which is clearly reflected when he speaks about what he learned in the 
camp. The story shows that the effects of the camp for learning citizenship were not universal 
for all camp residents.  
 
In the camp I learnt about socialization through participating in the traditional dances and 
football matches between the parishes in the camp.  Lamwo parish could play against K-. 
parish, A-. parish played against L-. parish. The qualifiers come from the two parishes and the 
winner represents Kal sub county play with another sub county. The same applies to traditional 
dance contests. These bring people together to socialise at the parish level and even at sub-
county level and inter-sub-county levels. 
 
I learnt about hygiene. There was a good programme that promoted hygiene through giving 
awards to the smartest household which had the best latrine, rubbish pit, and who smeared the 
huts properly. The award was in form of soaps and salt. The best among the smartest people 
gets an extra award of money from the sub-county chief and the Camp Commandant.  
 
There was one camp leader whose style of leadership was good. He never wanted to do things 
in a hidden place but could bring things in public and discuss with community in a way that was 
approachable and welcoming anybody who had a complaint about issues related to his office. 
He gave out the tents which people were using in the camp to the elderly persons and disabled 
people. What helped was their style of lobbying for resources for the community. It was the 
struggle of the sub-county chief and the Camp Commandant which made people get water in 
the camp, especially the sub-county chief who worked hard for water and had proper lobbying 
style for NGOs.  
 
People learnt how to raise their voice in a way that they should harass the leaders in case they 
want their voice to be represented. Also people learnt that if you want your issues to reach the 
district you can make it through LC 1. You don’t go direct. At home people were not seeing the 
value of leaders like LC 1 in the community until in the camp during allocation of settlement 
and registration, which was done by LC 1 at first before camp leaders were elected. Also youth 
learnt that there were other ways of sending a voice above like writing the issues affecting the 
community. The youth can select me as a youth leader to take that written issue into the 
community meetings or to the sub-county or to the district themselves. Like the youth of K.-l 
parish wrote about football matches and traditional dances to the sub-county, which 
forwarded the request to War Child and Oxfam who sponsored the league.  
 
And so I learnt how to talk to leaders like LC 1. But for simple problems you should have money 
to pay the court fee. This made many people refuse taking their issues to LC 1 and forget the 
issues, because the people were too poor to pay the court and LC 1. If they ask for court fee and 
you don’t have it they chase you and people could have nowhere to go. That was not common 
before the camp because the LC had resources like enough food. They did that in the camp 
because they wanted money for survival and drinking. In most cases LC 1s became drunkards in 
the camp, because of part of the fine that they charged people they hid for personal use.  
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The people who had more voice were the businessmen who had been in the centre before the 
camp.  They were used to leaders and had influence on raising complaints to the leaders. Also 
the educated people who had access to any office because they had the language of expressing 
the matter that people needed and the community could use such people to raise their voice. 
 
Nowadays, they have made it as a by-law to charge the court fees as people have gone home 
and it has become a usual situation for people although they don’t like it. Before the camp, 
people did not have many leadership apart from LC 1, Rwot Kweri, and clan leaders. Clan 
leaders usually call the community to sit down for a meeting. It was usually called by elders, 
who had the power to remove a Rwot Kweri as a group leader and replace him in case he did 
wrong. Replace him with someone in the group who can perform leadership well. But for LC 1 
the people should take the issue to the vice to forward to LC 2 and then to sub county. If the LC 
3 finds that the issue is big then he goes to the community to find out the opinion. The LC 3 
gives a go ahead to elect the person they want in the community to lead LC 1. But this never 
happens. The war confused those leaders. They do things on their own.  
 
 
Alfred decided to stay in the trading centre after the camp started to phase out. He usually 
hangs around near War Child’s youth centre. He does occasional building work in the centre 
and helps his parents in the village during the farming season.
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Annex 5 Joseph’s story  
 
Joseph is 56 years old and lives in Chua district. He describes how certain local institutions 
were disrupted during the conflict. His story shows how perceptions of the state and the public 
sphere, which developed during the war, affect his engagement with local state actors in the 
post-conflict situation. He has been a member of LC1 since the early 1990s. He now lives with 
his two wives and eight children in his home area and started to cultivate cassava.  
 
During the time of Kony, when we were not yet in the camp... my family was protecting itself.  
During the day the youth would stay in the bush and leave the elders at home to cook food and 
take it into the bush to the youth and children. During the night everybody went to sleep in the 
bush. The home will just be left empty without anybody. When it reached morning I could first 
check all the roads to see if there is a foot mark of those shoes... the kind that the soldiers 
wear. If I saw those, we had to go back to the bush. If not, then we could go home. Also if we 
hear the dogs barking we could run to the bush because it is a signal that there is something 
bad. 
 
During insecurity, before camp, I never witnessed any village meeting. Except when it was on 
Sunday... I remember I once called a meeting for some function in the church and many people 
came. In that meeting we were planning for a choir, playing instruments and collecting some 
money.  Rebels came and surrounded us. They abducted six young boys. Some came back after 
two weeks, others never came back. One boy was killed.  
 
People were to themselves. I did not see many people, or only briefly. Digging in groups was a 
risk now. I used to work on my land alone, which frightened me. I could now only farm a small 
plot of land. There were no village meetings, because we feared rebels. LCs were there by name 
only, they were not doing anything. There was no way they could go and report our problems 
at the sub-county. Then LC1 members were there by name only. During that time, there was no 
problem anyway. Like no quarrels. Only health issues, when someone was sick, we would try 
any means to get someone to hospital. Courts were held sometimes, with few people. But 
sometimes, if rebels would come, we would take off in the middle of the court and propose 
another day to continue with court if it was heard that the rebels were around.  
 
There was a fear during the insurgency, during that time people had no voice. Sometimes the 
government soldiers could arrest civilians that they were rebels, but they were not. Those 
civilians who were unlucky were killed by soldiers even after telling soldiers that they were not 
rebels. We had fear; maybe you heard that the rebels are somewhere and you go to report 
them, but someone who collaborates with them might hear you and he will tell you have 
reported them. Or when I have a relative who is arrested by the rebels and he comes home out 
of hunger, and I give him food, then others look at me, they will say I am a rebel and report me 
to UPDF. 
 
Then the camp, actually it was the same thing again. People feared to have voice because they 
would be reported and be killed by either rebels or even the government soldiers. Even when 
soldiers in the camp could plot against you with a leader, they could attack you in the camp at 
night and kill you.  
 
I used to fear to criticise the government. I feared to be punished. You know, I was once 
arrested. A soldier lied about me. One soldier came back from Gangdyang with two guns. 
When reaching the barracks, he hid the guns in the bush. But someone saw him. People 
thought he might be a rebel. They told the LC1 and this one had had [military] training, so he 
laid an ambush on the road side. I came from town and I was stopped by a soldier who knew 
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me. He asked me to go into the barracks and talk to soldiers there. The soldier that had hidden 
the guns thought I was the one who had reported him. He then accused me and said I was the 
one who had asked him to hide the guns. Then the soldiers came to me and arrested me. I was 
later released. 
 
Even now I fear because the government might arrest us if I do not do things as it required. For 
example, people asked for goats from government and they were given to a group of which I 
am a member. The goats died and it made me fear seriously.   
 
Now people fear to talk on leaders for when you raise any complaint they trace you up to 
where you live. That in case of any government programme or project they will ignore you and 
not put your name in a group. It happened in NUSAF1. I was in a group with my wife. The 
leader of the group was not transparent to the members. My wife tried to correct him. They 
replaced our names with someone else’s names. He told her he completely deleted her name 
and she missed the cows. Now we just sit back.  
 
 
  
 
